



Expert Qualifications My name is Patrick James Christian. I am a psychological anthropologist specializing in the psychological, sociological, and emotional conditions of civilian populations in current and post conflict conditions. I hold a doctorate in the psychopathology of ethnic and cultural conflict. I confirm that I have read and understand the European Asylum Support Office's EASO Practical Guide: Evidence Assessment, to include data collection, credibility assessment, risk assessment, and application of Article 4(5) QD. I affirm that I am an expert witness qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education of the country-of-origin conditions within the population segments of the Andes Mountain and Amazon Jungle Basin regions of South America that include the conflict regions of Peru, Peru, and Colombia. I employ the scientific principals and methods approved by the American Anthropology Association's Society for Psychological Anthropology and of the American Psychological Association's Division 45 (Race, Ethnicity, & Culture) and Division 48 (Peace, Conflict, & Violence) – all of which, I am a member in good standing. My work is guided by the application of western psychology based on the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Health Disorders - V5 ¹ that is carefully curated using anthropology to establish a baseline and pathway of indigenous family and tribal health – psychologically, physically, socially, emotionally, and spiritually, within an indigenous system of knowing and phenomenological reality. In my professional life, I work as a research scientist, clinical practitioner, and professor of practice in the field of ethnic and cultural identity and conflict at the family, village, and community levels of social organization in pre/ongoing/post conflict settings. My expertise is derived through a combination of academic training and extensive field expertise.² My expertise is best described as the 'application of psychoanalytical sociological analysis using anthropological methodology to curate the science to a specific subject community's emic or lived/living experiences both mentally and emotionally.' This level of analytical research allows me to illuminate the underlying psychosocial-emotional drivers or motivations of individual and collective behaviour post-mortem to and predictive of, violent conflict. Since my retirement from uniformed service as a US Army Green Beret Officer with 26 years of service in 2015, I have been on continuous contract for research, development, and teaching of my expertise with the Canadian, UK, USA, NATO, and other approved allied nations whose military and civilian personnel are deployed as interventionists into conflict communities. I am the lead social scientist researcher-author for the Islamic Militaries Counterterrorism Coalition (IMCTC) based in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and I am currently physically stationed in Kyiv, Ukraine, where I conduct field research into the psychosocial trauma conditions in the eastern oblasts for Valka-Mir Foundation. I am under continuous contract with the UK and Canadian Home Office Immigration Tribunals for Country-of-Origin expertise.



Figure 2 Author with Arab tribal elders conducting qualitative interviews 2019-2020

Country & Regional Expertise. With regards to the civilian psychosocial-emotional conditions in the **Kingdom of Saudi Arabia**, my expertise arises from both uniformed and academic field research. From 2015 through 2016, I served in a research and advisory capacity for the United Arab Emirates' National Security Council focused on the roots of the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Yemen's Al Houthi rebellion, spending time on both sides of the conflict border, to which the UAE was a party to. In 2019, I was commissioned by the USA DoD to develop psychological warfare defence curricula for the Government of Saudi Arabia's Senior Defence Service College, against operations emanating from Division 48 (Psychological Warfare) of the



Figure 1 Author and Valka-Mir research Team, at the Islamic Militaries Counterterrorism Consortium (IMCTC) headquartered in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia 2021

¹ (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR), 2000)

² 26-years as a United States Army Special Forces (Green Beret) officer and 7 more years as a civilian field researcher for Five-Eyes and NATO governments.



IRGC's Quds Force and the Al-Houthi regime of Yemen. For the past several years, I have led the social science research team that supports the Riyadh based Islamic Militaries' Counterterrorism Consortium (IMCTC) and routinely travel to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia to present my research at the King Faisal Research Centre and the Saudi Arabia National Guard's Command & General Staff College. I maintain continuing professional and social ties to Brigadier General Saed Alsubaie, the College's Dean of Research and Academics. One of my principal research partners in Valka-Mir is Dr Tasneem Salman Aljehani, my classmate and professional research colleague at the IMCTC. I have worked and lived in Saudi Arabia for extended periods of duty and have worked and researched with members of the Saudi royal family, to include Dr Aljehani. The principal problem sets that I research and report on include psychosocial, political, and sexual violence as a weapon of war, genocide, the weaponization of children and civilians as fighters and suicide bombers by malign state and non-state extremist organizations. I have direct first-hand expertise (both uniformed military and clinical field research) in the methods and practices of violent extremist non-state actors including Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, Islamic State (Levant, Khorasan, Maghreb), Al-Qaeda, Taliban, Janjaweed, Colombian Armed Revolutionary Force, Quds (*Jerusalem*) Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), and the Oromo Liberation Front, amongst others. My research and publication specializations involve quantitative and qualitative phenomenological inquiry and ethnographic discovery of the underlying psychosocial-emotional drivers of intractable communal conflict and



Figure 3 Author with research partner Dr Tasneem Salman Aljehani at the King Faisal Islamic Research Centre, Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 2019

inhibitors of successful resolution. My work is guided by the application of western psychology based on the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Health Disorders -³ that is carefully curated using anthropology to establish a baseline and pathway of indigenous family and tribal health – psychologically, physically, socially, emotionally, and spiritually, within an indigenous system of knowing and phenomenological reality. As a corollary, I also research field applications in conflict engagement, psychological messaging, and indigenous forms of justice, governance, health, and conflict mediation. The overall focus areas for researching the former involve individual and collective trauma, the generational transmission of trauma, and group identity conflict. Specifically, my research interests involve the psychological drivers of tribal member addiction and suicide, as well as the generational transmission of trauma and its effects on formation of collective indigenous identity. I translate indigenous knowledge systems to western-oriented political structures to resolve conflicts and establish interoperability between divergent structures of justice, health (psychosocial-emotional & physical), governance, and resource management. As the director of research for **Valka-Mir** Human Security R&D 501c3, I research, develop, and teach a series of specialized

courses and case studies (between 2 and 10 times a year) involving the psychological, sociological, and emotional conditions of civil communities that have suffered from conflicts. I research indigenous forms of trauma and psychosocial disintegration of states and their populations. I routinely deploy with NATO, U.S., and allied Special Operations taskforces into conflict zones in support of their field research and analysis requirements, with my most recent deployment to Eastern Europe with NATO (March-June 2022).

1. Disclaimers, Limits of Expertise, & Neutrality.

1.1 Limits of Expertise. My research is based entirely upon primary and secondary research on country conditions in Iran. I would like to be clear that I am not a medical practitioner, a mental health clinician, a psychiatrist, or a social worker. I do not present myself as such. I am a country-of-origin expert providing information about the psychosocial-emotional conditions of the host population, the conditions of the host nation security services and the violent extremist organizations resident within the country and their sociological effects and psychological effects on the population at the request of claimant's legal support team. I have close and continuing ties to the government and members of the royal family of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; however, my field research, analysis, and reporting is neutral as to politics or other national interests. The issues dealt with in my research and reporting are incredibly sensitive, both to the stability of the

³ (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR), 2000)



Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and to the individual psychosocial-emotional survival of Saudi women seeking asylum from male guardianship. I offer my research to the tribunal with the understanding that the Kingdom's social, psychological, political, and security challenges are all intertwined and not easily separated. For this reason, I ask that my research not be released into the UK public domain.

1.2 Scientific Training & Expertise. I would like to make clear that I am not a medical practitioner, a mental health clinician, a psychiatrist, or a social worker, nor have I presented myself as such. I am, however, a psychoanalytical anthropologist and a member of the APA's Division 45 and 48, as well as the AAA's SPA (Society for Psychological Anthropology). I use my academic training and field research expertise to study and analyse the psychosocial-emotional conditions of the host population related to the ongoing changes in an ethnically based, culturally unique, system of social order and governance that may or may not be causing members of its citizens to flee into exile. This includes the dichotomy between national versus indigenous and tribal systems of justice, governance, physical and mental pathology & treatment, and psychosocial development and sustainment. In this respect, I am qualified to understand the USA APA DSM-5 and, through field research and analysis, apply it (translate) to indigenous communities outside of western psychological theory language.

2 Country-Regional-Religious context of Saudi Arabia's Existence. *This rather lengthy section is necessary to establish the context of psychological and sociological life of the Respondent, his family, and tribe in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.*

2.1 Tension between the Muslim State, Religion, & Social Order. Saudi Arabia as a state and sociopolitical order, exists in a regional context of Arabia-Levant, Africa, and Eurasia because of the historical birthplace of Islam – in the city of Meccah and Medinah in the Arabian Peninsula. As of 2023, there are 2,000,000,000 Muslims whose sociopolitical-economic-religious institutions form countries in Africa, Arabia-Levant, and Eurasia. Few major religions tie the ethnic and historical identity of their first messengers and adherents to their central tenets as effectively as Islam.⁴ For non-Muslims, Islam can best be understood as a central part of their narrative identity that is overlaid onto their ethnic identity.⁵ This Islamic narrative identity provides for an entire social, political, and economic ordering that stems from a common Islamic religion.⁶ This is not intended as a pejorative conceptualization of Islam.⁷ I suggest that most, if not all, religious faiths begin deeply imbedded within the culture from which they emanated. Some, like the Christian faith, become so acculturated across sociological psychological states of being that their central progenitors change ethnicity, race, language, or even gender depending on the needs of their adherents.⁸ The Islamic faith, on the other hand, never

Figure 4 Simplified caricature of the Muslim Ummah.



⁴ (Alatas, 2006; Christian, 2016)

⁵ (Gellner, 2006; Khaldun & F. Rosenthal, 1969)

⁶ (Asad, 1961)

⁷ The reason that this is not intended as pejorative is that all faiths suffer faulty promulgation at the hands of imperfect humans; faulting human interpretation and practice of a perfect ideal does not diminish the ideal but recognizes the limitations of those who would apply divine revelation.

