

DISSERTATION

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**Between Warrior and  
Helplessness in the Valley of  
Azawar**

*The Struggle of the Kel  
Tamashek in the War of the  
Sahel*

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Between Warrior and Helplessness in the Valley of Azawar  
*The struggle of the Kel Tamashek in the war of the Sahel*

by

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
Between <sup>Imajalen</sup>Warrior and <sup>Timogoutar</sup>Helplessness  
In the Valley of Azawar  
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
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**Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences**

This dissertation was submitted by Patrick James Christian under the direction of the chair of the dissertation committee listed below. It was submitted to the Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences and approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Conflict Analysis and Resolution at Nova Southeastern University.

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
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## Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to the families in the touchetts of the Kel Tamashek who brought me into their homes and allowed me to enter into the secret spaces of their historical narrative and existential identity. Tanimert.

## Acknowledgments

This research was made possible by the pioneering work of Dr Howard F Stein, Professor Emeritus, University of Oklahoma, Department of Family and Preventative Medicine; the faculty of George Mason University and Nova Southeastern University's programs in conflict analysis and resolution; the Deputy Commander of the United States Special Operations Command, Lieutenant General John Mulholland; and the Commander of USAFRICOM's Special Operations Command, Major General James Linder.

I began following Dr Stein's work as an undergraduate student at the University of South Florida, after reading his research paper "Adversary Symbiosis and Complementary Group Disassociation: an analysis of the US//U.S.S.R. conflict" (Stein, 1982). The Poynter Institute for Media Studies was so impressed with Dr Stein's analysis that they published his entire research paper across multiple editions of their Sunday issues of the St. Petersburg Times in the late 1980s. This was my first exposure to the psychological factors that underlay multi-party conflict, ideas that I explored during my subsequent work in the US Army Special Forces in Central and South America.

My research here and over the past several years has been guided by the courses and faculty mentoring of George Mason University's School of Conflict Analysis & Resolution (where I started my post graduate work) and by the doctoral program of Nova Southeastern University's Department of Conflict Analysis & Resolution where I completed my doctorate in ethnic and cultural conflict. The examination and resolution of unmet psycho-social-emotional human needs as underlying drivers of violent communal conflict and inhibitors of conflict resolution has become a central line of effort

for the United States Special Operations Command. Most recently, USSOCOM Commander, Admiral William H. McRaven and USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah concluded an interagency partnership to study and wargame these drivers of conflict and inhibitors of resolution as part of programming and policy development. This partnership became the impetus for LTG Mulholland and MG Linder to deploy me into the trans-Saharan region of northern Niger and support this research into the drivers of conflict and inhibitors of resolution amongst the Tuareg peoples of the Sahel and Sahara in north-west Africa.

Most importantly, I would like to thank my wife Barbara for her patience and perseverance in this four year endeavor that dominated our lives and partnership.

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## Abstract

This dissertation is an Investigation into the Tuareg involvement in violent conflict in the Sahara and the Sahel of North Africa from a sociological psychological perspective of unmet human needs. The research begins by establishing the structure and texture of the sociological, psychological, and emotional life patterns of their existence when not involved in violent conflict. This is followed by an examination of the pathology of Tuareg social structures that are engaged in intra and inter communal violence as perpetrators, victims, and bystanders. The first part of the research establishes normal conditions of the sociological life cycle and highlights natural areas of conflict that arise from exposure to rapid and/or external changes to their physical and social environment. The second part establishes parameters of expected damage from trauma, extended conflict, and failure to adapt to rapid environmental, social and political changes. The research methodology relies on a case study format that uses collaborative ethnography and phenomenological inquiry to answer the research questions and validate propositions made from existing literature and pre-existing research. The research questions focus on aspects of the sociological structure and failing psychological and emotional needs that are relevant to the subject's involvement in violent conflict. The research propositions are in part shaped from existing knowledge of tribal sociological structures that are related to the Tuareg by ethnicity, environment, and shared psycho-cultural attributes. The expected contribution of this research is the development of an alternative praxis for tribal engagement and village stability operations conducted by the United States Special Operations Command.

## Chapter 1: Introduction and Justification of Study

This doctoral dissertation researches the *Kel* (people of) *Tamashek* (Təmàšæx language)<sup>1</sup> who are the indigenous people of the central Sahara and north-central Sahel regions of southern Algeria, northern Niger, and northern Mali. The Kel Tamashek are popularly known as the Tuareg tribes of the Sahara desert and its Sahel transition zone.<sup>2</sup> Specifically, my research gathers and analyzes case study data on the psychological, sociological, and emotional conflict dynamics of the Kel Tamashek. While the ongoing struggle between political power, environmental damage, and division of common pool resources is recognized in the research, it is used to illustrate the psychological, sociological, and emotional dynamics being researched.

The Tuareg in northern Mali and Niger can be thought of in three settings: those “in essuf” or traditional desert nomadic life, those who have merged into town or urban life in regional or national capitals, and those who are in or have returned from diaspora in Libya after the fall of Muammar Gadhafi.<sup>3</sup> The tribal conditions that I investigate in this research involve sociological and psychological structures that may be suffering damage

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<sup>1</sup> The phonetic spelling in parenthesis shows that emphasis on the middle vowel and that the end consonant is spoken with a sound that I best describe as a guttural *ghq*. As part of my research, I spent two months at the US Defense Language Institute (DLI) in Monterey, California studying *Tamashek* under the tutelage of two linguist instructors from Morocco who are ethnic Berbers. They speak a native dialect of Tamazight, a related but different language than *Tamashek*. We have been using a 2005 grammar text of *Tamashek* published by University of Michigan linguist Dr. Jeffrey Heath. More to the point, there are no *Tamashek* speakers in the US Government and none of the Berber dialects are taught at DLI Monterey. Less than 30 percent of Tuareg speak some level of Arabic or French, depending on their trade and travel route towards the Sub-Saharan or for trans-Saharan caravan routes (Native Prospector, 2012).

<sup>2</sup> The word Tuareg is thought to be of Hassaniyah Arab origin as a description of the people (*kel*) of the Tuareg language (Təmàšæx) (Heath, 2005). The Tuareg do not use this word to describe themselves, but for the purpose of clarity, I maintain its use throughout the proposal.

<sup>3</sup> Al-Jazeera reports that nearly a quarter of a million Tuareg refugees returned to northern Niger alone after the fall of Gadhafi, most of them with little or no means of support, adding to the burgeoning unemployment and homelessness in the Agadez region (Al-Jazeera, 2014).



and disintegration from the effects of extended drought, food shortage, rebellion, transnational insurgency, terrorism, smuggling, and human trafficking. While the environmental and food conditions have been ongoing, the active violence most recently recommenced in Tuareg homelands in early 2012 with political violence and the attempted seizure of northern Mali by the *Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad* (MNLA) (Oumar 2012).

### **United Nations in the Sahel: more questions than answers for international peace-builders**

The intended audience of this research is a United Nations based multi-dimensional stabilization mission involving peace enforcement, peacekeeping, humanitarian and civil assistance. The philosophical goal of this research is limited in that it supports interventionists' efforts to end uncontrolled communal violence, transnational terrorism, and transnational crime at the level that creates ungovernable spaces within political states. I have been working on this subject from a policy perspective in my previous assignment and recently returned from a forward deployment to Niger in order to work more closely with the issues involved.<sup>4</sup> Where previous research efforts have focused on state governing efficacy, political parties, and interest groups, my research will focus on the sociological, psychological, and emotional conditions of the segment of Mali society most involved in the violence as perpetrators, victims, and bystanders: the Tuareg community of Azawad.

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<sup>4</sup> For the past three years, I have been assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy and serving as an adjunct lecturer-researcher on African civil conflict.

The situation in northern Mali and Niger has become a significant international intervention effort and has resulted in a relatively rare Chapter VII mandate to control violence in the north of Mali, while French and American forces work to support and reform host nation security in the north of Niger. In northern Mali, the UN military troop force consists of over 11,000 multi-national uniformed military and 1,400 police personnel. In northern Niger, French, American, and European Union military forces conduct internal defense and development as well as security force assistance. The latest Tuareg rebellion that sparked the current crises played out during the early months of 2012 in the latest of a continuing string of rebellions by the Tuareg peoples of northern Mali and Niger to achieve political separation from the African majorities in the south.

This last rebellion was joined by trans-national insurgents from several organized groups consisting of al-Qaeda-in-the-Maghreb, or AQIM,<sup>5</sup> Ansar el-Din, and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (Idoumou 2012). Separately and together, they have attacked government and civilian targets across Mali and Niger. The United States, European Union, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have deemed them as transnational insurgent terrorist organizations (Miller 2013). They are transnational in that their affiliates operate in the reaches of the Sahara and the Sahel in Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, Algeria, and Libya. The insurgent groups openly profess and practice ideologies that seek social reconstruction along

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<sup>5</sup> Formerly known as *Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat* or GSPC, a fundamental Islamic political-insurgent organization seeking to restore primacy of Sunni Islamic social order and law over existing secular political states.

fundamentalist Arab-Sunni-Islamic lines commonly referred to as Salafist<sup>6</sup> or Wahhabi<sup>7</sup> influenced social movements (Native Prospector 2012).

The tactics and procedures that Salafist political-military groups follow are based on unconventional warfare (insurgent warfare) themes that are widely practiced by insurgencies of all ideological persuasions. These themes include the use of social organizing amongst the most displaced members of society; construction of alternative systems of law, finance, commerce, religious expression, justice, and political governance; and the use of violent force or threat thereof as legitimizing influences needed to achieve compliance (US Army FM 3-05.130 2008).<sup>8</sup>

During this latest Tuareg rebellion, the added force of the Salafi affiliated fighters and the recent internal military coup against the civilian government allowed the Tuareg warriors and the allied Salafist fighters to move the battle south into the capital of Bamako (Sethi 2013). This partnership was short-lived, as AQIM pushed the Tuareg's MNLA out of the fight and into refugee camps in Mauritania and Niger as soon as they had secured the majority of the northern approaches to the southern capital of Bamako in the summer of 2012. As the allied Salafi transnational insurgent groups advanced toward the Capital of Bamako in early 2013, the Mali transitional government requested

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<sup>6</sup> A Salaf (سلف) is an Arabic word meaning "predecessor," used to denote the philosophy and example of the early followers of the Prophet Mohammad's emerging religious movement in the Arabian Peninsula.

<sup>7</sup> Wahhabi influenced social-political-military groups include al-Qaeda and its affiliates and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Sudan. The movement stems from an early religious movement led by a Sunni cleric of the same name in early last century Arabia. In an arrangement or bargain engineered by military officers and diplomats from Great Britain, The House of Saud would form the political monarchy of the new Arabian state and the Wahhabi movement would retain control of the religious and spiritual ministry of the new country.

<sup>8</sup> The United States is the only industrialized country to have codified the use of insurgent (unconventional) warfare as a doctrinal method of combating totalitarian state regimes. The practitioners of this method consist of the 1<sup>st</sup> Special Warfare Regiment, commonly referred to as *Green Berets*.

emergency intervention by international forces (United Nations 2013). The subsequent invasion by French military forces repelled the Salafi insurgent forces back into the Sahel and secured the southern part of Mali under central government control.

As the French and Mali forces pushed north into Azawad,<sup>9</sup> Tuareg fighters who had fled to refugee camps returned to the field, now fighting against the multi-ethnic Salafist forces as they continue their efforts at retaking control of their Azawad homeland (Oumar 2012). The Tuareg are central characters in several narratives being articulated by Sub Saharan Malians, the interventionist community represented mostly by the United Nations, and the Salafist organizations operating in Azawad. These narratives have the Tuareg fighting against violent extremists, fighting against the government of Mali, and fighting within their own community.<sup>10</sup>

Depending on perspective and the day of the week, all or some of these narratives may bear some element of veracity. During the course of the nearly two years of conflict, differing elements of the Tuareg community have been perpetrators of organized violence as part of their bid for independence of their traditional Sahel tribal lands. They have also been victims of organized violence by the Salafi Islamic transnational insurgent groups attempting to create an Islamic state in the Sahel and the Sahara. The Tuareg see themselves as victims of organized violence by retreating and returning Mali, French, and other foreign interventionist forces seeking to push back the Salafi insurgency. As such, they think of themselves as victimized bystanders to ongoing Salafi attempts to control

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<sup>9</sup> The Tuareg homeland is called Azaouâd or Azawad and generally consists of the areas between Timbuktu, Gao, Kidal, and Taoudenni to the north.

<sup>10</sup> Credit for the general outline of events is given to cited media sources and to the Navanti Group, C. 2010-2012, operating the “Native Prospector” newsletter under contract with USAFRICOM. Their research products can be located at [https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/community/africa\\_command/1184](https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/community/africa_command/1184)

the traditional Tuareg spaces in Mali's northern Sahel and southern Sahara. Finally, they continue to be both victims and perpetrators of trans-national smuggling, human trafficking, and criminal lawlessness in the ungoverned spaces of northern Mali. It is within these contested spaces that a growing international intervention force seeks to understand and change the underlying conditions that have sustained and perpetuated the conflict in the Sahel.

The United Nations mission in Mali is organized as a multidimensional stabilization mission established by Security Council Resolution 2100 on April 25<sup>th</sup>, 2013. The terms of the resolution envision that the majority of the 11,200 military and 1,440 police interventionists will operate in the north of the country in an effort to address “long-standing structural conditions such as weak State institutes; ineffective governance; fragile social cohesion; deep-seated feelings among communities in the north of being neglected, marginalized and unfairly treated by the central Government; a weak and externally dependent, albeit vibrant, civil society; and the effects of environmental degradation, climate change and economic shocks” (United Nations 2013).

This short depiction above of the Tuareg participation in Mali and Niger's ongoing conflict generally describes a central role played by the Tuareg tribes and outlines how the international interventionist community is problematizing the issues between the African political elites from the south and the Tuareg from north. The conflict focus areas, according to both interventionist and Mali/Niger central governments, is generally thought to be in the north; especially when describing the under or ungoverned spaces in Azaouâd and Azawar where Salafist insurgencies are establishing alternative social constructions based on Sharia Law that compete with the central governments in Bamako

and Niamey. From my interviews with planning officers at USAFRICOM and the MINUSMA liaisons at USAFRICOM headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, the broad conclusion often reached was that the Tuareg communities that inhabit most of the northern part of Mali and Niger are alternatively thought to be the problem, the solution, or both. At the same time, most of the US and MINUSMA officials that I talked to related that the sheer opacity of the Tuareg community construction and culture generates a tendency to overwrite existing Tuareg issues and grievances with generalized standards transferred from other African communities under conflict.

Between the European Union mission in Mali and Niger, French, American, and Canadian military, and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization




Figure 1: USAID CVE & Resilience Programming for the Sahel Region

Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), there are large numbers of interventionist trainers working to professionalize the Malian and Nigeriennes armed forces and redirect their focus toward national defense, and the protection of life, property, and infrastructure.

ECOWAS, the French army and their Chad partner continue to push Salafi fighters out of Mali and maintain calm in the north while French, American, Canadian, and EU troops support Nigeriennes attempts to disrupt flows of fighters and material. The USAID CVE & Resilience Programming graphic below shows the flows of Jihadist fighters and materials, with Agadez at the center of movement. Significant numbers of Malian families remain in refugee camps in Mauritania and Niger.

The coalition analysts provided me with their data and interpretation, some of which found its way into my research. The majority of this data has representations of the social and political positions of the more organized groups in the reaches north of the river Niger. These social and political representations are interspersed with conflicting historical accounts that buttress position and entitlement, but rarely address the sociological and psychological conditions of life within and between the conflict parties. The extended communal violence, preexisting environmental conditions, rebellions, and insurgent terror raise significant questions about the nature of the society in northern Mali and the ability to the kels (tribes) in the north to accept peace-building propositions of the peacekeeping interventionists.

My training and experiences have led me to believe that the conditions of sociological, psychological, and emotional life of the conflict community must be explored if peace-building operations are to be successful. The social and political positions advanced by the conflict parties are meant to be representations of deeper,

unmet human needs. Depending on how their positions and interests are constructed and advanced, they may or may not actually satisfy those underlying needs. Also important to note are some of the social and political positions that may involve constructions of social life untenable to existing international law and order, such as ancient practices of slavery and inter-communal raiding. The concentration on the political and military activities of Tuareg, Salafi, and Songhai groups in the north by the interventionist analysts suggests a focus on the concerns of the Mandé and Hausa based population majorities and their representative governments in the south.

Absent in study and reporting were key concerns such as the nature of the relationships between the traditional Tuareg leadership and the MNLA; the relationship between Tuareg communities, the African Songhai, and the Arab Moor peoples in the Sahel; and perhaps most importantly, the relationship between the Tuareg and the Salafi Islamic movements that are seeking to establish a reordering of the basic sociological construction of the Western Sahel. The relationships that I am interested in are less of those at the level of political expression and more at those at the level of psychological and emotional interrelation.

### **The need for deeper psycho-sociocultural research in planning, programming, and executing international peace operations in communal conflict**

Throughout most of my participation in international humanitarian and military operations in failing, failed, and war-torn states, I have witnessed our organizational inability to understand and ameliorate the underlying drivers of conflict and inhibitors of resolution. Both diplomat and soldier now agree that success in these missions is “one of the greatest challenges of the century” (USIP/USA PKSOI 2009, 1.3).



Despite the past fifteen years of experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Africa, the current construction of our western diplomatic, military, and humanitarian efforts are rarely successful despite enormous cost in blood and money (Center for Global Development 2007). In 2009, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) crafted a supplement to the U.S. Army's manuals<sup>11</sup> that train field practitioners and planners in peacekeeping, humanitarian and stability operations, and counterinsurgency.

The USIP/PKSOI *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* manual (2009) was developed in order to offer a civilian perspective on reconstruction and stabilization operations. This combined effort failed to provide the field practitioner much assistance beyond the theoretical understanding of counterinsurgency or stabilization. Neither the military practitioner's preoccupation with physical security, nor the civilian specialist's focus on human development targeted the most acute and dangerous symptoms of unstable conflict zones.

Together, the current program analysis of US missions in violent conflict zones remains focused on needs assessments of physical infrastructure conducted by special operations forces and USAID operators whose frame of reference is based on dense, technologically advanced societies (Derleth & Alexander 2011). Even when we achieve high degrees of interagency cooperation in peace operations, counterinsurgency and humanitarian missions, we default to a focus on physical security and needs assessments of security, governance and development. We default to this focus despite knowing that

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<sup>11</sup> *The U.S. Army Stability Operations Field Manual: U.S. Army Field Manual No. 3-07* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 2009).

the populations we are seeking to engage possess a sociological structure has been damaged or even destroyed by severe and extended trauma. And even when we deliver results that have been less than satisfactory and far greater in cost than anticipated, we continue to pursue the same narrow focus on the physical rather than the human, on the quantitative over the qualitative.<sup>12</sup>

When I returned from Niger this past fall, I was asked to develop and teach a short curriculum on the psychopathology of violent extremist ideology by the Department of Defense's Joint Special Operations University. The course director told me that his university had asked the RAND Corporation to research the drivers of terrorism. The RAND Corporation's principal investigator (PI) recruited a team of prominent scholars to research the underlying origin, psychology, and pathology of violent extremist terrorism and its ideology.<sup>13</sup> This research team ultimately concluded that, "empirically, terrorism increases with democratization, development... although with inverted-U phenomenon." The RAND Corporation PI finally concluded in a briefing to the granting university that they were "in relative chaos" with a "multiplicity of theories, logical holes due to

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<sup>12</sup> Military and civilian government and non-government personnel (to include contractors) engage traumatized communities when conducting humanitarian operations, counterinsurgency missions, stability operations to include village stability operations, peace keeping operations, peace building operations, and reconstruction of societies damaged by violent conflict. The focus of the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations is on conflict prevention, crisis response, and stabilization activities. The U.S. Agency for International Development is the lead agency for the United States in providing development and humanitarian assistance. The Department of Defense conducts the bulk of interaction with traumatized villages, provinces, and tribes as it conducts peace enforcement, peacekeeping, stability, and reconstruction operations in a number of violent conflict zones worldwide. Both State and Defense conduct operations by, with, and through local partners, non-governmental humanitarian partners (NGOs), and intergovernmental organizations such as the UN, AU, EU, NATO, OAS, and the Arab League. All of these organizations' personnel who are assigned to interact with, plan, or program for these missions are subject to the issues described in this paper.

<sup>13</sup> The research team included Eli Berman of UC, San Diego, Martha Crenshaw and Doug McAdam from Stanford, John Horgan from Penn State, Brian Jenkins from RAND Corporation, Mark Stout from the Institute for Defense Analyses and Steve Simon of the Council on Foreign Relations.

disciplinary methods and social reluctances, and [an] abundance of counterproductive quantitative analysis” (Davis 2013).

Only after discovering that democracy and development are the real causes of terror and violence did the university begin to look elsewhere for answers. What we have been missing in the programming, training, and execution of peace and stability operations in violent, unstable conflict zones is the traumatized condition of the communities we are engaging. There is a great deal of research and literature relating to the political and economic dynamics of civil war (Fearon & Laitin 2003; Fukuyama 2004; Kaufman S. J. 2006; Krasner 2004; Spears 2010; Stewart 2008; Weinstein 2007). What is missing however, are corresponding “studies on the psychological effects of the civil war on the combatants on both sides” and the participants caught in the middle (Odejide, Sanda, & Odejide 1998, 378). The damaged condition of the population in unstable conflict zones normally presents obstacles that limit the interventionists’ ability to match success in the field with the amount of effort and donor dollars processed. There are many reasons for the tremendous costs incurred for such low levels of success in stabilizing the levels of violence. One reason involves attempts by programmers, planners, and executers to project developmental need-based assessments as a primary methodology of reducing instability. In doing so, they fail to identify local sources of instability relevant to the situation confronting them:

Effective stability operations programming requires a methodology focused on identifying and diminishing any local sources of instability, [sic] not addressing the perceived needs of the population. Most developing countries have myriad needs. Extremists/insurgents do not usually build roads, provide health care, or

dig wells. Yet they are able to gain support in the population. How?

Extremists/insurgents are able to ameliorate the priority grievances of the population because they understand the local community (Derleth & Alexander 2011, 125).

As an organizational institution, we in the US Government are aided and abetted by academia in the reduction of entire large group identities to individual actors operating with independent agency using violent action to meet rational utilitarian goals that are elucidated by political scientists operating from distant frames of alien reference. Nowhere do we account for differences in psychological organization, sociological construction, emotional conjugation, and cognitive imprinting based on psychogeography, geology, climate, or historical narrative.

The drivers of conflict and inhibitors of resolution within the Kel Tamashek of the central Sahel that I describe in the data presentation are infused with explanations of trauma and identity devolution rather than political and economic analysis. The ability of the Kel Tamashek to express their underlying human needs in appropriate political positions is profoundly important to the eventual reconciliation of the Niger political state. But the anecdotal stories of nomadic family alienation, shame, and rage suggest a more fundamental starting point, such as the breakdown of sociological and psychological reality and the multigenerational effects of extended social trauma.

My research goal is for this type of conflict analysis research to be seen as an initial tentative step toward reorienting humanitarian and peace operations practitioners from their current focus on the physical to a focus on the psychological sociological wreckage wrought by extended trauma and violence. Washington Irving writes that the tears found

in traumatized societies are not signs of weakness, but of power: “they are messengers of overwhelming grief and unspeakable love” (Wood J. R. 1899).

During twenty-five years of military service in conflict zones characterized by violent, communal conflict, I have found that there is blindness in the ability for most government interventionist organizations and their staffs to comprehend the power of the grief behind the tears and the danger that lies behind the loss of love and family. This blindness continues despite the reality that they, or rather we, are most likely the only other humans capable of bringing stability to chaos.

Our awareness of the power of trauma however, becomes actionable only when it is politicized for us. But it is politicized only when political institutions articulate the military and social security threats posed by the violence. Until then, we remain as bystanders, awkwardly trying to shield embarrassed eyes that are privy to scenes of intimate ferocity. Even though we lack understanding of what is happening and why, we embark on a process that transforms us into unwitting bystanders whose un-involvement creates the very authorization that we would resist offering.

Because we cannot comprehend what is happening beneath the vacant or hostile stares of the inhabitants; or gauge the relative psychological and emotional dispositions of perpetrator and victim; or because we don't understand the sociological, economic, and cultural structures that are broken, we hesitate. This initial hesitation by the humanitarian or peacekeeper quickly becomes a blueprint for ineffective action with exculpatory explanations that eventually lay the blame evenly on the shoulders of both victim and perpetrator (Ofer 1994).

The error of the humanitarian and peacekeeper is not in their hesitation when faced with the violent events that are unfolding in front of them. The first sin of the interventionist is to wander into that conflict zone uninformed, unaware of the structures of conflict and the dynamics of communal violence. But the second sin of the interventionist is to witness with averted eyes.

Perhaps it is necessary to place the topic of social trauma pathology and intervention into a historical context of practice so as to answer the question of “so what?” Why is this topic important for the interventionist? And if this topic is so important, why hasn’t it been incorporated into standard practice for western interventionist planners, operators and donors?

Historically and contemporaneously, issues of humanitarian support to the population during military operations were, and still are, tertiary considerations to maintaining control, protecting the occupation forces, and preserving the natural resources necessary for reconstruction of a new political-social order that conforms to the demands of the conquering party. The evolution of the standards of normative behavior expected of conquering powers has created what has been called the “Pottery Barn” policy effect by the international community: “if you break it, you bought it.”

No longer can the conquering party cut and run if their actions create dangerous destabilization of a fragmented society. Nearly by default, a conquering power is obliged by the international community to clean up the social mess in the aftermath of the fall of that political-social order, despite that fact that the former regime may have ultimately been the progenitor of sociological structures in ruins. Despite this increase in social responsibility, interventionist powers have not fundamentally deepened their capacity to

repair and treat broken sociological structures traumatized by violence and suffering from a disestablishment of its psychological support base.

The conditions of civil-military interventions today bear little resemblance to those undertaken even a half-century earlier. Interventionist personnel, whether public, private, armed military, or unarmed civilian, operate in the light of Internet media. Powered by millions of cell phone video cameras linked to YouTube style websites, conflict zone populations now turn the brilliant act and the horrifying misdeed into viral emanations of public knowledge.

At the same time, the nature of the violence that national, regional, and international governance structures are intervening into has changed; from interstate political-military conflicts to internal state conflicts involving sociological fracturing with strong elements of destabilized or collapsed large group psychological identity. The mixed remains of past empires have left behind divided and contentious cultural populations. Combined with simmering failures of colonial state constructions of governing institutions, the quest for globalization and the Westphalian state have left a series of failing or failed experiments in collectivized human identity, ethnicity, and culture. Assembled in strife and maintained with force, these failed social constructions are presenting themselves as Frankenstein-like monstrosities, with increasing frequency to the global consciousness for recognition and repair.

As authoritarian regimes continue to fall, the legitimacy of their existing ethnic, cultural, communicative, and psychological group identity boundaries are subject to renegotiation and vulnerable to collapse. Within states like Yugoslavia, Iraq, Sudan, Somalia, Syria, Libya, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Mali, and others, a type of violence emerges

from this renegotiation and collapse that intergovernmental and humanitarian interventionists are unprepared for. This type of violence is not new. The internal communal conflicts that raged in China, Russia, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh over the past century have provided us all the forewarning needed to understand the coming change in the nature of violent conflict. Samuel Huntington (1997) made famous the phrase, 'a clash of civilizations'. It is easy to understand his mistake when you think about his western-based viewpoint. A closer look at the changing nature of violence in the twenty-first century will lead one to the conclusion that the coming clash is not between civilizations, but rather, within them.



## Chapter 2: Literature and Research Review

### Part I of the Case Study: Assembling and Reviewing Literature and Past Research

If the *Kel Tamashek* are an extraordinarily complex people as studied from a distance, then the reality of their lived experiences proved to be even more formidable. The first part of my case study (the review of literature and past research) established my basic understanding of a publicly known historical narrative, sociological structure, psychological organization, and some expected trauma conditions of the Tuareg. This allowed me to then use the second part of the case study (field research) to validate, correct, and deepen my model of Tuareg lived experience. I organized my thought process of Tuareg research into a number of frames of reference, through which I attempted to understand the Tuareg. I borrowed this organization from my first graduate degree in cross-cultural organizational studies at Gonzaga University. It is these five frames of reference that form the basis of my review of literature and past research and that serve as the foundation of my case study. Each of the five frames represent a grouping of literature and research, although there is a degree of crossover. Each of these also loosely represent an academic field of study: anthropology, cultural sociology and psychology, social psychology and trauma studies, indigenous systems of justice and conflict resolution, and qualitative research in conflict settings.

- Anthropological studies of *Kel Tamashek*, the Tuareg of Mali
- Cross cultural sociological and psychological construction of tribal society
- The effects and conditions of sociological and psychological traumatization on tribal society

- Cross-cultural mediation and facilitation of conflict in tribal society to include systems of indigenous justice and conflict resolution.
- Research methods in dangerous research settings and the use of gatekeepers in tribal conflict zones and issues of transference and countertransference in violent research settings

I used these five frames as a foundation of knowledge on which to add and integrate my field ethnographic data collection and phenomenological inquiries. Collectively, I believed these five frames of literature and research review combined with field research have answered my research questions and validated my propositions. I purposefully avoided indepth political science perspectives of the use of organized violence in the contest over social reconstruction and division of resources. These literature and research perspectives have their place in interventionist negotiations with the Mali government and the various sectors of social life, to include the Tuareg and the political-military groups that purport to represent the larger society. For the purposes of my research, however, I moved from the political and military positions and interests of the Tuareg down to the underlying human needs and damage that are the basis for their psycho-social-emotional constructs. My research provides useful analysis as to whether political and military positions are consonant with underlying human needs and whether unmet needs are drivers of conflict and inhibitors of resolution. The research also illustrates possibilities of alternative expressions of those positions that can meet the same needs without engagement in violence or conflict. What I refrained from in my overall research is the comparison and analysis of Tuareg political and military positions and interests relative to the surrounding segments of Mali population. This I believe, places my

research out of the realm of political science and into the field of conflict analysis and resolution based on interpersonal mediation of underlying human needs. Below I have organized a discussion of each of the research and practice fields that I introduced into my dissertation along with a very brief introduction of the major theories that I integrated into my analysis.

### **Anthropological studies of Kel Tamashek, the Tuareg of Mali**

As I began ordering books and downloading journal articles on the Tuareg of Mali, several authors seemed to have produced most of the anthropological works. I bought several works by anthropologist Jeremy Keenan, especially his classics *The Tuareg*, *People of Ahaggar* (Keenan 1977), and *Sahara Man, Traveling with the Tuareg* (Keenan 2001). Keenan is a Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society and the Royal Anthropological Institute. His books are considered definitive works of anthropology on the central Sahara Berber tribes, and I think of him as an “I.M. Lewis” for the Tuareg of the Sahara. From Susan Rasmussen of the University of Houston, I found one book and at least one peer article, both on the *Kel Ewey* Tuareg of the Air Mountains in Niger. Rasmussen’s value for me is her exploration into the psychological and emotional constructions of Tuareg spirituality (1995) and sociological explorations of class and ethnicity (1992). From Anja Fischer and Ines Kohl, I found a recent work that focuses on the Tuareg of southern Algeria and documents several observed tribes’ struggles with dealing with modernization and the spread of globalized economy and communication in tribal society (Fischer & Kohl 2010). From Baz Lecocq, I found two publications on relevant themes to my research. Lecocq is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Modern Oriental Studies, Berlin, whose research focus is on Tuareg Migration and sociological

life in the Sahara and the Sahel. Lecocq's (2005) first work deals with the emancipation process of the Bellah, a slave caste of people who occupy a complex position in Tuareg communal life. His second work (2004) deals with a slice of Tuareg community called *teshumara*, or intellectuals whose application to modern Tuareg society is struggling to find validation and a place of respect. From Georg Klute I found pertinent research on tribal identities and kinship as they relate to violent communal conflict in northern Mali.

Each source that I encountered seemed to agree that the Tuareg are the most famous of the unknown peoples. By this I mean that given their central place in geopolitical conflict, they are relatively unknown outside of a handful of cultural anthropologists. I obtained an unclassified six part series on Mali Tuareg Sociocultural Analysis that was published by U.S. Africa Command for internal use. The series was written by a collection of anthropologists and analysts working for the command's Civil Military Division. Each of the series carries the disclaimer that "[p]ublished, English language cultural information is limited" (U.S. Africa Command Theater Intelligence Report 2013). From this series, I gained valuable context and an awareness of the state of research into my subject by the government body with the most responsibility for US intervention. As part of my case study research, I was assigned an ethnic Tuareg linguist Mohammed who served as my *Tamashék* language instructor and served as my translator for the phenomenological interviews during fieldwork.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> My tutor while in Germany was Mr. Muhammed al-Bakaye, from the *Kel Ansara*, north of the Niger River and west of the city of Gao in northern Mali. Mo, as he had us call him, is a naturalized American citizen, and a contract employee of U.S. Africa Command. Mo and his wife are residents of Silver Springs Maryland and both possess postgraduate degrees from the University of Maryland. They joke that it is easy for them to maintain friendships with other Tuareg in America; there are only six of them.

