

# PsychoSocial Profile

Audience Analysis

# CHAD




# Psychoanalytical Anthropology

Psychoanalysis of Conflict Participants



VALKA MIR



## APPENDIX A – REGIONAL CONTEXT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHAD – Governance, Civil Conflict, & Vulnerable Population Segments.


### §A1. CHAD'S NATIONAL & REGIONAL CONFLICT OVERVIEW.

The Republic of Chad is one of at least five Sahelian countries in Africa that are under the control of military juntas whose regimes are not widely recognised as legitimate and all five are involved in ongoing violent civil conflicts. The



Figure 1 Sahelian Arc of Conflict

graphic image in **figure 1** illustrates that the conflicts involving Chad are part of a wider pattern of conflict across the Sahel's Arc of Conflict, involving Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, and Sudan. The conflicts in these countries follow the ethnic-cultural populations which cross national boundaries and create cascading effects that can only be understood in context with each other. We refer to these conflict countries as an "Arc of Conflict" in the Sahel. The conflicts in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso all involve Islamic Violent Extremist Organisations (VEO) led and organised by Al Qaeda, Islamic State, and Boko Haram. The three military juntas based in Ouagadougou, Bamako, and Niamey, have ejected all military and societal support from the United Nations, ECOWAS, European Union, and NATO in favour of the Russian Federation's Wagner Group and Iran's Quds Force. These countries are supporting the military juntas' efforts to combat the violent Islamic Extremists while trying to displace the indigenous Tamashek (aka Tuareg) and Toubou (aka Gourane) peoples from the regions' deposits of petroleum, natural gas, gold, and yellow cake uranium. Chad is fighting a decades long military-political challenge to its ruling regime from the Front for Change and Concord in Tchad, or FACT. At the same time, Sudan's two-decade old genocidal war by nomadic pastoralist Arabs in western Sudan against African Fur and Masalit farmers has spilled over the Ouaddai highlands against Chad's own Maba and Bilal farmers, opening a second front against the military regime. This 'Arc' is overlaid onto the Sahel Transition Zone, where the world's largest desert, the Sahara, gradually merges with the green lands of the sub-Sahara. To the



uninitiated, this region appears as desolate as the surface of the planet Mars. Yet underneath this seemingly barren land lies a vast aquifer of trillions of cubic meters of fresh water that is thought to be 75 meters deep, well below the surface. What is not visible to the naked eye, are the thousands of points of surface convergence that creates oasis pools of water pushed up by tremendous pressure. Within the enormous massifs that rise thousands of meters high, there are hidden lakes, streams, and green lands that only the historical tribes of the Kel Tamashek/Tuareg, the Toubou/Gourane, Zaghawa, Masalit, Fur, Maba/Ouaddaï and Arab truly comprehend. What is even less visible, are the vast complex structures of human physical, social, psychological, and meta-physical realities that make these lands an invisible society.<sup>1</sup> The reason for illustrating this invisible reality is because many observers of refugee migration default to an incorrect assumption that the home regions of these people are inhospitable and that all who flee are economic immigrants. While the focus of this Country-of-Origin report is the Misriyah tribe of east-central Chad, all these ethnic-cultural peoples share a common psychosocial connection to the physical spaces they inhabit and none of these different peoples mentioned above live in a vacuum; their historical narratives and psychosocial competitions over space, identity, and governance constitute the underlying fabric of the violent struggles in this 'Arc-of-Conflict'. The invisible human social structures of the Sahel are inextricably linked to the geography, geology, and climatology of the region, in the same way that Inuits of the Arctic region are linked to the ice packs through Psychogeological and Psychogeographical imprinting.<sup>2</sup> The pictorial map in **figure 2**, illustrates some of the seemingly implausible beauty that is rarely seen by western outsiders whose views of the region are via satellite maps. Hidden within the beauty of this complex terrain are vast networks of invisible social structures as they cross political boundaries, conforming to the geography, geology, and climate.

From its independence from France in 1958 the Republic of Chad has been beset by civil wars, foreign conflicts, and coups. The late President Idriss Déby himself seized the Chadian presidency in a military coup in 1990 and his son, General Mahamat Debey, murdered his political rival and cousin to hold on to his father's regime. Idris Debey's willingness to accommodate France's interests ensured his backing by western powers, providing his forces with training and weapons sufficient to repeatedly defeat rebellions against his rule. Idriss Debey's rule was repeatedly challenged by armed militant opposition groups after his first 15 years of rule in the first Chadian Civil War (2005 – 2010). The armed opposition did not end however, only moving from the Darfur region of Sudan to the Fezzan region of Libya. The second Chadian Civil War reignited in 2014 and continues to this day and has involved at least 47 different



Figure 2 Hidden natural wonders of the central Sahel

militias and movements, all opposed to the rule by the Idriss Debey family. The Toubou ethnic group of Chad and Niger are at the centre of two separate armed political-military resistance movements that are threatening the viability of both states.<sup>3</sup> The former is the Front pour l'Alternance et la Concorde au Tchad (FACT) led by

<sup>1</sup> (Adeagbo, 2023)

<sup>2</sup> (Christian, 2020)

<sup>3</sup> (Massalatchi, 2008; Mcallister & Lewis, 2021)



Secretary General Toubou Mahamat Mahadi Ali, a long-term political **figure** from Chad, who served as one of President Habre's ministers.<sup>4</sup> The latter is the Toubou-led Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Sahara (FARS) led by FARS President Bocar Mohamed Sougoume, also a member of the Toubou. The hostility between FACT and the Débey regime in power goes back to a rivalry between Débey's Zaghawa ethnic group and the Toubou ethnic group of the former president of Chad, Hissen Habré.<sup>5</sup> The late president Habré and the current head of FACT are both from the Toubou ethnic group.<sup>6</sup> Most of the opposition groups to the Chad government are a mix of overt political and covert tribal. The controlling social cohesion that exists in strong tribal societies such as Chad are through ethnic bloodlines and prior to the introduction of the colonial Westphalian system of States, each tribe thought of themselves as a unique 'nation-state' of its own, or a tribute-subsidary tribe-nation affiliated to a larger, more powerful tribe. As in Europe, there have historically been many major and minor empires in Africa, led by a powerful tribe that subdued and controlled other tribes across vast regions. My research has continuously found that many African tribal leaders associate the modern political state with a form of empire, where 'winner-takes-all' form of political and social organization. Nevertheless, the leadership of most of the armed resistance groups opposed to the Débey regime's (Idriss and son Mahamat Débey) continuation of control over Chad publicly articulate a nationalist ideology that voices support for the interests of marginalized peoples and areas in northern and central Chad. By 2005, there were several different rebel groups that were opposed to Débey's regime, some of whom were family members of Idriss Débey, and most of them were based in western Sudan in the Darfur area where I was then serving with the African Union. Part of my assignment as a USSF military officer in western Darfur Sudan and eastern Chad was to monitor and report on the formation and evolution of these armed resistance groups, which brought me into continuous interaction with many of these same Chad government and rebel leaders. Chad's military regime has been in the hands of the Idriss Debey family - father, now son, as military dictators for nearly half a century. Most recently, the regime has joined the notorious Alliance of Sahel States under military juntas after a string of coups des états across Africa that were assisted by the Russian Federation and the Republic of Iran. The regime murders its opponents and dissenters on a routine basis, even when they are directly related to the regime's leader. The regime is under constant military pressure from armed rebel groups which are either intent on overthrowing the regime or conducting ethnic cleansing of vulnerable population segments. The principal threat to the regime is from the Toubou/Gourane led *Front for Change and Accord in Chad (FACT)*, a rebel political-military organisation whose fighters killed the current regime leader's father in battle 2 years ago. The principal threat to the black African Muslim agrarian Bilala and related Lisi peoples in the Lake Fitri region of the Batha Prefecture and to the black African Muslim agrarian Maba peoples of the Ouaddaï highlands, is the Arab Baggara and Abbala semi-nomadic tribes that are expanding westward from western Sudan with their vast herds of cattle and camels, respectively. When, the black African Muslim agrarian families and villages take up arms to defend themselves against the Arab militia onslaught, they often come under fire from the regime security forces, who perceive that armed African tribes may join in with the FACT or constitute yet another armed rebellion. The armed Arab militias of the

<sup>4</sup> During my service with the African Union in Chad and Sudan, The FACT Founder, Mahamat Mahadi-Ali was part of one of those groups, where he floated in and out of different positions. At the time, he had close links with France where he spent part of his life. His family still lives in Reims, northeast of Paris. The French government turned against him when he founded FACT and turned against the Déby government who was backed (then and now) by the French Army. Sources in Paris report that Mahadi-Ali was subjected to financial sanctions from the authorities in Paris after the late President Déby convinced French security officials that the FACT leader had/has links to terrorist groups in the Sahel. Some observers see the targeting of Mahamat Mahdi Ali as a favour by the authorities in Paris to the Déby regime, which has been a stalwart supporter of France's anti-terrorism strategy in the region.

<sup>5</sup> The Toubou south of the Tibesti Mountains, the Daza, are also known by their Arabic name, Gura'an.

<sup>6</sup> (Staff, 2022)



Sudanese Baggara (cattle) and Abbala (camel) tribes have been pushing into Chad's Ouaddai highlands, and on into the fertile Lake Fitr region of Central Chad for the past decade with periods of resistance and opposition by the military regime of Chad. The ongoing civil war between the Sudanese general in control of the regular army and half of Khartoum, the capital and the general in control of the Rapid Support Forces who controls the other part of the capital, has resulted in widespread violence and destruction. The fighting between General al-Burhan's armed forces and General Hamdan Dagalo's RSF has spread into Darfur, with African and Arab villages suffering the effects of the conflict. The African areas that are protected under treaty by the Sudan Liberation Army, led by Dr. Al-Hadi Idris, has reignited the African-Arab militia war with tens of thousands of refugees flowing across the border into Chad. The Arab militia, seeking to avoid the civil war, have been steadily moving into Chad, seeking pastures undamaged by the war and an easier target than the now heavily armed Fur and Masalit tribes of Sudan. The Debey regime of Chad has taken a confusing stance over the Arab inflow. The dangers that the African farmers in the Lake Fitr region face from the Arab pastoralists cannot be underestimated. I was personally witness to the genocidal murder of thousands of black African Muslim farm families of the Fur, Maba, and Masalit communities in Sudan and Chad and I understand the risk that these populations face. There are few reporting mechanisms in place and the current regime's alliance with the AES has pushed many NGOs out of the central and northern regions of Chad.

### §A2 POPULATION SEGMENTS (TRIBES) IN CHAD.

Using the demographics map in **figures 1 & 3** as a guide, you can discern the incongruity of the multistate boundaries of the ethnic-cultural tribes against the political boundaries in the northern regions of the Sahel. Tuareg, or Kel Tamashek, for example, claim ownership of the Valley of Azawad and its four geographical points of the Hoggar and Caucasus Mountains, the Adra' des Ifoghas, and Air Massif, located across four political states.<sup>7</sup> The Zaghawa, Masalit, and Arab homelands stretch throughout the north and east regions of Chad and most of western Sudan. Where the centre of Tamashek (Tuareg) Tribal life is the Valley of Azawad, the centre of Toubou life is the Tibesti mountains,



**Figure 3** Phenotype Comparisons of Dominant Warrior Tribes of Chad: Zaghawa, Arab, Tuareg, and Toubou Non-African Caucasoid Seminomadic Pastoralist Rulers of the Sahelian Regions; with African Sedentary Maba – Ouaddai Highlands and Bilal – Lisi from the Lake Fitr region. The caricatures of phenotype illustrate the difficulties of outside perceptions of racial discrimination and ethnic exclusions that are often derived from archetypal aspects of collective identity rather than differences in physical appearance.

<sup>7</sup> (Christian, 2020)



from where the Toubou derive their name and language<sup>8</sup> The word Toubou translates as 'People of the (Tibesti) Rocks' from where they first emerged as hunter-gatherers.