⁸ (Shen, 2006)



moved beyond its Arab roots.⁹ The faith is inseparable from the linguistic constructions found in the Arabic language of the Qur'an, and from the cultural context of the testified example (sunnah) and speech (hadith) of the Prophet Mohammed.¹⁰ The importance of this notion can be observed in the struggles between the various Sunni, Shi'a, and other schools of Islamic Religious Interpretation.¹¹ Social laws and political orders in Muslim states are governed by Islamic jurisprudence, or fiqh, the science of ascertaining the precise terms of the Shari'ah, or Islamic law.¹² The collective sources of Muslim jurisprudence are known as uṣūl al-fiqh.¹³ While Shari'ah is considered to be divine and immutable, fiqh, the human effort to know the Shari'ah, is imperfect and changeable.¹⁴ And this is where the various schools operate in competition and sometimes in conflict. As the graphic in figure 4 illustrates, most Muslim countries adhere to the Sunni schools of law, and four others (Iran, Bahrain, Azerbaijan, & Iraq) adhere to the Shi'a schools of law.¹⁵ Iraq has a Federalist system that accommodates its Sunni Arab and Kurdish regions.¹⁶ The Muslim World League (MWL) is an international non-governmental organisation based in Meccah, whose members from all Islamic countries and sects. The organisation's charter is to clarify the true message of Islam and its tolerant principles, provide humanitarian aid, extend bridges of dialogue and cooperation with all, engage in positive openness to all cultures and civilizations, follow the path of centrism and moderation to realize the message of Islam and ward off movements calling for extremism, violence and exclusion for a world full of peace, justice and coexistence.¹⁷ As all of its members will admit, this is easier said than done. The MWL has several councils and subsidiaries that it works through, such as a Supreme Council governing body, a (mostly Sunni) World Supreme Council for Mosques, an Islamic Fiqh Council (Sunni), and an Organization of Muslim (Sunni) Scholars. Under the four Sunni Schools of Islamic Law, there are a wide variety of traditions, sects, and movements which span the range from non-violent peaceful Sufism to the simmering anger of Wahabi Salafism. Far from being a unified ummah¹⁸, the Muslim communities depicted in figure 4 are laden (as is the non-Muslim world) with internal disputes, ethnic resentments, and conflicts over land, identity, and historical narrative. The ethnic divisions between Arab and African Muslims punctuate the (at times genocidal) violence in the Arc-of-Conflict across the Sahel, as well as south/southwest Asia. Caught in the middle of violent seething passions of fervent beliefs and intrusive globalisation is the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom-as-government is not responsible for Sunni or Shi'a Jurisprudence, nor is it responsible for creating,




Figure 5 Snapshots of Sunni and Shi'a Jurisprudence and Traditions




Figure 5 The '3rd School of Islamic Jurisprudence: Khawarij Extremist

⁹ (Izutsu, 2002)

¹⁰ (Donner, 2006)

¹¹ (Gaines, 1992; Gordon, 2012; Izutsu, 2002)

¹² (Donner, 2006)

¹³ (Bamyeh, 1999)

¹⁴ (Adra & A. Gingrich, 2011)

¹⁵ (Jones, 1994)

¹⁶ (Asfura-Heim, 2011)

¹⁷ (Muslim World League, 2024)

¹⁸ Ummah is an Arabic word meaning "nation". It is distinguished from sha'b, which means a nation with common ancestry or geography. Thus, it can be said to be a supra-national nation with a common history. It is a synonym for ummat al-Islām; it is commonly used to mean the collective nation of Islamic people.

naming, operating, or controlling the traditions, sects, or movements using and or manipulating the various schools of law for malign or violent ends. As a scholar with the Riyadh based Islamic Militaries Counterterrorism Consortium (IMCTC), my military and civilian research colleagues in the Kingdom teach that violent extremism is a psychological pathology, not a religious eschatology. Despite this, every sociopolitical decision or adjustment made by the Saudi government is scrutinised religious scholars and governments and subject to criticism for failing to honour the Islamic principals of Sunni law. The overly large Saudi royal family provides many government and non-government voices/interests with opportunities to voice these never-ending streams of reasoning, logic, complaints, and criticisms. Much of the criticism stems from the kingdom's refusal to intercede into the messy process of fiqh, in support of moderate-progressives on the one side, to conservative-rejectionists of modernity on the other side. I was teaching in the Saudi National Guard's Command & General Staff College and researching at the King Faisal Islamic Research Center during some of the most intense struggles between the Salman family currently on the throne, and various family segments advancing or supporting competing agendas over the process of fiqh. The infighting within the royal family that spilled into the public news was all part of that struggle between Muslim proponents of progressive liberalism and conservative retrenchment.¹⁹ The part of the infighting struggle that was not as easily visible, was the struggle of the Saudi government to combat the 'third school' of Islamic Law: the Khawārij.²⁰ It is perhaps dismaying that the first recognisable sect of Islam apart from the in-person leadership of the Prophet Mohamed, who led loyal military forces to fight and banish these extremists of his time and continues to do so today.²¹

The point that is being made here is that Saudia Arabia is not only a political state like Italy. Figure 7 illustrates the literal centre of Islamic life globally in the city of Meccah, Saudia Arabia which houses the centre of religious life in a square stone building and an ancient Black Rock that carry the weight of religious belief and historical origination for a fourth of the world's population.²² Each year, millions of Muslims embark on a pilgrimage called the Hajj to fulfil one of the principal


Masjid al-Haram in Meccah houses the Kaaba, Bayt Allah, a Stone Building that houses the Black Rock placed there by the Prophet Mohammed. The stone building was constructed by the Nabataeans, an ancient Arab civilisation, who used it as a place of worship long before the onset of Christianity.

The Black Rock is even older and more mysterious than the Stone Temple it resides in. Eschatological origins describe how the stone was given to Adam on his expulsion from paradise to obtain forgiveness of his sins. The stone was later given to Abraham by God, who in turn, gave it to his first-born son, Ishmael, who was cast out in favor of his younger brother, Isaac. Ishmael and his mother, travelled with the stone to the place called Meccah and founded the people who would become Muslims.

The stone was originally white.

Muslims believe that it become black by absorbing the sins of the countless thousands of pilgrims who have kissed and touched it.

Figure 6 Masjid al-Haram, Meccah, the Kaaba, the Black Rock, the Hajj, and Saudi Arabia's sociopolitical balancing act.



¹⁹ (Staff, 2022a)

²⁰ (Wald, 2017)

²¹ (Hubbard & MacFarquhar, 2015)

²² (KOCAC, 2023)



commandments of the Muslim Ummah – to physically present themselves before the Bayat Allah, House of God and be in His presence.²³ The honorific title of “Hajji” is given to a successful pilgrim who has made the sacred journey to ‘testify his loyalty ... and conclude personally the pact of allegiance [to God].’²⁴

“[T]he Prophet has named the (Black Stone) the “right hand of God” (yamin-Allah), and for purpose. In fact one poses there one's hand to conclude the pact, and God obtains there our pact of allegiance and submission. In the qur’anic terminology, God is the king, and [...] in (his) realm there is a metropolis (Umm al-Qurra) and in the metropolis naturally a palace (Bait-Allah, home of God). If a subject wants to testify to his loyalty, he has to go to the royal palace and conclude personally the pact of allegiance. The right hand of the invisible God must be visible symbolically. And that is the al-Hajar al-Aswad, the Black Stone in the Ka'bah”
Muhammad Hamidullah²⁵

The sheer logistics every year to accommodate millions of religiously fervent pilgrims makes sociopolitical life for the Saudi Kingdom quite difficult. Returning to figure 4 and figure 5; there are more Muslims in India than Pakistan. In Burma (Myanmar), the Muslim population is mostly within the poor, lower-class Rohingya minority, which the Burmese, famous for their orange draped peaceful monk population, commit the most horrendous acts of barbarity against a mostly defenceless population segment. Throughout the Arc-of-Conflict in Africa, Muslims who identify as Arab kill other Muslims who identify as Africa in intractable identify conflicts. Finally, in the Arabian Peninsula, the Levant, and Southwest Asia, in intense struggle is being waged against the sociopolitical Sunni oriented states by the centre of Shi’a sociopolitical ideology – Iran. Every Muslim in the countries listed in Figure 4, belonging to the schools of Islamic law in figures 5 and 6, is required to visit this place that happens to be in the political state of the Kingdom of the House of Saud on the Arabian Peninsula. Because of the Kingdom’s housing of Meccah and Medinah, the birthplace of Islam and its Prophet Mohammed, its every action, decision, and law is subject to, at times violent, criticism and rebuke for setting the wrong example in the land of God. What does all this geopolitical mishmash have to do with a 32-year-old girl from a conservative family in Saudi Arabia who is trying to exercise her fundamental human rights as enshrined in the United Nations Charter? The answer goes to the reasons why, that her own Saudi government, despite being a monarchy with control over its government and national resources, does not control the social and religious life of its own citizens separately from the many competing schools of Islamic Fiqh Jurisprudence which are nearly all in a steady state of interpretive tension. In 2015, King Salman engineered or directed one of the most profound rearrangements of the Kingdom’s governance and the roles that the many families of his brothers and uncles play and will play, in the governance of the state.²⁶ During my residency in Saudi Arabia in 2019 – 2021, I was in a position to observe first hand, the progress and the failures of the kingdom’s efforts at modernising its systems of governance. As a single male, merely entering a restaurant was a challenge because of the various entrances reserved for ‘women & children’ or ‘families only’, or single persons. It was shocking a bit, to now, only have one entrance to restaurants and stores for everyone and this took some getting used to even for a foreigner residing in the Kingdom. When my research colleague and I travelled around the kingdom before the changes, Dr. Tasneem was required to be a passenger attempting to give me driving directions despite her acknowledged ability to drive and navigate. The first time she was allowed to legally drive in Riyadh, was a blessing for both of us. The changes engineered by the King and the Crown Prince tried to remove some of the legal enforcements of the dreaded guardianship system, which consigned every Saudi woman to the near total control of a male family member. More women are believed to have entered the work force now that the government allows them to move around more easily, and the changes worked to sharply curtail the notorious religious police and ended the mandatory gender segregation they imposed on every public space. As Megan Stack of the New York Times notes, *“These are real, laudable changes. The complicating question is, who can take advantage of them?”*²⁷ The ‘changes’ as we called them, never touched the relationship between the Monarchical State and the Patriarchal Family. The cartoon in Figure 8 is a common theme in the Kingdom after the changes went into effect. The king may be the head of the Saudi state, but each father of a family in every clan and tribe, held and holds, absolute rule over their bloodlines. Most of these positive changes only benefited a woman lucky enough to have been born or married into a clan of freethinking men willing to let her do things, ending the