In preparation for this deployment, the Army sent me to the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California from June to August 2013 to learn Tamashek. Unfortunately, there were no Tamashek speakers there and I had to learn from several books on Tamashek grammar written by Dr. Jeffrey Heath of the University of Michigan. Subsequently, my Tamashek linguists continued to tutor me in Tamashek pronunciation and vocabulary. The purpose of learning Tamashek was to understand the genesis of ideas as they are represented by indigenous language. Part of my review of literature focused on Tamashek as a repository and vehicle for the Tuareg psychological identity and expressions of that identity in culture and social organization. Accordingly, my linguistic tutor and I organized a human terrain map that accounts for the organization and relationships of the *kels*, or tribes, in northern Mali—a task that was not possible without significant indigenous assistance from our host Kel Tamashek community. This process was important because members of nearly every Kel have either been killed in the fighting and/or ended up in the UN refugee camps along the border of Mali and Niger to the east and Mauritania to the west. Additionally, some sub kels of the Kel Adraʼ have been pushed into the Algeria and Libya by the fighting.<sup>15</sup> Without beginning with a human terrain map of the home areas of the kels, we would not have been able to comprehend sociological damage when it was explained to us. The Tuareg seem to have a significant capacity to comprehend this human terrain cognitively without reference to maps, notes, or diagrams. It seems as if they connect the land to the people in a seamless

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<sup>15</sup> Adragh (alternatively spelled Adrar) is a *Tamashek* word for Mountain. The mountain ranges in the northeast part of Mali are called the *Ifogas* (alternatively spelled *ifogas*, *iforas*, or *iforhas*) des Adragh. *Ifogas* is a *Tamashek* word that means Noble (selected free-born families who possess and transmit capital wealth) and is used by the Tuareg tribes in and around the *Ifogas des Adragh* (translated as the Mountains of the Nobles).

memorization of human cultural geography that I garnered literacy with as part of the research. This literacy allowed me to apply learned knowledge about the sociological and psychological construction of tribal society to the kels of northern Mali and northern Niger.

**Environment-geographical, sociological and psychological context research and literature review**

I place the Tuareg in a class of people that share common environmental and external factors that have an inordinate influence on their sociological construction and the quality of that construction's psychological and emotional emanations. In short, these factors involve extremes of environmental challenge to communal survival and ever-present threats of physical violation and attack from other populations. The environmental challenges are usually desert and mountain habitats that require great effort to sustain life and that form or possess natural barriers, passage points, and/or natural resources that are sought by social competitors. By this reasoning, I can compare and contrast the tribal sociological constructions of the Moor, Tuareg, Zaghawa, Rizeigat, and even Somali tribes of the Sahara and the Sahel against the Ik mountain tribe of northern Uganda or against the Pashto mountain tribes of the Hindu Kush and Chechen mountain tribes of the northern Caucasus to establish expected patterns.

These patterns provide ethnographically observable social organization that is based on habitat survival common to most subsistence level desert and mountain communities. The environmental and social competition for control and survival in these (normally) under- governed spaces can also affect the psychological and emotional constructions of the individual and group identity in somewhat predictable ways. Based on this

comparability I included research and literature on desert nomadic tribes in Chad to provide context for similar desert nomadic tribes in Niger and Mali. My past research on the Zaghawa African pastoralist tribes and Rizeigat Arab Bedouin tribes of the eastern Sahara and Sahel yielded insight on cognitive thought processes of time and expectation based on desert life. I subsequently used that insight as contextual understanding about pastoralist and Bedouin tribes of central and western regions of the Sahara and the Sahel. Without making specific judgments that are not verified, I used this extrapolated data as context to inform my planning for ethnographic research and phenomenological inquiry.

The paragraph above is meant to support the introduction and use of literature and research that I have previously used or conducted to help me with my research of the Tuareg. Before comparing components of life amongst various social groups from deserts and mountains generally and in the Sahara and the Sahel specifically, I wanted to make a clear connection between these communities who share a common environment of an extreme habitat that are often in spaces that are politically under-governed and socially isolated. I began my research and analysis thought process by reviewing my previous field research and experiences with tribes in the Sahara, the Sahel, and the desert plains of Somali Ogadin and Ethiopian Oromo. From them I established ideas of life cycles and community construction based on extreme climate cycles in subsistence level social organizations. Other uses of past context research and experience included the psychological and emotional organization of family and clan life in extreme environments with high levels of social sovereignty; and constructions of ethnicity, memory, and historical narrative amongst communities in competition over identity distinction and affirmation. Some of this type of context research is encapsulated in my

recent peer reviewed publication of a psychohistoriography of Darfur's conflict tribes in Routledge's Journal of African Security and a 2011 published field guide to tribal engagement (Christian 2013; Christian 2011). The former was reviewed and accepted by a professor of anthropology at the Providence Rhode Island College, Dr. Carolyn Lobban-Fluehr and the latter by the director of studies at the U.S. Army's Special Warfare University, COL Glenn Thomas (Thomas 2012).

Tentative questions that I explored in my data collection and analysis that are related to this section of the review include:

- How has the geographical and climatological environment shaped and bounded the sociological construction and the physical life of Tuareg community?
- How has the geographical and climatological environment shaped and bounded the psychological organization, emotional emanation and cognitive awareness of the Tuareg community?

### **Tribal context literature from Africa and Arabia**

From the few available anthropological studies of the Tuareg, I found several that touch upon their underlying emotional, cognitive and psychological identity issues. Lecocq's (2005) and Rasmussen's (1992) discussions on class, ethnicity, and the colors of constructed racial identity illustrated their use of imagined skin color to describe identity differentiations (black, white, green, red, blue, and so on) and the intense meanings that they apply to them. From ethnic identity to cultural spirituality, Rasmussen's (1995) work on examining and explaining the relationship between Tuareg personhood and spiritual existence provided me with insight into not just the Targui, but how they differ in social construction and psychological-emotional organization from



their Moorish neighbors to the north and how they relate to their Songhai neighbors to the south. I compared Rasmussen's observations and analysis to those of Mohammed Bamyeh (1999) in his work on the psychosocial discourse and organization of the Arab Bedouin prototype of the Arabian Peninsula. While the descendants, Bani Hillal (alternatively spelled Banu Hassan), in the Sahara and the Sahel may be racially and linguistically altered with time and space, my firsthand research and living experiences with them provided me with intense insight into these Arab nomads (Christian 2013).

The Tuareg people as a subject of study belongs to both the world of Africa and the world of Arabia, so the historical context and narrative of both social frames apply to their past and present construction. Where they may express a dislike or resentment toward their Arab neighbors to the north, the Tuareg's Islamic overlay of social construction and spirituality require my examination of the Arab Bedouin social construction and their own internal battle between tribal ethnicity and spiritual trans-tribalism. Ibn Khaldun (Khaldun 1969) and Sayed Alatas (2006) discuss historical sociology of the southern peninsula; Ernest Gellner (2006) discusses social cohesion and identity in the Maghreb; Sasha Gordon (2012) reviews the Abyani tribes in the Arabian Peninsula; Christine Helms (1990) examines the concept of nomadism against the requirements of the modern state; Toshihiko Izutsu (2002) investigates the interrelationships between the Quran and the demands of the ethnic tribe; Huyse and Salter (2008) offer a collection of articles that explore the structural and textural aspects of indigenous justice and social reconciliation from internal conflict; and finally, from I.M. Lewis (1994), I found in-depth ethnological descriptions of pastoral life cycles that are replicated by many such environmentally similar communities. Similarly, Paul

Riesman (1986) articulates ideas of African personhood and natural life cycles in pastoral and agrarian communities that I compared against researcher descriptions of actual field data such as Sugule and Walker's (1998) study of the changing pastoralism in the Ethiopian Somali plains of Ogadin.

Tentative questions that I explored in my data collection and analysis that are related to this context literature include the following:

- What aspects of Tuareg life are similar to other African desert tribes? How are they different?
- What aspects of Tuareg life are similar to other Arab desert tribes? How are they different?

**Developing a model of Tuareg sociological construction, psychological organization, and emotional emanation**

Ultimately, I was able to learn only so much from the limited amounts of research on the Tuareg themselves and from the context of peoples related by blood, marriage, and environment. To complete this research, I compared and contrasted these context images of the Tuareg with prototypical models of sociological construction, psychological organization, and emotional emanation that are constructed from basic archetypes of human life (such as love, nurturance, communication, creative expression, spiritual interaction, identity development and expression, memorialization, and generational transmission of existential identity). Then, against this archetypal model, I interpreted the sociological structures that I interacted with in order to better understand how the real structure exists and survives against its archetypal north star. Using Durkheim's (1933) formation of "collective effervescence," in which sacred events and objects serve as

organizing forces to cohere and order society, I added Halbwachs (1992) theories of collective memory to establish the basis for the transmission of existential identity through generational inculcation. This ideational construction of the rational of communal life at its lowest common denominator provided me with a template that I used to organize observations and begin guessing at causality and relatedness of communal actions and communications. Thus, I started with the premise that the act of survival became the basis of the first collective effervescence of creation; simple survival against implausible environments of desert, mountain, starvation, thirst, and natural predators.

From this basic construction of collective effervescence in the meaning created by humans acting collectively to achieve a most basic need, I wove in Geertz' (1971) ideas of myth and symbols. This was especially appropriate given the oral nature of Tuareg society where myth and symbol serve as narrative expressions of existential memory that organize personhood's self-identification into what we think of as identity. This identity is then expressed through physical activity as culture (Hollan 1992). Both the requirements for survival against environment and development of cognition and spatial representation of inner and outer worlds affect the rate and direction of sociological psychological growth (Stein 1984; Stein 2008). Jenkins (1991) and Stein (1983) helped me to understand and apply the mythological story that a communal composition of a group historical narrative must be and how that narrative provides a growing body of organizing ideations for the ethnic community of common descendants (Guijt & Shah 1998; Geertz 1973). From a utilitarian construction, Volkan (2003) and Tajfel (1982) helped me understand the development of social identity construction, while Brewer (2001) and Horowitz (1985) explained identity's requirement for optimal distinction and

positive affirmation, respectively. Becker (1973) and Attias-Donfur and Wolff (2003) explain fundamental drivers of translating identity into memorialization and transmitting that memorialization across generational memory as mitigation of existential annihilation.

From this basic model, I overlaid common constructions of higher levels of collective creation and memorialization gained from the adaptation of language and meaning to the social construction of ethnicity and identity (Miller C. 2006). I used Heather Sharkey (2008) and Anthony Smith's (1986) exploration of how simple constructions of social identity internal to a community are deepened through the recognition of physical markers of ingroup-outgroup belonging. I incorporated Guss, Tuason, & Teixeira's (2007) exploration of the process of metaphysical aspects of social identity and psychological-spiritual need that are both satisfied and used as constructed controllers of belonging and hierarchy in communal life. Anthropologist Charles Lindholm's models of agro-pastoral, segmented societies illustrated the sensitive foundation of the sociocentric construction of psychological organization and emotive emanations that I found to be uniquely presented in a society as complex as the Tuareg. Using my experience with similar desert nomadic peoples, I proposed and developed a theoretical model of social construction of the Kel Tamashek that I found constituted a landscape of interconnectedness and multi-level high context communication. Such models normally possess a complex system of social and behavioral locus of control fully external to the individual, but I found that several of the caste groups of the Tuareg possessed higher levels of egocentric identity construction that is the norm for such isolated societies, an interesting find in the research.

During the data collection and analysis, I constructed a theoretical model of social construction, psychological organization, and emotional emanation that I used as a base of comparison and contrast during my ethnographic observations and phenomenological inquiries. For the central prototypes of Tamashek individuation, (*Mashek*, *Ifogas*, and other noble classes) I described and tested an expected theoretical model of social construction, psychological organization, and emotional emanation for the father-mother-child(ren) family unit, which incorporated all of the previous review sections. My research questions worked to move beyond mere physical survival and into creation of love, pride, and belonging. My data collection and analysis sought to understand Tuareg creation of identity through creative construction and expression in story, art, defense, survival, communication, sociological construction, and political organization. I included descriptions of the possible individual and group archetypes, prototypes, and how meshed or unmeshed their individual identities would be to the nuclear and extended families compared to their African and Arab contemporaries living north of the Niger Buckle.

### **The effects and conditions of sociological and psychological traumatization on tribal society**

Using the constructed models of Tamashek life, I conducted a review of literature and past research on the sociological and psychological traumatization of communities from extended violence, loss of habitat, and rapid, uncontrollable change to political, social, and/or environmental conditions. The purpose of this aspect of the literature and research review was to visualize the strengths and weaknesses of the model structure under intense pressure and assault, developing expected behavior patterns when the sociological structural reality was pierced by external or internal events. From this pierced reality, or

traumatization, I began to estimate predictions of psychological disorganization and emotional expression and/or reduction consistent with the most basic of human psychological processes. Using models that depicted the healthy functioning of a particular type of human social construction, this part of the research depended on western psychology as a base of understanding at the lowest common denominator, then crosses those lowest common denominator principals over the barriers of differing sociological construction, psychological organization, and emotional emanation or reduction. Below, I've organized my thinking and review into several distinct, but still interrelated, segments for the purpose of the research proposal.

Trauma is a condition that pierces or damages the shroud of communal and individual reality and their psychological organization. I used psychiatrist Judith Herman's (1992) book *Trauma and Recovery* as a resource for clear explanations of Anna Freud's theories of trauma to the individual and group psychological and sociological reality and the attendant sequelae on behavior and thought process. Other theorist-practitioners that I used to assist my analysis and review of literature, research, and practice on trauma and stress include Mardi Horowitz's (2001) work on stress response syndromes; Bayer, Fiona, and Hubertus' (2007) work with trauma and PTSD; Patrick Bracken's (1998) work deconstructing and explaining PTSD and the effects of stress and trauma; Douglas Bremner's (1998) work with the effects of trauma on memory and dissociation; Peter Elsass (1992) work on the psychology of cultural resilience during stress and conflict; Richard Mollica's work on treating and healing trauma across cultural barriers; Peter Elsass (1997) book dealing with the psychological and emotional effects of torture and violence, especially as it relates to the breaking of the individual psychological reality

barrier; Henry Krystal's (1978) exploration of debilitating trauma on children's psyche; Soriede's (2009) work on the epidemiology of wartime trauma; and finally, van der Kolk, van der Hart, & Marmar's (1996) book on traumatic stress, where they describe the overwhelming effects on the mind, body and cumulative effects on family and society. These are some of the literature sources that I used as a lense to analyze the effects of trauma on the Tuareg. The trauma effects that I was interested in all relate to the continuation and exacerbation of violent conflict and that serve as continuing inhibitors of normal conflict resolution, especially in communal conflict.

Through research and field experience, I found that violence possesses what I think of as an *emotional logic* based on the linkage between alienation, shame, and rage in sociocentric communities, which helps explore the relationship between victim and perpetrator. Besides past research, I used psychiatrist James Gilligan's (1997) study of extremely violent offenders' violence in maximum-security prisons as a fundamental guide. It's well written, easy to read, and frighteningly accurate in terms of explanation of sequelae and diagnosis of origin. Other sources that I relied on include Scheff & Retzinger's (1991) work on shame and rage in destructive conflict; Elison, Pulos, and Lennon's (2006) work on the development of a compass scale of shame that helps explain causality between alienation and shame; finally, Leon Wurmser (1981) and Donald Nathenson's (1987) exploration of the relationship of shame to alienation and rage illuminates the debilitating conditions that shame engenders with healing and reparation. The application of explanations of extreme communal violence to the science of sociocentric communities' particular vulnerability to alienation and its attendant creation of shame and the sequelae of rage is novel to my military, diplomatic, and

development aid colleagues. Accordingly, I included these and many other published scientific references throughout the data presentation and analysis in order to demonstrate that the application is well grounded in science.

In my literature review, I did not find any English language research that fully documented and described the devolution of an entire cultural group's psychological organization based on the traumatic disruption of their sociological structure and emotional conjugation. Peter Elsass' (1992) book *Strategies for Survival* about the psychology of cultural resilience in ethnic minorities provided my starting point. With his work to guide me, I used the pathology of psychological devolution within an individual personality as a model to describe the effects of extreme traumatization of a sociocentric community in conflict. My intent with this application is the explanation of conflict community behavior that would otherwise not be recognizable to western military, diplomatic, and development aid interventionists. Given the effects of individual and social trauma in sociocentric communities, I applied literature and past research to anticipate characteristics of social devolution, especially of communal structures of support, identity, love, nurturance, and healing. The devolution of society included individual and group behavior that seemed normally contrary to its own needs for survival and continuation, but did make sense in light of the disorganizing communal personality and devolving sociological structure.

I included several exterior examples to illustrate the data presented and its analysis, such as the account by Colin Turnbull (1972) of the psychological disorganization and sociological devolution of the Ik tribe of northern Uganda after their loss of habitat—an account that anthropologist Margaret Mead described as “terrifying.” In my analysis,



I used Howard Adelman's (1997) work on deconstructing the genocidal rage of Tutsi and Hutu peoples in Rwanda as part of my analysis into the effects of group identity disintegration resulting from extreme trauma and alienation. In addition to these resources, I also used Albertyn, Bickler, van As, Millar, & Rode's (2003) exploration of the effects of war violence and trauma on children, focusing on associated behavior that helps establish trauma sequelae as causations of social breakdown. I incorporated Bhugra & Becker's (2005) exploration of the relationships to loss of habitat and community against cultural bereavement and cultural identity; Bolton & Hill's (1996) description of underlying causal relationships to mental affects, meaning and personality disorder; Derluyn, Broekaert, Schuyten, & de Temmerman's (2004) exploration of the conditions of personality disintegration and community devolution of Ugandan children forced into committing war violence; Annemiek Richters' (1998) investigation of sexual violence in war and the psycho-sociological wounds created and sustained across generational boundaries. And finally, I used Odejide, Sanda, & Odejide's (1998) investigation into the intergenerational aspects of communal conflict in Africa, especially the transmission of effects of trauma.

As traumatized communities devolve in sociological structure and psychological organization, normal psychological and emotional needs are cut off, unable to be satisfied by the survivors and their children. The work on traumatized families and communities in the existing literature and research suggested a number of key learning points that I sought to explore as a foundation for psychological sociological modeling. The first of these is whether there exists a human need for memorialization and transmission of existential identity across generational boundaries as an essential mitigation of normal

processes of death anxiety within the Kel Tamashek (Becker 1973). This point is critical given the extended violence they have already suffered, suggesting that the essential mitigation of normal processes could no longer be met when entire layers of family and kin are either dead or unaccounted for. As the human need for individual and family identity optimization, placement and affirmation in social contrasts is not merely overwritten by basic needs to survive. I explored the Kel Tamashek's phenomenological narrative to understand potential destruction of an ascribed society that has no history of self-constitution, thus eliminating even the possibility of a return to the basic condition of life, memory, and their historical narrative. My learning goal was to understand whether the damage would become part of the new fabric of social and personal identity that creates what Jason Stearns (2011) calls "monster" societies of emotionless warlords and their child soldiers living in and perpetuating a minimal existence of hell on earth.

Lastly, I explored evidence relating to the studies of cycles of violence where victims are taught the pedagogy of oppression to suggest a similar pedagogy of victimization. Understanding cycles of learned violence and victimization helped me to explain why, despite overwhelming effort and resources, many communal conflicts appear to have reached intractability (Freire 1998). I used Glasser, et al (2001) for an exploration of the cycle of child sexual abuse to illustrate the linkage between extended victimization and the learning (pedagogy) to victimize as an emerging perpetrator. I used Eduard Lain's (1998) exploration of the intergenerational aspects of victimhood and perpetrators and MacMullin & Loughry's (2004) investigation of the psychosocial damage to the children of Sierra Leone and Uganda who were forced into service as armed combatants to discuss the transmission of generational trauma and the breakage of psycho-social reality for the

family. I used Odenwald, Hinkel, and Schauer's (2007) assessment of the possibilities for the disarmament and reintegration of Somali combatants to explore some of the trauma sequelae of Tuareg fighters returning from Libya. I found similarities in the two combatant groups in their levels of PTSD, addictions, and waking intrusions of stress-related hallucinations that leave them with little connectivity to reality, never mind reintegration. Finally, Yael Danieli (1998) provides an *International Handbook of Multigenerational Legacies of Trauma* that span several continents of scholarship on the subject of transmission of social trauma that was directly applicable to my analysis.

Tentative questions that I explored in my data collection and analysis that are related to this literature include:

- What aspects of Tuareg life would be most susceptible to damage and traumatization?
- How would the ascribed desert reality of the Tuareg be affected by extended loss of family, habitat, and social organization relative to their historical norm?

**Cross cultural mediation and facilitation of conflict in tribal society to include systems of indigenous justice and conflict resolution**

The construction and validation of a model of sociological construction, psychological organization, and emotional emanation of a community involved in violent conflict offers the possibility of engagement in the praxis of conflict resolution. By employing the ideas of interpersonal conflict and the human quest for meeting their underlying human needs, I modeled the Tuareg family and touchett on these underlying needs and their success or failure at doing so. By doing so, the model contains both the conflict story and the underlying elements needed to reframe and rewrite the narrative in

a manner that allows the conflict participants to pull back from violence while still achieving their underlying human needs (Burton 1990; Burton 1997; Rubenstein 2001). I found that the narratives that house the conflict story are constructed of intimate portrayals of individual and group self-identity, love, and esteem that are intertwined with the reality of physical survival; past, present and future.

This last section of the review of literature and past research was meant to establish a field model of conflict mediation for use with intra-state cultures caught up in violence resulting from mal-adaptation to changes in their environment, population base, internal sociological psychological structures, and the external forces of social and political change. The mediation model served as an engagement praxis based on narrative mediation approaches of Winslade & Monk (2000) and the narrative therapy practices of Michael White (2007; 2011; 2008). I merged this model of conflict mediation whenever possible with existing forms of indigenous systems of dispute resolution that did not violate international law or internationally recognized rights of refugees and combatant prisoners.

During my work and research, I was encouraged to take time out and write specifically about the mediation model by the Chargé de Affairs, Ambassador Richard Bell. In December of 2014, the Bar Ilan University's International Journal of Conflict Engagement & Resolution in Tel Aviv, Israel, published my writing on the subject (Christian 2014). As part of modeling individual praxes of mediation that I used in northern Niger to resolve violent conflict, the internal process of conflict resolution and indigenous justice that evolved organically within the Tuareg sociological structure were examined for use and incorporation. We were not attempting to blindly reconstitute its

practice, but understand it's functioning within the community. I used Deborah Isser's (2011) collected edition of works to examine customary justice and the rule of law in conflict societies, especially the construction or coexistence of dual systems of formal-state and informal-tribal systems that find complementarity in their approach and practice. Perhaps more important during my research were Susan Rasmussen's (1995) descriptions or explanations of how Kel Ewey touchetts' spirit possession ceremonies constituted a form of indigenous justice that worked to overcome the psychological and emotional wounds that afflicted family based social constructions for generations.

Finally, in Chapter 6, I used Neuner, et al., (2012) to explore the indigenous use of metaphysical perception and role-play as an emotionally reparative processes to heal traumatizing violence in soldier children; James Latigo's (2008) illustration of the psycho-social aspects of northern Uganda's tradition-based practices in the Acholi region; and Igreja & Dias-Lambranca's (2008) investigation of the practices of restorative justice in central Mozambique. These indigenous conflict resolution and restoration of justice practices can play a central role in any effort to stabilize a society and help pull its members back from the edge of intractable violence, sociological annihilation, and psychological disintegration of identity and purpose. In doing so, I was interested in understanding the possibilities available to the Tuareg communities in conflict of indigenous systems of restorative justice and conflict resolution appropriate to the emerging sociocultural community in the central Sahel.

### **Chapter 3: Research Methods**

#### **Mixed methods case study with field research using ethnographic observation and phenomenological inquiry**

To introduce my research methods, I begin with a restatement of several issues that guided the establishment of my research questions in chapter two. The first issue was that my intended research audience is a mixed body of foreign (US and Europe primarily) interventionist practitioners of security sector and governance reform, plus infrastructure development and humanitarian aid, all of which I am a part of. This first part guided my end research state of identifying psycho-social-emotional drivers of conflict and inhibitors of resolution. A second issue was that we as interventionist practitioners had little in-depth knowledge of the research subject (Tuareg community) outside of emotionally charged political positions that have been filtered through multiple languages and culture.

The few academic researchers that I included in the literature review worked with different parts of the community in different states and during different decades of their lived experience. As such, I did not find them to be complementary in terms of providing a coherent picture of Tuareg sociological construction, psychological organization, and emotional conjugation. This second issue explained the requirement for human subject research in order to fill in the gaps of knowledge. Finally, a third issue involved the applicability of the reference books that I depended on for use in analyzing my data. The subjects of many of the reference books on violence, trauma, and family emotional dynamics were western, egocentric in psychological organization, and did not fit the rural, nomadic, and sociocentric organization of the Tuareg communities. This third issue

required me to cross the material from their western, egocentric subjects, across boundaries of language, culture and psychological organization with my Tuareg study subjects, often at the lowest common denominator. In the data presentation and analysis, therefore, I have included significant comparison and contrast between analysis source of origination (western psychology theory and practice) and how I applied that science of psycho-social-emotional human behavior.

### **A mixed methods case study in five frames of analysis**

From the three issues above, (audience, subject, and application of western developed science across boundaries of language, culture, and psychological organization) I developed a research method that relied on a mixed methods case study. The mixed methods I used began with a desk study of all available literature and past research that resulted in development of a research organization of five frames of analysis. This analysis framework then became my guide for the conduct of ethnographic observation and phenomenological inquiry. In part one of the case study, I used all existing research and literature that I believed to have a bearing on the Tuareg peoples in order to create an analysis template of five frames.

These five frames included sociological-psychological construction (frames 1 and 2: anthropology, cultural sociology, and psychology), sociological-psychological trauma, and the disintegration of indigenous systems of conflict resolution (frames 3, 4 and 5: social psychology, trauma studies, and indigenous systems of justice and conflict resolution). Based on these five frames of analysis, I conducted ethnographic observations and phenomenological inquiry data collection. The organization of my analysis into these five frames tended to help me plan and conduct my data collection by

separating my subsequent field research into two parts of related understanding from the perspective of the research subject; what was healthy and why versus what is now unhealthy and how.

The first part of related understanding became my first chapter (Chapter 4) of data presentation and analysis and relates most to analysis frames 1 and 2. The second part of related understanding became my second chapter of data presentation and analysis and relates most to analysis frames 3, 4, and 5. This mixed methods case study that incorporated ethnographic observation and phenomenological inquiry into an organized desk study framework was required due to the reality of the remote, austere environment that the Tuareg live in; how they are structured sociologically, how they are organized psychologically, and the ongoing damage or changes to their lived experiences.

The Tuareg are in a state of change, but from where they are now psycho-socially to where they will be is a progression that appears unpredictable. The Tuareg have suffered damage to their structures of family life, but there does not exist a documented point of past departure (recent or distant) to understand the depth or relevance of the damage sustained. To put their situation in a medical allegory, the patient is sick, but the medical staff has no basis of physiology, chemistry, or biology to understand the pathology of their sickness. Thus this research was about phenomenological meaning of lived experience and drives my ethnographic observations of words and actions, political positions and armed rebellion, and statements of need and physical suffering endured by those who are both least powerful (than the central government) and most damaged.



## **Ethnographic mapping of the sociological structure and phenomenological understanding of psychological organization**

By using the mixed methods approach to study, compare and contrast Tuareg concepts of “what was” against “what is now,” I achieved the majority of my research tasks, providing an illustration of underlying Tuareg social, psychological, and emotional needs that can serve as the basis of a future intercultural conflict narrative mediation. The research was complex because the Tuareg community is fractured and antiphonal; never completely at odds, but never in harmony. This fractured, antiphonal aspect of their expressed sociological structure and psychological organization ultimately became central to my psychoanalysis of their identity structure and emotional conjugation of sociological structure.

During the fieldwork, my ethnographic observations continued throughout, even during periods of intense phenomenological inquiry and listening. This was because so much of the lived experiences of the Tuareg make little sense outside of the reality of their physical habitats. The passages of oral stories, poems, and interviews that I collected as part of my phenomenological inquiry only make sense against the backdrop of ethnographic observation which establishes sociological context for subsequent psychoanalysis. The use of existing literature and past research as a desk study to develop a framework of data collection and analysis proved to be quite useful. For instance, previous work with tribes in Chad, Sudan, and Somalia suggested that the geography, geology, and climate would be significant aspects in the psychoanalysis of identity, social structure, and emotional conjugation, issues that ended up taking significant time to explore and document.

The psychological analysis of Tuareg lived experience required that I understand their sociological order or structure through an immersive ethnographic observation and participation in daily family life. In point of fact, I found that during data collection, it was impossible to separate out when I was conducting ethnographic observation and when I was engaged in phenomenological interviews as both occurred simultaneously.

Most of the ethnographic context gathered was gained through photographs, notes, and endless listening to stories, poems, and accompanying explanations from my Tuareg hosts and informants. Other ethnographic context was through the procurement of data from the traditional leaders (called *Amenokalen*), formal political leaders at the village, regional and national levels of government, as well as my interviewees. While ethnography builds context between sociological structure and geographic, geologic habitat, it fails to fully explain the intentionality of the violence or the interior meaning of the physical, psychological, and emotional aspects of Tuareg life.

Between the emic Tuareg tribes in the throes of violent confrontation and myself as an etic researcher struggling to make sense of a chaotic human tapestry, there exists a reality that even ethnography fails to penetrate. Introduced correctly, phenomenological inquiry offers relief from the opacity of the sociological confusion that accompanies tribal conflict.

### **Phenomenological inquiry in the praxis of tribal engagement**

As I engaged in phenomenological inquiry with my Tuareg hosts and informants, I sought to understand the cognitive and emotional representations of what they were experiencing as nomadic, struggling families caught in cycles of poverty and communal violence with each other and the tribes they cohabitated with.

I was less concerned with the actual reality that created the cognitive and emotional representations in the mind of the participants, as that reality was immersed in a bitter political dispute between the government and its rebellious population groups. I was however, concerned with the reality as it appeared to them (Smith D. W. 2011).

Phenomenology is concerned with what the participants perceive to be emanating from the reality they are part of and the “meaning-intention or meaning fulfillment” of their cognition and emotion as expressed in language, thought or reason (Husserl 2001, 167).

Although separate activities, cognition, and emotion interact as variable-or-result and can present themselves simultaneously (Eysenk & Keane 2000). The cognitive processing of terror in a Tuareg nomadic encampment, for instance, can be simultaneously mirrored by the emotional state of terror. Both the cognition of terror and the emotion of terror represent human experience and a phenomenological representation of the event(s) that produced them. The phenomenon I studied in the stories and narratives of the Tuareg was how the event that produces the terror, appears to those who experience it.

Perhaps one of the clearest descriptions of phenomenology is by Sokolowski (2007) who writes that such an inquiry is “the study of human experience and of the way things present themselves to us through such experience” (p. 2). In most scenes of communal violence that the Tuareg are participants to, terror is manifested through the experiential cognition and emotion of sensory perception, or emotional conjugation. Patton (1990) writes that phenomenological study is "focused on descriptions of what people experience and how it is that they experience what they experience" (p. 71).

I replaced Patton's "how" and "what" with Creswell's (2007) ideas of "structure" and "texture," as doing so helped me to align structure with the action of cognition, and texture with the feeling of emotion (p. 60). I found that the texture of how terror might be experienced consists of received visual, audible, tactile, and olfactory stimuli combined with internal cognitive functions of memory, awareness, and imagination (among others) to create a mental object. In most peace operations activities investigating the aftermath of communal conflict, the how (structure) of that experience is often the most frequently described portion of the event to us as interventionist practitioners, even to the exclusion of the what (texture) of that experience. This is because the structure constitutes the participant's cognitive representative account of actors involved and the activities as they seemed to occur that invoked or created the conditions for the experience.

The most visible part of the phenomenological inquiry, the structure, is what is often related in communication because it is the least invasive to the participant. Left unrelated is the more volatile part of the phenomenological inquiry, the texture, which is the completion of the meaning experience. The texture, even more so than the structure of the event, is required to fully analyze the psychological impact and the subsequent emotional conjugation. The phenomenological texture is often avoided because it is painfully invasive as the description of such reenactments must be, in contexts where suffering and dying are an integral part of the landscape.

This avoidance can result in the substitution of participant texture for bland imaginings of neutral affect by inexperienced or disconnected interventionists for “the naïve acceptance and assessment of objects, whose existence has been posited in the acts now receiving phenomenological treatment” (Husserl 2001). These surface understandings gleaned from past personal experience by western interventionists are a small measure of replacement for the realities that shape and construct the complex narratives of tribal conflict.

My goal in the incorporation of phenomenological inquiry was to avoid the substitution of the etic articulation of reason over the emic description of the object’s appearance. My use of phenomenological inquiry was as the collection and analysis of both the structure and the texture of the violent and chaotic events that are being reported about the struggles of the Tuareg as participants in the war of the Sahel. A phenomenological object of helpless-hardship is called *timogoutar* by the Tuareg, and its meaning is not complete without both parts of its structural and textural essence. The drought that dries wells; the lack of water for dying animals; bloated bellies of hungry children; the carcasses of once treasured animals whose lives and nourishment were a central object of sociological existence; or the mental instability of family members driven to madness because of thirst and famine constitute the structure of an experience in *timogoutar* that is documented in one of the interviews in the research.

Missing in the words of the quantitative interview is the textural experience that includes a painful inability to swallow or urinate; the peculiar smell of starvation that emanates from the bodies of loved children; the terrifying inability to recognize the mounds of putrefying flesh, covered with blue-black flies that could be a goat, or a child; the pure guilt of the parent unable to feed a dying child or explain why; the loneliness and emptiness of life as family members wanders off and die.