**The Toubou Tribe** psychologically 'owns' the tri-state regions surrounding the Tibesti Mountains with the most densely populated, and historically important areas laying in Northern Chad, NE Niger, and Southern Libya. Toubou Lands are bounded to the west at the Air Massif by the Kel Tamashek, also known as the Tuareg, or 'Blue-men of the Sahara/Sahel because of their Indigo dyed Tagelmoust (head and face covering). To the east and south, Toubou lands merge into Darfur at the Jebel Mara, Dar-Zaghawa, and Dar-Masalit, where geographical ownership gives way to population growth and movement. The centre of Toubou life is the Tibesti mountains, from where the Toubou derive



Figure 4 Toubou Tribe of the Tibesti Mountains

their name and language. As illustrated in **figure 2**, the Tibesti mountains are both home and sanctuary for the Toubou ethnic peoples. The largest Toubou sub-grouping is into the two great families on either side of the Tibesti Mountains: the Tedda in the north and the Dassa in the south. The Toubou, like the Kel Tamashek, and the Kel Tamazight, were original members of the Caucasoid race that over time, merged with other African and Arab tribes through intermarriage. Currently, the Toubou's DNA tests suggest that they are now 40% Caucasoid and 60% Negroid and present as a separately DNA identifiable ethnic community. Part of the Toubou ethnic peoples live as nomadic pastoralists herding cattle, goats, donkeys, camels, and sheep. Other communities or subcommunities of the Toubou are farmers near the many oases, growing dates, grains, legumes, and roots. Still other parts of Toubou society operate cross-border/cross-regional caravan trading routes throughout the Sahel and Sahara Desert. Continuing with the human terrain map in **figure 1**, the Bilala and other Lisi peoples claim homelands in and around Lake Fitri, while the Maba alternately describe themselves as the 'people of the Ouaddaï highlands' or simply Ouaddaï. The Bilala, Lisi, Maba, and Fur peoples consider themselves to be black African, while the Toubou, Zaghawa, Arabs, Tuareg, and Berber tribes, were original members of the Caucasoid race that over time, merged with other African tribes through intermarriage. Currently, the Toubou, Tuareg, and Arab tribes' DNA tests suggest that they are now 40% Caucasoid and 60% Negroid and present as a separately DNA identifiable ethnic community.<sup>9</sup> All of this matters in understanding long-standing racial conflicts within the Muslim Caucasian-north phenotypes from the Muslim African phenotypes (Bilala, Maba Ouaddaï) depicted in **figure 3**. Many of these northern ethnic peoples live/lived as nomadic pastoralists herding cattle, goats, donkeys, camels, and sheep, with other subtribes historically engaged as farmers near the many oases, growing dates, grains,

<sup>8</sup> (Heath, 2005)

<sup>9</sup> (Christian, 2015a)



legumes, and roots. Still other parts of these northern tribes operate cross-border/cross-regional caravan trading routes throughout the Sahel and Sahara Desert.<sup>10</sup> They are Islamic in religion and a single group will have a sultan. But real power and social authority rests with the local pastoralist herdsman who inherit their offices generationally.<sup>11</sup> The seminomadic and pastoral nature of the Arab, Zaghawa, Toubou, and Tuareg, tribes required them to be self-sufficient in a more complete way than sedentary communities grouped around farmlands, towns, and cities. Historically these communities survived because of a warrior-like culture whose individual and collective archetypes possess dominant characteristics of protector, saviour, punisher, and survivor. Such archetypal traits are necessary for survival in one of the most physically challenging regions of the world for human societies.<sup>12</sup> Like the thorny desert cactus, these communities survived through the evolution of psychosocial-emotional structures of identity that allowed them to bend, but not break in the face of extreme adversity, with advanced orientation of 'flight-fight' ideas filtrated by endless oral storytelling from childhood onwards. All nomadic pastoral peoples face complex difficulties with collective adaptation from warrior culture to post-warrior civilization.<sup>13</sup> This is because their collective psychosocial identities are formed around the avoidance of 'timogoutar' which the Tuareg define as the psychological place in-between 'fight or flight' which psychologists refer to cognitive overload and loss of individual agency.<sup>14</sup> This avoidance of timogoutar shapes male-masculine and female-feminine constructions that endow them with capacities to survive nearly any crises or threat.<sup>15</sup> Except those threats to their reality that are brought about by the intrusion of globalised trade, travel, transportation, communications, manufacturing, animal husbandry, medicine (human and animal). Where the Bilala and other Lisi peoples call Lake Fitr and the Batha River home, the Maba, also called Bargo or Ouaddaï people, are another African Sunni Muslim ethnic group found primarily in the highland plateaus of the Ouaddaï region in eastern Chad and southern Sudan and number about 542,000. The graphic maps throughout this case study illustrate the geographical context of their homelands, which are a crossroads for Chad's Sahelian pastoralists which dominate governance and military – formal and informal.

Regular visits by the president and his minister of public security to Abéché attest to growing official concern about instability in the east. The government fears that periodic violence could spread to other provinces and even lay the ground for different government opponents and insurgents to find common cause.

Figure 5

<sup>10</sup> The basic Arab social unit of the Toubou, Zaghawa, Arab and Masalit is constructed from a descent group called a kashimbet, that is made up of several generations of men, their wives, and children or grandchildren who are descended from the male lineage. Members of the same kashimbet descent group live near each other and follow the same route during migration. Each kashimbet is headed by an elder male, called a shaykh (Arab & Zaghawa) or Amenokal (Tuareg & Toubou). This aspect of the social structure is visible in the disposition of tents (or houses among the more sedentary Arabs of N'Djamena). The residence of the shaykh or Amenokal is often at the centre of the camp or settlement, with the woven straw tents or adobe houses of his relatives arrayed around it in concentric circles. The area is surrounded by a fence or some other boundary that defines the zeriba, or walled camp. Within the kashimbet, loyalty is generally intense. These inherited institutionalized relationships are continuously reinforced by bonds of common residence and personal acquaintance. Kinship bonds also provide the ideological basis for broader units. Led by the head of the senior lineage, who is more a "first among equals" than a chief, the shaykhs or Amenokalen of neighbouring kashimbets sometimes meet to decide matters of common interest, such as the date of the annual migration. The shaykhs' leader may also deal with outsiders on their behalf. He concludes contracts with farmers to allow other Arab clans to pass the dry season on agricultural lands and levies tribute on strangers who wish to use the group's pastures and wells. Unlike what is found in Toubou society, marriage among the Arabs strengthens kinship ties. First, marriage is more a family than an individual concern; senior males from each family make initial contacts and eventually negotiate the marriage contract. An ideal union reinforces the social, moral, and material position of the group. Second, parallel cousin marriage (that is, union between the children of brothers or male relatives more removed), is preferred. This custom encourages the duplication of bonds within the group rather than the creation of a far-flung network of more tenuous, individual alliances, as occurs among the Toubou. Finally, the marriage ceremony is itself a community affair. Among the Toubou, marriage is associated with the feigned "stealing" of the bride from her family, whose members respond with grief and anger, but marriage among the Arabs and Zaghawa is an expression of solidarity. The ceremony is celebrated by a faqih (Muslim religious leader), and a joyous procession of neighbours, relatives, and friends escorts the bride to the house of her husband.


<sup>11</sup> (Christian, 2013a, 2020)

<sup>12</sup> The Toubou language is of the Nilo-Saharan language family and is closely related to the Zaghawa and Kanuri languages. The Zaghawa lead the Fur dominated Sudan Liberation Army and the Masalit-Zaghawa Justice and Equality Movements, which are in a civil war against the Sudanese Arab backed Janjaweed militants of Darfur in Western Sudan. The Kanuri ethnic community of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon of the Lake Chad basin are the source of Boko Haram.

<sup>13</sup> (Christian, 2018)

<sup>14</sup> (Christian, 2020)

<sup>15</sup> (Christian, 2013b)



**The Arab Tribes.** The communities that identify as Arab in Africa's Sahelian regions are descendants of the Bani Hillal Bedouin that brought the new religion of the Prophet Mohammed to North Africa in the 6th Century. This fact remains important because most of these descent groups have changed very little. In the Arab countries of origin, Bedouin communities still exist as well. They are given space and protection by benevolent oil rich kingdoms who celebrate their Bedouin roots even as they have long since transitioned to urban cities and joined the globalized world of trade,

travel, technology, and communication. The **Misseriya** and Zaghawa are two such descent groups whose members are still more rooted in their past than their present.

Even those tribes and families who have become essentially sedentary, their psychological organisation is based on nomadism and pastoralism. **Figure 3** offers a comparison of the two groups' phenotype which are sufficiently similar that members of the two tribes must learn each other's lineage names to know if they are one or the other. **Figure 6** top illustrates

a typical Bedouin in the Arabian Peninsula from the 17th Century while the bottom photo depicts Chad's Bedouins as they remain today. Both Misseriya and Zaghawa are Muslim, but not in the manner that British, American, or European Muslims practice their faith. This is because the original Arab community surrounding the Prophet Mohammed consisted of two distinctly different psychosocial collectives: The badawah or Bedouin and the hadarah or Sedentary. The former is generally acknowledged to be the ethnogenesis of Arab origin, a sort of fantasy ideal of archetypal identity. The latter, on the other hand, was and is, the practical reality of human social life capable of progressive evolution. the hadarah (sedentary) consisting of tribes who had begun congealing Arab social life around established towns


and cities supported by farming, trading and support of the cross-desert caravans. It is this sedentary progressive Arab life that figures most prominently in the Qur'an and the Hadith, as Muhammad and his family were of the sedentary Quraysh tribe of the city of Mecca. But it was the newly converted Bedouin tribes such as the Bani Hillal that ultimately protected and transmitted the Qur'an into the Sahara and Sahelian regions of nomadic pastoralists. The religion they carried was their own unique blend that subordinated the 114 suras of the Qur'an to the preexisting Bedouin spirituality, placing this new religion into the perspective of nomadic life, rejecting or ignoring those elements that did not fit within the existing psychological framework of life in the open desert. The spirituality of the Bedouin grew out of the geology and geography of its tribal habitats where base survival in an inescapable, unchanging climate served as a normative destiny. "Austere as it was, Bedouin life seemed inescapable. Western and northern Arabia offered only a few alternatives, mostly around small-scale agriculture and trade" The Sahara and its Sahel transition zone, however, were vastly larger than Arabia's Empty-Quarter where Bedouin life evolved over millennia. In the desert, mere survival is a spiritual act little related to the will of humans fortunate enough to still be amongst the living at the end of the day. The initial Bedouin spirituality exalted the timeless ethics of survival in desert nomad life, becoming a psychological ingroup to the competing sedentary outgroup. As the alternative to nomadic life took root, Bedouin spirituality took on a moral dimension of condemnation against the sedentary challenge to the idealization of fatalistic acceptance of what dahr

Bedouin circa  
17th Century



Figure 6 Arab Misseriya life comparison `17th century versus present day

Bedouin Tribesmen of Chad 2006






(epochal time) would bring with certainty. If sedentary society could build towns, store water and food, create defences against the acquisition raid, then change was possible, a renunciation of spiritual forces that had allowed desert dwellers to survive in the first place. Bedouin spiritual philosophy expresses itself most clearly in the:

“...belief in the relative profanity of all subjective rearrangement of the norms of nature, norms from which the idea of a possibly different future is absent. This view is based in the feeling that unchosen frames of social existence possess a claim to timeless and superior stability that surpasses the claims to stability of frames of existence chosen during an individual lifespan.”

It's not so much as the advent of Islam then that the Bedouin railed against, but rather the fundamental change in moral and leader responsibility for directing human life best left to the finitudes of dahr. The struggle between the evangelizers of universal Islam and the Bedouin identity as expressed by its prototypical society the badawah over the placement of Islam in Arab life continues, finding its way into most conflicts where Arab and Islam vie for primacy of salience. This Bedouin identity harbours a tribal ethos that developed over millennia of severe deprivation which allowed the collective to survive. This ethos can be likened to a hard shell made impenetrable from suffering and loss that is 'baked into' the archetypal identity of male masculinity that interfered with the evolution of peaceful Islam as the outward expression of this identity is a generationally transmitted trauma of what is called muruwah. “From the very beginning, Muhammad's religion was diametrically opposed to some of the essential principles of muruwah”. The primary jihad or struggle of Islam was always against the resistance of the Arab tribes to abandon their patrimonial muruwah and the hasab or tribal glory contained therein. Muruwah is a complex ideation of individual and group identity that evolved from generations of bitter subsistence survival in the open desert. The feelings of muruwah that shape Arab identity encompasses stoic suffering, chivalric codes of honour and rigid conduct meant to ensure the survival of their species and historical memory of their existence. The two concepts of a peaceful application of Islam and the hold of Bedouin muruwah creates a cognitive dissonance in the placement of Islam as a subordinate feature of the tribe's Arab ethnicity, which has the effect of negating the universality of the Islamic social ordering force. This creates internal conflict because Islam is not merely a personal spiritual faith, but rather a complete reordering of social values, family hierarchy,



**Figure 7** Pastoralist Family depictions typical in central and northern Chad. Men and boys nearing the age of puberty leave the home-hamlet during rainy season, following the lush growth that sprouts after even small amounts of rainfall. This semi-nomadic existence is more than a way of life, it is an imprinting on the cognitive geospatial awareness of its members. The semi-nomadic imprint is expressed in pastoralism, trade, navigation, and security escorting trades that allow for the continuation and avoidance of complete sedentary life. One does not join into what one has not always been a part of. But not all Arab families still practice pastoralism, and many of the Misseriya families are now sedentary farmers, traders, crafts, and light manufacturing. Their connection with their pastoralist semi nomadic kin is evident throughout their shared identity.



and human relationships. The **Misseriya** **المسيرية** are the Baggara (cattle) segment of the Bedouin population of the central Sahel as depicted in **figure 7 & 8**. The other segment is called Abbala, which is Arabic for camel.

The sociological differences between the two involve the respective animal herds capacity to move over long distances without water. Abbala Bedouins can range further north into the northern reaches of the Sahel and southern reaches of the Sahara.