²³ (Lings, 2006)

²⁴ (Hamidullah, 1939) Page 138

²⁵ (Bhat, 2018)

²⁶ (Hubbard & MacFarquhar, 2015; Staff, 2022a; Wald, 2017)

²⁷ (Stack, 2022)

State mandate that male heads of household follow male guardianship rules. Fortunately for my colleague Dr. Tasneem, her husband was also our classmate and an 'enlightened Saudi male' as they are called. Regardless of the rules, each woman remains bound to male guardianship of her father and or husband who is the decision maker of whether she will be allowed to take advantage of these new changes. As Stack notes, *"there is no remedy If, for example, a woman's husband or father [who] doesn't think she should get her driving license, she is still compelled to obey his dictate."* As the King's new changes came into effect, we, or I, was able to see first-hand, the resistance, especially from the other segments of the Royal Families. I witnessed royal family members (male) who worked with orthodox Salafist and Wahhabi clerics, to mass protests the King, tying his meddling in Muslim's social lives with the 'changes', to his rearrangement in the line of succession of the Crown Prince, efforts at anti-corruption, and even national security and policy decisions regarding violent extremism and Iranian influence. The changes that ended separate entrances in restaurants and stores



Figure 8 Cartoon depicting Male Guardianship in the Kingdom

for single men, women, and families, for instance, was years in the making against heavy tribal resistance. The decree that gave women the right to drive a car or be without a male chaperone, was an even greater challenge.²⁸ The reason that the foregoing is important is to understand that primacy of the family-clan-tribe in the maintenance and enforcement of the internal social order and the limits to the kingdom/state's ability to effect modernizing change. Complicating all of these changes was the impact of intentional traumatization and weaponizing of Saudi civil society by the extremist ideologies of Sunni Khawarij and the Shi'ite Theocratic Republic of Iran.

2.2 Between Iran's Theocracy and the Khawarij School

of Extremism: A Kingdom under pressure. The Iranian Ayatollah and his Quds Force to build the Shi'a Crescent that surrounds Shi'a Iran's ultimate competitor – Sunni Arab's influence over the Muslim world.²⁹ Since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, the regime in Tehran has been forging a psychosocial-political "land bridge" that surrounds the Arab centre of Islam – Saudi Arabia.³⁰ This encirclement connects Iran through Shi'a minorities & majorities in Oman, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, and



Figure 7 A Tale of Two Cultures Past & Present: £1,000 Abayas covering £2,000 elegant sexy outfits that only other women are allowed to see.

²⁸ The researcher was stationed in Saudi Arabia and based in Riyadh, researching with the King Faisal Islamic Research Center during the years these liberalizations were decreed.

²⁹ The Shi'a Crescent consists of the Houthi Army in Yemen, the Arab Shi'a militias in Iraq and Syria, the Al Fatemiyoun Brigades of Afghanistan and Syria, the Hezbollah Army in Lebanon, and the Hamas Army in Gaza. The latest additions are Shi'a proxies in the Uranium rich regions of the Central Sahel in North Africa.

³⁰ In 2004, King Abdullah of Jordan warned about the emergence of an ideological Shiite crescent from Beirut to the Persian Gulf. (Barzegar, 2008)



Yemen.³¹ This is what MENA scholars refer to as the **“Shia Crescent”** illustrated in figure 9.³² Iran leads the global Shi’a Islamic community, but that ummah only comprises just 10 percent of the world’s Muslim population, against the remaining 90 percent Sunni led by Saudi Arabia.³³ The centre of the universe for the 100 billion or so Muslims is Arab controlled Mecca and Medina, which the Saudi Arab Kingdom holds in safekeeping. Because society, politics, law, and religion are so closely fused in Islam, the political state that controls Islam, wields outsized influence over all Islam. A large part of my work in the Saudi Kingdom involved support to their attempts to understand and reign in extreme orthodoxy in domestic society and religious educational programs that had become a breeding ground for psychological extremism both at home and exported abroad. And what small progress the kingdom has seen in recent years has come at the cost of bitter and intense infighting within the powerful families of the House of Saud.

The Kharijites (Arabic: khawarij; sing. khariji) were the first identifiable sect of Islam. Their identity emerged as followers of Muhammad attempted to determine the extent to which one could deviate from ideal norms of behaviour and still be called Muslim. The extreme Kharijite position was that Muslims who commit grave sins effectively reject their religion, entering the ranks of apostates, and therefore deserve capital punishment. This position was considered excessively restrictive by most Muslims, as well as by moderate Kharijites, who held that a professed Muslim could not be declared an unbeliever (kafir). The Kharijites believed it was forbidden to live among those who did not share their views, thus acquiring the name by which they are known in mainstream Islamic historiography—khawarij means “seceders” or “those who exit the community.” Radical Kharijites, on the other hand, declared those who disagreed with their position to be apostates, and they launched periodic military attacks against mainstream Muslim centres until they ceased to be a military threat in the late 8th century CE. The Kharijites were also known as Haruriyah (from Harura, the site of one of one of their main camps in Iraq), and more generically as ghulat (extremists).

2.3 Saudi Arabia’s struggle over traumatic social change. Officially, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a monarchical form of government where the House of Saud forms the government and defends the state and its Islamic Holy Sites in Mecca and Medina. The state bears the name of its founder, Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud, who cobbled the tribes together by force of arms, diplomacy, and reason. In practice, however, Saudi Arabia *“is not one monarchy. You have beneath it more than 1,000 monarchies-town monarchies, tribal monarchies, semi tribal monarchies....”*³⁴ The King who is the head of the House of Saud and the head of the Saudi government has never ruled with anything near absolute power. The tribes and their various emirates were united by the Saudi tribal leader to put an end to inter and intra tribal warfare, unite the tribes under one governing authority, and, later, exploit the newly discovered oil reserves to modernize into the 20th century. The House of Saud accomplished this unification through endless series of compromises and agreements with the hundreds of tribes that made up the kingdom and the Wahabi School of Islamic Theology that was dominant in the late 19th Century. In exchange for a central government control over its borders, management and distribution of natural resources, and exclusive dealings with tribes beyond its borders, the House of Saud ceded most domestic social authority to the tribes where it had always been maintained. Like




Figure 10

many other tribal societies, domestic family policy and execution were left to tribal elders and clergy, who held outsized authority, both hereditary and elected. The Kingdom entered the twenty-first century with a military and social system

³¹ (Shirley, 1999; Uskowi, 2019)

³² Data is from Pew Research Center.

³³ (Corwin, 2016; Eickelman, 1997; Friedl, 2014)

³⁴ Crown Prince Mohamad bin Salman, current defacto ruler of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

that regressed from international trends. Where other Arab countries used international commerce and globalization of trade, travel, and security to build the state, in the kingdom, “the strength of tribal and family ties and patronage [was] not weakened but rather embedded ever more deeply within a system of patrimonial rule.”³⁵



Figure 11

2.4 Tribal taxonomy of social order. The Arabian Peninsula consists of Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates and is the homelands of Arab ethnicity. The tribal social order is the basis of human, animal, and agricultural life on the peninsula. Between 80% of individuals and families are part of a social system that adheres to a tribal structure of governance, security, physical & mental health, economic, and political organisation.³⁶ Arab peoples and families' tribal identity is primary to their national identity as citizens of Saudi Arabia. The former is far more powerful than the latter which is interpreted differently by tribe. Every tribe considers themselves to possess a sovereignty that no other tribe, nor the state, can infringe upon. Each tribe possesses a collective ownership of, and direct control over, its hereditary geographical habitation and the resources underneath such as soil, water, or (when allowed) energy. Land is used

collectively to provide the means to its sustenance, development, and growth. To be without tribe is to be 'muhammashin', 'dhaif', and 'miskin,' without the means of survival in Arab society.³⁷ The basic stratification of Arab people is between those whose protection and social security is derived from their tribe and those who are dependent on the slowly developing state structures found predominantly in the large urban cities such as Riyadh and Jeddah. The latter includes the vast number of foreign workers (aka expats) and all Saudi citizens who are no longer part of a recognized tribe. For the former, the tribe is both the building block of society and a competitor to the central government. As a comparison to American jurisprudence and social structure, Arab tribes could be compared to states, shaykhs to governors, tribal law to state constitutions, and tribal militia to a state's national guard. While this is a very imperfect comparison in USA and Saudi law, it does accurately reflect the psychosocial-emotional sentiment of tribes and their leaders. In Arab tribal society, men who can bear arms, and thus are able to protect themselves, are responsible for those who are considered 'dependent' and are therefore under the protection of others.³⁸ The emphasis is not so much on the weaponry, but on the social authority to protect and speak for others. Although women, children, and young unmarried men belong by birth to their respective social group, they are also considered 'dependent' and are under the protection of those with social authority. There is a small class of Qadhi's (religious and legal scholars), Sayyids (religious and legal scholars who are descended from the Prophet Mohammed), and the muhammashin, which are dhaif and miskin. One does not join a tribe but must be born into it. WHERE a person is from matters only so much as it indicates WHO he/she is from. Children and adults from a broken Bayt are absorbed into the Hahl, usually within the Qarya, and always within the Uzla.³⁹ People who were not born into one of the Uzla of the Qabila have no status, no existence within (?) and could not join even if they tried to. As figure 2 illustrates, Arab tribal life is a closed social system. The Bayt and the Hahl that it belongs to is beyond patriarchal. Only men in tribal life can bear arms and thus wield authority of any type. Women, children, and land constitute a Qabili's principal patrimony, wealth, and obligation, and his greatest source of alienation, shame, and identity disintegration.⁴⁰ For an Arab Qabila, his ability to protect *and control* his women, children, and land is the basis of his social position which undergirds his male masculine identity.⁴¹ Contrary to French sociologist

³⁵ (Cronin, 2013) p.2

³⁶ (Lackner 2016).