These are glimpses of the emotional texture of the violence of the lived experience of timogoutar. The verbs and nouns of feel, smell, guilt, terror, loneliness, and emptiness describe the intentionality of the interviewee's experience. The direct object expressions, such as the "smell of starvation" or "pure guilt of the parent" articulate the presentation of structure and its link to the texture of the experience.

The surviving parent being interviewed feels pain, and anguish; experiences terror, loneliness, and emptiness; suffers from guilt from the look of their child, feel of their extended bellies, and smell of dying bodies from her first person perspective. She reacts not to the external events, but rather to what the external events mean, how they appear, what they portend (Lavery 2003). Together, the interior perceived texture combined with the structure of how he experienced the appearance of the object of terror constitutes what Creswell calls "the essential, invariant structure (or essence)" of the phenomenon (Creswell 2007, 62).

When written descriptively in research, phenomenological presentments provide a cognitive and emotive understanding to the reader of what the subject experienced. Such rich descriptions of lived experience must be based on meanings that are inspired by intimate, clear, authentic perceptions gained by a return “to the ‘things themselves’” rather than the individual assumptions of distant decision makers (Husserl 2001, 168).

### **Access to the ethnographic and phenomenological research setting in zones of violent conflict**

Access to northern Mali and Niger in general was problematic given the state of ongoing hostilities in the north and the ongoing attacks by Salafist groups, especially suicide bombings and kidnaping of UN and western interventionists. Even the Military Zone headquarters compound in Agadez, Niger was penetrated during my tour by eight fighters from Moktar Belmoktar’s Jihadist Brigade with significant damage and loss of lives. Research access outside of armed military escorts was not possible and even western NGO personnel required security escorts to leave principal population centers. During my tour of Niger, I led a multidimensional team that consisted of three remotely located, eight soldier elements US Army Special Forces trainer/advisors, one four-person element of US Army Civil Affairs operators, and one three-person element of US Army Psychological Operations integrators. Additionally, I was staffed episodically with members of a USAID OTI (office of transition assistance) team of developmental aid workers. Our work in Niger over the past year was partly chronicled by Pulitzer Prize winning report by Eliza Griswold in the June 2014 edition of New York Times Magazine (Griswold 2014, 11-12).

The various teams assigned to my advisory mission were located in several secure compounds in locations in the Agadez Administrative region and in the capital of Niamey. During overland movements, we travelled in 4-6 heavily loaded Toyota Land Cruisers, and were embedded in similar teams of host nation civil affairs and security platoons drawn from Niger's Zone 2 military command. The host nation civil affairs teams were organized and recruited from existing soldiers based on demographic balance of Tuareg, Fulani, Teubou, and Hausa communities located in the Sahel. Their mission was to learn about and sensitize the military and civilian leadership to the difficulties faced by the rural and nomadic populations. Together, we (US and Niger host nation) worked on several lines of effort towards stabilizing the conflict society. Some of these efforts included deepening or extending governance into the traditional roles held by elders in each ethnic community, assessing and expanding development and security outward from the populated towns and into the rural and nomadic communities.

Many of these lines of effort resulted in gatekeeper access opportunities such as my traditional leader engagement program. In this program, I solicited education and development funds (\$82,000.00) from USAFRICOM's strategic engagement division (J9) in order to expand the involvement of Tuareg, Fulani, Arab, and Teubou traditional leaders into the ongoing development and governance programs being funded by USAID and various NGOs. The program involved working with administrative region governors to provide funding in order to invite traditional leaders into leadership education seminars, tours of planned or newly constructed public facilities, and in-depth meetings in safe locations with United States and international development and aid executives. As the program gained exposure within the traditional channels of communication, we



received increasing requests from other Amenokalen (traditional leaders) to visit their villages/encampments and include them in the program. A natural part of preserving and presenting traditional society to the formal military and political leaders in the regional capitals of Tahoua and Agadez was the establishing of a requirement to understand them and their issues at length. Our previous work at ethnographic mapping of the traditional rural and nomadic society allowed us to mediate the process of Amenokalen selection by the governors to ensure the widest possible inclusion that appropriately balanced numbers of represented Amenokalen against their population numbers in the north.

In this effort, we garnered support from the office of the Tuareg Prime Minister of Niger, Brigi Rafini whose staff we worked closely with to ensure cultural accommodation and sensitivity. I was able to access Tuareg societies' gatekeepers in both the formal political realm and in the traditional spaces in a manner that we could ensure full and voluntary participation. This gatekeeper access was gained through the physical travel access that our host nation civil military engagement units provided combined with the multidimensional functions of the interagency team that helped us build dialogue and inclusion of marginalized traditional society in under-governed spaces,. Even more importantly, it was the Tuareg Amenokalen and their Prime Minister patron that drove the gatekeeper access. Most of the interviews that I conducted were arranged by the formal and informal leaders of the Kel Tamashek and I had difficulty keeping up with the pace of data and information being proffered.

**Data collection; ethnographic modeling, phenomenological interviews, oral histories, and poetry readings**

The process of establishing a present picture of Tuareg reality as they are living it through perception of historical narrative, cognition of daily events, and psychological “calls to position” from archetypal identity construction/organization was best accomplished (for me) using wide ranging dialogue about the past, present, and future. My plan for data collection called for interviews and ethnographic observations from the Tuareg communities that represented lived experience in both Azawad (northern Mali) and Azawax (northern Niger). Because of the continuous movement of Tuareg peoples, accessing informants from all of the major Tuareg confederations (Kel Ahaggar of southern Algeria, Kel Adraf des Ifoghas of northern Mali, Iwellemedan of the Valley of Azawax and Azawad, and Kel Air of northern Niger) was accomplished during my research. I was able to secure interviews with a variety of Tuareg families, clans, and individual members whose education combined with close family connections allowed them to help me cross barriers of language, culture, psychology, and even trauma. These informants included teachers, university students, journalists, politicians, and businessmen, as well as heads of families, clans, and tribal confederations.

As a member of the US Embassy’s country team, and with clearance from the Niger Ministry of Secondary Education, I had access to Tuareg interpreters, guides, and gatekeepers who assisted me with access to their community. Formal interviews with the traditional leaders (Amenokalen) of the various Tuareg tribes in the northern part of the country was arranged by the office director of PM Rafini and the Regional Governor of Agadez, Colonel-Major Mikitos. Through daily interaction with members of the Tuareg

community in the capital of Niamey and the regional capitals of Tahoua and Agadez provided me with insight and opportunities to organize interviews through appropriate gatekeepers.

Before talking with any of the respondents, I created an opening letter in Tamashek that explained my purpose using Tamashek words that I learned at the Defense Language Institute and from my language tutor in Germany. The purpose of the opening letter was to approach each interview (formal or informal) with a mental framework of the essentials of physical, psychological, and emotional health of the Tuareg family and community. This framework was to be a scientific frame of reference to organize questions and answers. As I used this framework in my interviews, some of them became a form of collaborative ethnographic dialogue and phenomenological inquiry that delved into a particular area of Tuareg life. Eventually the questions and answers merged in terms of length and complexity of question and answer. My point for having this framework of inquiry was in pursuit of the discovery of the lived experience of the participants both as they want it to be, remembered that it was, and how it is now; both the painful and exhilarating. My underlying inquiries throughout my field research sought deep respondent explanations that ideally would lead to complex understandings of:

- What does it mean to be a Tuareg man and what meaning does the respondent want there to be in the social construction of Tuareg?
- How does the Tuareg man feel love, pain, self-worth, and memory of past or hope for future?

- How does the Tuareg man create his sense of existential place in desert social construction and how is this maintained in the face of loss of habitat?
- How does the Tuareg man construct memorialization in language, monuments, and the historical narrative of his larger community?
- To what degree is sociocentric belonging and egocentric agency important as compared to the multiple group constructs that make up Tuareg society?

In those interviews with Tuareg traditional leaders, public officials, university students, teachers, and journalists, the use of my framework succeeded. In interviews with the Tuareg who lived “in essuf” or in the bush, (a way of saying those Tuareg who lived in a traditional semi-nomadic life style) my framework was woefully inadequate to the point of being inappropriate. I learned that Tuareg in essuf dialogued in terms that were interrogative and responsive for daily work, love, nurture, and all forms of interrelationship. They did not engage in a great deal of casual conversation, although I did hear an occasional bit of banter when foreigners (kefir) were present. This aspect of ethnography is detailed in chapter four. For the purposes of my research methods, I learned that Tuareg in essuf communicate emotion and thought and express existential identity and culture in their historical narrative through oral storying they call *tisseewhy* and oral poetry they call *Eemeyen*.

During one of my first forays into the field, I visited the town of Gofat, north of Agadez in the Valley of Azawax and met with the Tuareg gatekeeper, who also served as the Chef du Canton. After the Amenokal brought me to where the men from the Gofat

touchett had gathered with their livestock, I was quickly surrounded by approximately thirty men in full (and dirty) Tuareg robes. After a bit, I tried to read my Tamashek letter that described my research purpose. None of the men spoke English or French, and were quite surprised to hear familiar Tamashek words coming from a *kufir*, or foreigner. They quickly began correcting my pronunciation, and were at first bewildered by my questions of identity (*tomoost*), culture (*tagaste*), or the lives of semi-nomadic Tuareg families (*tmidrrt Tamashek imawalan*). Then, they pointed to themselves, their families, livestock, and the desert landscapes around us and said “tomoost Tamashek!”

As the assembled men of the Gofat touchett continued to talk over, around, and past each other, I quickly gave up trying to read my prepared letter and concentrated on taking notes from my interpreter’s rapid-fire translation. Glancing at my scribbled notes, I found that most of the younger men talking were asking for resources as they likely thought I was part of an NGO development aid team. As I focused on the elder men in the group, they began to speak and the younger men fell silent. The words of the elder men were not requests but stories of Tuareg life; their lives. Over the course of my research, I came to understand that within the Tamashek touchetts in essuf, dialogue that is not specifically interrogative or responsive is mostly conducted in structured forms of storying and poetry they call *eemeyen* and *tisseewhy*. I found that in order to conduct interviews of Tuareg people in essuf, who were illiterate and spoke only their local versions of Tamashek, I would have to resort to interviewing community members through these forms of indigenous communication.

My role in the data collection process was not quite as active as I had imagined prior to the commencement of interviews. Prior to beginning my research, I assumed that the

interviews would be conducted similar to those that I had used in collaborative ethnography and phenomenological inquiry in previous fieldwork. This turned out to be a fairly accurate depiction of each interview event, although in practice it was a bit more frantic than I might have desired. As a guide, I relied on Stein's description of "listening deeply" and "creating cultural space" as a way of centering myself for the experience of learning what my hosts had to tell me about who they are in the most fundamental way possible:

The methodological approach of listening deeply draws from, and attempts to integrate, many perspectives: anthropology, psychoanalysis (including classical psychoanalysis, ego psychology, self-psychology, and object-relations theory), existential psychology, political psychology, management psychology, counseling psychology, small-group theory, family systems theory, psychohistory, social psychology, sociology, and organizational development (Stein 1994, 3).

This description of deep listening leaves me, as a researcher, with a heightened awareness that all I need to do during research is focus on my hosts with intellect, empathy, and sufficient imagination so as to be able to place myself in their world, able to feel their ethos and passion as they open their lived experience for me to participate in.

This ideal data collection event using that process of listening deeply and creating cultural space occurred over several days or weeks so as to allow myself the time to experience their daily, weekly, and monthly routines. In practice, the data collection pace of listening was driven by the interviewees who were in no way shy of telling me to stop, help them perform a task, and then continue the interview. I then became part of the interior space of family, clan, or village life, with informants forgetting that I was an

outsider, yet still remembering to interpret the visual, verbal, and non-verbal contexts of every event, every conversation, and every laugh or cry. From those extended periods deep within the inner life of family, clan, and village, I was privileged to see relationships between family, kin, friends, ethnic collective, and between humans, animals, and the physical world they inhabit and create. I was also be able to visualize these competing and complementary sets of relationships as they overlaid each other, creating context and a dense web of sociological structure that accommodated, protected, and nurtured the psychological organization of the family and their life fulfilling emotional expression.

I found that all I had to do during the interviews was just be there and accept the flood of knowledge thrust at me by my hosts as a precursor to belonging. In the evenings, when the temperature allowed, I would journal my experiences and analysis, chronicling the rich texture that I had been exposed to and comparing day to day, allowing natural questions to arise that I could ask my hosts. My experience was, and Stein (1994) further reminds us, that our hosts love questions when they are in tune to the reality of their lives as they are experiencing it with the researcher who is listening deeply. Listening deeply was not a passive activity, but one that encompassed active listening that engaged the host, placing him/her in a position of servant-leader, showing a guest through their sociological house in a manner that illuminates psychological organization and emotional conjugation. Deep listening was an interactive process well suited to phenomenological discovery of lived experience.

Below are several data collection events that I conducted during my research that were sufficient in terms of preparation and length so as to warrant a separate description. These interview transcripts are all included as appendices to the dissertation.

### *The Teacher and Journalist*

*Interview.* This interview occurred in the home of my translator and research assistant, Mr. Agalih Hamidoun. Mr. Hamidoun is also employed by the United States Embassy in Niger as a cultural advisor and translator. When my



Figure 2: Photo of interviewees Mohamad Yahiya, Abdul Rachman Muhammad, and Wisslemane Rhansarata

research was approved, I was offered the assistance of Mr. Hamidoun to ensure both accuracy in translation and safety from a security standpoint; Mr. Hamidoun had been vetted by the Embassy's Regional Security Office for ties to extremist organizations that might be seeking the abduction of US government personnel operating in the Sahel by AQIM, Ansar el-Din, MUJAO, and others. Through the office of the Niger Prime Minister, we arranged for several Tuareg teachers and professionals to meet with us for the purpose of discussing Tamashek identity (tomooost) and Tamashek culture (tagaste). Mr. Mohamad Yahiya is a light skinned Tuareg man in his mid-60s, from the Daksahak clan of northern Mali and northern Niger. The Daksahak clan speaks Tamashek and a variation indigenous to their own clan called Tadaksahak. The name of their variation takes the clan ethnic name and feminizes it with a [Ta] to form Ta-Daksahak, in the same way that Amashek feminizes their ethnic name into the name of their language of Tamashek. Mr. Yahiya is a teacher who spent part of his career teaching in Dar es Salam, Tanzania. Mr. Abdul Rachman Muhammad is dark skinned man in his early 40s and a member of the Inhaden class (craftsman); I was unable to elicit the name of the Kel to which his family originally belonged. He is a respected journalist for private TV and



Radio in Niamey. Mr. Wissleman Rhansarata is a light skinned man in his mid-40s who reports himself to be a member of the Imajaxen class (warrior), but again, no specified kel. He is also a teacher, employed most recently in the Dar es Salam public school system.

*The public official interview.* This interview was held in the home of Batty Ag Elwaley, an advisor to the National Assembly. Ag Elwaley's home was substantial and his family well cared for. My impression was that he was a man of influence in a larger community of influential Tuareg. We were there to interview him and Mr. Mohammad Ali, a Tuareg man in his mid-60s and an Advisor to the Prime Minister's office on Tamashek affairs. Mr. Mohammad Ali is from Tchintabaraden and was schooled there and in Zinder, Niger. Tchintabaraden is the site of a major 1990s massacre of Tamashek civilians by the Niger military who were attempting to suppress Tuareg separatist ideology. Mr. Ali was dressed simply in a worn Jellabiya as contrasted with the fine clothes and furnishings of Mr. Batty Ag Elwaley; however, there was an evident superior status of Mr. Ali to Mr. Elwaley, with the latter deferring to the former on all questions except dinner, which the host arranged. As a Daksahak, Mr. Ali originated from an ethnic group that, while self-included in the Kel Tamashek, actually predates other Tuareg



Figure 3: Photo of interviewees Batty Ag Elwaley, Mohammad Ali, and Agalih Hamidoun

communities in the northern parts of Mali and Niger. While Muslim, many Daksahak maintain a proud remembrance of pre-Islamic observances of Christianity and Judaism, showing me family heirlooms that appeared to have the Christian Cross and Jewish Star of David blended into their symbolic mottos. Historically, the Daksahak touchett was a part of Tuareg society inside the Kel Ataram (people of the west) and were marabouts or spiritual advisors and herdsmen for the noble class of the Iwellemeden Tuareg confederation that spans eastern Mali from the town of Gao to the Western Niger towns of Tahoua and Agadez (Christiansen-Bolli 2010). They continue to report themselves to be a touchett of the Iwellemeden confederation of Kel Tamashek. The Daksahak were significant participants and victims in the armed rebellions in Mali's 1963-1964 and 1991-1993 rebellions and in Niger's 1990s rebellions.

*The Amenokalen Interview.* This interview occurred in the guesthouse of the Major and Préfet (Governor's representative) of the Rural Commune of Ingall. The Amenokal of Kel Fadey and the Amenokal (Niger branch) of the Kel Ahaggar in Southern Algeria performed the role of gatekeeper. Kel Fadey's traditional lands consist of the area from the border of Algeria in the north to the town of Tahoua in the south, and from the border



Figure 4: Photo of Amenokalen interviewees Ag Hamid Mohamad, Balho Aradile, Ag Sayadi Ahmed, Algabib Assalim, Balkou Eridel, Said Ahmed

of Mali in the west to the town of Iferouāne in the east. These borders are quite fluid as Kel Fadey is a nomadic tribe, but the presence of the Kel Ahaggar from south Algeria would necessarily be agreeable to the Kel Fadey. The Amenokalen were visiting Ingall as part of planning for the annual festival called *Cure Salé*, or Cure of the Salt, from the salty Oasis that the commune of Ingall is centered on in the central Sahel transition zone of the Sahara Desert. During this planning meeting, the Préfet and Mayor asked the Amenokalen if they were interested in talking to the “American” about Tamashek culture and identity and they nominated the above individuals. Because of the large number of participants and because of the habit of Tamashek in *essuf* of talking over themselves and each other, we did not attempt to identify individual statements with individual participants.

During the transcription process, we attempted to maintain the syntax and rhythm of the dialogue as much as possible, but the conversations were free flowing despite our structured introduction and statement of intent that was read to the group. Speakers would add to the thoughts of ongoing speakers in a sort of chaotic yet collegial manner. Much of the dialogue is either unintelligible to translate, or side talk that consisted of things like “push over, give me room,” “here, sit next to me,” or “where were you coming from?” Each time a new person would enter the group, half of them would turn their attention away from the subject at hand to exchange pleasantries and gossip that was often unintelligible. Also, Tamashek men in Essuf speak a form of Tamashek they call *Nigali*, which is a form of guarded Tamashek that only older Tuareg in Essuf can understand or speak. The interview session began with the reading of the informed consent letter in French and the interviewees’ acceptance to participate, followed by the PI’s explanation

in Tamashek language of the nature of the research inquiry. A copy of that explanation is enclosed in the appendices in both Tamashek and English.

*The Tisseewhy Interviews.* I met Abdurrahman Muhammad at his store off of Maliberro Road in the northern part of Niamey in May of 2014. There, he provided copying services for paper copies, audio and visual copying and provided other mildly technical services to the professional class of workers in the capital. Abdurrahman is a darker skinned Tuareg, tall, with strong features. His shop was a 10'x12' storefront with a door and one window, linoleum tile over cement, with a desk and several tables with copying and audio/visual equipment, fairly well dated, but still relevant for Niger/Mali society. During his interviews, Abdurrahman presented himself as an eloquent speaker with reserved but elegant use of hands and expressions to convey meaning and emotional intent of the stories. The interviews consisted of a number of stories from Tamashek life, with added commentary from Abdurrahman that reflected contemporary thinking of the Tuareg condition by those social and political leaders struggling over adaptation of a nomadic people to the changes of modernity.

*The Eemeyen Interviews.* This segment of interviews captures a number of Eemayen, a type of Tuareg poem that serves as an oral history vehicle for the passage of chosen glories, chosen traumas, and identity archetypes between generations of the Kel Tamashek. For all practical purposes, the Tamashek language is an oral language as there is no single recognized form of *Tifinagh* in use by all Tuareg. During several interviews, Tuareg Amenakolen attempted to show me how to write certain Tamashek words in Tifinagh, and nearly all of them came up with different letter usage to spell the same word, and a number used letters from differing versions of Tifinagh. This means that the

oral history through the use of Eemayen (poems of Tuareg life) and Tisseewhy (moral based stories of Tuareg life) is central to the preservation of Tamashek identity and its expression into physical culture through generational inheritance. For the Tamashek of the Essuf, these Eemayan and Tisseewhy represent the principal vehicle for the preservation of collective consciousness and generational memory.



Figure 5: Photo of Interviewee Abdurrahman Muhammad

The first storyteller was Ibrahim Amawal a member of the Imghad of the Kel Ferwan in and around the Maradi province of northern Niger. Ibrahim was educated only informally through the Eemayen and Tisseewhy stories that populate Tamashek life in the desert. He is said to have a special way with the telling of the Tisseewhy and Eemayen, such that bad or unjust Tamashek are afraid to hear his stories, that they may be indicted by them. The second teller of stories, or *tisseewhy*, is called Tambatan (one name only), of the Inhaden class of artisans, who is a renowned Tisseewhy speaker from Tchintabaraden, near Tahoua. The third storyteller was Mohamed Rhissa, from Attawari Touchett. They care for animals and practice prayer of Islam. The clans of the Attawari touchett are between Tahoua and Tchintabaraden and they all originated from Azawax, in northern Niger. The

transcriptions in the appendices are from three digital MP3 recordings made May 21<sup>st</sup> through May 31<sup>st</sup> 2014 in Niamey, Niger, and stored with the Principal Researcher on a secure drive.

*The Student Interviews.* The student interviews occurred over two nights, the first at Le Pillier Restaurant, and the second at Al Aribe restaurant, both in the capital of Niamey. A number of the students reported that their extended and sometimes their immediate family still lived in ‘essuf’ and were able to shed light on the growing divide between Tuareg in traditional semi-nomadic life and those relatives adapting to the encroaching globalization of modernity—a process they refer to as emutyen, or “big change.” Four of the students provided me with Yahoo and Gmail email addresses and two others gave me their Facebook names. Largely, they were all progressively thinking in their dialogue, but displayed continued discomfort with communal animosity between the Tuareg and the politically dominant Hausa community in the capital.



*Figure 6:* Photo of interviewees Abdoulaye Mohamed Ibrahim, Soufiane Amidi, Adoum Makane, Mohamed Agali, Hadiyatou Mohamed, Aichatou Mohamed, Oumouhane Ilioussaou, Salamatou Hima Mounkaila, Agoicha Mohamed, Mohamadine Abdou

When they talked about their family, they seemed to vacillate between pride of imajaren and embarrassment of essuf. Chapters four and five discuss this in depth. The



student interviews provided a greater perspective from female Tuareg social members that I found important in my understanding of the depth of some of the identity characteristics and how they crossed the gender divide. The female university students' participation in these interviews also allowed me to gain insight into the effects of social alienation and trauma from adaptive failure of the family structure. One exercise that we conducted during this interview was the collection of as many Tamashek names for children that would not likely be used by Hausa, Arab, Fulani, or Songhai families. The names, their meaning, and reasons for choosing them made for insightful learning of the interior landscape of Tuareg family life.

### **Research methods in dangerous research settings and the use of gatekeepers in tribal conflict zones**

The role of the gatekeeper in qualitative research set in places of violent conflict is sufficiently different in its complexities to warrant study and review by conflict interventionists. In traditional research, a gatekeeper is simply an individual with whom the researcher must negotiate access to participant subjects. Such a role implies a related condition such as ownership, stewardship, or other executive authority in line with the existing cultural norms of the research setting (Sanders, 2006). Depending on the place, nature and participant body of research subjects, the role of gatekeeper can be one of simple formality to one of extraordinary complexity where sought-after access is deeply embedded into the research project such as when gatekeepers are also participants and subjects.

Danaher, Danaher, & Moriarty (2010) explore risks and ethical dilemmas when qualitative research engages stakeholders and gatekeepers; Researchers Doucet &

Mauthner (2002) explore the relationship between gaining access and data with the responsibilities of ethical practice and the development of knowledge; Hadjistavropoulos & Smythe (2001) compare and contrast the elements of qualitative research risk with expectation of results; Hobbs (2006) explores the complexities of research settings amidst violent conditions where researcher safety has to be considered as a separate factor in methodology. McCosker & Gerber (2001) discuss sensitive research issues and strategies for maintaining the safety of all participants. Sanders (2006) provides a foundational discussion on gatekeeper issues in qualitative research; and finally, Shenton & Hayter (2004) investigate strategies for gaining access to organizations and informants in qualitative studies.

As part of researcher safety and research ethics, issues of emotional and psychological transference and counter-transference, respectively, are important to address in my review of literature and past research. Transference is a term used by Sigmund Freud to describe a psychological process where a person transfers feelings, emotions, and thoughts of someone in their earlier life to a person in their current life. In psychological therapy, transference is part of a process whereby a patient is able to use their therapist to safely explore these transferred feelings and thoughts with a purpose of validating or invalidating them through open dialogue. In terms of research in violent conflict zones, transference can occur when the researcher is a uniformed military member, whose physical presence may cause an informant to transfer feelings of fear, alienation, shame, and rage from past episodes of violence and loss onto the researcher.

The researcher's reaction to incidents of informant transference would be characterized as counter-transference. Transference of feelings, emotions, and thoughts



by the informant onto the person of the researcher and the researcher's reactive counter-transference of feelings, emotions, and thoughts back onto the informant are normal, and both can be helpful to the process of phenomenological understanding of the informant's lived experience. I used Heinrich Racker's (1982) book on transference and counter-transference to obtain a basic understanding of the processes; I used Pearlman & Saakvitne's (1995) book on therapists and trauma to better understand countertransference and vicarious traumatization, an issue of keen importance during research in violent trauma zones of war. Finally, I used Marshall & Marshall's (1988) transference-countertransference matrix as a review of the emotional-cognitive dialogue that affects trauma dialogue.

### **Mitigating the possible effects of transference and counter-transference during research**

The essence of my field research consisted of an individualized process of projecting myself into the cultural identity of my hosts as a way of perceiving and learning beyond the barriers of differing psychological organization of sociological structures that are vastly different from my own. The fact that I have an early background based in sociocentric psychological organization, but have lived most of my life in the egocentric psychological organization of an unmarried soldier and academic is beneficial to me in that I experience other cultures in a continuous process of comparison and contrast. Because I am grounded in both sociocentric and egocentric organization, I believe that I saw both for the benefits they provided and the costs they incurred on the membership therein. The familiarity that I felt of my hosts during field research however, likely created an image of what or who I am in the minds of members of my host community

that are inaccurate reflections of what is real. They could and did see in me illusions of what they wanted or needed to see that affected the future of their children and cultural in-group.

During previous field research assignments that were part of ceasefire mediation efforts between African and Arab tribes, I found that the lighter skinned Arab tribes would attempt to invoke a solidarity of racial similarity used as a basis for social superiority. They would, in essence, transference racial and social beliefs from themselves onto myself simply because of the outward color of my skin and my genial demeanor towards them. This transference was ultimately advantageous because their opening up this assumed bridge between us (based on race and perceived social superiority) allowed me/us to begin unpacking assumptions about race, society construction, and the essence of equality of peoples across race, language and culture. I used the idea that race is a continuum that ultimately places all of us in a position of inferiority based on factors whose relevance (skin color) has been proven to be without value for predicting intelligence, success, or beauty of the mind, body, or emotion. So, transference in that instance became a positive event for the mediation of conflict ideation, in that we could openly discuss long held beliefs centered on racial inferiority as a basis for involuntary servitude and hierarchical alignment of society. Ultimately, our mediation engagements did not end the war, but I believe that our conversations that emanated from episodes of psychological transference of attitudes, feelings, and beliefs from my hosts onto myself served a purpose for research and practice.

The danger of transference during my research was during that initial point where the host began to transfer and project their inner feelings, ideas, or thoughts about themselves

or about issues within themselves onto me as a researcher-practitioner. These elements of transference and/or projection were at times accompanied by heightened emotions of affection or derision (depending on what is being transferred), and I had to be on guard to intellectually sort out these transferences or projections as the desire to be accepted and affirmed could lead to falling into the host's fantasized vision of how I fit into (and reinforce) their existing stereotypes. I guarded against the inappropriate acceptance of transference by consciously and consistently remembering that I desire to understand, but not reinforce, their existing view of the world around them. I could sympathize, even empathize with psychological and emotional pain without becoming a part of their explanation for their suffering, or justification for positions taken or held. By being alert for transference when it occurred, and using these projections of the host's inner feelings toward myself as legitimate openings for sensitively continuing and deepening the discussions, I feel that I mitigated issues of transference.

My data collection in dangerous research settings involved deep, communicative interaction with participants to violent communal conflict. My hosts and informants were not uniformed commanders who operate dispassionately from fortified command bunkers that allow for disengagement between the employment of violence and the receipt of that violence. Instead, my informants were villagers pressed into the service of violence because of disintegrating sociological structures, psychological organization, and extreme intervention by transnational political interests. As such, these informant-villagers-conflict participants are at once, victims, perpetrators, and bystanders to debilitating communal conflict between members of a once-shared social reality. In their narrative stories were likely equal measures of love, nurturance, ethos of belonging, pain of loss,

shame of alienation, and rage of egos that are assaulted and placed outside of a once loving community from separation by death, dismemberment, diaspora, or simple despair.

These stories of horror and loss presented me as a researcher with a form of countertransference known as vicarious traumatization. This term describes the traumatization of trauma workers and caregivers whose constant exposure to narratives of human suffering create a vicarious trauma in them as part of countertransference (Pearlman & Saakvitne 1995). During fieldwork with the Zaghawa, Fur, Masalit and Rizeigat tribes of Darfur and the Somali clans and Oromo tribes of eastern Ethiopia, I experienced this countertransference phenomenon much more so than during my fieldwork in Niger. The former's stories of mass killings, rapes, and pillaging, followed by endless years in desperate refugee camps were combined with my own participation as an immediate witness and mediator which caused some level of ongoing discomfort. In Niger, I mitigated these effects of countertransference and vicarious traumatization in the same way that I did with previous effects of firsthand trauma, both physical and psycho-emotional—by daily acknowledgement of the effects and maintaining my linkage to the larger human structure that I work within.

#### **Chapter 4: Data Presentation & Analysis of Psychological Organization, Sociological Construction, and Emotional Conjugation**

The following two chapters present my data and analysis. Together, they constitute five analytical frames of analysis of the Kel Tamashek. Chapter four examines the sociological-psychological construction (frames 1 and 2: anthropology, cultural sociology and psychology) while chapter five examines the sociological-psychological trauma and the disintegration of indigenous systems of conflict resolution (frames 3, 4 and 5: social psychology, trauma studies, and indigenous systems of justice and conflict resolution). In this fourth chapter, I present the results of my ethnographic and phenomenological study as they relate to the analysis of the psychological organization, sociological construction, and emotional conjugation of the Kel Tamashek. In the fifth chapter, I present the results of data and analysis relative to evidence of trauma from violence and adaptive failure.

This chapter begins with an introduction describing the organization of the analysis and presentation. The results of the analysis attempt to portray Tamashek identity as it was observed, listened to, and perceived through ethnographic observation, phenomenological interviews, and heuristic comparison with previous research of my own and of others.<sup>16</sup> I did not confine my heuristic comparison to only research conducted with the Tuareg, but also with other vulnerable, at-risk, conflict ridden minorities, as doing so allowed me to better perceive elements of Tamashek identity that are not always apparent on their faces.

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<sup>16</sup> My previous field research included work with the Rizeigat and Fur tribes of Darfur, Sudan, and the Zaghawa and Massalit tribes of Darfur and Chad; the Somali and Oromo tribes of Ogadin, Ethiopia; and the Pueblo tribes of the Amazon Rainforest basin in Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Other researchers' work that helped me with comparing and contrasting included Jeremy Keenan, Susan Rasmussen, Peter Elsass, Anja Fischer, Ines Kohl, and others listed in the reference section of the dissertation.

Even during ethnographic observation and phenomenological interviews, I continuously attempted to employ techniques of comparison and contrast to perceive the uniqueness of the Tamashek identity and potential elements of social trauma and cognitive dissonance. In large part, this took on the appearance of merely trying to understand what was happening and why; not the stated political and economic decisions that were continuously related to me by the informants, but how these informants arrived at their political and economic decisions that kept them in the desert, in the conflict, and in the struggle for life and death despite calculated odds against survival.

Accordingly, I have organized my data and analysis into two parts. The first consists of an analysis of the psychological organization, sociological construction, and emotional conjugation of the Tamashek of northern Niger and northern Mali that focuses on natural obstacles to successful adaptation to change. An analysis of their conditions of adaptive failure and resulting trauma from sociological disintegration, psychological devolvement, and the corresponding emotional conjugations follows in chapter 5.

During my research, I kept my research question constantly close to the process of analysis to avoid losing focus. Many of the anthropology, psychology, and development resources that I relied heavily on are guided by specific goals that were slightly different than my focus on ethnic and cultural conflict in the Sahel. My research question focused specifically on the psychological, sociological, and emotional conflict drivers and conflict resolution inhibitors of Tamashek society in the Sahel region of Northern Mali and Northern Niger. The degree to which Tamashek retain or lose elements of identity is of concern only so much as it brings them into violent conflict as participant victims, perpetrators, or bystanders. To the extent that I focused on the sociological structure and

activities of the Tamashek, or the extent that I examined political and social stances taken by the group and its members, I did so only to illuminate the psychological organization and its potential devolvement, as well as the attendant emotional conjugation and traumatization due to extended violence and adaptive failure of this community in conflict.