Properly equipped, Abbala tribesmen can cross the Sahara Desert in caravans as part of the African to Arabian Peninsula trade routes that date back several millennia. The Baggara, are required by geography, geology, and climate to remain closer to the Sahel regions, traveling from river to lake during the dry season to prevent their livestock from perishing. Both Baggara and Abbala speak a Sudanese variant of Arabic. Many Misseriya families lead a common traditional mode of subsistence and nomadic cattle herding, although many lead a settled existence as depicted by the graphic in **figure 7**.

Where the **Misseriya** peoples believe themselves to be direct descendants of Bani Hillal Bedouins, the **Zaghawa** people were in recorded existence before and after the spread of Arabism and Islam from the Arabian Peninsula. The early Arabs called them black nomadic pastoralists who were organised around an oasis-centred system of animal herding and were based in Dar Zaghawa, Land of the Zaghawa. One such family is depicted in **figure 7**. The Zaghawa internally refer to themselves as the Beri, and that their language is Zaghawa, an eastern Saharan language that has become Arabized. Traditionally, the Zaghawa lead a predominantly pastoral life, made up of nomadic clans with horse, donkeys, goat and sheep herd keeping focus. they were noted merchants and traders with camels and horses, controlling some of the Trans-Saharan trade routes. Historically, the Zaghawa people have often held a sort of hegemony over most of the smaller societies that stretched along the Sahel between Lake Chad to the Nile valley kingdoms of Nubia, Makuria and Alwa. While the Zaghawa are not very powerful in Sudan, they politically dominate Chad. The former president, Idriss Déby, and his son Mahatma Deby, supported by his immediate family have a firm grip on power in Chad that appears unlikely to change anytime soon. Different segments of the larger Zaghawa people have also been deeply involved in contemporary wars in Chad, Libya and Sudan. In Chad, members of the Zaghawa tribe have aligned with and joined the FACT armed rebellion against the Debey regime of father and son. In Sudan, Zaghawa tribesmen lead the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and staff the majority Fur Sudan Liberation Army fighting the nomadic Abbala and Baggara commonly referred to as the notorious Janjaweed tribes. The Zaghawa have suffered much loss from the troubles there, with entire families and clans in Sudan among the peoples living in the refugee camps in Darfur and eastern Chad where the recruitment of child soldiers into rebel movements is an ongoing problem. The ongoing civil war in Darfur Sudan has spilled over to the Ouaddaï Highlands in eastern Chad and has become reoriented to a war of cultural identity cleansing between tribes who refer to themselves to be Arab against those who refer to themselves as African. The peoples now involved in this expanding conflict include African Fur and Maba peoples (see **figure 1 & 3**) who are strategically aligned with Masalit and Zaghawa peoples. The former are in fact distinctly African in phenotype and archetype, but the latter two

Figure 8  
Homelands of  
the Zaghawa  
and Misseriya





are nearly indistinguishable from Arab, Tuareg, and Toubou peoples of the Sahel and Sahara regions. If all of this sounds very confusing, it is even more so on the ground attempting to mediate with them, to perceive and understand the differences through their imaginary cultural constructions that were a thousand years in the making. There is an intractable conflict now in Chad and Sudan between Arab and African ethnic-cultural identity that drives a violent conflict. The Arab Baggara and Abbala against the African Fur, Masalit, Zaghawa, and Maba peoples over Arab-white versus African-black. Between nomadic pastoralist versus sedentary farmer. Between a perceived glorious past versus a terrifying present-future. Chad's Deby regime is unwittingly caught in this conflict which hampers its ability to consolidate political power. The regime's security services alternately punish (kinetically) the Arabs involved, then the Africans involved, in displays of impotent frustration. But the regime is unable to resolve the underlying conflict drivers because it is focused on maintaining power and resource control rather than building a national identity capable of integrating into a globalised world.

**The Maba** self-identify as an African people despite being an Arabized African people.<sup>16</sup> They are sedentary farmers of crops and livestock, living in tightknit communities who are clan-oriented.<sup>17</sup> In their homelands in Ouaddaï Maba families and clans organise into large tight clusters of houses, grouped together into fenced compounds that provide for human and livestock habitat, crops and grain storage. This organisation begins with compact villages that grow into larger towns and extends into both regional and national capitals. The Maba are a conservative people with a strong sense of identity and a resistance to change. They have a reputation for being wary of outsiders<sup>18</sup> and their most important influence is from the Sultan of Ouaddaï, based in the regional capital of Abéché.<sup>19</sup> The Maba's homelands in Ouaddaï are hot and dry most of the year. Broad flat grasslands and plateaus characterize the area and are populated by Elephants, antelopes, giraffes, and lions that co-exist with the Maba and other neighbouring tribes. Traditional Maba communities in Ouaddaï raise millet and wheat as their staple crops. Horses, cattle, goats, sheep, and chickens are

raised for their milk, butter, wool, eggs, and meat. They are also used for trade in the markets, as well as for animal sacrifices. Extremely poor infrastructure in Ouaddaï, coupled with limited water supplies, make the region an extremely difficult place to live. The region is vast, and roads are almost non-existent. Humanitarian workers face monumental challenges in developing strategies for safe water access to refugee camps. A common water resource in the region around *Farchana* and *Hadjer Hadid* is the *Moura Wadi*. Wadis run fast and strong during the rainy season, June through September. People dig shallow wells in the



*Figure 9 Maba family in the Ouaddaï highlands are African Muslim agricultural peoples who are on the receiving end of Arab nomadic pastoralist violence.*

<sup>16</sup> They and their language are better known by the name Ouaddaï (pronounced Wad-aye), which is the term used by people who are not Maba. Ouaddaï has become the name of an administrative district and is often used less precisely for the eastern region of Chad. Their language, Maba, is a Nilo-Saharan language which is locally referred to as Bura Mabang. Many Maba people also speak Arabic, as their traditional trade language.

<sup>17</sup> This is opposed to Arabs, Tuareg, and Toubou, which usually self-identify as 'non-African' and often place themselves in a higher sociogenic category than black Africans.

<sup>18</sup> Gustav Nachtigal, famous German explorer of Central and West Africa, described the Maba as the most arrogant and fanatical men he had ever met on his travels, stating that they were not only religious extremists, but also possessed a deep conviction in the superiority of their country, their king and themselves, which according to Nachtigal explained his aggressive behaviour towards foreigners.

<sup>19</sup> The capital of Ouaddaï is Abéché, which doubles as the home of the Maba's Sultan Palace is in the Capital town of Abéché, Sultan traditionally is the head of the State and rules that directs the people through governors, district Chiefs, and various Other Official. Sultan is also referred as Son of Queen or son of the Queen Mother, who is believed to be the widow of the previous Monarch and women have the highest status and great influence among the Maba People of Chad.



wadi in the absence of rain during the dry season and use pumps to access groundwater that is often contaminated and of high turbidity. Ouaddaï is one of the world's regions most affected by severe food insecurity, which is a consequence of limited rainfall, lack of sufficient fertile arable land, and overpopulation due to the refugee crisis and rapid population growth. Increasing numbers of Maba have populated the outskirts and neighbourhoods of N'Djamena, creating pockets of influence that link back to Abéché and their homelands in Ouaddaï.

**The Bilala** are an African sedentary agricultural Muslim people who live primarily in Chad's Batha Prefecture, in the centre of the country near Lake Fitri and the Batha River. the central region in Chad. Along with the Kuka and Medogo peoples, the




Figure 10 Bilala family from Lake Fitr, Chad



Bilala make up a larger group, the Lisi. The three groups speak mutually intelligible languages and often intermarry. The Bilala have lived near Lake Fitri for over five hundred years. They were originally nomadic people who settled down to grow their crops and raise their livestock near the lake. The claimant, his family, and the Bilala speak a language called Naba, also called Napo or Rotana. The Bilala are a Muslim people that live around Lake Fitri, in the Batha Prefecture, in central Chad. The last Chadian census in 1993 stated that they numbered 136,629 people. Their language, Naba, is divided in four dialects and is a part of the Central Sudanic language family; it is shared by two of their neighbours, the Kuka and the Medogo. These three peoples are collectively known as Lisi and are believed to be descendants of main ethnic groups of the Sultanate of Yao. **Figure 10** illustrates the geographical origins of the Bilala and provides an illustration of an average agricultural village of the Bilala communities. The Bilala and the other Lisi ethnic communities constitute a bounded collective of Chad that is historically self-reliant for most all their social, physical, security, economic, and internal governance needs. To their south is the majority African Christian sub-Saharan regions of the Sara peoples and to their west and north are the non-African Zaghawa, Arab, and Toubou-Gourane peoples, who are pastoral semi nomadic peoples of the desert and rock, at least historically. The closest communities ethnically to the Lisi peoples are the Maba, Masalit, and Fur of the Ouaddaï Highlands in the eastern regions of Chad. The capital of the Batha Prefecture is a small city or large town called Ati, on the Batha River. The Bilala and other Lisi peoples are not restricted to their home prefectures and there are collectives of Lisi, Maba, and Sara in established communities in the national capital of N'Djamena, often wealthier families who have established national and international trade efforts in support of their ethnic collectives in their home ethnic areas. These elite families will provide the social, political, economic, leadership for their respective communities at the national level. Not all members of each collective represented in N'Djamena are wealthy and provide essential home and business labour in the capital or they return home to their ethnic homelands. Bilala villagers work at farming and raising livestock. One of my research subjects, a young boy, was gored by a bull and his lingering internal effects of





the damage to kidneys and liver were never medically treated to anything close to modern standards, as is the norm in this type of society emerging into globalised life of trade, travel, communications, agriculture, healthcare, food and medicine. The boy's parents described that the family's village and their farms were attacked by seminomadic pastoralist Arab tribes who chased them off their land and into exile from their Lisi homelands.

*"Our tribe had a conflict with the more dominant Arab tribes in Chad. The Arab tribes did not like our tribe because they see those with darker skin as inferior. I witnessed first-hand how they would come and loot our lands. They would steal our animals and would often burn neighbouring lands if faced with resistance. Our village was very small; consisting of only 4 or 5 huts. One night they attacked our farm, and we fled with my maternal uncle to the town in Umm Basttna. The rest of my family fled to a small village of Al Hawia. I was split from my family at this point and have never seen them since. I do not know what happened to our land or animals, but I fear the very worst. I left Chad in the winter of 2021."*<sup>20</sup>

### §A3 TRIBAL TAXONOMY OF SOCIAL ORDER.

The tribes of Chad's Sahelian and Saharan regions are part of a continuous ethnic fabric that extends west into Niger, east into Sudan, and north into Libya. The Toubou / Gourane ethnic peoples of Chad are inextricable from the ethnic peoples of Niger and Libya. The Zaghawa and Masalit of Chad are linked by family ties and blood responsibilities to their ethnic kin in Sudan. The Arab Baggara and Abbala are more diffuse as their member tribes range from Mauritania in the west, to Mali, Niger, Chad, and Sudan in the east, a space larger than all of Europe. The tribal social order is the basis of human, animal, and agricultural existence that sustains a form of human life that is nearly unfathomable to western, developed societies. Tribal life in Chad and the Sahel consists of a social system that provides governance, security, physical & mental health, economic, and political organisation in spaces that are.<sup>21</sup> At the core of conflicts for these types of communities is change. Unwanted change from globalisation that intrudes into the core of their psychological identity; creates alienation of their ancient, constructed identity without any blueprint for how they could or should adapt. The alienation created conjugates to overwhelming collective episodes of shame that, unintegrated, erupt into a frenzied rage that blots out reason and drives genocidal murder. From a psychoanalytical perspective, the changes to their psychological identity at the archetypal level that threatens them with psychosocial disintegration and subsequent physical annihilation would predictively result in episodes of intense inter and intra communal violence that bystanders would assert to be irrational or insanity. This arguably emotional description is based on my 12-months of physical presence in this genocidal conflict in Darfur Sudan and the Ouaddaï Highlands in Chad. Each of the tribes involved in the Arc-of-Conflict in the Sahara and its Sahelian transition zone are beset by a cognitive dissonance that could be described as a 'Soul Wound' to borrow from the Native American Indians, which is an inability to adapt their nomadic, pastoral, warrior based psychosocial



Figure 11 Psychosocial Motivations of Tribes in Chad

<sup>20</sup> Field research 2024 notes.  
<sup>21</sup> (Lackner 2016).



organisation to the vicissitudes of intrusive globalisation. This soul wound is created from change that a people are unable to integrate into their psychosocial reality. Generations of nomadic pastoralism, we believe, imprints epigenetic changes in both mind and body that help ensure survival in the most inhabitable geography/geology/climate in the Sahara and Sahel. Beyond this, nomadic pastoralists possess a narrative identity designed to secure them from alienation, shame, and psychological disintegration. Roughly restated, their narrative support went something like this. On the one hand, the nomadic Bedouin (*badawah*) looked inward to the lights of the city, the smell of the wadis and oasis, and reflection of wealth and safety that they might never attain. On the other hand, the settled elites (*hadarah*) of the clan and tribe looked outward to the desert as both wall around the safety of hadarah community, and smelled the freedom and nobility that their security and comfort had forfeited:

*“The ancestors’ way of life had been the nobler one, the life of tent-dwellers, often on the move. Nobility and freedom were inseparable, and the nomad was free. In the desert a man was conscious of being the lord of space, and in virtue of that lordship he escaped in a sense from the domination of time. But the townsman was a prisoner; and to be fixed in one place – yesterday, today, tomorrow – was to be a target for time, the ruiner of all things.”<sup>22</sup>*

Nomadic pastoralist peoples and families’ tribal identity is primary to their national identity as citizens of any political colonial state such as Chad. The former is far more powerful than the latter which is interpreted differently by tribe. Every tribe considers themselves to possess a sovereignty that no other tribe, nor the state, can infringe upon. Each tribe possesses a collective ownership of, and direct control over, its hereditary geographical habitation and the resources underneath such as soil, water, or (when allowed) energy. Land is used collectively to provide the means to its sustenance, development, and growth. To be without tribe is to be ‘*muhamashin*’, ‘*dhair*’, and ‘*misikin*,’ without the means of survival.<sup>23</sup> The basic stratification of nomadic pastoralists is between those whose protection and social security is derived from their tribe and those who are dependent on the slowly developing state structures found predominantly in the large urban cities. For the former, the tribe is both the building block of society and a competitor to the central government. As a comparison to western jurisprudence and social structure, nomadic pastoralist’s think of their tribes as states, shaykhs & Amenokalen as governors, tribal law as social constitutions, and tribal militia to a home militia guard. While this is a very imperfect comparison, it does accurately reflect the psychosocial-emotional sentiment of tribes and their leaders. In pastoral nomadic society, men who can bear arms, and thus are able to protect themselves, are responsible for those who are considered ‘dependent’ and are therefore under the protection of others.<sup>24</sup> The emphasis is not so much on the weaponry, but on the social authority to protect and speak for others. Although women, children, and young unmarried men belong by birth to their respective social group, they are also considered ‘dependent’ and are under the protection of those with social authority. One does not join a tribe but must be born into it. Where a person is from matters only so much as it indicates Who he/she is from. Children and adults from a broken Bayt are absorbed into the Habl, usually within the Qarya, and always within the Uzla.<sup>25</sup> People who were not born into one of the Uzla of the Qabila have no status, no existence within and could not join even if they tried to. As **figure 9** illustrates, tribal life is a closed social system. The Bayt and the Habl that it belongs to is beyond

<sup>22</sup> (Lings, 2006, p. 23)

<sup>23</sup> (ACAPS Thematic Report, 2020)

<sup>24</sup> (Cronin, 2013)

<sup>25</sup> (Schmitz, 2011)



patriarchal. Except for the Kel Tamashek in the Valley of Azawad<sup>26</sup>, only men in tribal life can bear arms and thus wield authority of any type. Women, children, and land constitute a Qaabilah's principal patrimony, wealth, and obligation, and his greatest source of alienation, shame, and identity disintegration.<sup>27</sup> For a nomadic Qabila, his ability to protect *and control* his women, children, and land is the basis of his social position which undergirds his male masculine identity.<sup>28</sup> Contrary to French sociologist Émile Durkheim's<sup>29</sup> ideas about 'primitive society' - what he thought of as mechanical, repressive structures lacking moral cohesion - are sociocentric societies that depend on an external locus of member control. Durkheim's assumption that sociocentric societies (*which characterise the Sahelian nomadic pastoral tribes*) are lacking in morality was incorrect. Morality deeply infuses the sociocentric Arab person, perhaps more so than their egocentric counterpart. The sociocentric Arab father for instance, learns to live with the requirement to make painful and difficult choices between equally loved members of family; between the good of the one versus the good of the whole. The misunderstanding of morality in nomadic pastoral sociocentric society lies in the differing calculus of behaviour control of societal members – internal for the egocentric and external for the sociocentric. Where the egocentric member of society is consumed with individual decisions about moral thoughts and behaviour, the sociocentric member is consumed with a shared moral character that encompasses at a minimum, the nuclear family and maximally the entire tribe. The sociological construction of society based on an external member locus of control establishes vast and complex differences for the sociocentric family (from that of the egocentric) that is particularly susceptible to damage and rapid change. This greater vulnerability to damage in sociocentric families involves the requirement for group synchronization in thought and emotion as part of the process of making meaning and sustaining the ethos laden collective of shared individual identities. Using Durkheim's example of primitive morality, sociocentric family members determine right and wrong collectively, not individually – shame of alienation drives conformance rather than individual guilt socialized into the egocentric member. Even before any right or wrong act takes place, the family members interact with each other to form the basis for their shared individual morality, just as they do their shared individual identity. In such a communal structure, morality cannot be an individual ideation in the sociocentric society, dependent as it is on the collective for definition, context, and execution.<sup>30</sup>

#### §A4. ETHNIC, CULTURAL, & FAMILY SOCIAL CONDITIONS IN CHAD.

In the constructed societies of the developed world (as in UK and Europe), we have systems of repair of body, mind, habitat, relationships, and even family-like support systems because we have an expectation of damage and disruption. This is why it's called a constructed society rather than an inherited, sociocentric, tribal society. Constructed societies are repairable because they are expected to break. They break with job changes, education, travel, crime, elections, and so on. Sociocentric inherited societies are not expected to face such constant change, needing constant repair. When damage happens to Chad's tribal population segments, they adapt, they accept, the large extended family and tribe flexes around the damaged person(s) and the community copes. When the entire village is destroyed, when the family is lost, when war breaks these vulnerable inherited lifecycles, the survivors either survive or they don't. There is

<sup>26</sup> The Kel Tamashek, or Tuareg have a partial matriarchal society and in certain cases, women can become the leader of a family-clan-kel, with the right to bear arms and wage war.

<sup>27</sup> (Adra, 2006)

<sup>28</sup> The Arabic terms of Habl, Qarya, Uzla, Qabila, and others used here are not the only variations used by different Arabized nomadic pastoral tribes. Variations exist across the Arabian Peninsula, the Sahara, and the Sahel.

<sup>29</sup> (Durkheim, 2021; Gellner, 1975)

<sup>30</sup> (Christian, 2016)



no safety net. No medical assurance. No right to life or right to be free from fear. A person's physical injuries will either sufficiently heal, or she/he will perish. A person's psychological trauma will be endured because she/he will likely end up on the streets where the struggle for physical survival pushes effects of trauma deeper into the mind's recesses. Over the last few years, thousands of displaced young people have fled to N'Djamena from the villages in rural Chad. They are driven out of their home villages by war, violence, drought, mining, desertification, and deforestation. If they are lucky, they find work in part-time jobs as domestic workers or street vendors. These young men and women, many of them minors, are given colloquial names by the wealthier residential neighbourhoods of N'Djamena. In one of the capital's northern neighbourhoods, a 40-meter-wide boulevard runs through several wealthy neighbourhoods which attract homeless young people for subsistence work, who are called *fonctionnaires de la rue de 40*<sup>31</sup>. The young women are usually hired by rich families in the city's northern neighbourhoods, where they carry out menial tasks for the household in exchange for salaries far below the national minimum. They are often subjected to ill-treatment and sexual abuse. During the day, the young men roam the streets, offering various objects and services (nail clippers, shoe-shiners, hairdressers, domestic and everyday objects, pens, second-hand clothes, etc). They live together in small rooms in the outlying neighbourhoods of N'Djamena (especially Walia, Nguéli, Farcha and Gassi) and travel long distances to get to their workplaces. They can be seen in groups of five or six, morning and evening, walking along the streets leading to the neighbourhoods where they work. The collective psyche of N'Djamena's wealthy and elite, views these young people with a mixture of pity and reproach, accusing them of the evils of which they are both the vectors and the first victims. In a country where references are still overwhelmingly linked to the rural context, they are associated with all the scourges of large urban centres: violence, addiction, robbery, incivility, low education levels, isolation, misery, ill-treatment, delinquency, precariousness, prostitution, sexual abuse, early pregnancies, HIV-AIDS and other STDs, exploitation, and even slavery. The way in which they are treated by their bosses and the misery of their condition arouses compassion. Conversely, their lack of education and poor upbringing, the violence that is attributed to them and some of their behaviours, which are scandalous in the eyes of Chadian society, are met with disapproval. Deep down, they are blamed for having left the villages out of laziness, to escape the hard work in the fields, and to let themselves be taken in by the mirage of an easy life in the city. Associated with the rural exodus, this phenomenon which, according to N'Djamena residents, is growing in scale, is both shocking and worrying.

"God divided the jinn and the humans into ten parts. One part makes up the human race, and the other nine parts is made up of the jinn." (El-Zein 2009, p.52)



Figure 12 pre-Islamic metaphysical beliefs enshrined into religious text

#### §A4.1 INDIGENOUS MENTAL HEALTH IN ARAB SOCIOCENTRIC TRIBAL SOCIETY.

From 2004 to 2021, I was a field researcher in Somalia, Sudan, Chad, Niger, Mali, Libya, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, conducting in-depth qualitative interviews of families and leaders of tribal societies in conflict. My assignments were to research the psychological and emotional drivers of civilian participation in extremism, violence, ethnic

<sup>31</sup> (Bazzara. Aurélie, 2018; Nguedmbaye, 2019)



cleansing, and genocide. My focus direction was often drawn to indigenous mental health because behavioural radicalisation is a by-product of mental extremization, which is a form of psychological pathology. Nomadic pastoral tribes' conceptualisation of mental health uses metaphysical concepts that long predate western psychology's methodological ontology. Indigenous mental health conceptualisations also predate Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. This is central to all interactions with sociocentric societies whether tribal, nomadic, pastoralist, or subsistence hunter-gatherers. This lesson was reinforced for me during one interview of an elder of one of the clans in the Ha'il region. As we sat on a blanket and discussed his family's participation with rebel forces against their ethnic enemy, he pointed to the sky, where twin lines of jet contrails curved across the horizon. He then told me that we were watching "Jinns" or spirits flying across the sky, which he used to illustrate his story of human interaction with the metaphysical world. I naively attempted to inform my elder host that those white twin lines were from the engines of an aluminium tube with wings full of human beings and their luggage, flying several kilometres above the ground. His wrinkled face showed such incredulous contempt of my childish ignorance, that I never repeated that mistake.<sup>32</sup> Jinns are spirits that have interacted with mankind since the beginning of time.<sup>33</sup> Jinns work to comfort and console man in his darkest hour. Jinns also cater to, and excite man's imagination within art, music, purpose, and yes, sex.<sup>34</sup> Psychologically, Jinns serve an important mental housekeeping function of trait dissociation, where socially unacceptable thoughts and feelings are cast outward onto a Jinn spirit, where it can be safely condemned and disavowed, without undue damage to the individual's ego-self. The dynamic and its necessity is culturally universal. The expression of this dynamic using spirits called Jinns is unique to Arabic and Arabic aligned cultural identity groups. The use of metaphysical 'Jinns' to explain mental health conditions such as bipolar, manic-depressive, schizophrenia, trauma, and others is a natural part of indigenous forms of mental and physical health. In practice, however, Arabized Muslim tribes' attempts to employ religiously based explanations often lead to an increase in harm to the already suffering victim. In other indigenous, non-Arab, tribes, my research has revealed extensive structures of indigenous health that rival western psychotherapy. From the Acholi people's Mato Oput ceremonies of justice and forgiveness to the Kel Tamashek peoples' spirit possession ceremonies that relieve guilt, shame, and reaffirm individual and collective subconscious identity, many indigenous communities have developed complex practices of maintaining communal mental health.<sup>35</sup> Arab cultural identity construction is based on ancient modes of austere socioeconomic life of Bedouin archetypes, a condition that was exaggerated-made real by its incorporation into the Qur'an and Hadith of the Islamic faith.<sup>36</sup> The centrality of the Bedouin archetype in Arab identity and its unavoidable incorporation into the Islamic faith are evidenced as much by Islamic conflict and violence as by normative Arab cultural expression. Even as the hadarah Arab tribes settled into villages and towns, creating economies, social structures, and the moral basis necessary to support the evolution of a sedentary identity, the badawah Arab tribes resisted. Despite the change of parts of clan and tribe from badawah to hadarah, both desert dweller and townsman retained ritual and tradition, formulated by millennia of time surviving in the desert. The sociological structures that allowed for life to develop without water, without agriculture, and without


<sup>32</sup> As I pondered this episode in my field research, I realized how improbable was my explanation of those twin white lines high in the noon sky must seem to that elderly man who was born in the first quarter of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century.