³⁷ (ACAPS Thematic Report, 2020)

³⁸ (Cronin, 2013)

³⁹ (Schmitz, 2011)

⁴⁰ (Adra, 2006)

⁴¹ The Arabic terms of Hahl, Qarya, Uzla, Qabila, and others used here are not the only variations used by different Arab tribes. Variations exist in different parts of the Arabian Peninsula.



Émile Durkheim's⁴² ideas about 'primitive society' - what he thought of as mechanical, repressive structures lacking moral cohesion - are sociocentric societies that depend on an external locus of member control. Durkheim's assumption that sociocentric societies (*which characterise Arabia's Arab tribes*) are lacking in morality was incorrect. Morality deeply infuses the sociocentric Arab person, perhaps more so than their egocentric counterpart. The sociocentric Arab father for instance, learns to live with the requirement to make painful and difficult choices between equally loved members of family; between the good of the one versus the good of the whole. The misunderstanding of morality in Arab sociocentric society lies in the differing calculus of behaviour control of societal members – internal for the egocentric and external for the sociocentric. Where the egocentric member of society is consumed with individual decisions about moral thoughts and behaviour, the sociocentric member is consumed with a shared moral character that encompasses at a minimum, the nuclear family and maximally the entire tribe. The sociological construction of society based on an external member locus of control establishes vast and complex differences for the sociocentric family (from that of the egocentric) that is particularly susceptible to damage and rapid change. This greater vulnerability to damage in sociocentric families involves the requirement for group synchronization in thought and emotion as part of the process of making meaning and sustaining the ethos laden collective of shared individual identities. Using Durkheim's example of primitive morality, sociocentric family members determine right and wrong collectively, not individually – shame of alienation drives conformance rather than individual guilt socialized into the egocentric member. Even before any right or wrong act takes place, the family members interact with each other to form the basis for their shared individual morality, just as they do their shared individual identity. In such a communal structure, morality cannot be an individual ideation in the sociocentric society, dependent as it is on the collective for definition, context, and execution.⁴³



Figure 12

2.5 Indigenous Mental Health in Arab Sociocentric Tribal Society. In 2019, I was a field researcher supporting the King Faisal Islamic Research Centre, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. My assignment was to research the psychological and emotional drivers of young Saudi men who were lured into the grasp of Al Qaeda and Da'esh. The Saudi governing structure is highly educated and is exploring the relationship between mental extremism, behavioural radicalisation, and mental health, while discouraging linkages to Islamic religion. There is a dichotomy, however, between the government's enlightened understanding of mental health and the tribes' conceptualisation of mental health using metaphysical concepts that long predate Islam. During one interview, an elder of one of the clans in the Ha'il region pointed to the sky, where twin lines of jet contrails curved across the horizon. He then told me that we were watching "Jinns" or spirits flying across the sky, which he used to illustrate his story of human interaction with the metaphysical world. I naively attempted to inform my elder host that those white twin lines were from the engines of an aluminium tube with wings full of human beings and their luggage, flying several kilometres above the ground. His wrinkled face showed such incredulous contempt of my childish

Elements of Jinn as symbolic object

The Qur'an references Jinn and humans as the only two intelligent categories of beings on earth. Jinn are spiritual entities as opposed to humans who are physical entities.

The Prophet's divine message was intended for both humans and Jinn. Jinn, like humans, exist as lesser entities than angels or saints, but humans are God's vice-regents on earth.

Jinn live in an unseen metaphysical world but work to influence the destinies of physical humans. (Qur'an 6:128-130).

In Arabic, each time the letters "jeem" and "noon" appear together as in jinn, the word will convey a meaning of hidden or invisible. Other examples include Jannah, as in paradise is Jannah because it is hidden from human sight, and Janin, hidden in the womb.

Figure 13 Powerful Symbolic Objects jeem & noon.

⁴² (Durkheim, 2021; Gellner, 1975)

⁴³ (Christian, 2016)

ignorance, that I never repeated that mistake.⁴⁴ Jinns are spirits that have interacted with mankind since the beginning of time. Jinns work to comfort and console man in his darkest hour. Jinns also cater to, and excite man's imagination within art, music, purpose, and yes, sex.⁴⁵ Psychologically, Jinns serve an important mental housekeeping function of trait dissociation,

"God divided the jinn and the humans into ten parts. One part makes up the human race, and the other nine parts is made up of the jinn." (El-Zein 2009, p.52)




Figure 14

where socially unacceptable thoughts and feelings are cast outward onto a Jinn spirit, where it can be safely condemned and disavowed, without undue damage to the individual's ego-self. The dynamic and its necessity is culturally universal. The expression of this dynamic using spirits called Jinns is unique to Arabic and Arabic aligned cultural identity groups. The use of metaphysical 'Jinns' to explain mental health conditions such as bipolar, manic-depressive, schizophrenia, trauma, and others is a natural part of indigenous forms of mental and physical health. In practice, however, Arab tribes' attempts to employ religiously based explanations often lead to an increase in harm to the already suffering victim. In other indigenous, non-Arab, tribes, my research has revealed extensive structures of indigenous health that rival western psychotherapy. From the Acholi people's Mato Oput ceremonies of justice and forgiveness to the Kel Tamashek peoples' spirit possession ceremonies that relieve guilt, shame, and reaffirm individual and collective subconscious identity, many indigenous communities have developed complex practices of maintaining communal mental health.⁴⁶ Arab cultural identity construction is based on ancient modes of austere socioeconomic life of Bedouin archetypes,

a condition that was exaggerated-made real by its incorporation into the Qur'an and Hadith of the Islamic faith.⁴⁷ The centrality of the Bedouin archetype in Arab identity and its unavoidable incorporation into the Islamic faith are evidenced as much by Islamic conflict and violence as by normative Arab cultural expression. Even as the hadarah Arab tribes settled into villages and towns, creating economies, social structures, and the moral basis necessary to support the evolution of a sedentary identity, the badawah Arab tribes resisted. Despite the change of parts of clan and tribe from badawah to hadarah, both desert dweller and townsman retained ritual and tradition, formulated by millennia of time surviving in the desert. The sociological structures that allowed for life to develop without water, without agriculture, and without permanent abode required psychological conditions of fulfilment not found in other types of settled societies. The sociological structure of Bedouin life produces profound psychological emanations of ritual and tradition:

*The theme of perpetual loss and ruin, as the 'substance' of this tradition resonated differently within Bedouin and sedentary societies. For the nomads, loss and dying were regular norms of nature; they needed no metaphysical camouflage, and the ode [spiritual poems of Arab Bedouin life] did not venture to offer any. Only the language of mourning itself mitigated the loss.*⁴⁸

The spirituality of the Bedouin grew out of the geology and geography of its tribal habitats where base survival in an inescapable, unchanging climate served as a normative destiny.⁴⁹ Bedouin spiritual philosophy expresses itself most clearly in the belief in the relative profanity of all subjective rearrangement of the norms of nature, norms from which the idea of a possibly different future is absent.⁵⁰ This view is based in the feeling that unchosen frames of social existence possess a claim to timeless and superior stability that surpasses the claims to stability of frames of existence chosen

⁴⁴ As I pondered this episode in my field research, I realized how improbable was my explanation of those twin white lines high in the noon sky must seem to that elderly man who was born in the first quarter of the 20th Century.