In my presentation and analysis of data collected, I will try to illustrate the sociocentric psychological organization of the community and the strong currents of egocentric individualism; the construction of the groups and individual identities that possessed imprinting from constructed organization based on social roles and responsibilities (the so-called castes or guilds), also the cognitive imprinting from psychogeography, geology, and climatology that create conditions for nomadism, isolation, and independence. From all of this, I will try to tease out the emotional conjugations that determine the overall psychological health of the communities.

Because of the oral nature of the communal language and the overly possessive nature of the population to its language, I found that I had to start my data collection and analysis by learning enough of the language to understand how the Tamashek created meaning, compared cause and effect, and how the language served to meet the emotional and ideational communication needs of its native speakers. The Tuareg community is organized into structures of vertical Kel groupings and horizontal clan associations consisting of related caste-like families. The word “kel” is Tamashek for “people of” a multi-generational tier of families that are bounded by historical association in conditions of subsistence survival. I created the simplified diagram below as a guide for part of my

research organization of large amounts of disparate data that seemed both contradictory and, at times, overlapping.

The kels each consist of multi-generational tiers of families with inherited socioeconomic-educational-spiritual roles that define and order their communal unit. Kels can be small, housing only a few family groupings of several different castes, or large confederations that consist of many smaller kels such as those depicted in the diagram. The internal tiers of the kels consist of leadership and nobility (*amashek*/warrior-nobles) (*Ifoghas*, or lesser nobles), historical ownership (*iklan*, or slaves), common association by economics (*inhaden*, or craftsmen) and dependent workers (*imrad*, or vassals).

<b>Kel Adrar - Mali Tamashek</b>	<b>Kel Ahaggar - Algeria Tamahak</b>	<b>Kel Ataram - Niger Tamajek</b>
Warrior Nobles	Warrior Nobles	Warrior Nobles
Economic Nobles	Economic Nobles	Economic Nobles
Religious Nobles	Religious Nobles	Religious Nobles
Craftsmen/Artisans	Craftsmen/Artisans	Craftsmen/Artisans
Vassals/laborers	Vassals/laborers	Vassals/laborers
Slaves (free & bonded)	Slaves (free & bonded)	Slaves (free & bonded)
Outcasts/Untouchables	Outcasts/Untouchables	Outcasts/Untouchables

Figure 7: Cross Comparison of Major Tuareg Confederations in the Central Sahel

Within the *kel*, there is likeness to tribe and clan, except for the component of caste, which binds groups of non-related families together under a common (feudal-like) socio-



economic structure and linguistic variation.<sup>17</sup> Thus the Tuareg community is divided vertically by Kels and horizontally by castes. The Kel Ewey of the Air Mountains in northern Niger and the Kel Adfáʾ of the Adfáʾ des Ifoghas in northern Mali are two such examples of vertical division by mountain range habitat. Within each of these kels, there exists tiers of social strata consisting of social leaders referred to as nobles, as well as artisans, vassals, slaves, and former slaves. While noble families from similar castes but different *kels* associate, so too, do nobles marry vassals and slaves, creating a vastly complex set of social organization with layers of formal and informal social rules and mores. Given that the limited anthropological data was gathered during periods between violent conflicts, what we know of this Tuareg society is in continuous flux. For this reason, I suspect that much of the historical narrative of social construction is nearer to the point of social myth than current reality requiring review and validation during ethnographic field research.

### **Tamashek Identity Construction, Sociological Organization, & Emotional Conjugation**

Unpacking the collective identity of the Tamashek was both harder and easier than other cultural communities. It was easier because its desert-mountain habitat provides for an austerity (as compared to cultural identities that flow from a more diversified physical environment) that allows for vast imagination unrelated to large collections of natural and man-constructed objects. But it was harder because it is so carefully defended against assimilation and loss of distinction. Understanding the Tamashek identity was a

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<sup>17</sup> Jeffrey Heath provides a discussion on the various dialects of the Tuareg Kels, pages 2-3.

prerequisite for my effective interaction and intervention in security sector reform, governance, and development in those regions of Azawad and Azawax, traditional homelands of the Tuareg. My areas of data collection and analysis involved the language, physical and constructed identity markers, the psychological organization of identity relationships, and the formation of archetypes, prototypes, and existential narratives that are imprinted with the specific characteristics of extremes of geography, geology, and climate.

From spring of 2004 to winter of 2005, I worked with the rebel Fur, and Masalit tribes of the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA), the rebel Zaghawa tribe of the Justice & Equality Movement (JEM), and with the Rizeigat Arab tribes whose “Janjaweed” militia was central to the conflict in Darfur.<sup>18</sup> During this fieldwork, I developed an appreciation for the influence of geology, climate, and geography on the sociological construction, psychological organization, and emotional conjugation of desert communities in the Sahel region of northern Africa. I used this previous learning and experience as a basis for comparison with the Tuareg tribes who, along with the eastern Niger/western Chad based Teubou tribes, share a common physical environment including the geology of desert and mountainous terrain, climate of rainfall that makes transhumant pastoralism a principal requirement for survival, and a geography of shared, sacred spaces balanced between mountain fortifications and the freedom of the open desert. Given what I learned from earlier research and experience, I had hypothesized a strong relationship between

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<sup>18</sup> This fieldwork involved conflict mediation between tribes as part of the African Union’s Ceasefire Commission in Darfur 2004-2005 and was documented in a Special Warfare Journal article located at the following stable URL: <http://www.dvidshub.net/publication/issues/8264>

geography, geology, and climate and the psychological organization, sociological construction, and emotional conjugation of the Kel Tamashek.

My previous research and experience also taught me that in communal conflict, participants are drawn into the conflict by deep interpersonal forces that they may or may not even be fully cognizant of, to include struggles against self and group psychological devolvement and sociological disintegration. In Niger, through ethnographic observations and phenomenological inquires, I found evidence of both sociocentric and egocentric behavior patterns in families in essuf as well as in the relative urban settings of Niamey. As I will explore in the findings, there are likely extant historical origins of early Tuareg constructed society that provided for lines of analytical inquiry into the variances in sociocentric and egocentric behavior patterns. These variances may have specific implications for endogenous and exogenous relationships within the greater Tuareg community. A subset of these behavior patterns seems to be a growing divide between that portion of the Tuareg body politic (regardless of kel origin) that remains wedded to Tamashek life in Essuf and that part of the Tuareg body politic that is adapting to the challenges of Emutyen.

During my research with the Kel Tamashek I encountered what I believe to be an internal struggle within the group collective conscious between a seemingly never-ending search for identity distinction, versus an equal search for identity acceptance and social placement. Part of this search for identity distinction appears to be reflected in racial stigmatization of both white and black populations to their north and south respectively. This may be problematic, both for internal family clan relationships, internal kel or tribal relationships, and for their eventual quest for group identity legitimacy and affirmation.

Using an analysis of Tamashek language, ethnographic observations, and phenomenological inquiry, I found broadly accepted themes of identity archetypes across generational divides that I believe reflect back to the early sociological construction and historical narrative. I also encountered what I believe to be cognitive dissonance with regards to religion and spirituality, where ancient tribal expressions of cultural identity continue to clash with the newer brands of purified Islam sweeping down from the Arab north. This is of significant interest for security sector reform and political engagement teams working from the European Union and United Nations, as well as the French and American governments.

Finally, I encountered what I believe to be cognitive dissonance between their historical narrative and its calls to position, versus their desire to maintain a certain social, political, and economic competitive placement against their African and Arab neighbors with whom they use for identity differentiation and growth. This finding was reinforced by observations of anecdotal evidence of traumatizing adaptive failure within multiple generations of the same families and clans, which suggests that the conflict dynamics within the larger Tuareg community of the central Sahel will continue without significant intervention.

### **Language and naming, key words and concepts of the Tamashek people**

I began my study of the Tamashek language at the United States Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California as preparation for deployment to the Sahel regions of northern Mali and northern Niger. There, NSU DCAR graduate Dr. Elnoor Abubakr introduced me to several Berber speaking Arabic language instructors who helped me work through Professor Jeffrey Heath's study of Tamashek grammar of the Tuareg of

Mali (2005). This initial start ran from June through August of 2013 on orders from the US Army's Special Operations Command. After deploying to USAFRICOM headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany at the end of August, and while preparing for forward deployment to the Sahel, I continued studying Tamashek with Mr. Mohammed "Mo" Albakaye ([albakaye@gmail.com](mailto:albakaye@gmail.com)). Mo and his wife are US citizens and residents of Maryland. They were hired as contractor support to USAFRICOM for language and cultural instruction to military and diplomatic personnel deploying to the Sahel or supporting program management of governance, development, and security sector reform.

Once deployed, the US country team assisted me in hiring a Tamashek tutor, Ms. Salamatou Hima Mounkila ([salamatou.hima@yahoo.fr](mailto:salamatou.hima@yahoo.fr)). Salamatou was born in Agadez to parents who maintain their traditional life in Essuf, even as they allowed their daughter to live with an aunt in Niamey where she was able to attend the Lycée Tanimoune de Tillabery, earning her Baccalauréat en Littérature philosophie et Lettres, followed by attendance at the Institut de d'Economie Rurale du Mali, earning her Matrice en Science de l'Economie Développement Rurale. During my fieldwork, each time I spoke in Tamashek as practice, my field of language tutors expanded to include almost the entire male population of the village and sometimes the children as well. Finally, my assigned translators were Mohammed Abdulaye and Hamidoun Agalih ([agalihamidound@gmail.com](mailto:agalihamidound@gmail.com)), both employees of the US Embassy and USAFRICOM, who provided hours of patient coaching in meaning, translation, and pronunciation.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Agalih is an inherited family name, which he uses as his first name when outside his extended family to present himself as belonging to that well-thought-of clan, while Hamidoun is his first, or given, name used by intimate family members who share the same family name.

Abdulaye has served with US Special Forces teams in Niger since 2006 and Agalih has been part of the staff of the US Embassy since 2005 with several awards for achievement.

***Tamashek words, meanings, and concepts.*** The Tamashek language is primarily oral, of unknown ancient origin, and rich in meaning. This meaning can diverge from western concepts of psychological organization, sociological meaning, emotional affectation, and cognitive processing. I found that a number of the most important words and concepts relating to psychological and emotional profiling in both English and Tamashek either did not translate at all, or did so only with the use of lengthy meaning descriptions. I found that by using these words in their Tamashek form and providing a full explanation in English of their meaning, I could better interpret and try to follow the special psychological and emotional logic of what it means to think and feel as a Tuareg.

For these reasons, I chose to preserve a number of key Tamashek words, introducing and including them in the translations and analysis as part of the data collection. These words and their definitions are included in the following paragraphs. The transliteration into the Latin alphabet was determined by myself and my translator/research assistant, Agali Hamidoun, Tamashek tutor Salamatou Hima, and a host of interviewee informants whose willingness to argue their points could not be discounted.

That being said, I relied mostly on Agali and Salamatou, and I used the trial and error method of writing what we hear, then reading back what we wrote looking for acceptable pronunciation. The linguistic phonological spellings in parenthesis are from Professor Jeffrey Heath's 2005 edition of *A Grammar of Tamashek – Tuareg of Mali*. The character  $\text{ɣ}$  is an important sound in the Tamashek language and is meant to be a harsh guttural kh/q/ch sound made deep in the back of the throat. My translator's six-year-old daughter

Zaynab spent several amusing sessions trying to help me with the pronunciation of the Tamashek word for warrior, *Imajaren*.

I found that the collection of data and subsequent analysis of Tamashek *tomoost* and *tagaste* (identity and culture) is a very imperfect science made very difficult by the oral nature of the people and the specific conditions that they are attempting to cope with. I found that a collective conscious does exist within the Tamashek writ large and small, but it resides orally in thousands of *tisseewhy* (stories) and *eemeyen* (poetic renditions) that form a basis of Tuareg communal life. I found that the Tuareg take small pleasure in confusing *akafar* (white Arab-European-Asian) with subtle elements of differing habits, ways and manners of speaking, names, naming, pronunciation, and meaning of ideas and objects. In nearly every interaction that I had with Tamashek individuals and families, *tomoost id tagaste* were topics of vast importance and depth, not to be casually discussed without regard to their complexity and worth.

Understanding and perceiving the nature of this *tomoost id tagaste*, however, is complicated and difficult as there are no Tamashek schools that vouchsafe Tuareg literature, language, or historical narratives. There are no conventions for spelling Tamashek words in the Roman, Arabic, or Tifinax alphabets. Previous anthropological works that I used as part of my research used different spellings and pronunciations for the same words and phrases within and across the Tuareg confederations of southern Algeria's Kel Ahaggar (Tamahak), northern Mali's Kel Adfar (Tamashek), northern Niger's Kel Aïr (Tamajek), or their shared confederation-like grouping of the Iwellemeden (Tawallammat). Complicating this further because of the nomadic nature of these major confederations, in nearly every town I found Tuareg who claimed to be from

a different confederation or area so that in Agadez, for instance, men that I interviewed used pronunciations of words specific to Tamashek (Mali), Tamahak (Algeria), and Tamajek (Niger) with each claiming that their pronunciation or wording was the correct one for all of the Tamashek/Tamahak/Tamajek.

During one interview session in the town of Ingall, approximately sixty kilometers west of Agadez, several *Amenokalen* (tribal leaders) argued that Tamashek was not an oral language.<sup>20</sup> They explained that Tifinaɣ, an ancient script based in the Phoenician alphabet, was their written language and the two traditional leaders attempted to show me how it was written. When I asked them where they learned to read




Figure 8: Interviewee demonstration of the use of Tifinaɣ alphabet to write the Tamashek word *amasher*

and write Tifinaɣ, they said that they learned by themselves. As their differing versions show in figure 8, they each arrived at different versions and proceeded to argue extensively over which version was correct. The point I make is that so much about the Tamashek language and identity is slightly varied that no one convention of pronunciation, spelling, naming, or even meaning description is fully authoritative across kels, clans, or even families, much less confederations of kels that make up the larger Tuareg body politic.

***Naming the Kel Tamashek.*** Anthropologist Harold Isaacs writes that “Name is surely the simplest, most literal, and most obvious of all symbols of identity,” and that to “be

<sup>20</sup> The Amenokal of the Kel Fadey and the Amenokal of the Niger branch of the Kel Ahaggar from southern Algeria.



without a name is almost not to be” (Isaacs 1975, 71 & 75). The Tuareg or Kel Tamashek seem to have a vast array of names that they attribute to each other and themselves in ways that are not always mutually accepted as they herald variations in historical narrative from centuries past. The historical origins of the Kel Tamashek are shrouded in narrative myths closely held on to by each family, clan, and tribe, but are self-collectivized into four rough confederations: the Kel Ahaggar of southern Algeria, the Kel Adraǎ (or Adraɣ) in northern Mali, the Kel Aïr northern Niger, and the Iwellemeden (which includes the Daksahak) in an area that encompasses eastern-central Mali and western-central Niger or roughly from Gao eastward to Tahoua. The name they are called by outsiders is a Hassaniyah-Arab word called Tuareg, or its French spelling of Touareg, a name that the collectives use only when discussing themselves with outsiders.

The cacophony of the many Tamashek voices telling me how to name them and how to think of them was at times overwhelming, providing me with a confused and distorted image in my mind of these complex people. So it was that I started to investigate how they collectively name themselves. Tamashek (t-æ-mä:šæɣ) is the name of the language of the Tuareg and when preceded by Kel (people of), becomes the broadest internal name of the people as used within their community. There are three slight variations of the name of language that results from the use of a varying sibilant (the hissing “sh” sound) in the middle of the word. The Tuareg of the Hoggar Mountains in southern Algeria refer to themselves as the Kel Ahaggar, after the geographic massif (mountain) that provides them their psychological and physical home. They use a sibilant variant that makes a soft “h” sound and thus pronounce the common Tuareg language as Kel Tamahak. The Tuareg of the Aïr Mountains in northern Niger refer to themselves as the Kel Aïr, after

their geographic massif (mountain) that provides them their psychological, if not collective physical home.

The Kel Aïr use a sibilant variant of *ž* that makes the sound of a “j” when pronounced in French and thus pronounce the common Tuareg language as Kel Tamajek (Heath 2005, 2). Finally, the Tuareg of the Adřaf (Adřax) des Ifoghas in northern Mali refer to themselves as the Kel Adřaf, or the Kel Ifoghas, after their geographic massif (mountain) that provides them a geographic center of gravity. The word *á-dřax* is Tamashek for rock or mountain and was originally transliterated as Adřaf and pronounced as adqaq. The Kel Adřaf (Adřax) use the sibilant variant of *š* that makes the “sh” sound common to English pronunciation of Tamashek. For the purposes of narrative simplicity, the remainder of the analysis will refer to all three vowel shift variants (Tamašek, Tamažek, and Tamahak) of the language of the Tuareg as Tamashek, except where necessary to show the intentionality or affect of cultural and identity differentiation.

The derivative of the word for the language and the people (Tamashek) is both fascinating and sobering in its implications for successful future adaptation to changing socio-political realities outside of their desert and mountainous habitat. The noun stem of the word is *amashek* (a-mà:šæx; its plural is *imüşex*), a word that means one who fights, defends, and protects. It is the Tamashek word for warrior in the singular (Heath 2005). Here again, my research captured the slight variations in the vowel shifts made more distinguished by layers of etic research differentiations in pronunciation both by linguists and anthropologists. The word and meaning of *amashek* is known and pronounced as *imùhox* (sounds like imoohoq) by the Kel Ahaggar of Algeria (and now southern Niger). *Imùhox* and *amashek* are pronounced as *imajex* (sounds like imaj’akh) amongst the Kel

Aïr in northern Niger and the Iwellemedan confederation in east-central Mali and west-central Niger. My informants told me that the differences between the pronunciations are minor and, as there is no recognized spelling convention for Tamashek, the distinctions are subject to whatever variations are palatable to language identity distinction and assimilation by the larger Tuareg community.

Below the largest naming convention that involves defining themselves as a language group (Kel Tamashek), Tuareg delineate themselves after four major geographic features in four different countries that have formed their lifeline of access to water and safety, two essential requirements of survival in the contested spaces, transit passes, and caravan corridors of the Sahara and its transition zone the Sahel. In southern Algeria, the Kel Ahaggar are based around the massifs of the Hoggar Mountains and think of Tamanrasset as a historical if not spiritual home base. In southwestern Libya, the historical homeland of the Kel Ajjer is in the city of Ghat and is associated Acacus Mountain (Tadrārt Akākūs) range. In northern Niger, the Kel Aïr call the Aïr Mountains and its ancient cities of Agadez and Iferouāne their spiritual, if not always physical, home.

Finally, in northern Mali the Kel Adfāf have called the Adfāf des Ifoghas and the towns of Kidal, Timbuktu, and Gao their spiritual and physical home for times that run deep into their mythical history. In each case, the geographical feature consists of massifs and mountains that provide naturally occurring cisterns for the collection of water and denied access used for defense against physical annihilation by invaders and colonizers. Many of the sub-cultural collectives no longer live within or even visit the mountains, but they remain a unifying and organizing ideation for the three major confederations or geographical groupings of Tuareg communities.

I created the map in figure 9 using a land-satellite image of the core Tuareg homelands with their most important towns and kel groupings to provide a spatial representation perspective of how they see their emic geographical world. The center space inside of the protective boundaries of the Adfaï des Ifoghas, the Hoggar, and the Air Massifs is called the Valley of Azawar, where seasonal rains, wadies, and oasis create the basis for a stable semi-nomadic culture of several loose confederations. Each confederation maintains a base of interior protection and support within their massifs. Later in the analysis, I will offer an analytical perspective of the psychological and sociological influence of these




Figure 9: Relief Map of Kel Tamashek Homelands

geographical combinations of geological desert and mountain rock to the Kel Tamashek, but for now, one can easily see the ring of mountain-rock fortifications with shared desert in between and imagine their criticality to sense of identity and meaning.

Each of these four geographical confederations, plus the Iwellemedan confederation, are further self-defined as descendent followers (Kel) of a named ideation that is based on a historical person, an economic class of work, or other ideation that may no longer be remembered in the *tisseewhy* (oral history) of the community. For example, the noble clans of the Kel Ahaggar call themselves the *Ihaggaren* of the Kel Rela after a semi-mythical historical ancestor from which their *touchett* (community) is descended (Keenan 1977, 93). The Kel Rela historically depended on another Kel Ahaggar *touchett* for animal products and food and refer to themselves as the Kel Ulli, the Tamahak name for goat (Keenan 1977). The only portion of the Kel Ahaggar that I worked with during my research was a small *touchett* living in the extreme northwest portion of Niger, west of Arlit toward the border with Mali. I believe that they were probably a breakaway clan of the Kel Ulli, the principal *Imɔrad* clan of the Kel Ahaggar, and they were nomadic pastoralists allied to the *Amenokal* of the Kel Fadey.

Within the Kel Air of northern Niger, the *touchetts* of Kel Fadey, Kel Ferwan, Kel Gress, and Kel Ewey are the principal Tuareg tribes that I worked with and researched within. The Kel Fadey are primarily *imɔrad*, nomadic pastoralists raising a combination of camel, cattle, sheep, and goats west of Agadez and Arlit. We met with their *Amenokal* and several of their *Chefs du Canton* and *Chefs du Villages* in Agadez, Ingall, and points inbetween through the spring of 2014 prior to the onset of Ramadan. The Kel Fadey leaders explained that the availability of water wells and seasonal rainfall required them

to use a number of strategies for physical survival that included pastoralism, trade, and contract transportation, service guides for government and NGOs, and even security for local business concerns.

Given their remote locations and the fact that their nomadic pasture lands lay astride the transnational smuggling and kidnap-for-ransom (KNR) travel routes between Libya, Algeria, Mali, and Niger, we well understood that the families and clans were part of the larger conflict in the Sahel that was being exploited by the violent extremist groups of al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, MUJAO, Ansar al-Dine, and others. The Amenokalen of the Kel Fadey and the Kel Ahaggar reported that they were the Tamajek/Tamahak of Azawax, the historical lands of the Tuareg, but not to be confused with Azawad historical lands of the Kel Adfaʼ of northern Mali to which the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and the High Council for the Unification of Azawad (HCUA) were leading on behalf of the Ifoghas of the Kel Adfaʼ. So in addition to Kel Tamajek/Tamahak, I could add Kel Fadey (from an ancient ancestor they thought), Kel Ahaggar, and Kel Azawax all as identifying names for these people I was researching and engaging.

The Kel Ferwan were historically nomadic pastoralists (Imxad) with their capital wealth investments in dromedary livestock allowing them to roam from the Maradi and Zinder region northward to the Air Massif. Recently, due to non-governmental humanitarian intervention, part of their touchett split off and began to raise cattle, an accomplishment that created quicker, larger cash wealth, but depended on the largess of foreign supplies of wells and fodder. The new influx of cash from the sale of cattle allowed the breakaway part of Kel Ferwan to forego pastoral movements north to the

Massif as cattle cannot move long distances between water sources as camels can. Each of the two parts of Kel Ferwan claimed leadership of the whole under their separate Amenokalen, but the camel pastoralist touchett that continued to practice their traditional transhumant lifestyle in Essuf carried the primary respect within the larger Tamashek community, from what we were told. Later, when political fighters of the MUJAO kidnapped the humanitarian foreigners, the largess stopped and that part of the Kel Ferwan began to decline in relative wealth and influence.<sup>21</sup>

The Kel Gress are *inhaden*, or craftsmen by guild or generational inheritance, and provide a range of handmade manufactured products for the markets in Niamey, Zinder, and Maradi in Niger, and southward to Sokoto in Niger where the famous dye for the Tuareg taglemoust's are made. The name *inhaden*, like *imɣad* (animal breeder and or herder), *ifoghas* or *imajaxen* (warrior or noble), or *iklad* (domestic household servant) are guild-like classifications that historically identify the Tamashek into generationally inherited roles, much like the European guilds that arose around and within each princely state and kingdom. These groupings by guild are neither absolute nor exclusive. The Kel Ewey for instance, are semi-nomadic pastoralists living within the Aïr Massif's ancient system of cisterns and water cavities that they use to grow subsistence level fodder for their animals. However, as Susan Rasmussen documents in her work with the Kel Ewey in the Aïr Massif, they are capable of creating brilliant clothes, artifacts, and art for both internal consumption and trade.

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<sup>21</sup> This unclassified summarization of the Kel Ferwan was a result of several interviews with the Kel Ferwan, led by my CMSE team leader Army Captain Chris Evans, deployed from the 91<sup>st</sup> Civil Affairs Battalion, Ft Bragg NC.

The word *touchett* is a flexible description of a bounded community of Tuareg and is used by the Kel Tamashek to discuss and describe their different Kel groupings. Existing research by anthropologist Jeffrey Keenan provides an alternative spelling and potential pronunciation of *tawsit*, and several other anthropologists have adapted Keenan's spelling. I stand by *touchett* as a pronunciation for my work, and as seen in the example of the spelling and pronunciation of *amashek/imùšex*, *imajex*, and *imohox*, variations in the way that the different confederations and their *touchetts/tawsits* pronounce their oral language words likely accounts for all of these discrepancies.

From the existing research and from my ethnographic and phenomenological inquiries, I concluded that *touchetts* are naming ideations of communities of ethnic belonging that are separated by a complex combination of physical and constructed identity markers such as ethnicity (skin color), economic caste, historical narrative, cultural expression, and the like. My informants liken each "kel" and each non-Tuareg ethnic grouping to an individual *touchett*. A number of them routinely use the word "ethnics" for different communities unrelated by blood or marriage. This was important to me because it suggested that *touchett/tawsit* was a fairly generic descriptor of a bounded community, whether that be within the Tamashek community or outside such as Fulani, Hausa, Songhai, and so on.

I found that the lower the individual and group-family informant, the greater the likelihood that their *touchett* would be the focal point for group loyalty and issues relating to *it'tikhal*, *ashok*, *allok*, and *Walagan*, the feelings and values that unify and organize *tas'ax*, or communication within the *touchett*. As I inquired deeper into this meaning of *touchett*, I began to hear more often that the word-concept was thought of as a sub-



division of ethnicity, which suggested a stronger boundary than mere cultural expression of large group identity. Both Salamatou and Agali reminded me, when I asked them, that the Tuareg confederations in northern Mali and Niger did not constitute a monolithic presence throughout the Sahel. From the perspective of a Tuareg touchett living amongst Fulani, Teubou, Hausa, or Songhai touchetts, that word for communal division did have ethnic and even racial distinctions.

Finally, Tuareg families and community members that are adjusting to urban/suburban life in Niamey and in the Diaspora have begun to name those who remain committed (or stuck) to Tamashek life in the old ways of nomadism, semi-nomadism, and transhumant pastoralism and eschew modern technological advances. The name that emerging Tuareg urbanites in Niamey are giving their stay behind relatives is “Tamashek essuf, which roughly translates to “Tuareg in the bush” with the bush meaning the sand, mountains, and sky; in essence nature. But Tamashek essuf possesses a far deeper meaning than living in the bush, even as late nineteenth century Americans’ transition from family farm life to urban factory work possessed tremendous psychological, sociological, and emotional life change. As the data collection and analysis shows, Tamashek wa essuf (in the bush) is linked to central archetypes and the psycho-geography, geology, and climatology of the Tamashek identity and its cultural expression.

*The colors of Tamashek community: naming race, class, and ethnicity.* Much of the western literature and research on the Tuareg communities includes what Fischer & Kohl call “politically imposed conceptualizations” that imposes etic understanding in place of emic meanings that may or may not be accurate (Fischer & Kohl 2010, xii). These etic

understandings include the overlay of Eurocentric ideas of nobility, vassals, slaves, and confederations that carry significant weight of historical understanding that is likely not accurate when understanding across the cultural and linguistic divide that separate Kel Tamashek from both western Eurocentric and sub-Saharan Africa. Based on research studies that I participated with at USAFRICOM, we believe that at some period in their organizing formation, the Tuareg were constructed by the (forced or voluntary) combination of non-organic communities along the lines of economic outlay in a sort of “guild” type of structure that was mutually beneficial to survival in an environment hostile from both other human groups and from extremes of geography, geology, and climate. This supports how the Tuareg themselves described their social structure to me as one where social distinctions are based in part on socio-economic activities, both in current usage and in historical legacy.

From both prior research and my fieldwork, I know that the Kel Tamashek in each of the four countries possess a class of families and clans whose specific historical purpose was that of Imajaxen, or warrior. Eurocentric observers translated the conceptual meaning of Imajaxen into nobility after the distinctive experience of the rise and fall of Europe’s armed males who were characterized as knights, nobles, and rulers (Keenan 2010). This class of people was imbued with an authority to carry and employ weapons for defense from invasion and as forage from hunting and *razzia* (tribal raiding).<sup>22</sup> History is silent as

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<sup>22</sup> The Kel Adfai in northern Mali identified three classes of *razzia* that support the Tuareg honor code of tribal warfare: the *aqqa*, the *tewet*, and the *akafal*. The *aqqa* was a prepared attack to gain territory of a competing group who had dishonored the attacker; the *tewet* was an attack designed to capture material goods and did not have to be pre-communicated in advance; and the *akafal* constituted total war for survival for which there were no rules except to win.

to how they earned this right to arms, self-defense, and ritualistic raiding; why these hereditary clans garnered such authority and not others.

Prior research, literature, and current fieldwork establishes that the Tuareg have a class of families whose specific historical purpose was that of animal husbandry, herding, and trade in unfinished animal products. These family clans call themselves (and are called by others) *imɣad* as an identity label if not always a socio-economic label. European linguists, anthropologists, and colonizers superimposed an etic meaning of “vassal” on the emic function of *imɣad* in a way that created or exacerbated intra-Tuareg tensions between the *imajaren* who reveled in the dominant position of noble bestowed on them by European colonizers against the *imɣad* who resented the new label of vassal on the central economic position of the desert communities in the Sahara and the Sahel. The principal purpose of the *imɣad* was the care and raising of animal livestock that fed the larger Tuareg community. While historically, the *imɣad* were not as well travelled or educated as some of the other Tuareg social classes, this appears to be less accurate as different segments of the Kel Tamashek adapted to the encroachment of globalization of communication, society, economy, technology, and national/international political-military confrontations between states and their minority populations. Former Mali Army Colonel el Hadj Ag Gamou is the leader of the Republican Movement for the Reconstruction of the Azawad (MRRA).<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Historically, Azawad was the plains area south and west of the Adfār Mountains (Massif), but was later expanded by the current rebel political structure to include all of northern Mali. Historically, the area to the east of Azawad was called Azawaj and the Valley of Azawaj runs northeast from east-central Mali towards the Agadez and the Aïr Mountains (Massif).

Publically, Colonel Ag Gamou claimed to have 1000 fighters, but we were never able to see more than 500 or 600. He and most of his fighters were based out of Niamey, Niger. While Colonel Ag Gamou rejects the ideology of AQIM, Ansar el-Din and MUJAO, he was able to fully articulate political positions representing Tamashek nationalist aspirations that do not require the creation of a new state of Azawad, merely an adjustment to the republican structure of Mali that accommodates a degree of federally supervised autonomy. Despite his public and military leadership role as a Tuareg, Colonel Ag Gamou self identifies as a member of the imɣad and resents inferences of inferiority in comparison to the Imajawen or ifoghas. As this and other anecdotes illustrate, the historical characteristics of the differing social classes, or “guilds,” of the Kel Tamashek are no longer an assured method of measuring group identity characteristics, even as the group members continue to adhere to the naming identities of the fathers and grandfathers.

Another class or guild within the Tuareg community is a group of people who identify themselves as the inhaden, or craftsmen artists. The historical role of the inhaden was to create finished products for use by the other “guilds” from animal byproducts, metal, wood, stone, and agricultural products. As opposed to the Imajawen who wielded violence or the imɣad who raised and butchered animals, the inhaden created the weapons of war, the seats of camel and horse, the knives and platters for animal food preparation, the implements for harvesting, tents for living, and hundreds of other products necessary for an armed, mobile, desert-dwelling community of agro-pastoralists living in open desert amidst ranges of volcanic massifs. The inhaden specialized in working with wood, metal, leather, and bone; they made the war materials used by the imajawen and the

ifoghas, the animal husbandry materials used by the Imɣad, and supplied many non-Tuareg buyers of arts and crafts as a steady flow of community income. Entire kels such as the Kel Gress around Maradi and Zinder continue to employ themselves in craftsman, artisan, and light construction in keeping with their historic “guild” association. Most of what crafts and art still flow through tourist channels are from families and clans who self-identify as currently or historically belonging to the inhaden.

After the adoption of Islam, family clans of Tuareg emerged as a separate socio-economic provider of spiritual or religious clerics. The Tuareg call these clans ineslemen, or marabouts who traded religious education and spiritual guidance for required subsistence. The Kel Essouk in northern Mali and parts of the Daksahak of the Iwellemeden still perform these functions and are continuing targets of Islamic Salafist Jihadists supporting the ideology of violent extremist organizations. Several of my Daksahak interviewees self-identified as belonging to historical clans of ineslemen who provided Islamic spiritual guidance to the other social groups as part of their economic strategy for survival and social placement. Later analysis deals with Tuareg spirituality and Islam, especially with the Sunni Arab brand of puritan Salafism, but my informants reported a significant difference between how Tuareg practice their Islam versus their Arab neighbors to the north and African neighbors to the south.

The final historical class of Tuareg that research and the Kel Tamashek identifies is perhaps the most contentious: that of the Iklad (also Iklan, èkl-an) or domestic servant. The iklad/iklan consists of mostly sub-Saharan African populations whose introduction to the Tuareg community was through razzia, a form of tribal raid similar to the Arab’s ghazou. When captured, such persons became an enforced part of a Tuareg’s domestic

household, usually of the imajawen and the Ifoghas warrior clans whose armaments and access to faster, more capable dromedaries and horses allowed them to practice razzia and share or trade the spoils with the other Tuareg guilds. Those captured persons not incorporated into the Tuareg community were sold or bartered to the Arabs who in turn sold them to Europeans as part of the Euro-American slave trade.