<sup>33</sup> (El-Zein 2009, p.52)

<sup>34</sup> (Sunderland, 1983; Turner, n.d.; White, 2010)

<sup>35</sup> (Christian, 2015b, 2020)

<sup>36</sup> (El-Zein, 2009)



permanent abode required psychological conditions of fulfilment not found in other types of settled societies. The sociological structure of Bedouin life produces profound psychological emanations of ritual and tradition:

*“The theme of perpetual loss and ruin, as the ‘substance’ of this tradition resonated differently within Bedouin and sedentary societies. For the nomads, loss and dying were regular norms of nature; they needed no metaphysical camouflage, and the ode [spiritual poems of Arab Bedouin life] did not venture to offer any. Only the language of mourning itself mitigated the loss.”<sup>37</sup>*




Figure 13 Jinniyah as mechanisms of (negative) trait dissociation


The spirituality of the Bedouin grew out of the geology and geography of its tribal habitats where base survival in an inescapable, unchanging climate served as a normative destiny.<sup>38,39</sup> Thus, even though many Zaghawa and Arab families in Chad are mostly hadarah, or sedentary, a significant portion of their cultural identity remains based on the individualist, survivalist, nomadism of the Bedouin. Their collective identity exists in a steady state of tension between enlightened Islam and *badawah*, where male masculine identity involves a rejection of weakness and an embrace of alternate spirituality of the illogical metaphysical spirit world that rules man's inner psychological self.<sup>40</sup> The complexity of nomadic pastoralist tribes' struggle with cultural identity archetypes drawn from austere survivalist Bedouin life can be thought of or explained as the generational

transmission of trauma, a 'pierced/altered reality' that is out of place and time in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. This generational trauma of Bedouin survivalist is the reason for much of the family and tribal conflict in the peninsula, which is exacerbated by intrusive globalisation and malign external actors seeking to influence behaviour within vulnerable members and families. Even in the absence of external intrusions, the clash of the sacred (*badawah*) and the profane (*hadarah*) are infused with a life-or-death ideation that energises resulting family pathologies. Family members 'must comply' with ancient archetypes of thought and prototypes of behaviour if the family-tribal identity is to survive. This same identity has resisted change by Islam, modernisation, and now, globalisation of thought and mental health. Within nearly all of Africa's Sahara and Sahel regions and the Arabian Peninsula, tribal affiliation and affinity is as strong as ever and rising.

### §A5. VIOLENT CONFLICT CONDITIONS IN CHAD.

The organisation of African and non-African society and government in Chad are inherited rather than constructed. In the absence of psychosocial conflict, African communities have shown their ability to successfully adapt to globalised systems of the UN, AU, EU, ECOWAS, and ECOEAS that govern and lead development. The African Sara peoples in Chad's south are one such example. The normal development of globalisation pushes the other unprepared tribal societies into merger with the larger world around them. Their unprepared societies have preexisting psychosocial internal conflicts that, in the presence of competing others' they are called into positions of conflict that they can never

<sup>37</sup> (Bamyeh, 1999) Page 53  
<sup>38</sup> (Dickson & R. Wilson, 1983)  
<sup>39</sup> (al-Dawsari, 2012)  
<sup>40</sup> (Burge, 2012)



win.<sup>41</sup> Like Don Quixote, their endless battle for existence is a central psychosocially organising function, but their allegorical windmills are no longer real. The graphic aids in the conflict maps illustrate some of the past and present rebellions and civil conflicts in Chad. To its east, genocidal conflict still brews in Darfur, western Sudan and Arab nomadic pastoralists and their protective militias have brought the conflict to Chad's African Muslim farmers. The Zaghawa of Sudan are at the lead of a violent war with the Bedouin Arabs who are commonly referred to as the notorious Janjaweed.<sup>42</sup> This conflict has been referred to as genocide, but this applies to the African Fur peoples who cluster around Jebel Mara and give the region its name – 'Dar Fur' or homeland of the Fur peoples. The Zaghawa are in the lead of the Fur populated Sudan Liberation Army and have their own Army/Movement, the Justice, and Equality Movement. As Africans, the Fur accept Zaghawa's leadership provided that their basic needs are secured by the

### Confronting the "Arab North": Interpretations of Slavery and Religion in Southern Sudanic [Chad] Separatist Resistance

The [Islamic Arab] political elite's hegemonic project appears to have faced most opposition in those communities that were least integrated with the state and whose cultural and ethno-political identities contrasted with the Arab-Muslim dominated socioeconomic and sociopolitical state order. From the 1940s onwards, among the most adamant against Arabization and Islamicization of their local societies were a selection of members of the contemporary southern Sudanic [Christian] elite who saw forced cultural assimilation, in the historical context of slavery and perpetual racial inequality, as an outright assault on their own cultural dignity and values. This was due in part to the perception of not being treated equally by the Arab-Muslim governing elite, and the feeling of exclusion from political power at the centre of Sudanic polity, as well as a sentiment of resistance towards assimilation into the Arab-Muslim culture and the attempt to promote a regional identity in southern [Christian regions]. Among the mission-educated southern elite there was likely an element of fear that being unable to prevent cultural assimilation would gradually result in the southern intelligentsia becoming obsolete. The southern elite would lose local constituencies to the national elite, and eventually a wholesale cultural transformation would take place resulting in the eradication of local southern ways of life and conversion of southerners as a whole into a class perpetually servile to the "Arab north". The promotion of Arab culture and Islam provoked resistance among sections of the southern elite in parts of southern Sudanic Chad, and precipitated mobilization for anti-state activities to counter the perceived repressive policies. - **Aleksi Ylönen**

relationship. To its west, civil war and rebellions have been a common fixture in Mali and Niger for nearly 40 years, and now, violent extremism has spread throughout the Sahel and Sub-Saharan regions, complicating what was once already a complicated problem of cultural adaptation.<sup>43</sup> From the beginning of Chad's independence from France to the present day, the Christian African sedentary southern tribes (Sara, Dinka-bok, Nuer, Acholi) and the Muslim northern pastoralist tribes (Arabs, Toubou, and Zaghawa) have continuously fought over control of the government in N'Djamena, which is the point of entry for international donor funding which makes up a full 25% of Chad's GDP with foreign petroleum sales making up another 50% of GDP. Control of the institutions of government in N'Djamena has become the epicentre of 'winner-takes-all' political contests in Chad. Holding on to power in Chad, however, has not been easy as conflicts abound. The conflict maps in **figure 1** illustrates the many rebellions and civil wars between the Christian south and the Muslim Centre and North dominated the 1990s. Genocidal identity politics over Arab versus African identification; farmer versus pastoralist herder survival; Salafist Sunni versus Sufism Sunni religious practice; these and other highly emotionally charged conflicts have killed thousands of people in Chad and Sudan over the past 40 years and the violence continues even today. Hundreds of people have lost their lives in a spike of intercommunal violence in the east of Chad in 2019. In the Bilala and Lisi tribes of Lake Fitr and the Maba tribes' Ouaddai and Sila provinces, the conflicts have been between Maba-black-African-Farmer against Arab-Caucasian-seminomadic-herder. These conflicts flow in part from established rivalries between herders and farmers but also derive from deeper identity-based

<sup>41</sup> (Christian, 2014)

<sup>42</sup> Janjaweed originated from the Fur phrase of: "Arab man on a horse with a British G3 Rifle".

<sup>43</sup> (Christian, 2019)



competition over land, traditional authority, and local political positions. Bluntly, the African Muslim farmers are in the way and their ethnic-historical inferiority requires no payments of Diya when they are physically pushed off their farmlands to make way for increased pastoral lands. In addition, populations no longer trust authorities whom they accuse of taking sides in local disputes. The violence in the Ouaddaï and Sila regions has multiple origins. It is firstly linked to the settlement of nomadic herders from the country's north. This is not a new phenomenon. But its current scale causes concern among the region's majority farming communities, who fear losing power and accuse the newly arrived groups, especially Arabs, of refusing to respect local customs. Herders, meanwhile, feel stigmatised. Some Arabs say they are treated like foreigners in a region where their families have been part of society for generations. While the Arabs are not in power in N'Djamena, their tribes are generally in support of the current regime and are thus protected by the government. The African tribes are, however, in power in Sudan and have been driving a genocidal culture war between tribes who identify as Arab Muslim against tribes who identify as African Muslim in Darfur, which borders Chad's Ouaddaï highlands, home of the Maba peoples. The Arab driven violent identity conflict in Sudan's Darfur has long since spilled over into Chad, as described in my Curriculum Vitae qualifications and experience. The state backed Arab militia known as 'Janjaweed' has been driving the African Muslim Fur, Masalit, and Maba tribes westward into Chad, creating massive displacement and humanitarian crisis, not to mention, rising tensions within the populace that compound N'Djamena's security issues. Facing armed Arab tribes, African tribes have been arming for the past 20 years and fielding their own militias in defense. Faced with rising tensions in the east, Chad's authorities decided to escalate their response in August 2019 by imposing a state of emergency in Ouaddaï and Sila, as well as in Tibesti in the north. The government has strengthened its military presence in the east and intensified efforts to disarm communities and warring actors there. But populations in Ouaddaï and Sila are now suffering from abuses by security forces and restrictions on movement and trade. Moreover, the government's actions have addressed neither the intercommunal grievances nor the problems of local governance which underpin recent conflicts. One central obstacle to N'Djamena's ability to resolve the violence against the African Muslim tribes by the Arab Muslim tribes is the fact that the Débey Regime (father & son) has long depended on support from Chad's Arabs, even as it struggles to contain the spillover from the conflict in Darfur, on the eastern edge of Ouaddaï Highlands.<sup>44</sup> The Khartoum backed Janjaweed rebels and the Fur tribes' militias (SLA) fighting them, routinely cross into eastern Chad, bringing this 2 decade old war into the Maba's homelands. The Arab Janjaweed pushes the African Muslim farmer tribes of Fur, Maba, and Masalit into displaced persons camps, while retaliations from the SLA, in turn, drive Arab pastoralists and their encampments and herds into eastern Chad. The fighting between Arabs and Africans spread through the Ouaddaï highlands, driving nomads and their herds back into Darfur in a continuous cycle of violence that the regime in N'Djamena is unable to resolve. General Débey's security minister described the nomad migration part of a "satanic" plot by the Arab-led Sudanese government to replenish its Janjaweed militias in Darfur and settle Arab newcomers on farmland belonging to the 2.5 million people displaced by the conflict there.<sup>45</sup> The Sudanese Arabs, meanwhile, claim that Chad or one of its allied militias are indiscriminately targeting Arab nomads in eastern Chad, according to interviews with dozens of nomads, who described raids on their temporary villages, at least two aerial bombings, harassment and incidents of torture over the past year:

<sup>44</sup> (Human Rights Watch, 2007; World Watch Research, 2022)

<sup>45</sup> (Centre for the Study of Global Christianity, 2020)



*"The government is punishing us," said Yusuf Babad, who was among a group of nomads herding cattle north across a sweep of rocky desert here recently, their donkeys heaped with blankets, tarps, pots and other supplies. "They tell us to bring our weapons, and if you don't have weapons, they punish you. Some of us, they have been punished until they died. They put plastic over your head so you cannot breathe. They put hot glass under your knees and say, 'Talk!' They put pepper in your nose until you talk."*

As a result of the insecurity, an estimated 30,000 Chadian Arabs have migrated into the Darfur region of neighbouring Sudan, according to the U.N. refugee agency. Arab pastoralist nomadic tribes say that they fear a backlash and that they have all been broadly vilified as the so-called Janjaweed Arab militias responsible for a brutal campaign in Darfur.

*"The government wants to say that all Arabs are Janjaweed," he said. "As we are Arabs, the land has become narrow to us. Nobody likes us. Only God."*

The nomads' allegations represent only one thread in a tangle of conflicts across eastern Chad in which some Chadian Arabs have themselves participated. Presently, the Union of Resistance Forces (UFR) are a Toubou based rebel group that continues to battle with the government of Chad from their bases in Libya. Chad is listed as a failed state by the Fund for Peace (FFP). Chad had the seventh-highest rank in the Fragile States Index in 2021. Corruption is rife at all levels. Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index for 2021 ranked Chad 164th among the 180 countries listed, and tribalism is generally the context of the rule of law rather than formal legislation. During my African Union service in Chad and Darfur, I served with General Mahatma Idriss Débéy's cousin, Darkala Débéy. Darkala was assigned to the mission as a financial benefit from his uncle, then president, because each African military member received a €3,200EUR monthly stipend for agreeing to be part of the genocide mediation team, funded by the European Union. The living conditions in this region were difficult and hazardous; nearly every one of us contracted malaria, dengue fever, and Dysentery. Many members suffered from mental breakdown due to the immediate (face to face) proximity of ongoing mass murder of civilians, livestock, and crops that often occurred in the middle of our engagements with villages. Darkala explained that every euro of his stipend was taken by his family to pay a Diya obligation because he had killed one of his fellow military officers and the victim's family had placed a bounty on him until his blood debt was paid.<sup>46</sup> This short vignette is shared as an illustration of the tribal nature of social organization and governance that permeates Chad's population segments, including the Zaghawa Débéy family currently in power.<sup>47</sup> In the central Sahel regions of Chad, Libya, and Niger, a son is a primary form of social and economic currency, in line with livestock, oases, and hereditary position. The socio-political (tribal) connection between father and son cannot be compared with father-son relationships in the west which are based on childrearing, love, nurture, and constitute a voluntary relationship. In the tribal societies of the Sahel, a boy-man's place in society is entirely dependent on his placement within his male heir line of ancestry.<sup>48</sup> Without this, a boy-man has no name and therefore, no belonging. In these societies, it is not so much important as 'where' a boy is from, but rather, from whom he is from, because social entitlements, prestige, and worthiness are inherited first, then built upon in the individual's lifetime.<sup>49</sup>