⁴⁵ (Sunderland, 1983; Turner, n.d.; White, 2010)

⁴⁶ (Christian, 2015, 2020)

⁴⁷ (El-Zein, 2009)

⁴⁸ (Bamyeh, 1999) Page 53

⁴⁹ (Dickson & R. Wilson, 1983)

⁵⁰ (Alatas, 2006; Armstrong, 2006)



during an individual lifespan”.⁵¹ It’s not so much as the advent of Islam then that the Bedouin railed against, but rather the fundamental change in moral and leader responsibility for directing human life best left to the finitudes of *dahr*. The Bedouins did eventually accept Islam as a component of their tribal identity, subordinated and placed in the perspective of nomadic life, rejecting, or ignoring those elements that did not fit within the existing psychological framework of life in the open desert. The struggle between the evangelizers of universal Islam and the Arab identity as expressed by its prototypical society the badawah over the placement of Islam in Arab life continues, finding its way into most conflicts where Arab and Islam vie for primacy of salience.⁵² Thus, even though the Al Dawasir tribal is mostly hadarah, or sedentary, a significant portion of their cultural identity remains based on the individualist, survivalist, nomadism of the Bedouin. Their collective identity exists in a steady state of tension between enlightened Islam and badawah, where male masculine identity involves a rejection of weakness and an embrace of alternate spirituality of the illogical metaphysical spirit world that rules man’s inner psychological self.⁵³ The complexity of the Arabian tribes’ struggle with cultural identity archetypes drawn from austere survivalist Bedouin life can be thought of or explained as the generational transmission of trauma, a ‘pierced/alterd reality’ that is out of place and time in the 21st Century. This generational trauma of Bedouin survivalist is the reason for much of the family and tribal conflict in the peninsula, which is exacerbated by intrusive globalisation and malign external actors seeking to influence behaviour within vulnerable members and families. Even in the absence of external intrusions, the clash of the sacred (badawah) and the profane (hadarah) are infused with a life-or-death ideation that energises resulting family pathologies. Family members ‘must comply’ with ancient archetypes of thought and prototypes of behaviour if the family-tribal identity is to survive. This same identity has resisted change by Islam, modernisation, and now, globalisation of thought and mental health. Within modern Saudi Arabia today, tribal affiliation and affinity is as strong as ever and rising. Successful Saudi males have been using their wealth to recreate the Bedouin prototypical life with accurate archetypes, albeit one with substantially greater amounts of luxury and comfort.⁵⁴

3 Application of Country-of-Origin Report to UK Home Office rationale for denial of asylum and responses to solicitor issues requested to be raised in the report.

3.1 UK Home Office Asylum Denial. The UK Home Office investigator maintains that she is [1] ‘*not at risk of an honour killing or any harm in Saudi Arabia*’ as there would be [2] ‘*no way of her parents knowing she got married without their permission*’. They also deem there [3] ‘*not to be any sufficient degree of power or influence within Ms Aldossri’s family for them to target her with impunity* and [4] *the authorities would [not] assist them in returning her to her family home*’. The RFRL places emphasis on available country information which states that [5] ‘*women over the age of twenty-one no longer require permission from a male guardian to live and travel alone*,’ thereby alleging that internal safe relocation is an option. They also note that Ms Aldossri [6] ‘*would not need to wear an abaya and niqab and instead could simply dress modestly*.’

Response. My review of the UK Home Office decision makers rejection of asylum letter revealed a misunderstanding of the psychosocial context of family life in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

“The Saudi guardianship system and its enforcement are based on a unique interpretation of the Hanbali school of Sunni Islam and justify restricting women’s ability to travel, attend university, marry, or obtain medical care without the permission of a male guardian. The Saudi monarchy codified this system into law in the second half of the 20th century as part of its attempt to retain its religious credentials amid a period of political, economic, and social transformation. Although recent changes to provisions regarding women’s ability to travel are a positive development, key restrictive elements of the guardianship system remain in place.”⁵⁵

While many Middle Eastern governments violate religious freedom in ways that hurt women, Saudi Arabia’s religious guardianship system is uniquely repressive as a preservation of legacy tribal patriarchy. The Saudi government has also committed egregious violations in the extent to which it punishes women who challenge guardianship laws or try to

⁵¹ (Bamyeh, 1999) Page 62

⁵² (al-Dawsari, 2012)

⁵³ (Burge, 2012)

⁵⁴ (AFP News Agency, n.d.)

⁵⁵ (Weiner, 2020)



flee the country when life under such a system becomes unbearable.⁵⁶ I have numbered above, the six (6) incorrect and or misleading statements in the UK Home Office's letter of denial of asylum for REDACTED. As described in greater detail in §6.2.2, honour killings or injuries are a very real threat for many women in Saudi Arabia and cannot be discounted. The claimant's unsanctioned and unrecognised marriage in Jordan to a Jordanian national is the least of her problems. Her parents are, of course, fully aware of her attempt to escape from their legal (in Saudi Arabia) custody of male guardianship. Even if she successfully hides her unsanctioned marriage, her loss of virginity will be discovered during her routine pre-marriage wedding physical. And given the preceding circumstances, it would seem unlikely that the loss would have been accidental or anything other than sexual intercourse outside the boundaries of accepted behaviour. So, she will either be a whore or an apostate, rejecting her father's interpretation of Islam. REDACTED's father is a middle level civil servant without high status of office. He is, however, a father and entitled to the patriarchal rights provided by both the Kingdom and the Al Dawasir tribe. The ending of male-guardianship doctrine is a right that is fully subordinate to the rights of male-guardians over the blood related women of their household.⁵⁷ In any disagreement between a male head of household (father, husband) and a daughter or wife, the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia cannot and would not interfere in domestic family matters within a tribe.⁵⁸ REDACTED Mohammed A Aldossri is not, and can never be, a member of the tribally non-aligned citizenry without calling her entire tribe into question of social breakdown, thus would never be released from male guardianship.⁵⁹ To be sure, there are many non-tribal members of Saudi society, mostly in the large urban areas, and most often, they are expats, or foreign workers providing a wide range of services that the native Saudi population are unable to provide. As the quote from MBS in section 5 illustrates, the ruling family, Saud, navigates a social minefield that is fraught with emotion and collective angst.⁶⁰ The crown prince's directed changes to social policy that eliminated separate male and female entrances for restaurants and other commercial operations was unevenly accepted across the kingdom. Similar royal decrees that granted women the rights to drive cars, own guns, and remove their hijabs, did not unilaterally mean that individual members of a family are free to disregard their family's guidance.⁶¹ The practical effect of such royal decrees that loosen restrictions on Saudi citizens is that 'A Family' can make use of this liberalisation as that family decides. But each family within a tribal collective has obligations of collective behavioural norms that they are required to operate within.⁶² If the father decides that his daughter will wear the abaya and niqab, refrain from driving, return home and or remain home, then that daughter can be forced into compliance.⁶³ Finally, the most recent Saudi Religious Shura discussed and rejected any deviation of male-guardianship's right to approve the marriage of a daughter.⁶⁴ Saudi Arabia continues to ruthlessly defend against any internal opposition to Guardianship Laws. Unfortunately, the Kingdom's religiously-based system characterises women's rights as an extreme ideology of feminism and as aspects of violent extremism and radicalisation as illustrated in figure

Ms Aldossri was subjected to very strict parenting. She was never allowed outside of the family home unless supervised by one of her parents or her brothers. She was forced to wear a full hijab and niqab and was raised on Islamic values. She was forced to pray, fast and observe all Islamic duties. Ms Aldossri instructs that she grew up noticing stark differences in the ways that the female members of her family, herself included, were treated in comparison to the ways the males were treated. Ms Aldossri's parents were in the process of forcing her to marry her first cousin - this began at the age of 18/19 years old once she finished secondary school. She begged her parents to let her have some form of educational qualification before she got married to someone. She begged her parents to let her attend university and eventually, they agreed to this and Ms Aldossri was able to buy herself some more time. Her paternal cousin is 14 years older than her and she does not know why he was promised to her but instructs that priority always goes to paternal family members in forced marriages - in fact, it is encouraged over marriage to a stranger. Extract from Claimant Representations.

⁵⁶ Saudi Arabia first agreed to examine dismantling the guardianship system following its UN Universal Periodic Review (UPR) in 2009, in which it also admitted the existence of violations of human rights under guardianship "attributable to individual practices."

⁵⁷ (HRW Staff, 2023b)

⁵⁸ (Staff, 2022b)

⁵⁹ (Maisel, 2014)

⁶⁰ (Wagtendonk, 2019)

⁶¹ (MEMO Staff, 2022)

⁶² (United States Department of State, 2022)

⁶³ (Gill, 2019; Salahi & Qazi, 2024)

⁶⁴ (Habibi & Begag, 2019; Ho, 2019; Staff, 2020)



Figure 15 Slide from the Saudi Presidency of State Security that reads: Feminism: A Spiritual & Intellectual Kidnapping.

12.⁶⁵ The slide was presented by Saudi Major General Bassem Atia, a spokesman of the Saudi Presidency of State Security during a 2019 seminar at Qassim University in Buraida. My colleague in attendance protested his characterisation after the seminar, and General Bassem suggested that we misunderstood his comments. This does provide insight, however, into how some security and government offices use other real security challenges to defend and enforce Saudi's male guardianship system.⁶⁶ Saudi women and activists who advocate for an end to male guardianship within the Kingdom and without, face severe penalties. In June 2018, Saudi police arrested and imprisoned at least 11 activists who had peacefully protested the guardianship

system, several of whom were placed in the Dhahban Central Prison outside of Jeddah. The United States Commission on International Freedom received credible reporting that many of these prisoners are victims of torture, including beating, electric shock, and whipping. In addition, many of the women activists were mistreated in gendered ways. One woman was photographed naked and shown these photos during interrogations conducted by men, while in another reported case, two of the women detainees were forced to kiss each other in the presence of a male interrogator and whipped when they refused. Some were hugged, kissed, and groped while handcuffed by male interrogators.