The Tuareg practice of seizing members of other ethnicities through razzia and their forcible incorporation into their Tamashek family and touchett contrasted with the better known practice of reselling the captured humans to Arabs/Europeans. The two practices engendered competing historical narratives that define or translate the term “iklad/iklan” as a savage barbaric practice of human degradation or alternatively as enforced domestic participation across ethnic boundaries of belonging. The emancipated iklad in northern Mali around the Gao region are called *bellah* by the Songhai peoples living there, and the tension over the issue of slavery and emancipation is louder there than in the other Tuareg communities (Lecocq 2005).

The narrative of the iklad/iklan that I heard from Hausa and Bambara informants is markedly different from the narrative that I heard from the Tuareg informants. From the former, the narrative experiences of the iklad/iklan were typical of the experiences of black Africans transported and sold to slave owners in the southern states of pre-Civil War America. I found that sub-Saharan African informants tended to provide a narrative of iklad/iklan that involved degradation, humiliation, and a torturous life of bonded work; where children of slaves were resold as goods without consideration for humanity. From the latter, the narrative experiences of the iklad/iklan were quite different. The Tuareg narrative of iklad/iklan was one of enforced domestic participation within the family of

the capturing imajaren or ifoghas leader. Anthropologist Jeremy Keenan confirms this idealized, possibly mythical alternative narrative in several of his works cited in this research. What was important for my research was not the actuality of the iklad/iklan experience, but what the Tamashek thought their role in this experience was and how the iklad/iklan experience is embodied in the mythical narrative of Tuareg history

According to Keenan and those Tamashek informants willing to comment on iklad/iklan (a sensitive issue for both sides), the captured African became iklan/iklad when they learned to speak Tamashek and accepted a role in the household of their imajaren or ifoghas master. Once incorporated into the Tamashek household, the iklad/iklan gained most, or in some cases all, of the rights and privileges of their newly adoptive siblings, cousins, and parents. The imajaren or ifoghas master, for instance, was responsible for the education, marriage, bride wealth, and physical wellbeing of all iklad/iklan in his household (Vazquez-Figueroa 2009). Keenan's research, along with several tisseewhy that I was told, recount mythical instances where a widowed imajaren head of family married the daughter of his iklad, who in turn, upon his death, became the head of family in her own right (Keenan 1977). Keenan further writes that one kel in particular, the Kel Rela, is the name of a Tuareg female leader who was a former iklad until the death of her imùhoɣ (imajaren) husband.

The divergent narratives of African and Tamashek experience and historical narrative regarding iklad/iklan sustains deep rifts of suspicion between the communities across the Sahel transition zone where African meets Tuareg. The former narrative overlays the horrific experience of European and American slavery onto the latter's more benign narrative of Iklan as enforced domestic participant. The practice of razzia and Iklan have

been outlawed for the past half century, yet residual members of the Iklan remain in an enduring domestic relationship with their former Tuareg families, a fact that creates further suspicion amongst the African communities that their fellow ethnics have yet to find real freedom.

The touchetts of today's Kel Tamashek use the naming of race, color, class, and ethnicity to create boundaries of belonging and markers of psychological identity. The names of the principal divisions within and between the touchetts have significant importance in the establishment of identity archetypes, prototypes, and their generational inheritance of communal construction. Perhaps the most important and contentious of these divisions that I have found within the Tuareg is the group known in literature and learned about in my research called the amasheɣ in Mali, imùhoɣ in Algeria, and imajex (Imajaxen is plural) in Niger.

In a mythical but possibly real story seemingly drawn from a Star Trek episode, these amasheɣ, imùhoɣ, and imajex clans consisted of people who lived and earned their way through the wielding of the sword in defense of allied touchetts, the practice of the inter-tribal raid they called “razzia.” This practice included use of an indigenous system of desert navigation that uses stars, geography, and geology they called anamood to guide cargo caravans across the width and breadth of the Sahara desert and its transition zone, the Sahel. In the ungoverned pre-colonial spaces of the Sahara and the Sahel, these three capacities—wielding lethal weapons, developing and practicing tactics and strategies for raiding—and long distance navigation and travel, would constitute a formidable body of talent, one that would well allow for domination and rule of others.



As part of a research effort with USAFRICOM and as part of my dissertation research, I participated in the development of theoretical approaches to determining origination of the Kel Tamashek. The purpose of this theoretical war gaming was to develop lines of understanding about the Kel Tamashek origin that might shed some light on their public political positions and their private underlying psychological and emotional needs based on identity construction and cultural expression. The most popular theory that our group came up with was that the ancestors of the Tuareg were the remnants of the Garamantes, a sophisticated civilization in southern Libya. We found satellite data showing more than one hundred ancient fortified settlements in the Sahara desert that we think were built by the Fezzan tribes of the Garamantes circa 300 BCE to 700 CE, before their kingdom fragmented.

The scientific literature on the Fezzan tribes of the Garamantes is limited, but we used David Mattingly's (2003) *Archaeology of Fazzan* and Louis Werner's article *Libya's Forgotten Desert Kingdom* to track some of the mythology of ancient Tamashek origin (Werner 2004). Several of the characteristics of the Garamantes were or are similar to those of the Tuareg, such as historical tales of banditry, fantastical tales of navigational ability across open deserts, and the use of an ancient form of Tifinax script. None of the sources on the Fezzan tribes of the Garamantes demonstrate conclusive connection to the Kel Tamashek of Libya, Algeria, Mali, and Niger. Ultimately, most of the Tamashek stories of origination, both in my interviews with the Kel Air and Iwellemedan and in Jeremy Keenan's work with the Kel Ahaggar, do not run further back than the spread of the Islamic faith.

What is interesting here is the lack of reliable origination of the Kel Tamashek, and the presence of historical guilds that are generationally inherited, suggesting that the Tuareg were a constructed society rather than a natural evolution. The guild-like division of economic activities with generational inheritance does not exist in the rest of the Sahel communities that I work with such as the Teubou, Fulani, and Hausa, nor have I found such structures in the Zaghawa and Masalit tribes in Chad, or the Fur and Rizeigat tribes of Sudan. Whether the current Tuareg tribes are all or in part descendants of the Fezzan tribes of the Garamantes may never be clear. There does seem to be evidence that when the warrior Imajaxen/imùhoɣ/amasheɣ clans moved into their current geographical geological habitats (of Niger, Algeria, Mali), they may have incorporated pre-existing pastoralist and sedentary tribes into their own, leaving each to play their own socio-economic part in the newly formed or re-constructed Kel Tamashek.

**The psychological and emotional organization of the Tuareg; naming the emotions, psychology, and cognition of Kel Tamashek**

Throughout the remainder of the next two chapters, I have inserted transcribed passages of text from my interview notes and recordings as well as my recordings of tissewhy and eemeyen. For purposes of clarity, all quotes of an individual speaking are in italics, while quotes of supporting literature are not. My rationale for this is that the italicized quoted passages are the most visible or demonstrable proceeds of the phenomenological inquiries conducted during field research. I recorded this first passage in the studio office of Tuareg oral historian and broadcaster Abdurrahman Muhammad, on Malliberro road in northern part of Niamey, Niger on 12 May 2014. The eemeyen “Tamashek id Emutyen” is one of several recorded by Muhammad and used to illustrate

the psychological organization, sociological structure, and emotional conjugation of Tuareg life in the Sahara and the Sahel. Other eemeyen from Muhammad that I recorded and reproduced in this research chapter include “Tamashek Tilk’awi fil Essuf,” “Alkhisate wan Razzia,” and “Tilk’awi Tamashek Zizirrit,” which are presented later in this chapter.

***Tamashek id Emutyen*** – Abdurrahman Muhammad (2014)<sup>24</sup>

*Tamashek people always change their places where they live; they are always looking for a nice place to be with their animals. That is why the other ethnics are always saying that the Tamashek doesn’t have a country.*

*Tamashek are nomads—that is why they want to go everywhere; but I think that it’s only because of our animals.*

*We have a word called Ashok; it means about honor, trust, and good ways of living as a Tamashek that keeps you in good with other Tamashek.*

*The opposite of Ashok is Alghar, bad honor, no honor and Alghar makes you lose your place in your Touchett.*

*The Tamashek idea of Timagatirte, it’s something one can pass, something with a solution.*

*Tanaflit is a nice life with everything that is needed to be safe and healthy...*

*Aflanist is a word for happiness, being happy.*

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<sup>24</sup>The eemeyen “Tamashek id Emutyen” is one of several recorded by Muhammad and used to illustrate the psychological organization, sociological structure, and emotional conjugation of Tuareg life in the Sahara and the Sahel. Other eemeyen from Muhammad that I recorded and reproduced in this research chapter include “Tamashek Tilk’awi fil Essuf,” “Alkhisate wan Razzia,” and “Tilk’awi Tamashek Zizirrit.”

*Tamashek will survive in the future; I was afraid, but it's okay at the first time of rebellion for us Tuareg to make sensible decisions for our future. I talked on the radio to ask people to keep their self-calm, to stop doing bad things and show them an example because they try to quite their culture and go into refuge from the government with the Zarma or Hausa people.*

*They realize that people are wearing their culture, their clothes to sing or to show to the Europe or America the culture of the Nigerien. They live where they are, who they are to try to mixed with the others, but it's not possible the set and think, why are we living what we are or who we are, but there's some peoples who want to be what we are. Now it's better, you will see a Tamashek in the airplane or in a big conference wearing his Tamashek clothes and Tagelmoust.*

In the passage above, you can begin to perceive the language cadence that characterizes Tamashek speech and dialogue. Notice the way that keywords are identified as having extensive meaning when translated into modern languages. Even beyond the keywords, notice how each sentence can appear to be separate from each other, as standalone thoughts. Unwritten in Tamashek verbal cadence are vast amounts of context of shared belonging in a closed geographic, geologic habitat of untold beauty and danger. It is almost as if their spoken thoughts are the consonants of Tamashek words and the unspoken context are the vowels which in Tifinaɣ are unwritten and filled in by the speaker in a form that is as much art as communication. As I collected and studied their stories and poems, the extensive meaning I found was usually the emic context that is shared by the Tuareg community, but is not necessarily related in a simple transliteration of the word. Other meanings of complex Tamashek words involve differences in

cognitive meaning from a nomadic, desert people over to a low context multi-lingual audience.

During my attempts to learn some basic elements of the Tamashek language, I began to discover these words that defied easy translation into English and/or possessed significance to the construction and understanding of Tuareg identity for a number of my informants. Following this vein of inquiry, I developed a list of key Tamashek words that I would ask different interview groups to tell me what the Tamashek words meant to them. The groups included the youth and elder leader groups in Ingall and Agadez, and similar interview groups in Niamey. My methodology was to ask questions such as “mimos teenna id wir'tolee wan tiklea, tkrakit, azook, id taghdrrt?” (*What is the meaning and difference about banish, alienate, alienate, and betray?*) The responses and ensuing conversations about various examples would give me illustration (and frustration) from which I would try to extract meanings. Then I would state back what I was understanding to allow them to correct me or give positive concurrence that I had it more or less right.

Using a heuristic analysis of these comments from notes and recordings, I came up with a list of words and associated concepts that were central to my understanding of the psychological organization and emotional conjugation of the Kel Tamashek. As I use the latter term in my research, emotional conjugates are the emotions naturally linked with certain psychological states of mind, such as an affirmed social identity placement that creates an emotional conjugate of happiness or positive feelings from the release of ligands or other peptides (Schore 1994). The following list of Tamashek words and definitions are from the Ingall interviews with Ag Hamid Mohammed, Balho Aradile,

Balkhou Eridel, and Said Ahmad of the Kel Fadey; Ag Sayadi Ahmed of the Kel Ewey, and Algabib Assalim of the Kel Ahaggar (Mohammed et al. 2014).

*Ideations of honor, sacrifice, belonging and rejection.* My first objective of ethnographic and phenomenological investigations was to explore the language of Tamashek life used in the home, as opposed to the mixture of French, Hausa, Zarma, Arabic, English, and Tamashek that most urban dwellers, traders, and traditional leaders speak in order to communicate in a complex multi-lingual environment. The communication and the inherent relationships of the inner Tamashek family that are used in intimate verbal and non-verbal exchanges and expressions of psycho-emotional relationships between family members, family clans, and the kel itself is called tas'ax. Tas'ax is both communication and relationship in one word, laden with expectations of psychological involvement and emotional conjugation. Tas'ax Tamashek channels their public and private narratives of family, clan, and tribe together in tisseewhy (stories) that bind past to present and illuminate the archetypes that call each member of a family, and the family itself into the collective of what we understand as Tuareg community.

*Tamashek tmidrrt* (Tuareg life) has an internal, inward focus toward the tilk'awi (immediate and extended family) and its waset'ally, or inner environment of tas'ax. This inner focus allows the family to achieve high levels of unity necessary for amaghr (struggle or fight) against what the interviewees called Timagatirte (singular) or Timogoutar (plural). Timogoutar is a noun and an ideation that combines hardship with helplessness that exists for the Tamashek as a visceral object of *warwalek* (fear of) rather than a simple condition. Timogoutar, when combined with *warwalek*, seems externalized as something to fight or struggle against (*amaghr*), perhaps keeping in accord with a

warrior ethos in an unforgiving hostile environment. During interviews, the words Timogoutar, warwalek, imaghr, and waset'ally were often linked to the concept of it'tikhal. There is no direct translation of it'tikhal that I could discern from interviews and questions. I understood it'tikhal to be an intensely important word to the Tuareg that roughly denotes community members' right path of conduct and feeling toward each other and their own responsibility to assure the survival of the community.

It'tikhal seems to be a framework for individual member interaction in the family, clan, and tribe or kel, where ashok, allok, and walagan are integrated into a protective membrane designed to maximize the possibilities of family and clan survival. Ashok is an action and/or adjective that describes a concept of individual character that emphasizes self-sacrifice, abstinence, and service to the community over self; it is, according to the interviewees, a prerequisite for It'tikhal. Ashok appears to be a primary Tuareg archetype of warrior-savior that is differentiated from allok, or personal honor. The Amenokalen in Ingall said that allok belongs to an individual good or bad; allok is a Tuareg person's individual overall condition of personal honor. They explained further that he "has allok" but he "does ashok," and both contribute in a positive or negative manner toward walagan, or group honor that is compiled by the sum total of individual allok both living and deceased members of the kel.

Tamashek tmidrt (life) is typically sociocentric, which I will explore more in-depth later in the analysis. Tamashek belonging is organized around a combination of cognate and agnate strategies that are illustrated by their tisseewhy (stories) of love, marriage, and inheritance. The imajaxen, ifoghas, imùhox, and amashex warrior kels are more likely to be cognate and the imvad, inhaden, and iklad kels are more likely to be agnate (Keenan

2001; Kohl & Fischer 2010). For both, the focus of Tamashek *tmidrrt* is the linkage between *irwan* (the past) and *diffa'rrwa* (the future) with an emphasis on *iyzerien* (people younger than the speaker), *assam'drn* (remembering as a verb), and *emarr'wan* (parents, grandparents, forebears). Where *iyzerien* serves as a word for a generation of Tamashek that is highly contextual in its usage, normally meaning a generation below whoever is talking, *emarr'wan* serves to describe the line of expected remembrance along historical lines of origination.

This expectation of remembrance has become an issue of contention and fear within the generational divide of the nomadic societies of the Sahel. In an interview outside of Agadez, we spoke with a group of young men who were in the youth leadership committee formed with the partnership of Agadez regional governor, Colonel-Major Mikitos. The young men were in their 20s and 30s and sat with us for several hours discussing their *d'rann* (hope) of *diffa'rrwa* (future) life expectations. They talked about wanting to own a motorcycle and move to the city, buy and drive a taxi, get a job with the government, become an owner of cars to rent, travel and live in other cities in western Africa, and so on. Later that night, however, we sat back down around the same fire with elders of that community, some of them the fathers of the young men we talked to earlier.

The elders wanted education for their sons and daughters, especially education about Tamashek history and other subjects that would make the Tamashek community/nation stronger and better able to adapt and compete against the other “ethnics” of the political state of Niger. When we shared with the elders, their sons’ desires to leave *essuf* (traditional nomadic life in the desert) one elderly grandfather spoke up saying “that is okay, as long as they (sons, grandsons) come back home at night, or regularly.” When I



asked what would happen if they go to the city in Niamey, Ouagadougou, Nouakchott, or Bamako, the elder men became emotional and told us about their great warwalek (fear of) loss of assam'drn (remembering) by their sons. The Embassy public affairs officer who was with me seemed startled by this discovery of a potential generational rift between those Tamashek in essuf and those seeking to successfully adapt to emutyen or “big change” in the tmidrrt of Tamashek.

On the other side of belonging in tmidrrt Tamashek is the twin sides of tekrahit (its opposite is azook-inability to shame Kel Tamashek), or alienation. On the one side, there is tiklee (in Azawar the word is iguilu; in Azawad the word is tiklee; and in Aïr the word is tekley), which is banishment or rejection (because of honte or shame), and on the other is taghdrrt (trahir in French), which is betrayal (defined as “an impossible thing to do as Tamashek”).<sup>25</sup> In sociocentric societies such as the Kel Tamashek, the locus of member control is external to the individual. This means that everyone is his or her brother and sisters' keeper, watching over and protecting them from outsiders and also from their own possible mistakes in behavior, attitudes, and emotional conjugations.

While a more in-depth analysis of this will follow later, its an important point to make that these words have significance and power in Kel Tamashek, so much so that initially, interviewees attempted to talk past the overall subject with disclaimers like, “this is not a problem with Tamashek people” or “we are able to work out problems in our own ways.” After trust and empathy are built, slowly the curtain is pulled back and issues that affect breakage of family and clan are revealed. For now, these are several of the words on the

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<sup>25</sup> These translations of words are from Agalih Hamidoun and Salamatou Hima, my field translators, and are included in the appendices.

other side of belonging that the remainder of the analysis will use to evaluate observations, ethnographic observations, and phenomenological inquiry.

*Ideations of fear, love, joy, hope, courage, hate, anger, rage, shame, sadness, and suffering versus pain.* Tmidrrt Tamashek in essuf is a hard life rich in the extremes of senses and emotion. There are no hospitals and few clinics or modern social infrastructure characteristic of the cities of the southern Sahel, from N’Djamena Chad in the east to Niamey, Niger; Bamako, Mali; Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso; and Nouakchott, Mauritania in the west. The vast northern expanses of each of these Sahel countries lay in conditions quite similar to when the first French colonial explorers found it in the seventeenth century; ungovernable expanses of moving desert seas, sheer massifs, volcanic mountains, and enormous salt pans where the temperature in the day routinely exceeded 50 degrees centigrade and fell by half late at night, waking us to shivering cold.

To the uninitiated and unprepared, the Sahara and its southern transition zone, the Sahel, can be a frightening and rapid place to die. In the second of the three Aljazeera videos about the Tuareg’s return, rebellion and exile, a young Tamashek man recently returned from Libya ended up in Agadez with few survival prospects. In a moving portrait of Tuareg social crises, the young man returns to his family’s village seeking a safe harbor amongst relatives. His grandmother, suffering from Alzheimer’s disease can’t remember him and as he begins to pitch in and help his relatives with the chores of daily survival, realizes just how hard his Tuareg inherited life is compared with his former life as a soldier in Muammar Gadhafi’s army (Welsh 2014).

In a land where “nature’s sugar is starvation,” family members learn of *tarraguey* (love), *tidiurt* (joy), *tardey* (trust) and *aakshoud* (sadness) at an early age, reinforced by

periods of *iban-aman* (drought), *tatreet* (sickness), *imaghr* (war), and at times, *tiklea/milkate* (exile or banishment). With little access to the medical advances of the past century, pain and suffering blend together in a single word; *arkanaé*. Where *arkanaé* affects the body, *tidgazak* (emotional pain) forces the strongest of the imajaren warriors to *taala* (cry) over *bararan* (children) *abatu/imouut* (dying) from *tatreet* and *ashedad* (disease). When the Shamal winds (north winds/massive sandstorm) pushes away the rains creating *iban-aman* for years on end, or when the locusts descend and destroy precious animal fodder, *tik'sada/aksoudak* (a state of fear as an ideational object) sets in and violence ensues.

As happened multiple times in the 1980s, 1990s, and again in 2007-2009, *warwalek* (fear of) physical and social annihilation sparks rebellion, and violence replaces the quiet harmony of the Ténéré desert in the Aïr Mountains. The famous Tuareg rebel Mano Dayak led the separatist movements of the Front for the Liberations of Aïr and Azaway as well as the movement for the liberation of Tomoost until his death in the mid-1990s. The airport at Agadez is now named after him. As one of my hosts, Batty Ag Elwaley, spoke about his family members killed in Tchintabaraden, he struggled to retain emotional control. Batty talked about *amaghr* and *iba* (death) of friends and loved ones, introducing the terms *wit'tharhek* (shame) and *ekennass* (rage) as pathways towards their dreaded Timogoutar, the Tuareg concept of ultimate hardship combined with helplessness that undermines the imajaren (warrior) *tomoost* (identity) of the *tagaste* (culture) Tamashek. These are the contexts that my informants used to explain their most important words during our meals and evening talks about *tmidrrt* Tamashek.

*Ideations of cognition, remembrance, belief.* From the time I spent with the Kel Tamashek in the Sahel, my observations led me to believe that their individual cognitive processes are different than those of the sub-Saharan populations they are so anathema of being compared to. During my time with the Niger army soldiers who are mainly Hausa, Zarma, and Bambara, I found them to be relaxed and at ease when in the urban centers of the civilized lands of the Sahel. When I accompanied them into the north, they became increasingly less at ease and more disparaging of the conditions around them. This was in direct contrast to the Tuareg whose experience is opposite that of the former; less at ease in the urban settings and expressive of Tidiurt (joy) only when returning to the open landscapes of Azawar and the Air massifs in the north. In later analysis, I examine the psychology of geography, geology, and climate to assess cognition, psychological organization and emotional conjugation, but a number of key Tamashek words come into play that help with understanding remembrance and belief.

Two of these words are remembering of events, people, places (*assam'drn*) and thinking of thoughts (*amed'drn*). I questioned my interviewees about different conjugations or grammatical usage for thinking and remembering, as they are central to my analysis of the Tamashek historical narrative. I was looking for remembering and thinking as action verbs, which I found in *assam'drn* and *amed'drn*, but I was also looking for the noun equivalent to memorial and thought, and the adjective equivalent to memorialize, remembered, or thought about. I was never able to get past the action verbs of *assam'drn* and *amed'drn*, however. These nouns may well exist, but as Tamashek is mostly an oral language with a diverse amount of dialects and transliteration strategies, finding additional such nouns may not be as useful as imagined. The verbs of thought and

remembrance may only be actions by living humans who think and remember in the present tense and exist as ideations that are articulated by humans to humans rather than as preserved ideas in books and other written material that is not commonly available to the Tamashek family.

Nomadic, transhumant life in the Sahara and its southern transition zone, the Sahel, possess cognitive differences in the way that time, distance, and imagination are constructed in both *amed'drn* and *assam'drn* (thinking and remembering). The geology and geography of the open desert and the variances in the availability of water provide specific psychological and emotional imprints that I will explore and analyze later with respect to the Tuareg, but several Tamashek words are worth mentioning in this section that have to do with imagination and memory. The first is *dayrrn* or daydreaming, a concept that Tamashek think of as imagining desired or feared future events that are within the imaginative scope of their historical narrative thus far.

Much of nomadic desert identity and its cultural expression relies on vivid imagery of human and animal relationships and the traversing of vast distances with little or no constructed infrastructure support. The physical landscape in the nomads' desert is overlaid with imaginary landscape that put meaning into rock formations, desert seas, and ancient formations of rock and volcanic artifacts. This imaginary landscape provides for broad purposes that preserve life, identity, cultural expression, and replace loneliness with belonging. Even at night, the desert nomad Tuareg lives in a real-imagined world of *tahargit*, or night dreams, that are remembered after awakening and incorporated into *dayrrn*. Those night imaginations that are lost upon awakening are called *jarguelwal* and are the source of speculation and existence in the world of the jinn.

*Tamashek language of knowing, time, and change.* When I sit and listen to the conversations in Tamashek within the family, especially between the children and their parents, I hear what psychoanalyst Paul Schilder calls “the melody of speech” and what Harold Isaacs calls the “cadences of the mother tongue” (Isaacs 1975, 93). I can hear the clicks as the tongue pulls away from the roof of the mouth; the complex sound of “ɣ” made in the back of the throat that my translator’s daughter worked so hard to help me pronounce. Linguist Jeffrey Heath would be able to correct me and provide the proper linguistic anatomic words and phrases that accurately describe each sound made within the complex languages found in the Sahel. But what I hear in Tuareg homes are Schilder’s “melodies” and Isaac’s “cadences” that convey words, meaning, emotion, intent, and causality. The time that I spend with my Tuareg hosts listening to and reading their stories illustrates the context in which they live giving me meta-contrast for dialogue in family conversations. The relationships that I develop with them as an outsider allow me to *tgroot* (understand) the nature of their relationships endogenous and exogenous to the kel. The identification and remembrance of key Tamashek words of content allows me to follow *magarred* (conversations) even without interpretation.

None of this implies that Tuareg society is “at the mercy” of Tamashek or that it establishes what Sapir seemed to suggest as an unapproachable interiority of “social reality” (Sapir 1929, 96). Tamashek as a language is strewn with words from Arabic (although most are antiquated) and modern words borrowed from French, Hausa, Zarma, Songhai, and in the case of the Saharawi Tuareg-Berbers of the Western Sahara, Spanish. Isaacs notes that within language, such subjects that are technical and utilitarian in nature to survival are often more straightforward in their translation. The part of language

however, that is reserved for story telling, poetry, morality, emotion, and psychological construction is much more “ambiguous” and “resistant” to translating and understanding (Isaacs 1975, 98). This provides the impetus in this analysis for using key Tamashek words in their original form rather than translating/substituting them with the French or English.

During my interviews, after I read my letter of informed consent, I provided a verbal explanation in Tamashek of the *gamia* (knowledge) that I am seeking to *masnut* (learn). In response, many of my interviewees offered insight into the context of Tuareg life and their inner relationships through *tisseewhy* and expressions of love, valor, honor, and survival described in their *eemeyen*. *Tisseewhy* are oral history recitations of Tuareg life and lessons from the past and present, usually with a moral or point that reflects deep Tuareg identity and its cultural expression. *Eemeyen* are poetic stories of Tuareg historical narrative and the lives of the individual families and significant people who helped shape the Tuareg ideals. *Eemeyen* and *tisseewhy* are often related in Tuareg gatherings, accompanied by the playing of the *Azad*, a one string musical instrument with an ancient historical origination that serves to emotionalize stories and poetry of Tamashek life.

The combinations of *tisseewhy* and *eemeyen* provide a basis for understanding *timogrtar*, a Tamashek word for the aspirations of family and clan for enhanced survival, social evolution, and the avoidance of *Timogoutar* (hardship and helplessness) and overcoming *aljahalate*. *Aljahalate* in Tamashek means an ignorance of the world around the Tamashek; a Tuareg who never travels and learns, only stays with the animals, not seeing another life; not knowing how to change one’s life; an inability to adapt to change;

and an oral illiteracy, although Tamashek who are literate in Arabic, French, English, or Tifinax will include written literacy as well. There exists a relationship in Tamashek between aljahalate and a word called Emutyen, or big change. The common use word for change in Tamashek is *Imuti*, or change; change the color, change the shape, and so on. Emutyen however, is a specific word for change that describes change that is driven by changing social, political, and environmental conditions as well as changes due to technological advances.

The ability of the family, clan, and tribe to adapt to emutyen (change) and transition from *dae'twa* (the past) to *differ'awa* (the future) without loss of *assam'drn* (memory) of *emarr'wan* (parents, grandparents, forebears) is the principal *amaghr* (struggle) of the Kel Tamashek. Their failure to adapt to emutyen threatens to break the connection of their present lives in chronological time from their past and future lives that exist in mythical, even sacred time. Isaacs writes that “fixing links to past-and-future, is clearly the deepest and most pressing of all the needs served” by the process of genealogical inheritance of origin and historical narrative (1975, 117). The link between past and future is a need, but a need whose psychological call into a position of either transmission or inheritance exerts an emotional conjugate that is almost physical in its power to compel. At the conversational level within the Tamashek touchett, the failure of a Tuareg to deal successfully with Emutyen implies that he is aljahalate and thus diminishes ashok (warrior-savior character), allok (personal honor), and ultimately, reduces it'tikhal of the community he is affiliated with. He is without place, without home, *tekrakit* (in alienation).



### **Physical markers and meaning of Tuareg identity**

Perhaps the most iconic marker of Tuareg identity is the *tagelmoust*, which is the (usually) indigo blue headdress and face covering worn by the males of the community once they have reached manhood. An offshoot of this popular marker is the result of the blue dye from the cotton giving their faces, necks, and hands a blue hue that earned them the name “blue men of the Sahara” in popular literature (Keenan 2001). Internally, the Kel Tamashek refer to this physical identity marker by calling themselves Kel Taseɣnest Tedidaɣ, or “People of the Blue Veil” (Heath 2005). Traditionally, the tagelmoust is an indigo dyed cotton cloth veil, four to ten meters in length that is worn as a combination turban and face covering by the Kel Tamashek. For daily practical purposes, many, if not most, Tuareg men wear what they call a turban (veil) made of white, black, or dark blue muslin, a cheaper and lighter type of cloth readily available at low cost.<sup>26</sup> The traditional indigo dyed tagelmoust is quite expensive (\$150 - \$300) and is called an *Alecho* tagelmoust.

The tagelmoust serves a practical purpose of protecting the wearer from wind-borne dust, sand, and intense sun in the Sahel and Sahara deserts. It serves a number of semiotic social and cultural purposes that help Tuareg define their differing touchetts and identify the various social strata within each touchett. For example, the method used to wrap the tagelmoust indicates the touchett to which the wearer belongs whereas the color of the indigo veil suggests the relative social and financial position of the wearer. Finally, the tagelmoust appears to serve important psychological defensive functions that protect the

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<sup>26</sup> Susan Rasmussen refers to this veil as *echchach* (1992, 43).

Tuareg man (psychologically and emotionally) from the external world of nature and society. A boy's journey into manhood is symbolized with his receiving his first tagelmoust in a veiling ceremony that takes him from *amawad* (without the veil) to *amangad* (with the veil).

A male Tuareg who is amangad is eligible to go to war, attend meetings, get married, and bear the consequences of his actions and his words. The covering of the face (how much, when, and where) is a delicate system of social messaging and acknowledgement of social class, status, respect, age, and accomplishments; the lower the social position or age, the more of the face that is covered. The tagelmoust is colored with an indigo dye from a northern Nigerian town that is hand rubbed or pounded into the cotton cloth until it is a metallic black-blue/purple sheen.

While important, the tagelmoust is only one of many physical shorthand markers that the Kel Tamashek use to define their communal membership; imagine or perceive their individual and group identities; determine their social placement endogenously and exogenously with other ethnic touchetts; describe and protect their socio-economic structure, and finally, plan for the existential transmission of individual and group identities across time and space. Other popularized physical markers include their Bedouin-like nomadic life style with camels, horses, and expansive tents tended to by fierce women with their iklad who perform domestic duties and possess little understood relationships with the larger Tuareg community (Lecocq 2005). Less well known are Rasmussen's (1995) rich descriptions of Tuareg symbols of dress, body painting, hair display, and sexual rituals that contrast with Keenan's (2001) vivid descriptions of the

physical boundaries of their desert and mountain habitats made extreme with by the vagaries of climate.

From my ethnographic observations, I observed a number of physical attribute markers that seemed to be displayed by the Tuareg leaders and informants that I interviewed. One of these seemed to be a desire to emulate elegance when talking and gesturing with hands and body; an attempt to keep emotions out of their voice and body language. Keenan (1977) described thoroughly how the French colonizers characterized the Tuareg as being noble based on the lightness of their skin relative to the sub-Saharan populations and because of their warrior ethos identity. Whether their displays of seeming elegance are part of what the French originally noticed when they assigned them their noble status or whether the Tuareg have been trying to fulfill that French assessment, I'm not sure. But what I did intuit is that my Tuareg informants desired my respect for their displays of elegance combined with bravery, the beauty of their people, and a certain civilized sophistication within their ability to conquer a harsh desert and mountain landscape.

*Race, ethnicity, and caste as primary physical markers of Tuareg Identity.* One of the most unique aspects of Tuareg identity markers that I have experienced is that of race, ethnicity, or skin color. I have had three separate and distinct conversations about race, ethnicity and skin color with language tutor Mohammed "Mo" Albakaye, interpreter/research assistant Mohammed Abdulaye, and interpreter/research assistant Agali Hamidoun. These three Tuareg confidants were the safest informants of my research with the Kel Tamashek as they were men of my own age who were educated, familiar with western culture, and men with whom I had developed a continuing

relationship, if not friendship. Despite this, none of them felt comfortable being videotaped during our conversations about race and skin color as the subject is laden with social and political tension in both Mali and Niger.