---

<sup>46</sup> (Christian, 2006)

<sup>47</sup> (Christian, 2011)

<sup>48</sup> (Christian, 2014)

<sup>49</sup> (Christian, 2015b)



### §A5.1 Front pour l'Alternance et la Concorde au Tchad (FACT) and the CCMSR.

FACT was founded by dissident Chadian army officers who had split from an earlier and larger group of Chadian rebel forces opposed to the regime of Idriss Débey, called the UFDD.<sup>50</sup> FACT was organized as union of different rebel factions in March 2016, but its early formation was factious. Dissidents split off and organized themselves as the Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic (CCMSR) later that same year.<sup>51</sup> The CCMSR immediately elected the former spokesman of the UFDD, Mahamat Hassani Bulmay as its first leader. Bulmay, who was a prolific writer and articulate critic of the Débey regime. He was captured and imprisoned by Idriss Débey in 2017 and was succeeded by Mahamat Tahir Acheick (2017–18), Michelot Yogogombaye (2018–2021), and currently, Rachid Mahamat Tahir as of 2021. The CCMSR was the first armed Chadian opposition group to return to its home country since 2010, launching a raid in April 2017 that killed 12 Chadian soldiers. The CCMSR's threat to the Débey regime is not so much their military prowess, but their ability to organise social and political opposition within the marginalised Toubou/Goran, Arab, Ouaddaï, and other ethnic communities in central and north Chad.<sup>52</sup> Each successful military action, however marginal, works to spread the CCMSR's ideology deeper into Chadian society, a powerful threat to the authoritarian governing regime now led by Idriss' son General Mahamat Idriss Débey. Since 2020, the CCMSR has aligned or realigned itself to the Front pour l'Alternance et la Concorde au Tchad and participated in the 2021 cross border attacks into Chad. On the evening of 11 April 2021, the day of the Chadian presidential election, FACT attacked a Chadian border post in northern Chad just as polling stations were closing, citing their protest of continuing sham elections that had kept Idriss



Figure 14 Mahamat Mahdi Ali, leader of FACT. Crest of the armed rebel movement FACT, and several of its fighters in Chad.

Debey in power for over a quarter of a century. Even before polling stations closed, Idriss Debey and family celebrated his 6<sup>th</sup> continuous presidential term of office. In return, they were attacked by government force's suffering losses. Days

<sup>50</sup> The UFDD stands for the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development and was founded by fellow Toubou politician-turned-resistance leader, Mahamat Nouri in 2006, who managed to bring many smaller resistance groups together under one leader.

<sup>51</sup> (Crisis Group Staff Report No 266 - Africa, 2018)

<sup>52</sup> (Christian et al., 2018)



later, on 17 April 2021, the British government said that two armed convoys from FACT were advancing towards the capital of N'Djamena. The Chadian army claimed they destroyed one FACT convoy in the province of Kanem while another was seen approaching the town of Mao. Chad's president Idriss Deby, carrying his rank of General of the Armed Forces, led the attack on the FACT columns, and was fatally wounded by FACT gunfire on April 20<sup>th</sup>, 2021. The FACT rebels claimed that Déby was wounded in the village of Mele, near the town of Nokou, before being transported back to the capital, N'Djamena, where he died. General Mahamat Déby Itno, son of the deceased President, was declared the interim President as head of a military junta. By early May 2021, the Chief of the General Staff of the Chad National Army, Abakar Abdelkerim Daoud, announced an end to the latest battle, and allowed international press to have access to dozens of the several hundred captured FACT members at the central Army base in N'Djamena. The captured FACT members were quickly tried in the notorious Koro Toro prison, isolated in the desert 600 kilometres from N'Djamena.<sup>53</sup> The remote location and proceedings drew condemnation from international human rights groups., with FACT leader Mahamat Mahdi Ali, declaring that "It's a masquerade that follows no law, no convention".<sup>54</sup>

After his father's death, his son, Mahamat, serving as interim president, engaged in ceasefire accords with Chad's various rebel groups, encouraging their demobilisation and return to their home villages based on guarantees of free and fair elections to decide his father's replacement. As a gesture of good will, General Mahamat pardoned hundreds of FACT prisoners to encourage the group to participate fully in peace talks. The ceasefire held until 2023, when Mahamat murdered his rivals to reassert his family's control over the government without any change from his father's regime. During the period between March and August of 2022, serious efforts were made to bring the combatants together in Doha by the United Arab Emirates, but most of the dialogue could not survive the intransigence of Mahamat Deby to relinquishing power.<sup>55</sup> (Ejime, 2024) The main FACT organisation subsequently announced an end to a ceasefire that it had accepted 2021, accusing the interim authorities of electoral fraud and renegeing on the cease fire by bombing one of its bases in what it called an act of war.<sup>56</sup> The return



Figure 15 Toubou FACT soldiers emerging from the Tibesti Mountains

to war by Mahamat Deby after securing the regime's loyalty, signals a likely return to all-out hostilities between the military-led government and FACT. The ceasefire between the Deby regime and FACT was supported and pushed by France and the US, wary of the ever-growing breakdown of governance in the Central Sahel. Once secure in his control of the regime, in 2023, Mahamat Deby pivoted against France and its western allies, joining the Russian Federation backed Alliance of Sahelian States (military juntas).<sup>57</sup> With Russian Wagner's Africa Corps support,

<sup>53</sup> (Organisational Staff, 2024)

<sup>54</sup> (By Rédaction Africanews and AFP, 2021; Organisational Staff, 2024)

<sup>55</sup> (Gaffney, 2021)

<sup>56</sup> (Ramadane, 2023)

<sup>57</sup> Chad says it is ending its defence cooperation agreement with former colonial power, France, in a move that will require French soldiers, leaving the Central African country. Chad's Foreign Minister, Abderaman Koulamallah describes France as an essential partner, but says it must now consider that Chad has matured and is a sovereign state, very jealous of its sovereignty. The announcement was made hours after a visit by French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot.



Mahamat Debey's regime is expected to take its overdue revenge for the death of the late president. The analysis suggests that France and its western allies, played an important restraining role on the Debey regime, seeking to prevent mass atrocities that would only escalate the violence.<sup>58</sup> The Chad regime's dependence on the west for financial assistance, processing of its extractive resources, and access to weapons and training, kept the regime in check. The switch from Europe to the Russian Federation as a guarantor of security and control over Chad's population and resources, allows the regime to operate in a far more intensely violent manner than would otherwise be possible.

#### §A6. GOVERNANCE & SECURITY CONDITIONS IN CHAD.

For the past 33 years, the government of Chad has been under the control of one family of the Zaghawa Tribe of east-central Sahel, specifically the Bidayat clan of the Zaghawa ethnic group. This does not mean that the Zaghawa tribe of Chad and Sudan, controls the government, only that, more than Arab, Masalit, Toubou, or African tribes, members of the President's tribe are normatively better integrated into family and clan relationships and more likely to be trusted. The late president Debey constructed his regime to ensure his clan's survival in power. The make-up of President Débey's (father and now, son) inner circle and its security services is referred to simply as ZAG, an acronym after its Zaghawa, Arab, and Goran/Toubou members. Chad is a one-party state under the control of the Patriotic Salvation Movement, led by the Débey family, despite its 1996 constitution that recognised a multi-party and decentralised system of political participation. In practice, the Chadian authorities under Idris Débey and now, his son, General Mahamat, operate for a single purpose: to control the population and resources of the state. This control is exerted through a complex system of balancing and co-opting of local power brokers. As the state is managed under the Debey clan, it has little capacity to provide services and control the territories using its own regime forces. Instead, the regime coopts and cooperates with influential and armed subnational elites who can maintain order at the local level. Where possible, these subnational elites are appointed hereditary chiefs, former military officers, or even former rebels who have come to an accord with the national regime. These subnational elites manage whatever capacities of social security, justice, conflict resolution, and general law and order that are not held by the tribes, clans, and families to sort out, using traditional methods governed by elders.<sup>59</sup> The only time that Chadian security authorities' step in is when foreign western personnel are involved, or when a situation begins to spiral out of control and becomes publicly embarrassing to the government.<sup>60</sup> The state maintains its presence by managing these complex networks of patronage, allowing a degree of violence among its subnational population segments and their leaders as a means of control, while heavily repressing any forms of dissent.<sup>61</sup> These methods have provided relative stability, but at the same time, they have exacerbated internal tensions, fuelled communal conflicts (especially in the less arid southern and central regions), and facilitated the infiltration of armed groups into certain areas of Lake Chad or the Libyan and Sudanese borders I have personal experience with the legal systems



Figure 16 General Mahatma Idriss Déby & his family's political party insignia.

<sup>58</sup> (News Wires, 2021; Reuters Staff, 2021)

<sup>59</sup> Valerio Colosio, '(Re)naming the Cantons, Re-exerting Authority: Ambiguous Decentralization Reforms and the Nature of Power in Rural Chad,' *Africa Today*, 68 (3), 2022, pp. 3-23

<sup>60</sup> (Adeagbo, 2023; Newsroom Infobae, 2023)

<sup>61</sup> Julien Brachet and Judith Scheele, "A 'despicable shambles': Labour, property and status in Faya-Largeau, Northern Chad," *Africa*, 86 (1), 2016, pp. 122-141  
Valerio Colosio, '(Re)naming the Cantons, Re-exerting Authority: Ambiguous Decentralization Reforms and the Nature of Power in Rural Chad,' *Africa Today*, 68 (3), 2022, pp. 3-23



in Sudan, Chad, Niger, and Mali, and have researched and documented the lassis-fair cultural environment of formal government (uniformed) law enforcement. Much of my instruction to US and UK Civil Military Cooperation detachments from the 77<sup>th</sup> SOF Brigade, for instance, focus on the formalisation of indigenous, tribal systems of justice and conflict resolution, rather than trying to apply western industrialised versions of law, order, and justice to tribal communities.<sup>62</sup> All power, justice, and security in Chad's tribal societies flows within the bloodlines, and the most trusted ties are those that are direct from father to son.<sup>63</sup> In April 2021, President Idriss Débey, who had ruled Chad with an iron fist since 1991, was killed during clashes between the Chadian army and the rebel group Front for Alternation and Concord in Chad (FACT).<sup>64</sup> His 39-year-old son, General Mahamat Idriss Débey, took power, annulling the constitution and dissolving the government and parliament. After consolidating power in N'Djamena, General Mahatma took aim at the families and relatives of the FACT, characterising them as active rebels and imprisoning entire families.<sup>65</sup> The actual rebel fighters and their leaders have refuge in neighbouring Libya under the protection of those northern Toubou/Goran clans north of the border with Chad.<sup>66</sup> The families, clans, and tribes within the Sahelian regions of Sudan, Darfur, Chad, Niger, Mali Libya, and Algeria are complex interrelated communities with dominant indigenous systems of thought and behaviour that do not respond well to authoritarian control. Consequently, these peoples have been exposed to violent conflicts, psychosocial trauma, and manifestations of civilian and government participation in extremist thought and radicalized behaviour for most of the past quarter century. My research indicates that during the apprehension process of real or perceived suspects, Chadian security forces have used live ammunition to subdue those of interest, killing and injuring potential suspects. Credible reporting indicates that Chadian security forces are authorised to beat people, chase them into homes and forcibly detain them regardless of probable cause. Relatives,



Figure 17 Depiction of Koro Toro Prison

witnesses, and former detainees said that those detained were held in police stations, and were severely beaten in detention by soldiers, police, or gendarmes. Suspected sympathisers of the FACT movement as well as political protesters (males, females, and children as young as age 13) would then be taken to prison facilities called Koro Toro, a high security prison managed by the government and located about 600 kilometres from N'Djamena, in Central Chad, which was designed to house "violent

extremists. The facility consists of two locations, approximately 1 kilometre apart, Koro Toro Debey & Koro Toro Habré, named respectively for the Chadian presidents under whose rule they were built. The two prisons are located near the village of Koro Toro in the vast Boukou-Ennedi-Tibesti prefecture of north-central Chad next to the Erg du Djourab. Detainees at Koro Toro can be convicted or suspected – awaiting further investigation and trial that can stretch to years. Medical care is absent, and many prisoners are shackled with an iron bar because there are insufficient doors and personnel to monitor the prisoners. The prisoner population segments include those accused or convicted of participation with Boko Haram, FACT, or opposition political parties. The most important distinction that I found was between crime for profit versus actions that threatened the Debey regime control over the state. The latter was often

<sup>62</sup> (Cooke et al., 2016)

<sup>63</sup> (Christian, 2011)

<sup>64</sup> (Adamou et al., 2021)

<sup>65</sup> (Rédaction Africanews and AFP, 2022)

<sup>66</sup> (Al Jazeera Staff, 2021; Crisis Group Staff Report No 266 - Africa, 2018; Mcallister & Lewis, 2021)



resolved via unofficial payments to law enforcement authorities at a low level, while the latter was decided by the central state security and intelligence directorate of the Debey regime. The dead at Koro Toro are usually disposed of without recourse to family notification. Chad's minister of justice denies any violations of its legal codes or constitution in how its security services treat its various population segments.