3.2 Women in Saudi Tribal Families fleeing into exile.

3.2.1 Category 1. Likelihood of her enforced return to parental-family-tribal control, discovery of secret marriage and loss of virginity, ability to independently end her male guardianship over the objections of her father and relocate internally. Response. The claimant, if deported to Saudi Arabia, will arrive at Riyadh International Airport and be detained as she passes through immigration control. The laws that will enable her detention will be within the internal security statutes governing potential extremization and radicalisation against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. REDACTED will be held until the arrival of her male guardian father, who will accept custody of her and agree that she will be presented before any tribunal for illegally leaving or remaining away from, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and her family guardianship which is responsible for her physical, psychological, and emotional health and behaviour.⁶⁷ Absent her father's request, I do not believe that REDACTED will be placed into a woman's prison complex and interrogated and tortured. She will, however, be placed in her father's absolute custody and warned of the consequences of further defiance of her father's directives and if she returns to the attention of the Kingdom's security services.⁶⁸ Once she is returned home, her family will spend as long as needed to understand what happened to her. Who entered her life to lead her so astray from her family, tribe, and religion? Extended male family members (uncles, grandparents) will seek to determine if she has mentally renounced Islam, the capital crime of apostasy. Her mother/aunts/sisters will determine through physical inspection if she was sexually assaulted, either with or against her consent. Against the charge of apostasy, her mother and sisters will try to help her 'craft and own' a story of 'innocence corrupted' by the boy in Jordan. Her loss of virginity; her fleeing from family male guardianship, her renunciation of her family-tribal obligations in marriage will be explained to the extended family as a tragic, but explainable mental health story so familiar to Arab families and explained in ways like described in §5.5. The goal will

⁶⁵ During my work in the Kingdom, myself and Saudi colleagues Dr. Tasneem Salman Aljehani and Brigadier General Dr. Saed Alsubaie, interviewed and studied young Saudis who had been captured from Da'esh raids and found little if any knowledge of Islamic religion. We successfully taught curricula in the Saudi Defense College of our findings using a translated text of United States Special Operations Command entitled "Origin and Epidemiology of Extremism & Radicalization are Psychological Processes, not Religious Beliefs. (Christian et al., 2018a)

⁶⁶ My colleague was a male senior Saudi Army officer and his opposition to General Atia's 'misunderstanding' clarifies that the issue is a divisive one within the Kingdom, but that the institution of male guardianship is not uniformly supported across Saudi government.

⁶⁷ (BBC Staff, 2019; COMPARATIVE STUDIES 1100 SPRING 2021 (FINVER), 2021; Estatie, 2017; HRW Staff, 2023a; Staff, 2022b; Wagtendonk, 2019; Weiner, 2020)

⁶⁸ (ALJ Staff, 2019)



be to arrive at an acceptable narrative to the family and tribe that results in a socio-politically agreeable solution to REDACTED's future as wife, mother, and member of the family and tribe that is consistent with patriarchal structure and vision of Islamic social order. The independent agency of REDACTED will not be allowed outside the demands of her male guardians. The specific narrative of her psychological-physical 'kidnapping' will be circulated within the confines of the tribe until a suitable male guardian steward comes forward to accept responsibility for taking REDACTED into his guardianship and ensuring that she becomes a contributing member of the Al Dawasir tribal society. This process of reinduction, re-acculturation, into the family and tribal narrative may take weeks or months, but REDACTED will not leave the family home or another secluded location until she does. Her family's love for her and her isolation will be the vehicles used to break down her will to preserve her individual agency and gain her cooperation with their decisions about her. Her family's participation in REDACTED's re-indoctrination will be their desire to prevent her physical, psychological, and spiritual demise at the hands of the family's tribe. The tribe's goal is simply the preservation of its status and prestige among the other tribes of the Arabian Peninsula and the Islamic ummah, which they cannot maintain in the face of successful rebellion by a young girl of a modest family of the Al Dawasir tribe. The foregoing response is based on my decades of living and working with Arab tribal peoples over 20-years of fieldwork.

Reasoning. The Personal Status Law is the name of the Saudi government's most recent document pertaining to the social and legal condition of women in the kingdom. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and other Saudi government officials describe the law as "comprehensive" and "progressive."⁶⁹ The new PSL, compared to historical norms, is a step forward for all women who either do not have a male guardian by blood or marriage, or have a male guardian who declines to exercise his rights under male guardianship, or foreign women working/living in the Kingdom. For the women of Saudi citizenship who do have male guardians that maintain their guardianship rights, the new law helps to codify their rights over the women they have guardianship over. The new PSL does not intend to codify discriminatory practices nor facilitate domestic violence and sexual abuse in marriage, but unfortunately, the new laws do exactly that. The PSL operates on the assumption that the male guardianship of tribal patriarchy is the best way to ensure the safety and security of women in a family, from the profane outer of the family and tribe.⁷⁰ This includes the safety and security of the woman from herself, should she become infected with the immoral dangers she finds on the internet, in western education, and globalisation in general, without the benefit of her male guardian to guide her and interpret her understanding of the world.⁷¹ To this end, the PSL employs vague language that privileges the articulation and reasoning of male guardians over the women who might object. Overall, the PSL provides judges wide discretion when adjudicating cases across the many tribal customs and practices.⁷² Under the new laws promulgated by King Salman, the Kingdom security services of local, provincial, national, and public facilities police forces will no longer attempt to detain a lone woman travelling without male-guardianship.⁷³ Her family, however, under the newly codified rules of male guardianship, will have reported her missing from her male-guardian and request that she be located and returned home safely.⁷⁴ Multiple Saudi women have sought political asylum outside the Kingdom because of poor treatment by their families under guardianship laws, at great risk to their personal safety.⁷⁵ Many of these women denounced Islam, potentially subjecting them to capital punishment were they to return home. The Saudi government has actively attempted to extradite these women back to the Kingdom on behalf of their guardians. It has cancelled and seized their passports in foreign airports and tracked them on behalf of their families, reportedly by using unique identifiers associated with their cell phones.⁷⁶ Despite recent legal changes, Saudi government social media channels have stated that women fleeing guardianship are radicalized extremists seeking to harm the country's international image.⁷⁷ Under the PSL, the influence of the male guardian is pervasive throughout a woman's life. Only

⁶⁹ (COMPARATIVE STUDIES 1100 SPRING 2021 (FINVER), 2021)

⁷⁰ (Staff, 2022b)

⁷¹ (HRW Staff, 2023a)

⁷² (Wagtendonk, 2019)

⁷³ (Wagtendonk, 2019)

⁷⁴ (Weiner, 2020)

⁷⁵ (BBC Staff, 2019)

⁷⁶ (Staff, 2022b)

⁷⁷ (Weiner, 2020)



men can be legal guardians, and unlike men, only women must have the consent of a male legal guardian to get married and for the marriage contract to be validated.⁷⁸ The law does contain some safeguards which seek to protect a woman from being forced into marriage, such as proof of consent of both the man and woman and the prohibition of a legal guardian's agreement to a woman's marriage without her consent. However, it does not provide any clarity on what "consent" means or how it should be obtained.⁷⁹ The Saudi woman cannot choose her legal guardian. The PSL defines the order of male legal guardians for marriage by social rank, beginning with the woman's husband if she is married. If not, then her father, then his guardian, then her grandfather is the established male guardianship line of succession. If a woman's legal male guardianship successfully comes into legal dispute, the courts will not simply abrogate her guardianship. Instead, that guardianship is transferred to the court, to "take charge of marrying the woman." This transfer of guardianship further diminishes women's agency, increases men's control over women, exacerbates the unequal power dynamics between them, and eliminates the possibility for women to give their "free and full" consent to marriage as required under international law.⁸⁰ The new PSL also codifies discrimination against women by allowing a Muslim woman to only marry a Muslim man, but allowing a Muslim man to marry a Christian, Jewish or Muslim woman. Under international law, this differentiation impairs a woman's right to freely choose her spouse. Additionally, the PSL codifies stereotypical gender roles which are discriminatory against women by requiring wives to "obey in righteousness" and cancelling a woman's right under the law to financial maintenance by her husband if she "refuses herself to her husband...without a legitimate reason." Here too, the PSL fails to provide a definition for a "legitimate reason."⁸¹ A Saudi woman is required to obtain a male relative's approval to apply for a passport, travel outside the country, study abroad on a government scholarship, get married, leave prison, or even exit a shelter for abuse victims. "This is something that affects every Saudi woman and girl, from birth to death. They are essentially treated like minors," the Egyptian-American journalist Mona Eltahawy told the BBC.⁸² Even after the new PSL, prison-like restrictions on women remain - most notably, the "male guardianship system", a⁸³ woman's father, brother, husband or son has the authority to make critical decisions on her behalf.⁸⁴ Examples of what REDACTED will face if she is deported back to Riyadh into her male guardian's custody abound and are well known in the western countries where they flee to. Recent cases include a young Saudi woman fleeing her family who barricaded herself in a hotel room in Bangkok saying she feared imprisonment if she was sent back home. In 2008, the prominent rights activist Samar Badawi, whose father allegedly physically abused her, fled her family home and found refuge at a shelter. She then began legal proceedings to strip her father of her guardianship. In retaliation, she said, her father filed a charge of "disobedience" against her. A judge ordered her detention in 2010 and she spent seven months in prison before activists drew attention to her case and the authorities dropped the charge. Mariam al-Otaibi, another activist, spent three months in detention in 2017 after her father accused her of "disobedience". She had fled her home after allegedly facing abuse from her father and brother in retaliation for leading social media campaigns against the guardianship system. Her eventual release from prison was hailed as a victory by fellow activists because it took place without a male guardian. Even women who have fled abroad have been unable to avoid detention. In 2017, Dina Ali Lasloom was forcibly returned to her family in Saudi Arabia while in transit in the Philippines enroute to Australia. She had said she was escaping a forced marriage. Human Rights Watch said it received reports that Ms Lasloom was detained in a shelter indefinitely until a guardianship court determined her guardianship succession, if any was required in lieu of her father. Saudi courts have repeatedly warned that "those who incite women to rebel and overthrow guardianship should be held to account"⁸⁵ and that the disputes between a woman and her male guardian are a "family affair".