My first conversation was with Mo during a language training session and we became enmeshed in dialogue over the ethnic differentiation between the touchetts of Tuareg, Fulani, Songhai, Arab, Hausa, and Bambara. Mo introduced me to a series of different skin colors used by the Tuareg to differentiate the ethnic divides between the different population groups in Niger and Mali. There was *imikwal* or dark (black), *imēšwaran*<sup>27</sup> or red, *sattafan* or green, and the French word *blanc*. Mo's description of the four colors and which of the touchetts in Mali, Niger, Algeria, and Libya were which colors became quite confusing to me, yet he seemingly could not understand why I was confused; like I was missing something so obvious that the answer was right in front of me. Finally, out of amused frustration, I asked him; "So Mo, what color are you?" Mo replied, "I am *imēšwaran* (red) skin, my Arab friends are white like you, and the Hausa and Bambara in Niamey and Bamako are black." To which I asked, "Are all Tamashek *imēšwaran*?" Mo replied, "No, some are *sattafan* (green) and some are *imikwal* (black)."<sup>28</sup>

Over the course of the following three hours, Mo tried to explain whose skin was black, red, green, or white and why. I learned (from Mo's depiction of his understanding) that some Tamashek could be *imēšwaran*/red or *sattafan*/green, but that the physical

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<sup>27</sup> Baz Lecocq transliterates *imikwal* as *koual* and *imēšwaran* as *shaggaran* (2005). The transliterations used here are from Jeffrey Heath's *A Grammar of Tamashek*. Other informants such as Ekaley Joulia d'Azal provided yet other words for the Tuareg skin colors of red and green, but what is important for my research is that for all of my informants, these colors exist and have significant importance on the dialogue of Tamashek ethnicity.

<sup>28</sup> Personal conversation with Mohamed Albakye during Tamashek language training at the AFRICOM language center, Kelly Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany October 17<sup>th</sup> 2013.

emanation might seem imikwal/black; that some Tamashek could appear darker brown-black than some Hausa or Songhai, but that black meant they were African rather than Arab or Tuareg; that even though some Tuareg were the same color of skin as Arabs, the Arabs were still blanc and the Tuareg were still imēšwaran or satafan.<sup>29</sup> By this explanation, I learned that iklad touchetts would be considered imikwal/dark-skin members of Kel Tamashek because they had originally been African before they were forcibly incorporated into the Tuareg society, rather than for the actual color of their skin. If the individual and/or family were part Tuareg (usually ifoghas, imùhoɣ, or imajaven) and part iklad/African, then their constructed skin color would be called irağanatan, or caste of mixed blood.<sup>30</sup> Taken together, the three hours with Mo taught me that the Tuareg construct skin color not as it appears to the uninitiated, but as a constructed element of ethnic belonging.

Subsequent conversations with Mohamad Abdoulaye and Agali Hamidoun clarified that some touchetts still think of themselves as having either red or green skin as a physical marker of ethnic origination as the original inhabitants of the Sahara and the Sahel. Their discussions linked the skin colors of imēšwaran (red) and satafan (green) as defining physical traits that separated these clans from their imikwal (black) African neighbors to the south and from their Blanc (white) Arab neighbors to the north. As I looked at my Tuareg friends' actual skin color, I perceived Albakaye to be of light olive

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<sup>29</sup> Baz Lecocq suggests that the identification of imešwaran (red-skin) Tamashek touchetts were constructed ethnicity markers belonging to free, but not noble clans and the identification of satafan (green-skin) were constructed ethnicity markers that belonged to noble clans such as the ifoghas, imohoɣ, and imajaven clans (2005, 46).

<sup>30</sup> As discussed earlier, it was not uncommon for the warrior (noble) castes to marry eligible daughters of their own iklad, who would then be eligible to inherit upon the death of their Tuareg husband.

tone, Abdoulaye to be of burnt mahogany color, and Hamidoun as one shade darker than Albakaye. Their description of skin color in such a matter of fact manner caused me to think that they were struggling to achieve Brewer's optimal distinction of physical identity markers against Horowitz' assimilation and cultural annihilation (Brewer 2001; Horowitz D. L. 1985).

A number of comments made during our interviews supported my perception that the Tuareg use constructed racial identification as a means to avoid assimilation and annihilation. These comments had to do with comparison and contrast of Tuareg with Africans and Arabs, usually in a pejorative manner. On several occasions for instance, during breaks from interviews, some of the Niamey based informants would show me (and any other westerners present) cell phone pictures of naked children playing outdoors. Their comments suggested minor, almost childish like differentiation between African families and themselves. Yet at other times, the Tuareg informants would demean Arab social life and culture in similar, definitional ways to create separation between the black Africans, white Arabs, and the red and green Tuareg.

Many of my informants would continuously use touchetts as a term for all communities or communes, whether they are Tamashek, Fulani, Songhai, or Hausa. Separately though, they would revert to the term "ethnics" to refer to all non-Tamashek groups living around them. What interested me was not the pejorative denigration of other ethnic or cultural communities, but rather the ongoing efforts at trying to differentiate Tuareg community from African and from Arab. After one particular interview session, I began to wonder about the possibility of the presence of narcissism of small differences within the larger Kel Tamashek community (Stein 2008). Normally,

this type of issue occurs when two or more distinct large group identities possess failing or insufficient boundaries for the interior members to fully perceive their identity outlines. The failing or insufficient identity boundaries create psychological crises one or both of the groups create “issues” that serve to bring the boundaries into sharper focus allowing members to reacquire a safe level of group identity recognition (Volkan 2005; Stein 1982).

These observations increased as we continued to meet and dialogue with the traditional leadership of the Kel Tamashek. During an interview in northern Niger for instance, we invited six to eight Tamashek Amenokalen (hereditary traditional leaders of Tuareg sub-kels) to an interview to discuss *tomoost id tagaste* (identity and culture) of the Kel Tamashek (Mohammed et al. 2014). These leaders included *chefs du canton* and *chefs du village* of a number of Tuareg clans, assembled to plan for the annual *Cure Sale* held each year in September at Ingall Rural Commune. When asked, the response was overwhelmingly positive, with the respondents wanting to know if they would start now; even insisting that they could provide many answers to the question of Tamashek identity and culture. By the time of the group interview, the six to eight interviewees had grown to twelve Tuareg men eager to share their perspective of Tamashek *tomoost* and *tagaste*. I had brought with me two of my civil affairs officers and a humanitarian aid worker from the NGO Sprit of America as observers.

Immediately after reading the letter of informed consent in Tamashek, the group began talking and answering any and all parts of my questionnaire without regard to our ability to listen and record. Much of the entire interview was a cauldron of vocal noise from excited Tuareg leaders eager to share their thoughts and feelings. The interviewees

talked over and under each other, but I was able to gather several themes. First, a level of differentiation in that all I was hearing was that they were different from each other; the Kel Fadey wore their tagelmoust in such a manner that was or is different from the Kel Ferwan, or Kel Ahaggar and that a Tuareg man can tell which kel someone is from simply by how he ties it around neck, face, and head. Then there was the dialect—the men from the different kels continuously argued over how to say or pronounce words, write in Tifinax, perform ceremonial customs, and the like.

When I suggested that their descriptions of differences sounded to me as though Kel Tamashek was not as unified as some might think, the entire group reversed course and began explaining how close they actually are in terms of thought, concepts of honor, and a set of unique but parallel historical narratives. The entire experience was like talking to a set of related sociocentric families who live in separate geographic locales but share a common history, language, and geography, but bicker constantly over interpretation and meaning. My initial confusion was about why my foreignness did not establish a greater meta-contrast that would cause them to coalesce in the initial stage of discussion followed by establishing distinction once they felt comfortable with my outsider-ness in their inner dialogue. When I had similar discussions with similar desert societies in Chad and Sudan, such as Zaghawa, Fur, and Rizeigat, they displayed an initial coalescence that did not break form until they had accepted my presence and no longer took notice of the foreignness that I brought with me; only then giving me opportunity to see into the natural jockeying for social positions of the many individual and group identity faces of the larger sets of families, clans, and tribe.



## **Tuareg identity archetypes, psychological organization, emotional expression and the call of the conflict narrative**

“Arregh tmidrrt Tamashek timos awa timos dae'twa” – *Ag Ghaliou, Amenokal of Kel Fadey, Agadez, April 10<sup>th</sup> 2014 (I want Tuareg life to be like it was before)*

An integral part of my professional fieldwork as a tribal engagement team leader for US Africa Command is to discover the conflict story from the emic perspective of those who are at once victims, perpetrators, and bystanders of the ongoing violence in the northern Sahel and southern Sahara. I had already received several of the narratives from the Africa Command staffs, explanations that were mostly disjointed and enemy threat centric, prior to leaving Germany. I had received several more narratives from the host government political establishment (contacts within the ministries of defense and interior) and a supportive US Embassy Country Team that variously focused on competition over common pool resources, political party agendas, and of course, foreign enemy threats. What I was lacking was the conflict story internal to the central protagonists of the war in the Sahel: the Tuareg of Azawad, Azawar, and the Air Mountains. I was looking for a conflict story that would likely be quite different from the framing employed by the political elites of Niamey and by the Military/Diplomats of US Africa Command.

In the beginning of the previous section, I suggested that the Kel Tamashek, as conflict participants, are drawn into conflict by deep interpersonal forces that they may or may not even be fully cognizant of, to include struggles against individual and group psychological devolvement and sociological disintegration from factors outside of their control. Broadly, I believe that these factors outside their (perceived) control, and which can lead to psychological devolvement and sociological disintegration, do result from

conflicts involving group identity and trauma from their inability to adapt rapid environmental, social, political, economic, and technological change. I don't believe that the target group (Tuareg in this case) cannot change, but rather to date they have not been able to change and their adaptive failure has led to a type of trauma that I will explain and explore later in this research. Certainly, the growth and development of indigenous traditional leadership and appropriate measures of interventionist support can lead to the Tuareg's ability to adapt their historical narrative and the existential identity it contains to the demands and reality of the emutyen (changes) happening to them, and within them as a society.<sup>31</sup>

What makes our interventionist support in northern Niger and Mali difficult is the fact that the conflict story of the Kel Tamashek is quite different from those of the egocentric western societies from which the interventionists are from, be they public or private sector humanitarian, governance, or development assistance workers or corresponding security sector reform advisors and trainers like myself. Besides sociocentric forms of identity-meaning and agency-action, the Tuareg are characterized by the use of high context communication and meaning-making, as well as a locus of control external to the individual that uses alienation and shame as principal measures of discipline. Within the Kel Tamashek, I found that these differences (sociocentric, high context, external locus

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<sup>31</sup> I acknowledge that a moral question exists that deals with the fundamental assertion that indigenous societies like the Kel Tamashek should even have to change. While it is true that the Kel Tamashek can't be forced to adapt to emutyen, and it is true that they may not ultimately succeed in adapting, my/our past experience teaches us that, like the Ik tribe of northern Uganda, adaptive failure may lead to partial or complete existential extinction of historical narratives and/or the physical society that constructs that narrative.

of control, shame based) tended to exacerbate conflict from a collective failure to adapt to emutyen.

Perceived damage from emutyen within the touchetts during conversations is often expressed as being totalizing in nature with an immediacy of consequence and complexity of meaning that is sovereign in its ownership of identity-meaning and agency-action. These descriptions are both interrelated and causative in effect, in that the high levels of interior complexity of identity ownership and construction can create barriers to change acceptance, leading to greater social damage. The sociocentric sociological systems within the Kel Tamashek are laden with high context communication and meaning. Tuareg family and clan members are closely bound in the making of group meaning that populates a largely oral, nomadic, desert-mountain historical narrative nearly opaque to outside observers. Much of what they need to say is implied rather than stated, and conversations can be shorter and densely laden with interior meaning that takes what Stein calls “deep listening” to even begin follow (1994).

Because the Tuareg individual is so subordinated to the family, clan, and kel, individual agency is abnormal and conduct is directed and enforced by the group rather than individualized internal controls of morality, judgment, reason, ambition, and the like. This places the locus of control outside the individual, but within the group. This also creates a powerful disciplinary measure; alienation and the attendant shame resulting from exclusion. Because individual agency is outside the norm, a cast out member of a clan or confederation either reforms and solicits re-admittance to the group or is cut off from his past and, more importantly, his identity. A final characteristic of the Kel Tamashek is the sociological sovereignty of their inward focused system of meaning-

identity making and agency-action. Without going into which comes first, sociological sovereignty or sociocentric society, this independence of social and identity ownership as separate and distant from the sub-Saharan majority whose representatives govern the state create unique challenges based upon cross-cultural understanding and adaptation.

Within the concept of adaptation as it relates to Niger and Mali, the multiple cultural groups in these Sahel states are rooted in distinct differentiation of north and south. The majority population lives in the minority part of the land characterized by sub-Sahara savanna of rich(er) soil and water abundance of an agrarian based society. In the south, the Hausa and Zarma majority constitute the political elite that is tied to their fellow ethnic/linguistic populations in Nigeria. The minority population lives in the majority part of the land characterized by vast massifs, volcanic mountains surrounded by desert seas, and arid desert plains that support transhumant and semi-nomadic agro-pastoralism and trans-regional trade and travel.<sup>32</sup> There in the north, the Tuareg and Teubou minorities constitute the perennial rebellious class that is tied to their fellow ethnic/linguistic populations to the west, north, and east in Mali, Algeria, and Chad respectively.

The historical sociological structures that emanate from these very different environmental habitats create sociological sovereignty and competing indigenous systems of justice; indigenous that is, to the specific culture rather than the political state that

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<sup>32</sup> The northern parts of Mali and Niger also contain the principal natural wealth of the region including uranium, gold, copper, and phosphates. Perhaps a third of France's electricity exports in Europe are derived from Niger's uranium mines in Arlit, north of Agadez resulting in significant depletion of the water tables under the Air Mountain region. USAFRICOM has found uranium in the water supply around Arlit and despite our use of bottled water for drinking; US military advisors from my teams suffered from acid reflux and other symptoms for months after returning to the US. During our tribal engagement in the north part of Agadez region, we received a number of complaints from the Tuareg, Fulani, and Songhai communities that the Chinese were exploring for uranium, digging exploratory shafts that were contaminating the ground water and killing livestock. My informant for this was an informal village spokesman named Maidagie Inwall from Tigidafessou, Niger.

houses the many separate cultures within. Even the politically dominant Hausa, for instance, often default to tribal politics and justice in favor of the multi-cultural state of Niger and its central political and justice structure in Niamey.<sup>33</sup> Logically, the presence of multiple, sovereign sociological systems with their indigenous systems of justice suggests a state with governance that is problematic, failing, or non-existent, as described in the introduction. The Kel Tamashek in Niger and Mali tend to understand the conflict from within the boundaries of their own sovereign systems, like mini-states of Azawad and Azawaj, rather than population group subordinate to their southern majorities. Tuareg political structures such as the MNLA or the CRI—Cooperative for Renewal & Innovation—construct their story internally without dependence on the dominant majorities of the south or the internationally recognized political structure of the state (NAVANTI West Bridge 2014).<sup>34</sup>

### **The archaic typologies of Tuareg identity**

Tuareg tomoost (identity) is a vast, semi-amorphous, semi-mythical historical narrative that exerts tremendous influence over the members of the many disparate kels and allows them to survive in geography, geology, and climate that precludes most species of fauna and flora. It is, as Stein suggests, “sacred tribal (group) authority...[that] has a compulsory quality to it: it must be believed” (1994). Elements of this sacred

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<sup>33</sup> This observation is from thirteen months of interaction and observation as part of the US Embassy’s Country Team.

<sup>34</sup> The CRI Secretary General (Elkontchi Kriska) and most of the senior members are former members of the 2007-2009 Tuareg uprising and themselves sons and grandsons of the leaders and members of the earlier Tuareg rebellions of the 1960s through the 1990s. Their quest for recognition of an alternative version of justice and social ordering in the north, separate from that of the south, is anathema to the Hausa political elite in Niamey. Consequently, members of the CRI face continuing political and legal opposition to their organization and existence.

historical narrative may even have a neurological component to the compulsory quality through cognitive imprinting from their environmental habitat. Their identity is laden with the context meaning of geographic, geologic, and climatologic extremes that can be seen throughout their tisseewhy (poetry), eemeyen (oral stories), and art. In the tisseewhy “The Lessons of Tamashek” reproduced below, the Tamashek phrase “Nilo Guer Jimawan id middlum” is commonly used within the touchett to describe conceptual existence of Tuareg life that is deeply interrelated with nature.

The human-nature interrelation is a foundational part of Tuareg identity required as a basis of context for all other conceptualizations of thought. Tuareg thought is laden with ideations of contrasted combinations that make sense only in the context of their desert-mountain habitat and semi-nomadic life cycle. As you read the sentences of the animals and survival; warriors and saviors; helplessness and hardship; or earth and sky, the image combinations construct thought and dialogue, creating cognitive imprinting about their existential identity and its place in nature. As much as does their identity, this cognitive imprinting shapes the way the Tamashek community thinks about time, space, and their relationship to nature and neighboring ethnic groups.

In the open deserts of northern Niger and Mali, the tyranny of distance and the impenetrability of the massifs and volcanic lava flows protects the desert nomads of the Kel Tamashek from their Arab competitors to the north and would-be African masters to the south. When the desert seas advance and the arid plains dry up from iban-aman (drought), the kels retreat to the water sources in their massifs, mountains, and oasis that have historically allowed them to survive even amidst unbelievable suffering. They still transmit this suffering and glory through eemeyen and tisseewhy, in generational

inheritances of shared chosen traumas, and glories rooted in survival in a hostile natural world and in defense against ethnic cultural competition for control of scarce resources and transit access across barren passages.

As the outer world changes, their eemeyen and tisseewhy become more dependent on historical rather than contemporary context. The generational inheritors of this Tuareg identity tend to be an increasingly confused and discontented *iyzerien* (younger generation). The generational inheritance that the *iyzerien* receive consists of a trifecta of group identity, individual and family placement in an overarching mythical narrative, and what I believe to be a cognitive and physical imprinting from the geography, geology, and climate of the Sahara and its Sahel transition zone. These three elements of Tuareg inheritance (identity, narrative, and imprinting) serve as barriers to their successful adaptation to the demands and reality of *emutyen* (big change). Below is an example of eemeyen, an ancient practice in the oral Tamashek society that transmits their existential identity through the extended continuation of an ethnic historical narrative.

The storyteller below is Ibrahim Amawal, a member of the Imrad of the Kel Ferwan in and around the Maradi province of northern Niger. In his eemeyen, notice the syntax and the defined measure of each statement, as if each were a separate thought that could be expanded on indefinitely until the full story of Tamashek life was revealed. The passage illustrates the transmission of both structure and texture of the lived experience of desert nomadic existence.

*The lessons of the Tamashek-* (Amawal, 2014)

*Nilo Guer – Jimawan id middlum (We are under the sky and on the earth) \**

*Idgazane Medranan (We have a lot of dreams) \* Idgazane Mana id tiwarnawen*

*(We are disturbed by the Drought and Sickness) \* Tamasna and to the Kel Ahaggar, Ifoghas and Ibelkorayan \* A camel who knows where she is going, to Tiguida in the north \* The young Tamashek with their sword and lance; they stand to protect what they are \* I'm walking when I saw a tomb, with a démon on it \* Some of the Tamashek have a lot of animals \* Some of the Tamashek have what they learn in Islam \* Some of the Tamashek had their guns to get what they need \* Some of the Tamashek hold the culture and they are afraid of Alghar \* Some of the Tamashek are still hearing of the imzad songs \* If the Tamashek men are always thinking of their young Tamashek ladies, they will always be trying to do the best they can \* Aljahalate is the first thing that we have to fight before everything else \* This year, I made a good trip without any time in timogoutar \* I went to a small village where I found a girl who everyone needs to get; I was lucky, I win her over and that made me very popular because all the young Tamashek always likes to see a winner \* Fatima, don't worry; I'm here to do everything you want even to give my life because of you \* To love Tamashek, there are two things that must be learned – the lessons of Ashok and Tangalene \* Elam is the soft skin of Fatima; her elam is like a river, like a grass, looks like a milk; I don't have words enough to describe my Fatima \* Those from Mecca and Konni; from Dakar or Ingall; from Libya and Imanan \* Three someone's from Azawar who every year they pass in the rainy season at Tiguida \* Everything from Tisseewhy I understand \* I'm not going to visit Taklit; I will visit a lady with the long hair and the white color skin \* You have to listen to the imzad to stop all the bad things \* It's better to see with your eyes than to hear from someone \* I get*



*in to a family that I don't know; I only know my girlfriend, I don't want someone will see that I broke my girlfriend's leg \* Tamashek tile tibdad fil timogoutar id aljahalate \* Stand and push to resolve some of our timogoutar \* Tamashek ladies will never hear that we shot and we run \* Tamashek warriors will do everything to save the lives of ladies and children \* We will show to the world who Tamashek is \* We will get our freedom with our old guns and knives and stones or all of us will die*

The Kel Tamashek constructs, learns, and transmits their narrative story as communal collectives of warrior-rebels, artisan-craftsmen, transhumant semi-nomadic agro-pastoralists, and a growing body of un-self-identified traders-travelers-smugglers called ishumar by national and international governance.<sup>35</sup> This last body of Tamashek has been drawn from the ranks of ifoghas, imùhox, imajaxen, inhaden, imxad, and even iklad, often sharing a common journey to the north as Libyan leader Muammar Gadhafi's Tuareg legion of fighters and government workers (Welsh, 2014). Where the ishumar's personal narrative may be different from their families remaining in essuf, during phenomenological dialogue they continue to describe identity archetypes similar to their peers remaining within the traditional family/clan touchetts of the many kels of Tamashek life. What I found to be the primary difference between ishumar men and women versus their family "in essuf" (traditional life of nomadic Tuareg) is an evolving

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<sup>35</sup> Ines Kohl explains that the word ishumar is derived from the French word *chômage* or unemployed Tuareg who had left their traditional touchetts and migrated to towns or cities seeking work, often in the wake of devastating droughts and rebellions. Over time, the word ishumar is used by non-Tuareg to denote the growing body of Tamashek who are no longer a physical part of the traditional touchetts engaged in crafts manufacturing, animal husbandry, or agro-pastoralism. More clearly, they are not completely tied to or under the authority of a particular kel or touchett, although they may self-identify with their families' touchett and that clan may accept and embrace positive contributions from their ishumar member living outside the community.

personal narrative that is more egocentric in psychological organization and an intellectual capacity as a bricoleur or identity entrepreneur. When the ishumar talk about their identity connection to Tuareg, I sense an almost protective hold over their receding connection to the mythical past of the Tamashek, almost as a business man of New York City might talk about being a grandson of a Texas rancher, holding on to his fantasied connection to open ranges, cowboys, and the masculinity and personal sovereignty of life on an open range.

*The archaic-typical foundation of Tamashek identity and the organization of Tuareg narrative.* All cultural identity groups possess ancient (archaic) typologies (archetypes) that reflect perfect forms of human presentation that are often awkwardly expressed in physical (prototype) form within that society. The closer these reflections of perfect human presentation (archetypes) are to the requirements of physical survival, propagation, and emotional nurturance, the deeper or more ancient the archetype tends to be. Those societies whose past was laden with challenges to construction and survival, for instance, will necessarily possess greater variations in typologies that reflect those challenges.<sup>36</sup> The archaic typologies of the Kel Tamashek are deeply rooted in physical survival and complex behavior relationships that are necessary for survival in the open desert and mountains of the Sahara and the Sahel. Survival there is very much a group effort, and independence from the close-knit group is often rewarded with suffering and death. The central typologies of the Kel Tamashek are ifoghas, imùhoɾ, imajawen, allok, ashok, and it'tikhal; roughly translating to noble, warrior, honor, character, and ethnic

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<sup>36</sup> While there is no one source that I derived this assertion from, Edward Edinger's (1992) *Ego and Archetype* was a fascinating read, helping me to understand some of Jung's more complex ideas.

brotherhood that calls its members into tight configurations of collective creation on a desert mountain landscape to repel attack and ward off famine, drought, and illness while preventing psychological disorganization and sociological disintegration.

Just as the Arabic word *jihad* linguistically describes the human activity of struggle, so too does the Tamashek word *imaghr* describe for the Tuareg concepts of struggle to survive from either starvation or invasion. My perception of *imaghr* (struggle and war) as it is led by the *imajaxen*, *imùhoɣ*, and *ifoghas*, is not simply an archaic typology for the expression of male masculinity, but more related to the archaic savior typology. *Imajaxen* describes families who are hereditarily born into clans whose historical roles were those of warriors, raiders, and protectors of the Tuareg realms in Azawax and the Air Mountains to which they belonged. *Imùhoɣ* is the same role, but for those warrior families (*kels*, people of) belonging to the realm of the Hoggar Mountains in Algeria. A third such descriptor is *amashek*, used to describe warrior and noble families or *kels* in the Adfaɣ des Ifoghas in Mali. “Tamashek comes from *amashek*...in the past, *amashek* was the leaders of the Tuareg before the colonization by the French” (Mohammed et al. 2014).

From interviews with Tuareg leaders, combined with Keenan’s work and the research conducted as part of the USAFRICOM effort, I have come to theorize that the warrior families of *amashek*, *imùhoɣ*, and *imajaxen* brought the language of Tamashek, Tamahak, and Tamajek to the pastoralist and craftsmen who were the original inhabitants of the mountain ranges, massifs, and deserts in northern Mali, northern Niger, and southern Algeria and Libya. The well-armed *amashek*, *imùhoɣ*, and *imajaxen* clans would not have needed to use force to take control of the undefended existing tribes and would naturally

see the benefit in having them learn their language of Tamashek. Their contribution to this society would be as protectors and procurers; protectors against dangerous animals and invaders and procurers of materials and products unavailable to the imɣad (agro-pastoralists) and inhaden (manufacturing craftsmen). The amashek, imùhoɣ, and imajaxen practice of obtaining domestic labor during razzia (tribal raids) from the sub-Saharan tribes living at the edge of the Savanna south of them would meet their interior domestic needs without interfering with the delicate balance of work product between the three main work groups of amashek-imùhoɣ-imajaxen, imɣad, and inhaden. Keenan describes a similar arrangement in his study of the Kel Rely (imùhoɣ) and the Kel Ulli (imɣad) in nineteenth century accounts of the Kel Ahaggar in southern Algeria. Keenan describes the formation of what he translates to “Drum Group” led by an imùhoɣ leader called the Amenokal who decided when to fight and how to divide spoils, goods, and services amongst the three guilds or work groups.<sup>37</sup>

Many practices of the old system of Tuareg social order are gone, but memory and meaning linger on. Understanding what was there before helps us to understand identity ideations and internal Tuareg conflicts now. For instance, during interviews with Tuareg men belonging to imɣad and inhaden families and kels, a continuous theme was anger at the amashek-imùhoɣ-imajaxen clans who were supposed to be protecting the livelihoods of the guilds. One informant, a member of the inesleman and imɣad kels, said, “what good do the ifoghas do us now that we Tuareg are the lowest of the ethnics” (Ag Elwaley

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<sup>37</sup> A fourth guild or group emerged in the Kel Adɣaf des Ifoghas in northern Mali and within the Iwellemedan confederation that spans east-central Mali and west-central Niger; that of the ineslemen or religious scholar-teacher. The particular clan within the Kel Adɣaf des Ifoghas is the Kel Essuk, and within the Iwellemedan, families of the Daoussahak report having performed this function in addition to their imɣad member-families.

& Ali 2014). At the same time, however, I became aware that almost all of the imɣad, inhaden, and ineslemen informants in the interviews had somehow managed to separate out the “of no value” noble clans, their inherent and exclusive use of the Tamashek warrior attributes or descriptors of amashek-imùhoɣ-imajaren.

Said differently, all the castes or guilds of Tuareg communities or kels now herald the descriptors of amashek-imùhoɣ-imajaren even as they reject the higher social placement of those named kels (such as the Kel Ifoghas of northern Mali) who originally represented those warrior-savior images and (theoretically) incorporated them into the constructed communal identity of Tamashek. As I probed tomoost and tagaste with all the Tuareg interviewee groups, I could easily perceive the heightened senses of internal esteem when their claim (however tenuous) of belonging to amashek-imùhoɣ-imajaren is supportively embraced. It is as if all or most of the Kel Tamashek have incorporated amashek-imùhoɣ-imajaren as a standard arch-typology for all Tuareg. These claimants to the central Tuareg identity arch-type never claimed to belong to the few original known and or remaining noble-warrior clans, but rather have distilled that identity arch-type over to the remainder of the larger Tamashek community even as they (lightly) disparage the original, known, and existing warrior kels for not living up to their promise and name.

In Tamashek, the name for a warrior or fighter or protector is imùšex-imùhoɣen-imajaren in the collective, and amashek-imùhoɣ-imajex for the individual (Mali, Algeria, and Niger respectively).<sup>38</sup> From this point forward, for the sake of simplicity, I will use

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<sup>38</sup> As seen in several of the interviews and as written in Tifinaɣ, some Tuareg conjugate amashek as amasheken rather than as imùšex, which is how Heath describes it in his grammar manual for Mali. Because Tamashek is, for all practical purposes, an oral language, communicating within and without of the Kel Tamashek is complicated.

only the Niger variant as it matches up with most of the interviews, but keep in mind that they are all the same word pronounced differently due to the vowel shift. The use of *imajer* or *imajaren*, however, is to describe a person or group in Tamashek, not a function or activity. *Imajaren* is what they are, as much or more than what they do. When the community requires defending from banditry, from rival competing ethnicities, or from the political state in the case of Mali and Niger, *imaghr* or struggle is what the individual and collective do to protect the inner from the invasive outer. The activity of *imaghr*, however, only exists in the Tamashek identity as a part of *ashok*, the adjective of warrior-savior that is characteristic of the Tuareg who has *allok*, the noun of personal honor and only when they perform *ashok* for the benefit of the collective. This sort of selfless service builds *walagan*, or group honor, that ultimately leads to *it'tikhal*, the assured survival of the group with its membership intact.

***Alkhissate wan Razzia*** – Abdurrahman Muhammad (2014)

*The Emoulougane are a people who used to live near the Tamashek, but who are no longer around. The Emoulougane liked to practice the razzia which is an old thing known as raiding another tribe for things they need and also for gaining honor of courage and skill in riding and fighting.*

*This is an Alkhissate story of razzia that should be heard by young Tamashek people to let them know about what the Tamashek did in the past. The Emoulougane people practiced razzia, a form of raiding where men from a village would come to another village and use power to get what they wanted; this is called tarkabte in Tamashek; the men doing razzia are riding fast horses, and*

*they would come and take all the animals and leave the villagers without anything.*

*One day, they came just near a small Tamashek village and some of them make a big noise to inform the village that they are coming. They are getting ready to get into the village to kill and get everything they want. All the people run away from the village and only one of them, a man whose name was Attaher Ibrahim, said no. I will not run; I should go to fight with the raiding group. Attaher got all his war material, such as his Takola, (sword), allough (French lance), and aghar (armor covering).*

*All the village think that it will be finished and Attaher will be killed by the raiders. He make a big noise called a taghirit, and he asked the group if there is any brave man. Attaher said that I need him to come down from his horse and fight with me. All of the raiders came down to fight with Attaher, who made another big taghirit and told them “you raiders are not good fighters because I am alone; all of you want to fight with me.*

*The raiders, shamed, told Attaher to choose one of them to fight. Attaher chose the one who was doing the talking. He cut all of his hands, but Ibrahim continued to fight even with injuries. The raider that he was fighting against, said to everyone, “Ibrahim, I give you the truce because you are fighting even without hands, but you still fighting not giving up.”*

*The raider took Attaher on his horse and they told Attaher and his villagers, come with us, we will never fight with you.*

I introduce the story above from Abdurrahman because it is characteristic of the type of mythical *imaghr* (struggle) that a prototypical *imajer* (warrior) engages in to reach into the archaic typologies of the warrior-savior in Tuareg historical narratives. Notice that the story doesn't denigrate the *Emoulougane* for conducting *razzia*, but instead recognizes the social value to the *touchett* that wins in the gain of martial skills and inner group confidence to take what they need to survive as a last resort. This is because historically, *Tamashek in essuf* (living the traditional life as transhumant, semi-nomadic clans of pastoralists, traders, and raiders) possessed no guarantees of survival between seasons of rain and of drought. Wells and oasis became single points of conflict with too many families and their livestock in competition for too little water to sustain life. During *iban-aman* (drought), famine killed the very young and the very old and thirst drove good men and women insane (Welsh 2014). During the rainy seasons, floods could eliminate an entire *touchett* if it was placed in a poor location and the standing water bred mosquitos, *ashedad id iba* (disease and death).<sup>39</sup> The choice of family survival by *razzia* turned banditry into survival of the fittest guided by complex codes of honor that kept the need for mere physical survival from destroying the humanity, charity, and empathy of those struggling to survive.

Notice the right to raid and the right to counter defend are both established and reinforced along rules of honor, fairness, and courage which can transcend socio-political environments from the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial conditions of chaotic

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<sup>39</sup> *Tamashek touchetts in essuf* can be as simple as two to six families moving every three to six months following the cycles of rain and trading, ensuring that any one well does not become overused and drawn down too close to the bottom where it would become useless. The selection of the *touchett* site is a serious business conducted by the senior heads of families based on years of watching fathers and grandfathers make careful decision about ground slope, wind direction, and the like.



communal life in northern Niger and Mali. The Tuareg clans who make up the armed political organization MNLA, for instance, routinely clash with the semi Islamic-Jihad VEO group Ansar el Din, the openly Islamic-Jihad VEO MUJOA, as well as the Songhai armed political groups such as Ganda Koy. To the United Nations interventionist, the endless clashes can seem as chaotic as was characterized by the French colonists a century ago. In appendix 1 is a three page summarized sampling of conflict incidents in northern Mali and Niger that provide a brief look into the ongoing conflict. Notice that the entries in blue, which denote Tuareg involvement as either victims and/or perpetrators, include a number of incidents of ongoing inter-tribal razzia, as well as defensive operations, offensive operations, and state-building of Azawad as an alternative political state. What is chaotic in the Kel Tamashek is also what is historic in the Tuareg touchett. Even within the Tuareg confederations, razzia continues with incidents such as the violent clash between Daoussahak (part of the Iwellemedan confederation) and the Targhitamout clans this past July in in the Gao region, east of Ménaka. What this means is that the seemingly chaotic nature of the violence in the Sahel still follows a pattern of social construction, social defense, and inter-tribal, inter-clan conflict that pre-dates the French colonization.