### §A6.1 POLITICS AS FAMILY BUSINESS – MONOPOLY OF STATE.

The elevation of Idriss Débey's son, a young General of the Army, to Chad's president, follows a similar pattern of tribal power politics and the ascension of military control over civilian populations that is occurring across the African Sahel. Seven countries claiming status as democracies on the African continent have father-son-brother-uncle-nephew tribal-political dynasties ruling their countries, usually for multiple decades. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) Presidents Kabila - father & son - have ruled for 18 years. In Gabon Presidents Bongo - father & son - have ruled for over 55 years, and in Uganda, Presidents Museveni & Son are on track to rule for at least 35 years and struggling to hold onto power. In Chad, the late President Idriss Débey's son, an Army general, has succeeded his father and together, they have ruled Chad for 33 years, while Togo's Presidents Gnassingbé & Son have ruled for 48 years. Three additional Sahelian countries have recently suffered military coups-de-état, the Republics of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. Western (USA, EU, UK, NATO) efforts at instilling the rule of law and a democratic process of changing rule appear to have failed throughout the 'Arc of Conflict' in the greater Sahelian region of Africa. These authoritarian regimes do not go unchallenged by internal forces. Nearly all of them, to include Chad, have organized, armed sociopolitical movements that are contesting this 'winner-take-all' form of family, clan, and tribal political control over the Westphalian state. The families, clans, and tribes who are in control of a state, understand that, like Syria's Assad Bashar and his Alawite regime, there can be no going back without risking physical and cultural annihilation. The gruesome deaths of Iraq's Sadaam Hussien and Libya's Colonel Gaddafi and their family members by a vengeance seeking population have taught these African despotic leaders to hold on to power at all costs. To accomplish this, they transform their governing structures into wartime oppression where the population is the enemy that must be monitored, controlled, and pre-emptively engaged with violence, intimidation, incarceration, and extrajudicial punishments and executions to ensure the survival of the 'family-owned' state. The controlling social cohesion that exists in strong tribal societies such as Chad are through ethnic bloodlines and prior to the introduction of the colonial Westphalian system of States, each tribe thought of themselves as a unique 'nation-state' of its own, or a tribute-subsidary tribe-nation affiliated to a larger, more powerful tribe. As in Europe, there have historically been many major and minor empires in Africa, led by a powerful tribe that subdued and controlled other tribes across vast regions. My research has continuously found that many African tribal leaders associate the modern political state with a form of empire, where 'winner-takes-all' form of political and social organization. Nevertheless, the leadership of most of the



Figure 18 Depiction of typical post-demonstration violence scene in Chad.




armed resistance groups opposed to the Débey regime's (Idris Débey and son Mahamat Débey) continuation of control over Chad publicly articulate a nationalist ideology that voices support for the interests of marginalized peoples and areas in northern and central Chad. By the mid-2000s, there were several different rebel groups that were opposed to Débey's regime, some of whom were family members of Idris Débey, and most of them were based in western Sudan in the Darfur area where I was then serving with the African Union. Part of my assignment as a USSF military officer in western Darfur Sudan and eastern Chad was to monitor and report on the formation and evolution of these armed resistance groups, which brought me into continuous interaction with many of these same Chad government and rebel leaders. The operations and methods of the Débey Regime have been well documented by international observers and researchers such as me. The regime depends on networks (real or perceived) of ZAG families and clans to staff the government. Official and unofficial corruption permeates the entire government of a type that internally, is consistent with family-clan-tribal loyalties. The Débey family ultimately determines when any one ZAG family-clan-tribe crosses a red line and receives discipline. Over the years, I have found it difficult to discern the boundaries between sanctioned and unsanctioned corruption. My expert opinion is that the regime's organisational structure also finds it difficult to discern as well. Ultimately, actions, words, messages, or trends that threaten the Débey family's hold over the Patriotic Movement of Chad and the PMC's hold on power is considered 'corruption'. If, for example, a Débey family-clan member decided to contest either General Mahatma's control over the PMC or the PMC's hold over the government, then that individual, even though a family member, would be considered corrupt and be sanctioned. Even violently. To be fair, the expression of anti-Débey regime views by a member of Chad's tribal community would not automatically result in persecution. If a member of ANS or the military overheard someone 'bad-mouthing' General Débey and or the military council that he heads, the offending person might expect a bit of physical 'straightening up' that would teach the offender to be more circumspect in their views. An offender who is believed to be related to anyone in the FACT resistance alliance, would immediately be sufficient reason for their arrest, interrogation, and detention. A person who was perceived to have a public platform such as a leading tribal elder, or a member of a prominent rebel officer's family, on the other hand, would certainly warrant the government's investigation, intervention, and resolution of that situation in a manner that would assure no further threat to the regime. This is based on my years of field experience in the Sahel. There are broad coalitions of opposition parties and civil society representatives that have been protesting military governance and the rule of General Mahatma Idriss Débey and his father before him. The largest endeavour to maintain legitimacy by seeking government permissions for all its protests and demonstrations, despite postponements and outright bans by the government in N'Djamena. In October and November of 2021, for example,



*Figure 19 Depiction (from photograph) of Chadian security services breaking up a demonstration.*

Wakit Tama, a popular new party led by an entertainer, Bobby Wine, organised legal protests in N'Djamena, calling thousands of people to protest the continuance of military government under a one-party rule of the Débey clan. The protesters demanded a more inclusive transition and a revision of the transitional charter as well as reforms to education, governance, commerce, and an end to corruption. In response, Chadian security forces used excessive force injuring 40 to 45 people and damaging



private property during each event. According to Human Rights Watch, anti-riot police and gendarmes used tear gas, rubber bullets and potentially live ammunition to disperse protesters, despite authorisation for holding the protests.<sup>67</sup> Authorities claim the intervention was due to protest organisers not adhering to the agreed protest itinerary. Authorities cancelled the protests in each case after they began, citing "risks to disturb public order."<sup>68</sup> According to human rights group Amnesty International, internet connections were reported to have slowed down for hours in certain areas of N'Djamena. According to Human Rights Watch's Illaria Allegrozi:

*"Six months after the Transitional Military Council came to power, civic space continues to be largely closed, peaceful protests are still violently repressed, and security forces enjoy impunity. The CMT should end its assault on dissenters and protesters and ensure that security forces implicated in rights abuses are held accountable."*

The activist and social organisations opposing the regime, continue to defy the government's restrictions on protesting and they are being met with increasingly violent responses by Chadian government police and soldiers dispatched to prevent them from gathering and protesting. In November, medical students in N'Djamena went on strike from classes,



Figure 21 Depiction (from photographs) of scenes from the October 2022 protest demonstration and Chadian security forces suppression in N'Djamena.

demanding the payment of scholarships that had already been awarded to them by other entities, as well as improved conditions at the hospitals they are in residence at. After nearly a month without government response, the students marched in protest in the city centre on December 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2021. Again, in response, Chadian police used violence to disperse the students, arresting more than 50 of them.<sup>69</sup> In most of these security responses, both protestors and leaders were arrested. After the October 2021 protest, three political opposition leaders - Barka Michel, Sitack Yombatinan Béni

and Félix Marting - were detained after they were summoned by judiciary police. The three were charged with "a gathering that caused a disturbance to public order", "attack on bodily integrity" and "destruction of property" in relation to the coalition's protest on 2nd October 2021. After President Idriss Débey was killed fighting the Toubou rebels of FACT in April of 2021, His son, General Mahamat Idriss Débey, took control of the government in a military Coup de état and suspended the country's constitution. The coup and suspension of civil liberties ignited fresh rounds of protests and demonstrations which the military coup leaders attempted to suppress with mass arrests and violence. Between 14th and 17th May 2022, large numbers of opposition



Figure 20 Murdered Chad opposition leader Yaya Dillo Djérou (18 December 1974 – 28 February 2024)

<sup>67</sup> (Euractiv.com with AFP, 2022)

<sup>68</sup> (Maravi Post Reporter, 2021)

<sup>69</sup> (Elusoji, 2021)



members and supporters were arrested, including the Secretary-General of the Trade Unions of Chad (Gounoung Vaima Ganfare); a senior lawyer at the Chadian Bar Association (Koudé Mbainaissem); the President of the Group of Civil Society Executives (Hissène Massar Hissène), former ambassador Allamine Adoudou; the Secretary-General of the Union of Chadian Supplier Traders (Youssouf Korom; the spokesperson for Wakit Tama (Max Loalngar), and the former head of human rights organisation Chadian Human Rights League (Ligue Tchadienne de droits de l'homme). The six were charged with gathering to cause public disturbance, harm to property, and physical assault. The Chadian Bar Association protested the arbitrary arrests by suspending all their activities in Chad until 6th June 2022, when some of the arrested activists are scheduled to appear in court. On 25th May 2022, the Union des Syndicate du Tchad (Trade Unions of Chad) organised a strike in the public sector in protest at the arrest of their secretary-general and protest members and supporters. Under pressure from the international community, the military coup leaders promised to return power to an elected civilian government after 18 months, in October of 2022. Shortly before, in August 2022, the military junta leaders announced that they would retain power as a military government for two additional years, sparking some of the largest protests and demonstrations since the takeover of the government by the military coup in April of 2021. During the protests and demonstrations that followed the announcement of continuing military rule, Chad's government suspended political opposition parties and ransacked their offices and facilities. The protests and demonstrations were put down with lethal force, leaving more than 60 protestors dead in N'Djamena and another 32 in Chad's second-largest city, Moundou, according to an official in the city's morgue.<sup>70</sup> Other protests were held in the southern Chadian towns of Doba and Sarh.<sup>71</sup> The demonstrations of October 2022 that followed the announcement of continued military rule were the deadliest anti-government protests since Débey took over in the wake of his father's assassination 18 months ago. Thousands took to the streets in the capital, N'Djamena, and other cities on Thursday, to protest the 24-month extension of the transition to civilian rule. Witnesses say demonstrators began to blow whistles at 3 a.m. all over the capital of N'Djamena. Police fired tear gas at the crowds, which continued advancing and their numbers grew. It was then that security forces opened fire, leaving protesters struggling to gather the dead from the scene amid the tear gas. "Bodies of slain protesters were recovered from the Chari River in N'Djamena over the weekend," The World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) reported that school classrooms had been turned into prisons at the Abena Communal high school in the capital. The OMCT spokesperson informed press outlets that "*Young people were reportedly summarily executed there this morning ... hundreds have been arrested, and some tortured.*"<sup>72</sup> At the main reference hospital in the capital N'Djamena, overwhelmed doctors tended to scores of people with gunshot wounds. Some of the wounded were taken to Liberty Hospital by army vehicles and bore signs of having been tortured, witnesses said. The United Nations condemned the military junta's "lethal use of force" and called for an investigation into reports of human rights violations.<sup>73</sup> The African Union, the European Union, the governments of France and the United States have also condemned the repression of the protests and called for the junta to stick to its original promise to transfer power to a civilian elected government.<sup>74</sup> Under pressure from western allies, the military junta announced plans to hold an election several months early, in May 2024. Opposition political activity, however, had been suspended at the end of 2022, and Chadian security forces continued to employ lethal violence to suppress demonstrations and

<sup>70</sup> (Dariustone, 2022)

<sup>71</sup> (Ramadane, 2022))

<sup>72</sup> (Euractiv.com with AFP, 2022)

<sup>73</sup> (Türk, 2022)

<sup>74</sup> (TAKADJI, 2022)



protests. The situation in Chad in 2024 and 2025 has now taken a decidedly more deadly course, as government security forces murdered General Mahatma Débey's principal opposition rival, his cousin or nephew, Yaya Dillo Djerou.<sup>75</sup> Dillo was believed to be the strongest contender in the upcoming elections as the leader of the Socialist Party Without Borders.<sup>76</sup> Reuters News Service reported that witnesses heard heavy gunfire near the headquarters of Dillo's opposition party in the capital of N'Djamena. Several people had been killed in earlier clashes near Chad's internal security agency building, and the government claimed that a member of Dillo's political party, the finance secretary Ahmed Torabi, tried to assassinate the president of the Supreme Court, Samir Adam Annour, but failed and Torabi was arrested. The opposition party's general secretary told Reuters the deaths near the security agency occurred when soldiers opened fire at a group of party members. The secretary-general of Dillo's political party told Reuters that Ahmed Torabi had been killed by Chad security forces the day before Dillo's murder. On the day of Dillo's shooting, Ahmed Torabi's body was brought to the headquarters of Chad's security agency, located near the party's headquarters office. According to the party secretary general, Torabi had been shot dead on Tuesday and his body was deposited at the agency's headquarters. On Wednesday morning, Yaya Dillo, with several party members and Torabi's relatives went to look for his body at the agency and soldiers opened fire at them, resulting in multiple deaths, the general secretary said.<sup>77</sup> The state prosecutor refused to explain the circumstances of the killings; however, the government's communications minister, Abderaman Koulamallah, released a statement saying that the relatives of the deceased finance secretary and several members of Dillo's political party came to the security agency and attacked them. The security agency said that opposition candidate Yaya Dillo and his supporters had taken refuge in their party's headquarters in Bololo district of N'Djamena, and security forces were sent to arrest Dillo. Communications minister Koulamallah said security forces intended to arrest Dillo and his supporters, but "they responded with heavy weapons and the security forces exercised their legitimate right to defense."<sup>78</sup> The remainder of the political party members who were not killed, were arrested, and charged with attacking the government. The violence flared amid tensions ahead of a presidential election set for May and June that could return the Central African state to constitutional rule three years after the military seized power. Troops remained deployed in the city, the Internet remained cut off and private schools in some districts of the capital were closed. The protestors against Chad's military rule have been ongoing and have resulted in numerous deaths amongst businessmen, students, professionals, teachers, doctors, lawyers, tailors, and housewives. As described above, the leaders of law firms, trade unions, civic associations, and even former government officials such as ambassadors, have been politically active in protests and demonstrations, and have paid the price through injury, torture, imprisonment, and death.