⁷⁸ (Ho, 2019)

⁷⁹ (Habibi & Begag, 2019)

⁸⁰ (HRW Staff, 2023a; Staff, 2022b; Wagtendonk, 2019)

⁸¹ (Staff, 2022b; Wagtendonk, 2019)

⁸² (BBC Staff, 2019)

⁸³ (Stack, 2022)

⁸⁴ (Sallon, 2023)

⁸⁵ (Weiner, 2020)



3.2.2 Category 2. Likelihood of her familial and or tribal punishment, persecution, or other adverse actions given her rejection of familial obligation-honour and male guardianship over her body, decisions, and actions. (possibilities of honour killing or injury; imprisonment in family home; forced arranged marriage; etc.)

Response. Based on the circumstances of this case as presented to me in the documents in §2 and my own field research and country expertise, I opine that REDACTED Mohammed A Aldossri is at grave risk of physical, psychological, and emotional harm if she is involuntarily deported to Saudi Arabia. As in the cases of many other involuntary returnees, REDACTED will be met at the Riyadh airport by the police and her father who will take her into custody. As noted, Saudi law will uphold her father's right to custody of REDACTED based on the laws of male guardianship in the Kingdom. My reasoning below will endeavour to answer thoroughly, the individual questions above.

Reasoning. In the Islamic tradition and experience, women are special beings rather than equal beings with men. God created woman as a carrier of human purity and virtue which is evidenced by the unbroken virginity of a woman before marriage.⁸⁶ The conceptualisation of virginity is perfectly intertwined with purity and virtue with accrues outwards onto the males she is related to. This conceptualisation of virginity, purity, and virtue is expressed as an unbroken hymen. Islamic thought holds that 'Allah created a woman whose hymen is not worthless and useless'. Its existence is proof of the seriousness of women's commitment to and maintenance of purity of faith and virginity. 'Allah arranges for His servants to take care of themselves as well as possible in accordance with Islamic teachings. If a woman cares for herself, her honour will be safe and will not give rise to views that demean her.'⁸⁷ Even though there is no accurate evidence in the Qur'an that determines virginity, the maintenance of the unbroken hymen is the best way to maintain the integrity of a woman's honour prior to her marriage.⁸⁸ The value of an unbroken hymen assures the families clan and tribe that the males entrusted with her guardianship (father, brothers, uncles, cousins) can be trusted with the larger protection of the clan and tribe.⁸⁹ Their failure to ensure the physical expression of virtue and purity (the hymen) lays a nearly unbearable burden on many Arab families that drives them into violence.⁹⁰

Hymen proves the purity of a woman, where the socio-cultural and religious context still highly upholds this value, especially in Middle Eastern, Asian, and other Muslim countries.

"One day my father asked me to come and sit with him, he and I were the only ones who were home. He said to me, 'You know how much I think of you, trust you, love you, and now I need your help...Listen, we can't bear the rumours anymore, we have to put an end to it.' I asked him what exactly he wanted me to do. He answered, 'Finish it, you know how.' I couldn't sleep all night. I remember looking at the clock and seeing that it was 5:02. Everyone went to work, but I didn't. My body started to shake; my hands became sweaty. I took a knife from the kitchen and went straight to her room. When it was over I changed my clothes and went to sit in the yard. My father came ... and I told him that I had done it [that] 'I killed my sister.' "⁹¹

The themes of 'unbearable' and 'rumours' only hint at the feelings of betrayal, shame, and rage carried by the failed male guardians of their women. Young women, often not more than teenagers, are assigned the status of a widow if their husbands decide they were not virgins at the time of their marriage and are subsequently divorced.⁹² The lives and futures of these young women who experience this are destroyed, and the future will of course be even more difficult for them.⁹³

"Virginity is the state of a woman who has never engaged in sexual activity. An unbroken hymen, which can be demonstrated by bleeding during the first sexual encounter after marriage, is the defining characteristic of this condition in general. Virginity is a social, cultural, and religious construct rather than a term used in medicine or science. A specific

⁸⁶ (Wold, 2019)

⁸⁷ (Christian, 2019; Gupta et al., 2023; Guy-Evans & Mcleod, 2024)

⁸⁸ (Udasmoro, 2022)

⁸⁹ (Reema, 2020)

⁹⁰ (McElroy, 2008; Penda & Szabo, 2023)

⁹¹ (Glazer, 2019)

⁹² (Shalaby, 2018)

⁹³ (AlQahtani et al., 2022a; Staff, 2021)



civilization places such a high value on virginity that after the first night, bloodstains on a sheet are required to prove it.

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Even before and after the first night of marriage, the family's female carriers of virtue and purity bear responsibility for the quality and quantity of trust and respect given to their male guardian relatives. A principal violation of a female's role in Saudi Arab tribal society is any failure of willing acceptance and obedience to male guardianship. A family's males are judged by the quality of their female's responsive obedience to their guardianship. The extent to which REDACTED's father and mother tried to grant her wishes of education and travel are indicative of their desire to repay in advance, their daughter's obedience to her male guardian.

*Salma and I tried to convince my father to let us study in Jordan. There was no way my father would let two girls travel abroad alone. He was concerned about what society and his family would think of his values to allow his daughters to travel by themselves. My father never opposed studying but we had to follow their guidelines. After a lot of back and forth, my father finally agreed but he would move to Jordan with us. We did not like the idea of this, but we did not have a choice. All we wanted to do was study. Sometimes my parents would get suspicious. They would shout at me and ask me why I am late, and I would always come up with excuses ... They would try to intimidate me by saying they do not believe me and say that lord knows what I am doing.*⁹⁵

REDACTED's narrative retelling of her story illustrates the extreme pressures her parents felt about her desires for freedom versus their obligations to their family, clan, and tribe, of holding and presenting their trusteeship of the male guardian system of social life in Saudi Arabia.⁹⁶ Her father's social and emotional 'face' to his family, clan, and tribe, depended on the outward acceptance of his wife and daughters' roles under his male guardianship. While some men employ harsh words and physical punishment upfront, others, like REDACTED's father, employ a more compassionate approach to moulding girls and young women into submission to males.⁹⁷ When wives and or daughters betray the trust of their male guardians; when they violate or refuse the underlying principles of women's 'special place' in Arab Muslim tribal society, their behaviour (speech, actions, decisions) calls into question the intrinsic value of the males in their family, including fathers, grandfathers, uncles, and brothers.⁹⁸ Something in the male line must have become spoiled for their women to so resolutely repudiate their guardianship as evidenced by a daughter/sister's refusal to participate in an arranged marriage; a wife's refusal of sexual favours or an attempt to divorce her husband.⁹⁹ The contexts of domestic violence or her husband's infidelity are usually immaterial. Anything from speaking with an unrelated man, to rumoured pre-marital loss of virginity, to an extra-marital affair can be cause for an attack, often carried out by a father or brother.¹⁰⁰ In some especially tragic instances, even women and girls who have been raped are slain to remove the stain from the family honour. As with other forms of intimate violence against women, perpetrators are seldom punished.¹⁰¹ The simple interpretation that her behaviour has "dishonoured" her family is enough to launch reprisals.¹⁰² If a woman acts against the values and principles imposed by society, then this dishonour is passed on to the men in her family, who must then make amends.¹⁰³ It's a tradition that is legitimized in society and overtly and covertly protected by governments. In theory, honour killings are condemned practices in Middle Eastern countries, but they are tolerated due to government inaction, or defended as legitimate cultural practices. In such

"The Arab family is becoming smaller, less clannish, and women are aspiring to more education and employment. These elements create dissonances and tensions with old worldviews." He adds that although the public tends to assume that the "honour" issue is related to provocative sexual behaviour, in actuality it is more deeply rooted in the question of how far the woman accepts the authority of her male relatives. "There are many women who have been murdered even though they did not do anything sexual. For example, a woman who doesn't want to get engaged to a certain person, or who insists on getting a job, even though her husband objects." Said Tali, the national inspector on domestic violence in the Labor and Social Affairs Ministry.

⁹⁴ (Raihana & Ghufon, 2023)

⁹⁵ Witness Statement of Ms. Sahar Mohammed A Aldossri dated 28 December 2023

⁹⁶ (News Staff, 2020)

⁹⁷ (AP Staff, 2005; IRB – Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2005; News Staff, 2005; Salahi & Qazi, 2024)

⁹⁸ (AlQahtani et al., 2022a; Statista Research Department, 2019)

⁹⁹ (Shoro, 2017)

¹⁰⁰ (Pope, 2012)

¹⁰¹ (Ali, 2003)

¹⁰² (Khatana, 2022)

¹⁰³ (Abdellatif, 2020; Salama, 2020)

cases, police investigations are botched or even non-existent, and in cases where a man is prosecuted, it is the woman's behaviour that becomes the focus of the trial, not the guilt of the accused. In the Middle East, this practice is still frequently used, under the pretext of preserving the honour of the family and/or the husband, and the number of victims is increasing.¹⁰⁴ In many Middle Eastern countries, domestic violence is not criminalized, as it is considered a private matter to be settled within the family. Honour killings are omnipresent in the Middle East, a traditionally conservative region where the notion of social order is very present. In Iran, for example, the notion of individuality is secondary, and society comes first. The question of honour is paramount in Middle Eastern societies. For French sociologist Camille Boudjak, who has led a worldwide campaign against honour killings, the question of honour is fundamental in Middle Eastern tribal and clan societies. Male behaviour is linked to honour, while female virtue is associated with chastity. Going against established social norms is considered shameful and dishonourable not only for the family, but for the whole community. To restore their lost honour, murder is often seen as the only solution.