### **Psychoanalysis of Kel Tamashek geography, geology, and climate**

A portion of my data collection and analysis relied on the premise that the geography, geology, and climate affect the construction of identity and imprint the cognitive representation of spatial integration of the individual to environment, as well as the realities of time and expectation on social interaction. I was introduced to this perspective as an undergraduate student twenty-five years ago from Stein's (1984) writings on the

psychological effects of spatial representation to the world around us. My first encounter with the power and possibilities of the spatial effects of geography and geology was in the southern Libyan Desert areas of Chad and Darfur, Sudan in 2004 during the genocidal conflict there. I remember thinking that humans could not possibly live in such a place. Filmmaker May Ying Welsh offers a poignant western perspective of the psychological and emotional impact of life in the Sahara and the Sahel when she writes that:

*The physical conditions of Tuareg existence in the Sahara have hardly changed in decades. Even now, sleeping in the Sahara is like lying alone on a boat in the middle of a vast ocean. You are lying in the sand at 2 a.m. when suddenly a primordial wind howls up from infinite corridors of emptiness and time - terrifying in its loneliness, as awesome as the stars in the night sky - to confront you with the essential fact that you are alone in the universe, and everyone you have ever loved will die. If the Sahara can inspire that terrible feeling of cosmic loneliness in an adult, what would it feel like to be a child in this environment who had actually lost their parents?* (Welsh 2014)

Mohammed Bamyeh may have said it best when he wrote, “[t]he desert is a sphere of absolute speechlessness” (1999, 3). Gradually, over the eight months working with the African Union mediating conflict between the tribes at war with each other, I began to perceive a hidden landscape of those communities we were interacting with. Rocks, wadies, and mountains had names, meaning, and the cultural power of identity definition and expression. Understanding Bamyeh’s speechlessness, I think, is a prerequisite for understanding the hidden landscape of the Kel Tamashek of the Sahel.

One day I asked several of my Tuareg informants which part of the Azawar and Aïr Mountain landscape most defined the Tamashek; desert or mountain. Such a seemingly simple question over tea became a raging discussion lasting for nearly a week. The first man I asked answered with authority that it was the Ténéré open desert that so defined




Figure 10: Satellite image of Aïr Massif range, Ténéré Desert, and sand dunes of the Ergs

the “Blue Man of the Sahel.” After the laughter died down, two other men responded that no, it was the mountains more than the desert seas that defined the Tamashek. Because I had just returned from Arlit, Dirku, and Agadez, I knew the magnitude of the terrain they were discussing. The generic words of desert and mountain do not accurately describe what my Tuareg informants were discussing; rather they were debating the psycho-social impacts of the geologic formations of ergs and massifs on the Tamashek community. Beginning with sand, an erg is defined as a “sea of sand” that covers fifty square miles or more of open dunes without noticeable ground cover or rock formations. Called a sea of sand, strong desert winds push the sand into wave like formations of pure sand that from a higher altitude, look like a brown or beige sea of rough waves.


Figures 10 and 11 are satellite images of the Aïr Massif range, a complex of great rock intrusions over 350 miles from north to south. The square labeled “1” is a section of

the Ténéré erg or desert that consists of a massive sea of sand dunes that end at the sheer walls of the Air massif. Notice that in the square labeled “2,” a small section of the endless sand dunes of the Ténéré erg is blown up for size comparison. An individual dune can be the size of a two or three-story house and completely bar all movement across it except for the heartiest of dromedaries (camels). The figure in the photo is a Tuareg nomad named Attouwa who sings tisseewhy and chants eemeyen of Tuareg life in essuf. Climbing a dune can permit spectacular views of hundreds, even thousands of multi-story sand-waves over hundreds of kilometers. The dunes are not static; they move with the wind in slow, but inexorable travel and can eventually wipe out villages, mining operations, wells, and oases. The power of the dunes on nomadic populations is of fascination, fear, and awe. The Tuareg claim to possess an inherited sense of navigation in and around the ergs of the Sahara desert and its Sahel transition zone called *anamood*. This indigenous navigation ability supposedly uses a combination of celestial navigation and inborn spatial awareness of the Sahara and Sahel’s geography to travel across open desert, ergs, and around massifs without losing one’s way even under low visibility.

The massifs, on the other hand, constitute a nearly mythical point of safety and survival for the Tamashek touchetts, historically and still today. As figure 11 shows, the massif is actually a series of flat or concave circular volcanic protrusions that are up to twenty miles in diameter and stand between 1,600 to 3,000 feet in height. The ring dikes are surrounded by basaltic strombolian cones and phreatomagmatic tuff rings with differentiated alkali lavas consisting of plugs and flows of hawaiite and trachyte rock. Within the crevices of the massifs, entire army brigades are said to be able to safely hide from both ground and air observation. The height of its rings establishes a mean

temperature far cooler than the surrounding desert and the granite igneous rock pools and holds vast amounts of water that Tamashek communities such as the Kel Ewey use for agro-pastoralism. The Aïr Massifs of northern Niger, the Adfár des Ifoghas Massifs of northern Mali, and the Hoggar Massifs of southern Algeria are all related geological Precambrian formations of similar structural composition, albeit with significant differences in size and scope.

Where the ergs establish geological barriers to movement that the Tuareg have long since learned to navigate, the massifs provide security, protection, and lifesaving water. Between these two geological features—ergs and massifs that are spread though the largest hot weather desert in the world—we have the context for the analysis of the psychological impact of geology and geography, respectively. Much of the Sahel transition zone consists neither of erg or massif, but of flat semi-arid desert scrub that, during even small amounts of seasonal rainfall, blooms into green fields and valleys of millet and grass. This is the transhumant, semi-nomadic treasure that sustains pastoral life in the desert. But when discussing those geologic parts of Tuareg life that are key to how they identify themselves, the ergs and massifs are of paramount importance in terms of their standalone meanings. Returning to the earlier discussion between my Tuareg



*Figure 11:* Close-up of one of the igneous ring dikes on the NE side of the Aïr Massif

informants, for the two who argued that the massifs were more important aspect of Tuareg identity, their thinking followed lines of protection from invasion and annihilation from external forces. For those informants arguing for the importance of the ergs, their thinking followed lines of mobility and travel necessary for nomadic freedom and the possibilities inherent in trade and transport routes known only to the inner circles of Tamashek imajawen.

Where the largest parts of the Sahel are flat and arid deserts that establish the basis for transhumant life, the ergs and massifs serve as the psychological reference points of awe and wonder that punctuate an otherwise bland landscape. Even as the normal part of the desert provides wells, oasis, and edible fodder for their livestock, it is not exclusive to the Kel Tamashek. Only the ergs and massifs, impenetrable for most other communities, provide a sort of exclusivity that the Tuareg have blended into their historical narrative through their use in trade, travel, protection, and physical defense.<sup>40</sup> Thus it is no surprise that the Kel Tamashek's geographically oriented sub naming conventions would center on important volcanic protrusions in their areas of common habitat; Kel Aïr of the Aïr Massif, Kel Adrar des Ifoghas in Mali, or the Kel Ahaggar of the Hoggar Massif in Algeria. The word *Adrar* (pronounced adrax) is a Tamashek word for rock; thus in Mali they call themselves "People of the Rock of the Nobles." The constructed and ascribed

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<sup>40</sup> In the central Sahel, only the Arab Bedouins and the nomadic Teubou live and travel through ergs and massifs. The Tuareg relationship with Arabs and Teubou is one of respect, competition, and at times cooperation against the sub-Saharan political elites. In northern Niger, the eastern part of the Ténéré desert is the dividing line between the Kel Aïr tribes of the Kel Tamashek and the Teubou tribes that extend well into Chad. Tuareg and Teubou compete fiercely for control of the Niger-Libyan passes like El Salvador Pass.

connection of the Tuareg to their geological inheritance and its placement in their historical narrative and group identity is easily found in their self-naming conventions.

*The psychological and emotional affect of Tuareg life-spaces.* The desert as a sphere constitutes the sum of life spaces for the Kel Tamashek. The desert writ large, with its ergs, massifs, and arid plains establishes geographical boundaries for these geological landscapes that constitute a closed reality for the Tuareg's historical narrative. These boundaries are demarcated by a "perennially visible enigma, the *horizon*, [which] sets the boundaries of knowable nature" (Bamyeh 1999, 3). These boundaries of the horizon create an ideology of movement that both sustains a Tuareg nomadic character and reinforces the presence of the boundaries by the sheer tyranny of distance. Tamashek tomoost id tagaste (identity and culture) can only exist in the knowable space in this closed geographically bounded system of extreme geological features as the desert is, to the single man and the single family; inescapable. And "[w]hat is allowed to inhabit that space later in life is prefigured" by the inherited and constructed narratives and relationships of Tuareg life to each other and to their physical environment (Stein 2008, 19).

Since this physical environment is inescapable, it becomes their "normative destiny," which the creation of an ideology of movement or "nomadology" sustains by the continued denigration of an unobtainable alternative (Bamyeh 1999, 53; Fischer 2010, 12). The denigration of any alternative existence outside of the geographical boundaries of the horizon supports the imprinting of cognition and narrative with a moral exaltation of "the timeless ethics of the...(nomadic) lifestyle" (Bamyeh 1999, 53) This moral exaltation establishes for the Tuareg, a part of their narrative and perhaps even as part of

their cognition, that they have actually chosen their geographical boundaries of endless horizons with its sanctuaries of erg and massif. This determination of choice is more than a mere historical footnote in an oral narrative. It is an orientation of thought that permeates spiritual belief (usually Sufi) and poetic expression in art, literature, and music. Through these forms of cultural expression, the psychology of geography and time bounded by horizons and energized by movement becomes pedagogy of nomadism as much as an ideology of identity. This passage from the literature of Ibrahim Al-Koni gives us a visceral feel for the emotionality of this pedagogy and identity:

*When the creator made the soul, He assigned for it three frontiers and set it within three prisons: time, place and the body. Any who attempted to break free from these was justly cursed and consigned to perditions, since the Creator had hallowed them and made them a destiny for every creature. Any attempt to pass beyond them was disobedience to His will. He who seeks to leave his appointed place has sought to leave his body. He who seeks to leave his body has sought to leave time. He who seeks to leave time has laid claim to immortality. And he who lays claim to immortality blasphemes against his fate, presuming to be above the miracle of creation, to compete with the divine. And he who competes with the divine is consigned to perdition (Al-Koni 2002, 100).*

The power of this pedagogy lies in its hold over ashok, the character display of power, violence, and savior archetypes of the imajaren. The masculinity displayed by imajaren of great ashok bears little resemblance to that of modern, western, urbanized counterparts. The battles that imajaren face are as much against the raw violence of the desert as against other men. The line between thirst and insanity, for instance, is



approached at least once in the life of every imajaxen, with those who lose suffering almost as much as their loved ones who must watch their descent into madness. While the psychological and emotional effect of the erg, massif, and lure of horizons create nearly mystical imaginings within all Tuareg, this is only possible because of the sheer contrast between the breathless spirituality of the natural beauty of the Ténéré against the sheer terror of iban-aman (drought-thirst).

Real imajaxen don't merely fight against other men; they fight against their own all too human weakness to surrender to the violence of the world around them and the resulting timogoutar (helplessness hardship). This pedagogical refusal to surrender against all odds is a central part of ashok, allok, walagan, and it'tikhal, which are in turn only possible because of the geography and geology of the Sahel.

*Spirituality and ideology of movement.* In discussions I have had with Kel Tamashek people, a constantly reoccurring theme was their need for *alhoria*, or liberty-freedom. Taken out of context, this is translated into political and social freedoms. But taken in the context of an ideology of movement that sustains the Tuareg nomadic ideal, *alhoria* becomes a plea for the freedom of continued movement outward to and from the limits of their bounded frames of geological and geographic reference to the horizon. Moreover, the quest for *alhoria* or freedom from "territorial confinement stands as a sole and self-evident indicator of honor, in no need of further elaboration as to why it should be regarded as such...[and] is a common motif in nomadic narratives" (Bamyeh 1999, 60).

The Tuareg concept of *alhoria* from constricted sedentary life shares deep roots with Bedouin badawah of the Arab tribes in the Middle East and North Africa. Together, such nomadic lifestyles that are bounded by the geography of the horizon and the geology of

the desert, erg, and massif possess a spirituality based on nature and tribal interconnectedness that Islam's jihad was meant to replace with the divinely revealed knowledge of the Quran. The "spirituality of...[nomadic desert life] is rooted in their pride of survival, willingness to avenge any wrong committed on their members, and protection of their 'chivalric code, which, by giving meaning to their lives and preventing them from succumbing to despair in . . . harsh conditions, performed the essential function of religion.'<sup>43</sup>" (Christian 2013, 10). This desert form of natural spirituality grows out of the geology and geography of its tribal habitats where base survival in an inescapable, unchanging climate served as a normative destiny.

"Austere as it was, Bedouin life seemed inescapable...<sup>49</sup> The initial Bedouin spirituality that exalted the timeless ethics of survival in desert nomad life was reinforced as those tribes adapting to sedentary life created out-group competition. As the alternative to nomadic life took root, Bedouin spirituality took on a moral dimension of condemnation against the sedentary challenge to the idealization of fatalistic acceptance of what dahr (epochal time) would bring with certainty. If sedentary society could build towns, store water and food, and create defenses against the acquisition raid, then change was possible (Christian 2013, 11).

This same competition between tmidrrt Tamashek in essuf (nomadic Tamashek life) and their related communities in Agadez, Tahoua, Timbuktu, or Niamey is evident in the slight change of how essuf is used as a pejorative manner by the town dwellers for their families in essuf, but used with pride by those members who remain in essuf. For both nomadic and sedentary members of the Kel Tamashek, however, the imprint of

geography and geology on their worldview is spoken the same: in terms of historical boundaries that are “out there” and the security and safety of geological features. This imprint establishes an intricate balance between the boundaries of geography (horizons) and sanctuaries of geology (erg and massif) that carries over into Tuareg nomadology of Tamashek members in city and *essuf*. Hélène Claudot-Hawad calls this imprint “a philosophy, a manner of interpreting reality and acting upon it” (2006, 658). Consider the following conversation that I observed during ethnographic data collection, between a Tuareg father and his six-year-old daughter, Zaynab:<sup>41</sup>

*Zaynab: Aba, mimos essuf?*

*Father: All around us...the sand, the mountains, and even the sky.*

*Zaynab: Aba, miniawa ad'ra'?*

*Father: they are “out there” in essuf.*

*Zaynab: Aba, miniawa emarr'wan?*

*Father: they are “out there” in essuf.*

Little Zaynab was trying to understand spatial representation of her world that consisted of the sacred *essuf* against the time representation of beloved *emarr'wan* (deceased grandparents) whom she knew only from photos and stories told by her parents and siblings. The father's rote depiction of *essuf*, *ad'ra'* (mountains), and *emarr'wan* as all being “out there” at the boundaries of geography and geology combined the natural into the sacred and spiritual place of safety and reunion with deceased family members. The protective massif then becomes the metaphysical haven of love past where at

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<sup>41</sup> From field notes taken during ethnographic observation at the home of Agalih Hamidoun, Niamey, Niger, 2014.

moments of peril (physical and psychic), offers protective embrace of spiritual sanctuary. Even if the protective embrace of the Air Massif is never needed for a particular Tuareg or touchett, the possibilities that they possess in having this sanctuary creates layers of narrative lines of identity expression and create a certain sense of emboldened esprit de corps of the inner Tamashek to the outer non-Tamashek.

Similarly, a Tuareg may never need to escape across impenetrable ergs with dunes as high as mythical castles, but the secret knowing that one possesses the wherewithal to make such a fateful escape from harm or worse, imprisonment, creates existential breathing room for identity definition and expansion. With defense against immediate fear of physical annihilation comes a freedom toward the construction of historical narrative as a reflection of shared dreams and archetypal imaginations (Stein 1994). This supports my anecdotal observations of Tamashek dialogue suggesting that when threatened, Tamashek families (especially in essuf) are more likely to seek safety and sanctuary in flight outward to erg and massif. But their sub-Saharan contemporaries (Hausa, Songhai, etc.) are more likely to seek safety and sanctuary inward to urban congregation of ethnic relatedness.

***Tilk'awi Tamashek fil Essuf*** (Muhammad, 2014)

*A Tamashek man lived with all his tilk'awi (family) and kinsmen.*

*All of them are nomads.*

*Where they are, there is nothing for their animals; ((Iban Aman)) ((Iban Soudare))*

*He ask all of the Tamashek to come and decide to move and look for another place for the animals and for them.*

*If anyone thinks that this place is bad, then they would have to move.*

*Some of the other Tamashek families do not agree, and the Tamashek man decides to go alone with his family because, they refuse to go with him.*

*He prepared his leaving, then he took his wife and his son and began his journey to a new place.*

*He and his family travelled far and eventually found a good place, where there were mountains and some fresh green places for the animals to graze.*

*He built a small ahakeytt (home) for his wife and his son who was at that time, six years old.*

*He goes behind the animals for all the day; after the day; the night comes and the Tamashek man stayed to protect the animals.*

*The place that he had built his house and where his wife and son were living happened to also be a place where lions hunted; a camp for lions.*

*The lion attacked his family and killed the Tamashek man's wife.*

*When the Tamashek man returned to his newly built home, he felt that there was something wrong, that something bad had happened.*

*He was looking for his wife but he could only find his son hiding between two big rocks.*

*The Tamashek man spent all the night thinking about what he was going to do.*

*Early in the morning, he crept up behind the lion that had attacked his family and killed his wife and fell on the lion, killing him.*

*The Tamashek man cried and said, any animal or person who harms my wife or child; I know that I will do the same to him that was done to me.*

In the tisseewhy (oral story) above of a nomadic Tamashek family told by Abdurrahman Mohammad, the protagonist feels the need to move ever outward toward cleaner pastures and fresh water sources, even against the fearful unwillingness of his fellow clansmen. The rocks that his son used as shelters from harm are called adfaʔ or adraʔ, the Tamashek word for rock and the same word for massif. The Tamashek man's ability to track the lion across the desert and kill the one who had killed his wife signifies his confidence in his in-born cognitive ability of anamood or desert navigation and his prowess as an imajaʔen, or warrior who is beholden to no one but the demands of ashok (warrior-savior), allok (personal honor to avenge a wrong) and his role in it'tikhal (building a stronger, more resilient Tamashek touchett through courage and adherence to the principals of imuʂeʔ (freeborn noble who struggles for honor). By combining Tamashek tisseewhy, eemeyen, and a context based rendition of the Tamashek language, I can connect elements of Tuareg identity, cultural expression and even cognitive imprinting to the specific geology and geography that has ruled their life for several millennia.

*Psychology of time, waiting, expectation, and hope.* The geology and geography (the erg, massif, and boundaries of horizon) of the Tuareg habitat affect psychological organization and cognitive thought by their influence over the development of thought patterns relating to spatial orientation and representation, but also to cognitive conception of time awareness, ideations of waiting, expectation, hope and the construction and use of language. "What is strange in the desert is speaking, thinking in words, dialogizing, communicating" (1999, 3). What is also strange in the desert is waiting, expecting, hoping. There are few places on earth that change so little as the open desert. The

movement of dunes is a process so slow that an entire generation may be needed to visually, physically ascertain their change of place within the erg. The massifs have lain in place, gathering water since the Precambrian era millions of years past. Scheduled change does not occur in the psychological geography and geology of the Kel Tamashek.

The seasonal bloom of grass and millet after a rainfall; the angry boiling of a wall of sand a thousand feet high during the Shamal (north wind sand-storm); the arrival of a distant clan-related touchett in the sphere of one's spatial awareness; a long distance caravan of either camels or motorized vehicles laden high with goods that are legal and illegal, or licit and illicit; these are events that mark the passage of life, not events to be expected or anticipated (Bamyeh 1999). I experienced this change of how humans record time in the desert when we traveled through northern Niger, Chad, and western Sudan. We found that we did not track time by hours, days, or even months. Rather, the physical markers of change such as sunrise, sunset, rain, and darkness were the primary elements of environmental stimuli that allowed us to perceive change. I found that using my wristwatch became useless as the passage of the day by hourly rate bore no reasonable usefulness to our progress. There were no milestones from which we could map speed and time to predict destination arrival. In fact, we learned that predicting anything in the desert outside of the sun and moon is of little use. All of our intelligence predictions about the movements of the caravans (legal and illegal) have eluded both the French and the United States military systems despite the most advanced of technological systems. Our Tuareg hosts informed us lightly that we always leave on our journey when we were ready, and always arrive at our destinations when we arrive, and not a moment before.

The nomadic Tuareg does not wait with expectancy for caravans, rain, the Shamal, or the bloom of grass and millet. The vastness of geography, the purity of the geology, and the unpredictability of the climate preclude waiting, expecting, or anticipation. A Tuareg in *essuf* does not make plans with his uncle to meet him next Tuesday at 4 o'clock in the afternoon at the fourth dune to the left of a certain part of the massif outcropping. To expect such a meeting is to accept that someone is in active control outside of the waiting person; that someone will be acting on or against the waiting person, for good or for bad, but in opposition or defiance of, the power of the desert, the *erg*, the *massif*.

Since the nomadic Tuareg is sovereign unto himself, there is no one to act against him lest it be by organized human threat for which the *touchett* will answer to with equal or greater force. Therefore, and even in battle, the events and their direction of occurrence as glory or *arr* (defeat) are known (believed) to be mere chance beyond mortal control. Like the ancient Bedouins, Tuareg *iss'saan* (comprehend) that "death is like the blundering of a blind camel; - him whom he meets he kills, and he whom he misses lives and will become old" (Zuhayr 520-609 CE). Chance is to be accepted, trusted even, because then all are equal in the *tidiurt* (joy) or *aakshoud* (sadness) found within the horizons of Tuareg boundaries.

Where desert establishes alternative meanings of time by reducing (in comparison with western cognitive concepts) the usefulness and dependence of waiting, expectation, and hope of change, it also affects the usefulness and dependence of speech, communication, and language. There are no small man-made structures in the desert; lest they would be covered and lost with the first heavy falls from the Shamal sandstorms. As my research and training team moved across the Sahel, every rise brought a new vista;



the same as the first. Only our Tuareg guides could distinguish between the wadies, ridges, massifs, and ergs that we passed on our journey around the Air Mountains. There are a few large man-made structures in the Kel Tamashek's Sahel that consist of uranium mining sites with machine made piles of land so high and wide that they can nearly compete with some of the smaller massifs. But whether one is standing amidst the rolling dunes of the ergs, or climbing amidst the massive walls and crevices of the massifs, or contemplating the enormity of what modern mining has created in the town of Arlit, the effect is the same; spheres and objects of speechlessness.

*Psychology of speech, language, and memory.* The sheer size of the natural and man-made geology in the Sahel precludes visible, noticeable change for those who occupy the boundaries within. The vast differences in size perspectives from the six-foot height of man to the sheer walls of dune waves and rock face massifs elude description to those not present. Thus since the only way to perceive such massive spectacles is by direct sight and experience, the act of discussing and or describing that which can't be described is an exercise in futility. One doesn't point out changes of the seasons because there aren't any. One doesn't point out the coming of the Shamal except to warn others to cover and mark the location of their belongings lest they be eliminated by the volumes of sand that flows down as the Shamal passes over. To comment on the Shamal as it comes over would be like commenting on the immediate approach of a tidal wave or tornado from which there is no place to hide; wasted breath and lost words. Even in normal times, during the day when the land skin temperature can approach 70 degrees Celsius, the use of language opens the airway passages to searing heat for little purpose as it is difficult to listen and comprehend in such extremes.

The Tamashek word for forget is *itawaex* and for the act of remember the word is *assam'drn*. The nomadic geographical boundaries of horizon coupled with the geological absolutes of plains, ergs, and massifs affect the construction of memory and control the rate of forgetfulness as part of the Tuareg psychological organization and emotional conjugation. Tamashek in essuf construct the traditional *ahakeytt*, or home, which is usually a series of tent structures designed to support one immediate family. Each *ahakeytt* encampment would be separated by short distances from the other extended families for privacy, but not so far as to risk security.

The memories of birth, growth, marriage, and death that occurs at each *ahakeytt* encampment is memorialized by stories and poems rather than physical objects that serve as manifestations of loss or reminders of past members whose presence is no more. The ideology of movement sustains within the Tamashek cultural construct, an unwillingness to surround themselves with endless physical manifestations of loss that cannot be packed onto camel or car. Eventually, the desert covers all that is not carried from *ahakeytt* to *ahakeytt* leaving no trace of the temporariness of the human presence.

The word *assam'drn* means to remember, a mental act that occurs at a specific time and place in dialogue, *eemeyen*, and *tisseewhy*. I was unable to find a separate Tamashek noun for remembrance or memorialize as a thing to be discussed separately from the person or the event being remembered. I speculate that the Tuareg have no need for such a noun, so ingrained is their forms of speech to the demands of existential remembrance.

The ideology of movement towards the psychological boundaries of their geographical existence, the horizon, allows the Kel Tamashek to construct their memories of past and present into *tisseewhy* and *eemeyen* which are carried and refined

by constant replay and growth-adaptation by renewed connections of the disparate families and clans all remembering common past losses and events. Left unsaid are the left behind memories too painful to bear continuous witness to if they had been memorialized into physical markers permanently as a part of their daily life. These painful memories the geology of the plains, erg, and massif will clean; erasing with wind and covering with sand. Such a fate of forced memorialization of unwanted hurt is left to the sedentary who are unable to outrun their painful past. The ideology of movement protects its adherents by allowing for new pastures untouched by pain, shame, and loss.

**The psychological organization and emotional conjugation of the Tamashek touchett**

*Locus of member control; internal versus external.* Like other rural, transhumant, nomadic communities that I have worked with in Chad, Darfur Sudan, and the Somali areas of Ethiopia, the Kel Tamashek possess a psychological organization that is profoundly sociocentric. Central to their sociocentric psychological organization is a complex locus of Tuareg member control that is external to the individual and resides in an outward web of relationships at the family, clan-touchett, and ultimately, geographical level of social structure. It is more complex than other sedentary agnate or cognate communities because of the transhumant and semi-nomadic nature of the communal life

cycle.<sup>42</sup> In contrast to the (western) egocentric, the sociocentric person remains a deeply integral part of the family structure of function and identity (Lindholm 2008).<sup>43</sup>

Egocentric western societies are characterized by diffusion of the operating structure of the family. The children attend schools, sports, clubs, and other extra-curricular activities that are pre-planned with parental involvement, but executed by the individual child. This requires egocentric parents to instill within their children, an ability to act independently, choose between conflicting positive desires, and possess a willingness to accept rebuke or reward for their efforts, all in the absence of parental control. This is accomplished by the augmented development of the egocentric child's id-superego-ego. A poor choice on the part of the child between the competing demands of the id-superego creates psychic pain in/on/of the ego; this we refer to as feelings of guilt, which have a powerful effect on people's actions (Hartmann 1952). In the presence of the pain of guilt, the child is taught to balance their desires for pure pleasure (id) against their desire for higher levels of recognition, belonging, and acceptance (super-ego) won from their peers and superiors as they embrace and emulate archetypal behavior that establishes the norms of each particular group (Sandler 1960).

In contrast, the Tuareg family structure trends toward the growth of mutually interdependent identities where ego development is partially dependent on the functioning and interaction of sibling and family members who share a common

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<sup>42</sup> Within the Kel Tamashek, both systems of agnate (through the male blood lines) and cognate (through the female blood lines) inheritance of property and rights transmission are used. The ifoghas of the Kel Adfa' des Ifoghas in northern Mali and the Imohox of the Kel Rely in southern Algeria both have historical uses of cognate systems of inheritance (Keenan 1977). The remainder of the kels however, especially the imyad and inhaden, report the use of agnatic strategies for most of their inheritance.

<sup>43</sup> I explain sociocentric and egocentric as poles within which all psychological construction occurs. Where egocentricity in its purest form is perfect individuation with the resulting development of the ego

interactive responsibility towards each other. In Tamashek households, conversations with children possess far fewer sentences that begin with the word “I.” Tamashek children do refer to themselves, but far more often in the context of family or group think. Embarrassing or hurting a Tamashek family member would cause the same or even greater degrees of discomfort to other members not out of sheer love, but because of the implied failure to protect and defend the whole. The development of such an integrated cognitive and emotional construction within the family would logically require individual family member identities that are more blended in terms of ego definition and action. They would naturally think less in terms of individuated goals and activities and think (and feel) more in terms of inclusive collective goals and accomplishments; walagan and it’tikhal or group honor and group health.

The sociocentric family and touchett of the Kel Tamashek are characterized by this inclusive operating structure of the family. The children attend schools and other extra-curricular activities within the confines of an extended family where the concept of emarr’wan is extended to all or most blood and marriage related adults within a touchett. This extension of emarr’wan (parentage) requires all adults to look after the children of the corporate whole without distinction to paternity or maternity. The following story is an example of this extension of parental responsibility and its enforcement by the touchett community.

***Tilk’awi Tamashek Ziziritt*** (Muhammad 2014)

*This is a story about a divided or torn (ziziritt) Tamashek family, a story of a young boy who went to live with his uncle a younger brother of his father, at the*

*behest of his father who could not care for the boy. His uncle took in his brother's son and took care of his nephew as if he were his own son.*

*The uncle paid for the boy's education, gave him a home and all that he needed to live. The uncle took care of him until he finished his studies and then the nephew gets a job; he gets a promotion. The boy get money from his job and from his promotion. When the boy gets a vacation, he goes to his family's village and goes to see his father. His uncle gets angry, very angry.*

*The boy's uncle says that it's not the boy's fault, it is his father's fault because he is the one who is supposed to tell the boy that I as his uncle am his first father because I do everything for him. The act of the boy choosing his father over his caretaker uncle divided the family.*

*Neither side was talking to the other side because of the bad feelings on both sides. The boy's real father, the older brother, subsequently had a naming ceremony (like baptism) for a new child that he and his wife bore. The people of the older brother's village asked him why his younger brother didn't come to the naming ceremony, one of the most important events in the family. The older brother tried to hide the truth, but they besieged him and he said that he and his younger brother had a small problem that somehow became a big problem.*

*The older brother tried to explain but the people of his village judged that he had wronged his younger brother. The villagers of the older brother told him that he must take all his family to the home of his younger brother and apologize to him; ask him for his forgiveness despite the fact that he is the older and his brother is*

*the younger. This he must do because he must protect their family, not breaking it, staying in contact; that all other things are not as important as the family.*

Notice that the boy's father doesn't tell his touchett to mind their own business; they and all of the Tuareg members are the business of all the touchett despite the father's superiority in age to his younger brother. Just as the children guided by an external locus of control that is shared amongst all family members (siblings, cousins, and the like), so are adults guided by their peers and superiors within the extended family and the touchett and functions as part of the indigenous system of justice and conflict resolution. Instead of the father being labeled as an amaelxon (worthless or wrongdoer), he is given correction by the collective external locus of control of the touchett who wield authority through the power of inclusion and alienation. In an egocentric society, the amaelxon father would have his guilt or innocence judged against what he knew or should have known the rules of society to be.

In the sociocentric society, the group takes on the role of social arbiter on a minute-by-minute basis to ensure that conflict is always resolved at the lowest level of social organization. The power of the touchett as social arbiter is through their authority to include or alienate. Both inclusion and alienation are sliding scales that can elevate a member up to near prototypical status or alienate a recalcitrant member slightly or outward to complete exile. As I will explore in the later sections on trauma, alienation results in shame, the one primal emotion that cannot be shared as a method of amelioration. The difference between the two forms of discipline (guilt and shame) is that guilt is sharp psychological pain that the mind produces within its own estimation of itself (Baumeister R. F. 1997; Elsass 1997). Shame is sharp psychological pain that the

mind produces from its estimation of its role or placement with other human beings (Gilligan 1996; Scheff & Retzinger 1991). Most often, guilt is related to one's own actions that have been found lacking or unacceptable, while shame is related to the quality of the self to be included within the core group from whose identity the self identifies with existentially (Edinger 1992; Gilligan 1996).

Where egocentric communities promote individuation of its members' personal identity, sociocentric communities of the Kel Tamashek promote collectivization of their members' personal identity at the family unit. This is how a Tuareg practices ashok, thereby earning allok, which builds walagan, and contributes to the all-important it'tikhal (practices archetypal Tuareg warrior-savior principals, earns personal honor, builds family/group honor and contributes to a strong and resilient Tamashek community). The Tuareg self is deeply enmeshed within the collective whole. It is not the individual Tuareg that flexes outside the family to achieve development and growth, but rather the family as a whole that seeks to grow and develop emotionally and intellectually achieving it'tikhal. This explains for example, the use of Hamidoun's given name inside the home, but the use of his family name (Agalih) outside the home as a continuous projection of the family identity over the individual. The pride of family walagan is borne on the name, Agalih, and as Hamidoun grows his family, fortunes, and exploits, he practices ashok and earns allok.