## REFERENCES CITED.

<sup>75</sup> (VOA Staff Writer, 2024)

<sup>76</sup> Oxford Analytica's Nathaniel Powell said personal rivalries between Déby and Dillo may have escalated after Saleh Déby Itno, younger brother of Idriss Déby, defected to Dillo's PSF in January, signalling that the ruling family was fracturing further. Déby Itno is also reported to be in custody following Wednesday's chaos. (Larson & Takadji, 2022)

<sup>77</sup> (Takadji, 2024; Tasamba, 2024; VOA Staff Writer, 2024)

<sup>78</sup> (Takadji, 2024; Tasamba, 2024; VOA Staff Writer, 2024)



- ACAPS Thematic Report. (2020). *Tribes in Yemen - An Introduction to the Tribal System*.
- Adamou, M., Maclean, R., Walsh, D., & Schmitt, E. (2021, August 24). President of Chad Is Killed as Soldiers Clash With Rebels. *The New York Times*.
- Adeagbo, J. (2023). Major Problems Facing Chad Today. *AFRICAW Africa and the World*.
- Adra, N. (2006, May 13). Mediating Culture: Customary Law in Yemen. *Conference on Customary Law*.
- AFP News Agency. (n.d.). *Saudi Bedouins maintain traditional lifestyle in extreme heat* [Broadcast]. YouTube.
- Al Jazeera Staff. (2021, April 21). Who are Chad's FACT rebels and what are their goals? *Al Jazeera*.
- al-Dawsari, N. (2012). Tribal governance and stability in Yemen. *The Carnegie Papers*, 1(20).
- Amnesty International. (2001). *Chad: the Habré Legacy*.
- Antúnez, J. C. (2022). *The Root Causes of Violence in the Sahel*.
- Azevedo, M. J. (1998). *Roots of Violence: A History of War in Chad*. Gordon and Breach.
- Bamyeh, M. A. (1999). The Social Origins of Islam: Mind, Economy, Discourse. In *Middle East Studies Association Bulletin: Vol. (Issue 2)*. University of Minnesota Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s0026318400040505>
- Bazzara, Aurélie. (2018). À N'Djamena, la souffrance muette des "fonctionnaires de la rue de 40. *Le Monde Afrique* [https://www.lemonde.fr/Afrique/Article/2018/07/18/a-n-Djamena-La-Souffrance-Muette-Des-Fonctionnaires-de-La-Rue-de-40\\_5333128\\_3212.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/Afrique/Article/2018/07/18/a-n-Djamena-La-Souffrance-Muette-Des-Fonctionnaires-de-La-Rue-de-40_5333128_3212.html).
- Burge, S. (2012). Islam, Arabs, and the Intelligent World of the Jinn (Contemporary Issues in the Middle East Series), Amira El-Zein. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 39(3), 427–429. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2012.726497>
- By Rédaction Africanews and AFP. (2021). Chad jails over 400 rebels for life after ruler's death. *AfricaNews*.
- Center for the Study of Global Christianity. (2020). *The Maba People and Chad's Ouaddaï Region*.
- Christian, P. J. (2006). Brokering Peace in Sudan. *Special Warfare Quarterly*, 19(2), 6–13.
- Christian, P. J. (2011). *A Combat Advisor's Guide to Tribal Engagement*. Universal Publishers.
- Christian, P. J. (2013a). Darfur-ground zero for Africa's crises of identity: A psychohistoriography of tribes in conflict. *African Security*, 6(1). <https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2013.759457>
- Christian, P. J. (2013b). DarfurGround Zero for Africas Crises of Identity: A Psychohistoriography of Tribes in Conflict. *African Security*, 6(1), 1–37. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2013.759457>
- Christian, P. J. (2014). A Reformulated Model of Narrative Mediation of Emerging Culture Conflict. *The International Journal of Conflict Engagement and Resolution*, 2(2). <https://doi.org/10.5553/IJ CER/221199652014002002002>
- Christian, P. J. (2015a). *Between Warrior and Helplessness in the Valley of Azawad - The struggle of the Kel Tamashek in the war of the Sahel*. Nova Southeastern University NSUWorks [https://nsuworks.nova.edu/shss\\_dcar\\_etd/22/](https://nsuworks.nova.edu/shss_dcar_etd/22/).



- Christian, P. J. (2015b). *Between Warrior and Helplessness in the Valley of Azawaj, the struggle of the Kel Tamashek in the war of the Sahel* [Doctoral Dissertation, Nova Southeastern University School of Psychology]. <https://doi.org/DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.1.4879.4320>
- Christian, P. J. (2016). Sunni Islam's Internal Ethnic Conflict: The Cognitive Dissonance between Universal Faith and Ethnic Origination. *Al Noor Middle Eastern Studies Journal of Boston College*, 10(1), 48–61. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743810000851>.
- Christian, P. J. (2018). Qualitative Research in the Shadow of Violent Conflict. In B. Browne & R. Althea-Maria (Eds.), *Experiences in Researching Conflict and Violence* (pp. 31–46). Policy Press.
- Christian, P. J. (2019). Qualitative research in the shadow of violent conflict. In *Experiences in researching conflict and violence* (pp. 31–46). Bristol University Press. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1zrvhdn.8>
- Christian, P. J. (2020). Between Imajayen (Warrior) and Timogoutar (Helplessness): Trauma and Identity Conflict in Indigenous Spaces,. In R. Nicholson (Ed.), *Natural Healing as Conflict Resolution*. IGI Global.
- Christian, P. J., Nestic, A., Sniffen, D., Hallaway-Rowe, B., Aljehani-Salman, T., Al Sumairi, K., Khadka, N. B., Alemayo, S., & Owusu-Sarfo, K. (2018). Origin and Epidemiology: Extremism and Radicalization are Psychological Processes, not Religious Beliefs. In P. McCabe (Ed.), *Countering Transregional Terrorism: Vol. JSOU Report* (18th–5th ed., pp. 107–122). Joint Special Operations University, USSOCOM.
- CIVICUS Staff. (2022). SIX MEMBERS AND SUPPORTERS OF WAKIT TAMA ARRESTED, CHARGED FOLLOWING PROTEST. *Monitor*.
- Cooke, J. G., Sanderson, T. M., Johnson, J. C., & Hubner, B. (2016). *"The Context: Corruption, Fragility, and Hardship in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin."*
- Crisis Group Staff Report No 266 - Africa. (2018). *Chad - Defusing Tensions in the Sahel*.
- Cronin, S. (2013). Tribes, Coups and Princes: Building a Modern Army in Saudi Arabia. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 49(1), 2–28.
- Dariustone, B. (2022, October). Dozens killed in Chad "repression" of protests. *DW*.
- Deng, F. M. (1995). *War of Visions - Conflict of Identities in the Sudan*. Brookings Institution.
- Dickson, H. R., & R. Wilson, & Z. F. Eds. (1983). *The Arab of the Desert* (3rd ed.). George Allen & Unwin Ltd.
- Duarte, L., Ngarassal, J., & Guichon, G. (2022). Release of the report "Chad: a hereditary repression". *Tournons La Page*.
- Durkheim, É. (2021). FROM THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY. In *The New Economic Sociology* (pp. 227–244). Princeton University Press. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1f886rp.11>
- Ejime, P. (2024). Chad Ends Military Cooperation with France. *TVC News Nigeria*.
- Elusoji, S. (2021, May). Chadian Police Fire Tear Gas To Disperse Anti-Military Protests. *CHANNELS Africa*.
- El-Zein, A. (2009). *Islam, Arabs, and the Intelligent World of the Jinn*. Syracuse University Press.
- Euractiv.com with AFP. (2022). Chad junta accused of executions, torture after protests. *EURACTIV*.



- Gaffney, S. (2021). Chadian President Idriss Deby dies on frontline, rebels vow to keep fighting. *France24*.
- Gellner, E. (1975). Cohesion and Identity: the Maghreb from Ibn Khaldun to Emile Durkheim. *Government and Opposition*, 10(2), 203–218. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.1975.tb00637.x>
- Heath, J. (2005). *A Grammar of Tamashek (Tuareg of Mali)*. DE GRUYTER MOUTON.  
<https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110909586>
- Human Rights Watch. (2007). *They Came Here to Kill Us": Militia Attacks and Ethnic Targeting of Civilians in Eastern Chad*.
- Human Rights Watch Staff. (2023). *Chad: Closing Political Space Ahead of Referendum Warrant for Opposition Leader; Dozens of Members Arrested*.
- ICG Staff. (2019). Avoiding the Resurgence of Intercommunal Violence in Eastern Chad. *International Crisis Group*.
- Jullien, M. (2016, April 30). Hissene Habre: Chad's ex-ruler convicted of crimes against humanity. *British Broadcasting Corporation*.
- Larson, K., & Takadji, E. (2022). Security Forces Kill at Least 60 as Anti-Government Protests Engulf Chad. *NBC 5 Dallas-Fort Worth*.
- Maravi Post Reporter. (2021). Chadian police disperse opposition protest. *The Maravi Post*.
- Massalatchi, A. (2008). Toubous open new front in Niger's Sahara conflict. *Reuters News Service*.
- Mcallister, E., & Lewis, D. (2021, April 21). Explainer: Who are the rebels threatening to take Chad's capital? *Reuters News Service Online*.
- News Wires. (2021). Chad jails more than 400 rebels for life after death of former ruler. *France24*.
- Newsroom Infobae. (2023, July 15). At least 27 rebels killed in southern Chad in new clashes against army. *InfoBAE*.
- Nguedmbaye, M. (2019). Exode rural : le phénomène prend une dimension inquiétante. *Tchadinfos.Com* <https://Tchadinfos.Com/Tchad/Exode-Rural-Le-Phenomene-Prend-Une-Dimension-Inquietante/>.
- Organisational Staff. (2024). "Worse Than Hell."
- Ramadane, M. (2022, October). About 50 people killed in Chad protests, government says. *Reuters*.
- Ramadane, M. (2023). Chad's FACT rebel group ends ceasefire over alleged attack by junta. *Reuters*.
- Rédaction Africanews and AFP. (2022, March). Chad jails over 400 rebels for life after ruler's death. *AfricaNews Online*.
- Reuters Staff. (2021). U.S. embassy to withdraw staff as Chad rebels advance. *Reuters*.
- Schmitz, C. (2011). Understanding the Role of Tribes in Yemen. *CTC Sentinel*, 4(10).
- Staff. (2022). Mahamat Mahdi Ali, leader du Fact, en interview. In *Actualites*.



- Sunderland, E. (1983). Genes, Mind and Culture: the Coevolutionary Process. By C. J. Lumsden and E. O. WILSON. (Harvard University Press, 1981.) 12.00. *Journal of Biosocial Science*, 15(2), 247.  
<https://doi.org/10.1017/s002193200001453x>
- TAKADJI, E. (2022, October 21). Chad govt suspends 7 political parties after deadly protests . *Associated Press*.
- Takadji, E. (2024, February 29). Chad opposition leader was killed as he led attack on security agency in the capital, official says. *ABC News*.
- Tasamba, J. (2024, February 28). 7 people killed in attack on Chad’s national security agency. *Andalou Ajansi*.
- Türk, V. (2022). Chad: UN Rights Chief Deplores Deadly Use of Force Against Protestors in Chad. *UN News Service OHCHR*.
- Turner, J. H. (n.d.). Psychoanalytic Sociological Theories and Emotions. In *Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research* (pp. 276–294). Springer US. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-30715-2\\_13](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-30715-2_13)
- VOA Staff Writer. (2024, February 28). Chad Opposition Leader Yaya Dillo Killed in Shooting, Prosecutor Says. *Voice of America*.
- White, J. (2010). Culture and Identity: The History, Theory, and Practice of Psychological Anthropology, Revised and Updated Edition. Charles Lindholm. Oxford: Oneworld Publications. 2007. xxxii446 pp. *Ethos*, 38(1), 1–3.  
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1548-1352.2010.01106.x>
- World Watch Research. (2022). *Chad: Full Country Dossier*.
- Ylönen, A. (2017). Confronting the “Arab North”: Interpretations of Slavery and Religion in Southern Sudanese Separatist Resistance. In *FLUID NETWORKS AND HEGEMONIC POWERS IN THE WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN* (pp. 103–129). Centro de Estudos Internacionais.