How Do Families Kill their Daughters? The Psychology of Power, Control, Alienation, Shame, & Rage



Figure 16 How do parents decide to murder their daughters? L-R T-B. Naiyera Ashraf was a 21-year-old student who was nearly decapitated for rejecting a marriage proposal. Rotana and Tala Farea committed suicide in New York rather than be deported back to Saudi Arabia and returned to their family. Asra and Amaal Abdullah Alsehli were killed in their bedroom while awaiting asylum from their family in Saudi Arabia. Sarah and Amina Said were shot to death by their father for disobedience to his directions on who they would marry. Areej and Ashwaq Hamoud fled their family in Saudi Arabia and claimed asylum in Turkey. They were detained at the request of their family and the Saudi Government and are being returned to family custody. Eman Arsheed was shot to death for also, rejecting a marriage proposal.

¹⁰⁵ No country in the Middle East and north Africa releases an official count of "honour killings", which typically involve

¹⁰⁴ (Udasmoro, 2022)

¹⁰⁵ (Lamboley et al., 2022)



men murdering female relatives for actions they consider immoral.¹⁰⁶ Some have viewed honour killings as a logical extension of traditional Islamic gender practices, the natural consequence of a system that enforces sex segregation through veiling and female seclusion and harshly punishes violations of these boundaries.¹⁰⁷ I think that all concerned can agree that the levels of emotion that drive honour killings of loved family members is extraordinary in pathology.¹⁰⁸ The graphic in figure 17 works to help us better understand the nature of the problem. The pairs of sisters killed or arrested trying to flee familial male guardianship is quite intriguing in my research, much of it dedicated to the conditions that families kill their own children. We find that the root causes are in sociological structures that are highly patriarchal and highly sociocentric. These two social dynamics can place an intense burden on males to force a type of conformance upon the women of their family that is becoming rejected at a higher rate as intrusive globalisation offers alternative life choices to women. The failure to manage this process can create debilitating alienation, shame, and rage onto those males who are most vulnerable. Additionally, malign state and non-state actors work to amplify and deepen this process of alienation, shame, and rage on the male population as a means of psychosocial warfare waged against recognised governance. The emotion of shame is the primary or ultimate cause of all violence, whether toward others or toward the self and creates a 'logic of violence' that can be predicted and, unfortunately, artificially created by malign actors.¹⁰⁹ This aspect is touched on in §5.2 and §5.3 above. From a malign state/non-state actor perspective, inducing fathers to murder their daughters and wives may seem barbaric, but the practice serves a form of warfare purpose beyond the scope of this report. To bring this back to one Saudi girl seeking asylum in the United Kingdom, once I identify that her father, mother, and family are experiencing the mental and emotional affect of REDACTED's betrayal as alienation, I am assured that this alienation will conjugate to significant shame, which left unintegrated, will explode into physical rage if the family regains control over their daughter.

6.2.3 Category 3. Mental Health Services and Treatment; Protection from physical and emotional violence; Freedom of Personhood open to claimant if she is returned to Saudi Arabia.

Response. My responses in §5 and §6 articulate that REDACTED will not be able to seek relief from the Saudi government for her violation of her family's rights to her male guardianship. If, while in the UK, REDACTED has publicly spoken out against the Kingdom and its laws, REDACTED could be taken into custody by the anti-terrorism forces to ensure through interrogation that she has not become mentally extremised with western feminist ideology. Once released back to her family, REDACTED's disciplinary regime will begin with the goal of returning the girl to her obedience and acceptance of family, clan, and tribal norms of male guardianship. In terms of REDACTED's mental health, her acquiescence to her birthright as an Arab woman and 'special being' will be the most forthright pathway towards her renewed mental health. REDACTED's rejection of male guardianship and her fleeing from her family's control will be seen as the behavioural effects of her consumption of extremist-western ideology that damages their family, clan, tribe, and ultimately, Arab and Muslim ummah.

Relocation outside of her family's male guardianship. As explained above, this is not an option for REDACTED in Saudi Arabia in 2024 and beyond.

Mental health treatment. As a psychoanalytical anthropologist, I argue that any human community, left in isolation, can and will achieve stable mental health of its members as a requirement for communal survival. The UK, Western Europe, and the America's developed their methodological structure of mental health and therapeutic intervention based on very different social development needs than indigenous sociocentric tribal societies of the Arabian Peninsula. The mental health needs and practices of the UK are based on constructed societies where the needs and practices of REDACTED's family, clan, and tribe are based on inherited society. The differences between the two are extensive. The significance of these differences matters only because of intrusive globalisation and the internationalisation of law in Europe and the Americas. Inherited society in Saudi Arabia is sociocentric. Everything revolves around the collective rather than the individual. Members' ego-self identifies are formed from childhood as

¹⁰⁶ (Staff, 2021)

¹⁰⁷ (OECD.Stat, 2019; Staff, 2023)

¹⁰⁸ (AlQahtani et al., 2022b; ESOHR, 2020; Salem, 2021)

¹⁰⁹ (Birtchnell, 1997; Christian et al., 2018b; Franks et al., 1992a, 1992b; Lewis, 1972; Nathanson, 1988; Wurmser, 1982)



less individual agency, less individuation of thought and action and more collective agency. This is starkly different from the egocentric society in the UK, Europe, and the Americas where individual agency and individuation of thought and action are required rather than restricted. Mental health care for REDACTED in Saudi Arabia will consist of her re-indoctrination into the demands of her sociocentric and patriarchal family, helping her to disavow or disown the western ideas that have infected her mind, creating cognitive dissonance between the inner purity of family-tribal womanhood and against the profanity of western individual agency for females.

Western mental health facilities and capacities in the Kingdom. There exists in Saudi Arabia, twin forms of governance, justice, forgiveness, physical and mental health, family law, and tribal order. The first is a national ideal that is promulgated by the Kingdom through royal decrees and formal courts. The second can be described as an indigenous and ancient form that has survived in one form or another since pre-Islamic times. The tribes of Saudi Arabia are 'self-authorised' to choose from each without real risk of interference if there is no overt challenge to the primacy of the ruling house of Saud. In domestic matters of family law and health, patriarchal elders hold enormous authority of everyone in their household. And the predominant concern for each level of family, clan, and tribe, is the collective sustainment of social placement and avoidance of alienating shame. The mental health therapists that do exist in Saudi Arabia largest metropolitan communities are used almost exclusively by the foreign worker community. Enlightened wealthy families who pursue mental health treatment usually opt to send their family members to Europe or the United States. Several of my colleagues, for instance, routinely travel to the UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia to attend to these requests, or receive these family members at their practices outside of the kingdom.

Sexual Violence Power & Control Wheel.

There is a fully developed science behind western conceptualisations of positive and negative mental and emotional health that is encapsulated in the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Health Disorders (DSM) and we are on version number 5 (DSM-V). The DSM-V was developed for constructed western psychological organisation and sociological construction. Our science is far less helpful in examining and analysing sociocentric, inherited societies. To better explain, the graphic in figure 18 describes the dynamics and mechanisms of one person's 'unhealthy' power and control over another. Psychologists will use this graphic aid to understand the relationships of those they are attempting to assist. In sociocentric, hereditary, tribal, and patriarchal societies, this graphic would convey unacceptable negative valuation to central aspects of male and female personhood.^{110 111} The psychologist therapist in the UK would use this graphic to understand, analyse, and treat REDACTED in clinical sessions. This same graphic, however, would be rejected by her home community



Figure 17 Sexual Violence Power & Control Wheel

¹¹⁰ The graphic was created by the American State of Maryland's Coalition Against Sexual Assault and was adapted from the Power and Control Wheel created by Domestic Abuse Intervention Project at theduluthmodel.org.

¹¹¹ (MCASA, 2024)



in that they would not accept the characterisation of the concepts related in the graphic aid. This is why the question of psychological mental health equivalence between the UK and Saudi Arabia is not easily answerable. As an alternative, I would suggest that a person who psychosocially-emotionally thrives in a constructed society such as the UK would benefit from remaining in that society.

- 4 **Summary and Conclusion.** My duty to the Court is to offer the clearest description of a Respondent's condition as possible. I believe that if the claimant, REDACTED is deported to Saudi Arabia, she will be detained by the Saudi security agencies who will physically turn her over to her father and ensure her transportation home. Her entire activities in Jordan, to include her illicit marriage, loss of virginity outside of an approved marriage, intent to flee her obligations under family male guardianship, and even her doubts about the reasonableness and applicability of their interpretations of the Prophet's teachings will be discovered. I will not opine that she will be killed in an honour killing by her immediate or extended family, but that possibility is quite possible from the case documents and from the research. I do opine that she will be held in isolation at her parents' home until they are satisfied that they know the full circumstances of their daughter's actions and the motivations and reasonings behind them. I opine that her family will attempt to develop and implement a solution to REDACTED's perfidy that does not entail her murder. This would likely be locating a suitable husband from within the Al Dawasir tribe who would be willing to take REDACTED as one of his wives and ensure that she follows the social patters of acceptable behaviour, possibly bringing credit upon her parent's household. This would likely mean that REDACTED would become a subservient wife whose behaviour would be modified by the senior wife of her husband using various measures of behavioural control. Historically, strong minded women in Arab Muslim communities are not a new phenomenon and the male elders have ready experience in dealing with obstreperous women. What is different, is these types of women's ability to use the newer liberalisation of the Kingdom to try and escape a life of domestic imprisonment with absence of control over body, mind, emotions, and sexuality.

I, Patrick James Christian, confirm that I have made clear which facts and matters referred to in this report are within my own knowledge and which are not. Those that are within my own knowledge I confirm to be true. The opinions I have expressed represent my true and complete professional opinions on the matters to which they refer.

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