Sociocentric Tuareg family members see themselves as a sort of corporate inner circle where how to think and what to think are collective, group activities. Adults and children alike are inculcated with external mechanisms of group control based on collective responsibility sustained by systems of alienation and inclusion with emotional conjugates



of shame and pride (Leyendecker et al. 2002; Scheff & Retzinger 1991). Continuing on with Hamidoun Agalih's family as an example, Zaynab (10), Ayesha (8), Fatimah (6), and Mohammed (5) all receive steady external signals of extremely subtle shifts of social placement and roles within the family unit that gradually increase with age and ability. These steady but very subtle signals from Ghoumar Aghalih (Hamidoun's wife and the children's mother) and Hamidoun allow the four children to interact and bond with an ethos laden interconnectedness of shared identity that is advanced as a group rather than as individuals.

Similarly, outside the home, Hamidoun Agalih's interactions with members of his Daoussahak clan operate in the same fashion. Just as Zaynab provides signals of greater or lesser affirmation to her younger siblings that is accepted and passed further down, Hamidoun's brothers, cousins, uncles, and living emarr'wan (parents, grandparents, great-grandparents) provide similar signals that guide Hamidoun's placement in society and help him structure his socio-economic prospects to raise up continuously within the extended family clan. Such signals may also be present in egocentric families and clans, but what is different is the lessening of the individual agency that enhances the sociocentric connection. Each Tamashek person's sense of self is not only sustained, but formed by the struggle over alienation and inclusion within family and clan. "Answers to the questions, 'Who am I?' and 'Where do I belong?' are forged in the crucible of shame and pride" (Kaufman G. P. 1996, 5). With the Tuareg family unit remaining a discrete whole, there is little need for the parents to assiduously arm their child with those individual judgment and choice skills so necessary in an egocentric society.

Very quickly after getting to know Agalih, Abdoulaye, and Salamatou's families, I was able to perceive these positive aspects inherent in their Tamashek families that provided deeper nurturing environments for their children and protected them from having to face ethical dilemmas, especially at so early an age. Without this need for heightened individual agency in order to survive, the identity, or existential "I Am" of the child is left in a state of enhanced identification with their siblings and parents creating that ethos laden atmosphere that was openly visible and celebrated in ceremony and memorialization. My learning process within my hosts' families involved meals, stories, and games that were conducted to teach "Patrick" how to speak Tamashek.

From watching how Zaynab, for instance, interacted with Ayesha and how both interacted with their mother Ghoumar, I noticed an enhanced or shared basis of sibling and familial identity. In nearly every Tuareg family that I was able to interact with, I found a heightened perceptual awareness between family members' actions as well as mental and emotional states. They constantly watched each other, maintaining a steady heightened awareness of not merely physical location but emotional states, verbal and nonverbal communication. The communication they passed between each other appeared to inform thought, action, and emotion as well as acceptable behavior in the house and in front of strangers. This internal focus inward to the interior of the family seemed to create a resiliency towards perceived negative outward stimuli not vetted through the affirming whole of the family and touchett.

The significance of this developmental difference in sociocentric structure (from western based egocentric organization) is that each member's activities are expected to be guided and controlled by the family membership; that there is an inherent duty amongst

members to care for and safeguard each other even from their own actions. When an egocentric child commits a fault, the parents look to that child and ask, “Why did you do that?” When Hamidoun’s child Ayesha commits a fault, he and Ghoumar look to Zaynab and ask why did you let her do that? This then establishes a relationship of duty on Anisha to not hurt Zaynab by her wrong actions and engenders proactive participation by Zaynab in the minute life of Anisha. While even egocentric western families practice this type of communal or collective responsibility for the interior members, in sociocentric societies, the degree is simply greater and this is far less development of individual agency.

The external locus of member control places the burden of choice and action between right and wrong in the hands of the family and touchett level of social organization. This serves to further bind the touchett together and make it harder to fail. The Tamashek family member isn’t asked to independently decide what is right or wrong; ethical choice is a group process more than an individual struggle. He or she is informed, guided, and directed to make that right decision by the family and touchett they are part of. At each level of social organization, each member participates in decisions, but responsibility is diffused amongst an intimate set of relationships (Lindholm 2008). This can create a placement or differential of esteem between members where family and clan members with greater seniority provide or send signals of approval for conduct or communication that enhances builds walagan and increases it’ tikhhal. When the signal sent is disapproving of conduct or communication, the social bond between the family members is threatened and the reprovved member may feel slight alienation and resulting shame. When the disciplining pain of shame is acknowledged and the reasons respected, the point is made,

and the two parties return to the pre-conflict position. When the disciplining shame of alienation is repressed by the receiver and/or the reasons for disapproval and alienation are not respected, not understood, or the alienating position of the shamed person is not one of choice, a tight circle of alienation, shame, and rage can arise with the power to split family and touchett.

*Communication, meaning, and historical narrative in the Tamashek family.* Two sociological descriptors of sociocentric characteristics that appear in egocentric literature are the “shame based society” and the “high context communication society” (Chua & Gudykunst 1987). Of the two, my most readily observed aspect of Tuareg sociocentric family and touchett was their development and use of high levels of context in communication and meaning. Communication in high contexts is the ability of a closely relational set of participants to use a common knowledge of meaning and intimately shared experience to reduce the volume of verbal and non-verbal language while still achieving a level of understanding higher than that of an egocentric (and therefore low context) community (Martin & Nakayama 2000). As part of their sociological structure, Tamashek family members and community members tend toward the use of collective action for as many creative activities as possible. In his novel of Arab life, Abdelrahman Munir describes western visitors’ reaction to Arab clansmen swarming to complete a task than only one of them really needed to do (Munif 1988).

Whether cleaning, cooking, repairing, gardening, or nearly any pleasant or unpleasant form of labor or activity, family or community members within the touchett seek to collectively participate in most activities that support the collective as those activities are the context of family and clan conversations now and in the future. Work and

responsibility in Tuareg society are not broken down into individual actions, but rather always remain a family or group activity. While training northern Niger soldiers in Arlit this past winter for instance, my Special Forces training teams would become exasperated when they found that half of each squad (especially if they were related by blood or touchett) would seek to clump together during missions rather than remaining spread out three to five meters. My training team was initially puzzled—were they lazy or afraid to be alone? The sociocentric person is not lazy, I explained to my Army trainers, nor are they any less afraid of danger than their egocentric counterparts. Collective action is how they build and maintain high levels of communal context out of which flows an ethos of communal psychological and emotional relationships (Munif 1988).

The context that the Tuareg gain from their collectivization of physical activity allows for a form of communication that western guests are unprepared for. I brought several Department of Defense (DoD) civilian guests from Washington D.C. to Abdoulaye's house at his invitation. We spent the day before shopping for his wife who was cooking for the group, helped by her niece and oldest daughter. My western dinner guests were joined by two of Abdoulaye's brothers and their wives and children for a sizeable dinner party, all splayed out on the floor of their modest house on the outskirts of Niamey. My western guests quickly became the center of attention, and the rapid conversation that flowed in Tamashek, English, and French was quite overwhelming to them, so they reported to me the following day. The guests were buffeted by overflowing and seemingly cross-current conversations that consisted of fragments of sentences rapidly finished by each other with yet additional family members chiming in with almost indecipherable tangents to the story despite the plentitude of translation available

(Abdoulaye and his brothers are all Army Special Forces interpreters). What was indecipherable was not the words, but the context that gave all their words meaning and depth to a degree that allowed for the communication of concepts that are on the surface, structural accounts of events and conversations, but that are also deeply laden with the texture of lived experience.<sup>44</sup>

Tuareg community and communication is deeply emotional even as it is publicly reserved. The emotionality appears to be derived from the rich inner life of family and clan and can be seen in tisseewhy and eemeyen stories where love of family is tested against the struggle for survival and coping with loss and grief. The reserve of their verbal and nonverbal communication can be seen in their (at time exaggerated perhaps) customary body language, where riding a mount or walking is done so with a calm, unhurried demeanor of quiet, dignified pride. On several occasions, my Tuareg informants pointed out ongoing behavior of Hausa, Zarma, or Bambara children and adults as being silly, unreserved, and shameful in expression and openness. Reviewing my recorded video sessions with Tuareg men and elders, I realized they demonstrated a commonality of non-verbal body language when speaking that was characterized by rigid posture; gentle laughs and smiles, but never hysterical laughter; and hand gestures that kept the hands always open but in close proximity in steeple clasps, or palm over hand

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<sup>44</sup> The structure and texture of lived experiential memory follows Creswell's (2007) replacement of Patton's (1990) "how" (structure) people experience events and "what" (texture) people experience phenomenologically. Where the structure is the recounting of the physical event devoid of meaning, causation, or emotion, the texture is the cognitive and emotional reliving of the event as it was experienced and consists of received visual, audible, tactile, and olfactory stimuli combined with internal cognitive functions of memory, awareness, and imagination to create a mental object of the event that may or may not fully match the structure. Together, structure and texture of lived experience constitutes the participants' perception of the reality they have experienced and is the "meaning-intention or meaning fulfillment" of that experience (Husserl 2001, 167).

with fingers together and extended, almost in a sensual, slightly effeminate manner. At first glance, such non-verbal body language as part of their communication seemed to attempt to fulfill by a stereotypical pedagogical behavior to communicate a “noble-like” archetype. And while this may still be the case, many of those Tuareg who demonstrated such elegant non-verbal body language were, in fact, nomadic seniors of the Tuareg community who lived quite humble existences with varying levels of economic placement and social positions of authority.

During many interviews with some elder Tuareg informants such as Mohamed, their *tisseewhy* and *eemeyen* were told when wearing traditional Tuareg clothing complete and using elegant hand gestures to emphasize points in the story or poem. Alternatively, when I worked with the *Iferouāne* nomad Attouwa to listen to and record his *tisseewhy* and *eemeyen*, he dressed in a combination of traditional and western dress and demonstrated his elegance not in hand gestures, but in defiance of time and nature. During the onset of a *Shamal*, for instance, Attouwa continued to prepare his traditional Tuareg tea while the rest of us took shelter in our vehicles. Only when Attouwa was finished making his tea and stowing his teapot did he leave the marginal protection of a sun-blasted tree stump and join us out of the eighty-mile-per-hour winds. His demonstrated attitude remained one of an *imajaren* who was ingrained to practice the imperatives of *ashok* despite any level of natural or manmade challenge. For the Tuareg, it seems as if part of their existential meta-message learned from childhood was an elegant defiance of nature and man that was to be seen in their body language communication whether that be walking through the *Ténéré*, leading animals along Tillyberry Road in Niamey, or teaching young

Tamashek children how to talk with elegant hand gestures; archetypes of *elaell* (noble man) and high character.

Dialogue in a Tamashek home consists of intimate, complex communication where single words and phrases carry tremendous meaning, as they are intimately associated with past collective experience. Tamashek families in their touchett transform their spatial sociological structure into vast machinations of complex communication that fulfill their psychological and emotional needs to a very high degree. Where my western DoD guests at first perceived Abdoulaye and his family to have a minimalist life existence void of the trappings of individual modes of engagement, toward the end of the night they were beginning to perceive the superhighways of communication and meaning imbedded in the existing sociological infrastructure all around them. For Abdoulaye and his extended family, their high context life establishes a commonality of meaning and thought, allowing them to have far less (unnecessary) verbalization of feelings, attitudes, and the formulation of ideas.

As I watched the western DoD guests interact with their Tuareg hosts, I could easily see how the sociocentric and egocentric forms of sociological structure presented clear and clinical differences between psychological organization, expression and emotional conjugation. As I work primarily within conflict communities, this clinical difference becomes of high value importance in understanding how traumatized communities process loss, victimization, anger, shame, and damage to their society by man-made and natural disasters. Both systems have their strengths and weaknesses yet each has the potential to respond to external trauma in complex and nuanced expressions that the



humanitarian, peacekeeping and stability operations must be able to make sense of (Bhugra & Becker 2005).

## **Chapter 5: Data Presentation & Analysis of Conditions of Adaptive Failure and Trauma**

*“Therapy is not about relieving suffering, it’s about repairing one’s relationship to reality” (Kalsched 1996, 100)*

### **Kel Tamashek: communities in transition**

*The context of life in the Sahara and its Sahel transition zone.* When I travel through the Somali clan and Oromo tribal lands of eastern Ethiopia and western Somalia, I use ethnographic mapping to document the human sociological structures of villages as a first step in understanding the phenomenology of the lived experiences of semi-nomadic pastoralist and agro-pastoralist communities along the Sahel transition zone. I observe and note routes of travel and the physical emanations of agro-pastoralism and compare them to my observations of the rural areas of northern Sudan, Darfur, northern Chad, northern Niger, northern Mali, and northern Mauritania.

In this comparison and contrast of the sociological structures that span open desert-mountain areas across the northern geographic and geologic belt of northern Africa, I attempt to visualize life in the Sahara and the Sahel as it has been, unchanged for a millennium. Since 2004, this stretch of desert and transition zone has been my principal deployment destination.<sup>45</sup> From October of 2013 to September of 2014, I served as USAFRICOM’s senior military advisor to the Republic of Niger, a tour of duty documented by the New York Times in the spring of 2014 (Griswold 2014, 11-12).

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<sup>45</sup> Nine months in Sudan and Chad, six months in the Somali-Ogadin region of Ethiopia, two months in Kenya, one month in Morocco, and twelve months in the central Sahel regions of Niger and Mali.

The reality of desert community life consists of thorn-branch fences for animal control, with wide swaths of land a hundred miles or more that serve as travel routes for the large herds of livestock owned by the semi-nomadic pastoralists. Between erg and massif, herds of camels and cattle move amongst clusters of mud-brick walled enclosures with mud and grass thatched roofs that are grouped around ancient wells in support of subsistence agro-pastoralism. As Dida Badi notes, Tamashek life in essuf consists of both the semi-sedentary as well as the semi-nomadic, but both forms of communal life revolve around water, agriculture, and animal husbandry (2010).

When I look more deeply into the life of a single village, I often see village leaders talking into cellular smart phones or Thuraya© satellite phones. I see the growing use of motorcycles as transport by young men who were meant to replace fathers and grandfathers on massive caravans laden with raw and manufactured goods that crisscrossed the open desert. Their jobs would have been as armed guards, animal caretakers, or loadmasters supervising the nightly loading and unloading of the thousands of pack animals and trailers.

When my ethnographic observations look even deeper into family, village, and provincial life in the Sahel and the Sahara, I see the lines of political power and common pool resource allocation of natural and imported resources being decided not in those villages, but in the capital cities of urbane Somalis constructing the Transitional Federal Government; in the Amhara and Tigray capitals high in the mountains of Addis Ababa and Asmara; in the Arab riverine and coastal cities of Khartoum, Benghazi, Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers, and Casablanca; or in the sub-Saharan African enclaves of Nouakchott, Ouagadougou, Bamako, Niamey, N'Djamena, and Juba. What I see are interior spaces

with indigenous populations cut off from representation and resources. Even more importantly, they are cut off from the modernizing influences of assured security, participatory development, and indigenous governance. These three modernizing influences are primary sponsors of psychological cultural resilience of ethnic minorities vulnerable to changes in habitat and at risk of recruitment into extremist ideology of transnational insurgencies. Their capacity to adapt to modernizing influences provides them with developmental pathways where technology and economic growth increase opportunities for younger generations' participation in the communal life of family, village, and tribe. Their ability to participate in the development of localized governance maintains a social ordering of large group identities necessary for individual, family, and clan self-esteem and community coherence. But their inability to relate to and participate in the larger community of their political state results in disenfranchisement and dissociation.

The 2011-2012 drought in northern Niger came on the heels of the previous drought in 2010 that resulted in wide spread famine across all of the touchetts of Kel Tamashek. In response, thousands of Tuareg in the Valley of Azawax left their touchetts in search of money and resources necessary to keep their families who remained at home alive. But these Tamashek sons and daughters did not travel south to the state capitals responsible for their welfare, but rather to the north in Libya, where they had only recently been expelled after the fall of Gadhafi (Al-Jazeera 2014). The Kel Tamashek of Azawad and Azawax may be legally bound into the political states of Mali and Niger respectively, but their actions suggest that psychologically and sociologically, they remain neutral residents of the Sahel and the Sahara. This neutrality of Tuareg psycho-social positioning

between the African south and the Arab north is reflected in the constructed identity of their green and red skin and in the delicate balance that the Tuareg maintain within their remote desert-mountain habitat.

The remoteness of the desert and the massif normatively shield them from identity diffusion and cultural obsolescence as described in the previous chapter. Where Imajaren serves as a defense against timogoutar, amaghr serves as a defense or rebellion against emutyen. The four horses of Tuareg emutyen involve a type of invasion into their desert-mountain habitat of technology, economics, transportation, and drought. While none of these change agents are new, collectively their effects over the last half-century have disrupted the patterns of Tamashek life sufficiently to create a deterioration of identity and social structure (Badi, 2010). For those Tuareg in essuf, the effects of rapid, unintegrated external change threaten catastrophic loss of identity and cultural expression.

For those Tuareg living in exile in Libya, their forced expulsion from the civilized-privileged existence of Arab cities after Gadhafi's downfall shattered their self-constructed identity of successful Tuareg-in-diaspora. Their forced repatriation back to distant families still living in essuf replaced success and civilization with a dubious title of *Ishumar* or unemployed Tuareg (Kohl 2010). Over a quarter of a million Tuareg men, women, and children found themselves unceremoniously returned to northern Niger and northern Mali. After a lifetime of working in Libya and living in a hierarchal status somewhere between entitled white Arabs and black Africans, the Tuareg-in-diaspora were unprepared to return to Niger and Mali to survive amongst their relatives in nomadic life in the desert. Neither were they able to find room in the southern cities run

by the Hausa, Zarma, or Bambara African elites (Al-Jazeera 2014). In the valleys of Azawar and Azawad, the mix of Tuareg expelled from Libya combined with the larger Tuareg population in essuf resulted in a powerful mix of armed political activism. The 2014 three-part documentary by Al-Jazeera about the return and exile of the Tuareg describes the conditions they found on their return and documents their political-military leaders who organized and led their rebellion in 2012.

The rebellion and political unrest that followed defeated the political state in Mali and continues to threaten the power structure in Niger's capital of Niamey. Underlying this rebellion and unrest is the inability of an enduring community to resist or adapt to external change that threatens their psychological reality. The remainder of this chapter explores the scope and rapidity of emutyen (change) faced by the Kel Tamashek and the sequelae of their inability to adapt sufficiently to avoid psychological devolvement and sociological disintegration. The underlying thrust of this examination is the discovery of the drivers of the Tuareg violence and psychosocial inhibitors of resolution in northern Niger and Mali.

### **Future shock, culture shock and the narrative myth of the Kel Tamashek**

Theorist Alvin Toffler describes future and culture shock as a psychological state of individuals and societies that are exposed to levels of social, political, and environmental change such that they are unable to successfully integrate without suffering from adaptive failure and traumatic sequelae (1965). Psychoanalytical anthropologist Howard Stein distinguishes future shock from culture shock by the "participant's perception of the locus of movement...One who suffers from culture shock is out of place precisely *because* he/she has physically moved; one who suffers from future shock is out of place

*despite* the fact that he/she has not physically budged” (1994, 129). Using this differentiation, the Tuareg in Agadez and Kidal who were expelled from Libya are suffering culture shock as they return to life in essuf, from life in Libya’s northern cities. This is opposed to the existing Tuareg population there who are suffering future shock, where the invasion of emutyen continues to change the landscape of social, political, and spiritual life of family, village and tribe faster than their ability to adapt.

Where both Tuareg returnee and Tuareg in essuf are in shock because of disruptions in daily reality, both project a causative effect that “the times are out of joint;’ and likewise in both, the would-be shamanistic culture-hero dreams ‘to set things right’” (Stein 1994, 129). In Agadez and in Kidal, the culture hero who dreams of “setting things right” is the imajaxen, or warrior-savior archaic typology from deep within the group identity of the Kel Tamashek. Expressed in physical prototypes, these imajaxen culture-hero’s form armed political movements who effectively contest control of the Sahel with the African political states in the sub-Saharan capitals of Bamako and Niamey. Such culture heroes now lead the Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), the Ansar el Dine in Mali, and the Council for Renewal and Innovation (CRI) in Niger.

***Emutyen as challenge to tagaste and tomoost (identity and culture).*** From the description of the Kel Tamashek and their environment in the preceding chapter, it might seem as if change does not come quickly or easily in the Sahara and its Sahel transition zone. Man-made events such as the 7<sup>th</sup> Century Arab invasion and more recent environmental changes have pushed and formed the Kel Tamashek from part of the larger Berber peoples into a distinctly recognizable subset of their Tamazight genealogical origination. In their early history, the Berber-Tuareg were buffeted by social, political,

and economic change from the invasions of the Banu Hilal and the subsequent spread of Islam in the 9<sup>th</sup> Century from the north; and by the rise and fall of sub-Saharan African kingdoms such as the Mandinka or Mali empire founded by Sundiata Keita c. 1230 to c. 1600 in the south (Khaldun 1969; Ki-Zerbo 1997). When the (Arab) Bedouins pushed south from the coast, the Tuareg moved deeper into the Sahara and into the Sahel.<sup>46</sup> When the Mande and Hausa pushed north from their empire bases in Burkina Faso and Nigeria, the Tuareg retreated into their geological fortresses of massif and erg (Keenan 1977).

Throughout this movement of Arab power from the north and of African power from the south, the Tuareg have sought to distinguish their large-group existential identity through efforts at creating distinction on the one hand, and affirmation or acceptance of that distinction on the other. Here I incorporate Brewer's (2001) theories of the need for optimal distinction and Horowitz' (1985) theories of affirmation, assimilation, and acceptance to help explain what I have observed in Tuareg identity establishment and maintenance within their historical narrative. Against the African identity, pre-colonial Tuareg touchetts created violent distinction by routinely raiding southern communities during razzia, taking livestock, iklad, and seizing grazing lands. The practice of razzia still continues today between Wodabe Fulani and Iwellemedan Tuareg as described in chapter 4. The Tuareg's creation of chosen glories against their African neighbors to the south created deep social divides that guaranteed distinction through African communities' chosen traumas, especially amongst the Mande populations of southern

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<sup>46</sup> The remains of early desert kingdoms are still visible from satellite imagery on clear days.



Mali. Other Tuareg touchett strategies such as the psycho-social development of red (imēšwaran) and green (sattafan) skin colors served to create artificial physical identity markers to distinguish Tuareg from black (imikwal) African and white (blanc) Arab communities.

Where the Kel Tamashek were able to accommodate the African push from the south and the Arab push from the north, the arrival of French colonization constituted an invading social, political, and economic force that brought the emutyen of the western world deep into the Tamashek homeland. From the African push to the north and the Arab push to the south, the Tuareg touchetts could retreat deeper into their desert habitat with little concern that either had any interests there outside of historic trade routes, the ownership and price of which was already well established between the three communities. French geology and research expeditions changed this with the discovery of a vast assortment of natural fuels, minerals, and metals (Keenan 2010). Within a single generation, the once barren uselessness of the Sahara and the Sahel to anyone other than the Kel Tamashek was over and the scramble for new ownership to Tuareg lands began. Even had ownership of these natural resources been accredited to the Tuareg as the original inhabitants of the lands under which the newly discovered resources were found, their historical narrative and its encapsulated existential group identity would have suffered profound change. Theirs is a psychological identity and social organization that is based on constant movement with little physical ownership of the sedentary accumulations that complicate nomadic life in essuf.

The initial part of French occupation of the Tuareg homelands was a mix of French preference and outward respect for the lighter skinned Tamashek clans and their idealized

depictions of noble stewardship of the desert lands of the Sahara and Sahel (Keenan 2001). Attempts by the French, however, to engage and incorporate the indigenous objects of their fascination were met with rebellion and defiance as the Tuareg never considered their placement in a social hierarchy headed by the white French as accurate, even if they were socially ranked higher than the African Hausa and Mande peoples to the south (Rossi 2010). Given the Tuareg preference for nomadic isolation in the least useful (at the time) portions of Algeria, Mali, and Niger, the eventual French attitude toward the Kel Tamashek was to leave them to their desert landscapes while they concentrated on developing the more subservient and willing southern peoples into a technical layer of social management and economic resource.

Eventually, with the Tuareg refusal to accept French positional superiority and submit to colonial administrative supervision, the African Mande and Hausa majority southerners were tasked to set up and run indigenous governance in Mali and Niger, respectively (Scholze 2010). The choice of majority population for African national state structure building had little to do with a French preference for majority rule as can be seen in Mauritania, where a minority Arab population still rules a majority African population, thanks to the French colonial preference for lighter skinned ruling subordinates (Rossi 2010). The post-colonial policies of the Hausa and Mande ruling majority leaders in the south of Niger and Mali were similar toward the Tuareg in that they allowed them to live in their desert landscapes fantasizing about their continuing self-governance and sovereignty. That is, until the discovery of natural resources underneath the tents and grazing areas of the nomadic Tuareg, Arab, and Teubou populations.

With the discovery of natural gas, uranium, oil, silver, and gold, the rush of developed western world prospectors and business interests brought the larger world directly into the nomadic home of the desert dwellers. The political elites in the south ensured that their majority populations were available and received preferential treatment in the rush for jobs and the sale of methods and materials needed to mine and market Niger and Mali's natural resources (Alghafet 2014). Year by year, advances into the Sahel by transport, travel, communications, commerce, industry, and technology flowed past and around the Kel Tamashek, carried north by the partnership between western business and Hausa-Mande partners filling the demand. In Arlit, the central Uranium mining operation of France's Areva corporation, the entire majority Hausa and Zarma populations were transplants from Niamey, Maradi, and Zinder as the labor force for the mines; work that Tuareg were then unwilling to take. These recent changes of environmental desertification and industrial development of the Sahara and the Sahel, present both a challenge and a dilemma to the Tuareg communities in the north of Mali and Niger. The latter is that the Tuareg sociological structure and psychological organization is based on unchanging survival in an ultimately hostile environment. The former is the marginalization of physical ownership of the natural resources laying under Azawad and Azawaj that are exploited for the purposes of state building by the southern political elites in Bamako and Niamey respectively. Both the challenge and the dilemma create for the Tuareg what I characterize as an adaptive failure significant enough to violate the psychosocial reality of the lived experiential reality of the Tuareg family and touchetts.

***Adaptive Failure and traumatization.*** The twin wake-up calls to growing Tuareg marginalization come from the growing defection of Tuareg *iyzerien* (younger generation) from a life in *essuf* and the relative deprivation felt by the Tamashek touchetts as they compare themselves to their growing Hausa, Zarma, Songhai, and Mande neighbors. By the 1960s, the first Tuareg rebellions began against their African political masters over control of the Sahel reaches of Mali and Niger. The rebellions continued sporadically until the 1990s when they peaked in intensity and damage. Intercessions and mediations followed each rebellious period with Arab states to the north calming the violence, at times by large-scale economic migration to Libya to work government jobs and serve as military soldiers; work rejected by the Arab tribes there. After the Gadhafi regime collapsed, most of the Tuareg families living and working in Libyan diaspora were ejected by the Arab tribes and forced to return to lives and families in northern Niger and Mali (Al-Jazeera 2014).

After living in cities and towns in Libya for decades, these returning Tuareg men and their families were quite unprepared for life in *essuf*, further exacerbating the Tamashek crises of *emutyen*. In Mali, the Libyan Tuareg returnees launched a rebellion that is ongoing as of this writing and is carefully watched by former rebels in Niger who long for their own free land of Azawaj (Al-Jazeera 2014). Both northern Niger and Mali have experienced Tuareg rebellions seven times in the past half-century. This includes uprisings in the 1960s, 1980s, 1990s, 2000s and finally, the 2012–present rebellion by the Kel Adfaï in Mali that was reinforced by thousands of armed Tuareg returning from service with the fallen regime of Muammar Gadhafi. This latest rebellion resulted in the

collapse of the Mali state in a military coup and the near conquest of its capital Bamako by competing Tuareg and Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb forces.

During interviews that I had with Tuareg informants over the past year, conversations and dialogue were in conflict between the abject poverty that the returnees from Libya found that seemed to them to be in complete contradiction to the mythical sense of Tuareg nobility they had received as a shadowy inheritance from past forebears. I found their description of this mythical inheritance to be similar to American families of European descendants attempting to trace their family trees to some major or minor nobility through the purchase and display of coats of arms displayed in anxious public areas in hopes of acceptance or affirmation of worthiness. For the Tamashek, their dialogue threads resonated with continuous variants of justifications of why they are behind their non-Tuareg ethnic peers and why they still maintain the sanctity of desert nomadic life in the face of dwindling membership and survival in *essuf*. Yet the myth of the freedom and nobility of nomadic life as imaginary *imajaren* persists even as their touchetts continue to fall prey to the dreaded *timogoutar*. Jeremy Keenan's 1977 book on the Kel Ahaggar of southern Algeria provides detailed accounts of mythical Tuareg noble origination and warrior identity along matrilineal lines of inheritance in full contrast to the patrilineal Arabs and the passive agrarian Africans. Some of my more urbanized informants speculated that the Tamashek people's insistence on continuing to propagate and live such a mythical fantasy of warrior nobility has allowed both Arabs and Africans to marginalize the Tamashek and devalue their historical claim over the Sahel and Sahara homelands.

The future ability of the Kel Tamashek to maintain their psychologically preferential landscape of racial color, ethnic superiority, and geographic-geologic social construction of desert and mountain nomadism that provides them with physical and constructed identity markers between the dominant populations to the south and north respectively is uncertain. The fact that this artificial color creation exists and continues its hold over Tuareg thought suggests a deeper communal uncertainty over the nature and separation of their large group identity from the African and Arab touchetts with whom they share common geographical space with. I suggest that the Tamashek community is suffering from adaptive failure, or an inability to adapt to rapid social, environmental, and political change (emutyen) without breakage of their historical identity and narrative; and that their inability to maintain a known and accepted schema of natural Tuareg life pierces the social and psychological reality of generations of Tamashek parents and grandparents. This pierced reality, or trauma, is then passed from emarr'wan to izyerien in a generational inheritance of trauma. The very strength of the Tamashek individual and group identity that was forged through incredible hardship in the rough lands of the Sahara and the Sahel, now serves as an inhibitor of identity and narrative evolution to meet the demands of global change.

**The challenge of building resiliency in the Kel Tamashek, Fulani, and Songhai communities of northern Niger and Mali**

During my work and research in northern Niger, I found that the single most immediate priority grievance of the semi-nomadic and agro-pastoralist communities was their inability to manage or ameliorate social trauma and a correlate inability to halt the disintegration of sociological structures that define their existential reality. Within these

communities I found that their basis of agro-pastoralism and semi-nomadism had begun to disintegrate because of increasing difficulty to maintain traditional life in essuf and pressure of modernity.<sup>47</sup> The growing difficulties to agro-pastoralism and semi-nomadism that were described by my informants included desertification, drought, changes to structures of trade, travel, and resource allocation. Against their declining ability to practice historic modes of life and sustenance, they found their *iyzerien* (younger generation) refocused by *emutyen* (big change) towards the city/town by the introduction of technology, economic diversity, and individual agency inherent in the egocentrism of the urban life.

*Ag Sayadi: We have emutyen now, a lot of changes occurs in Tamashek peoples. Every Tamashek has problems, but the feeling and the thoughts are the same. We have worries about iyzerien (younger generation) ... they want the motorcycle, the picture (smart) phone, and to go and live in the town away from essuf. How will they know emarr'wan (parents and grandparents) and eemeyen batu (oral – talk stories of the past)? When the Hausa and Zarma towns take iyzerien what about assam'drn tas-aq-q (remembering and relationships)? (Aradile et al. 2014)*

Within the delta of a declining way of life and the threatened loss of their children to modern change, the body of adults left behind in essuf find themselves too acculturated into their own historical narrative and group identity to lay the foundation of social course change without external assistance. The Tuareg adults left behind in essuf are faced with an unresolvable dilemma in that they don't know how to change without

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<sup>47</sup> In Niger, I led an inter-agency team from the US Government that supported the host nation with security sector training, internal infrastructure, and governance development.

existential annihilation. They are seeing their community disintegrate because of membership defection to the lures of emutyen or the siren calls of rebellion and violent extremism with their attendant gifts of death and disease.

*Algabib: Tatreet id ashedad (sickness and disease) is with us and threatens our survival. One of my girl's feels ill, she is going to the clinic (in Ingall). That is why they called me to this meeting. Most times, those in our touchetts are not able to travel or find medicine. If my children are in tatreet id ashedad, it is like I am in timogoutar and it is me that went to there. (Aradile et al. 2014)*

They are between hardship and helplessness, social conditions that deny a primordial archaic typology that serves as the central tenant of Tuareg large group identity - imajaxen, or warrior. As this condition deepens, they descend into a form of inescapable shock they think of as timogoutar. It is this condition of timogoutar that is at the core of what I found to be an adaptive failure by the larger Tamashek community in essuf and which has become the central part of my research, guiding my efforts at reforming security and building development and governance in the central Sahel.<sup>48</sup>

Previous teams operating in the Sahel focused their efforts on increasing securitization, disarmament of militias and construction of physical infrastructure. I found that such a focus could be likened to constructing a hospital around a dying patient while

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<sup>48</sup> An example of how I used my awareness of timogoutar and adaptive failure within the Kel Tamashek in northern Niger is my tribal leader engagement initiative during USAFRICOM's FLINTLOCK Security Exercise in the spring of 2014. As a corollary to security sector training events in Tahoua, Agadez, and Diffa, I invited and paid for Amenokalen from the surrounding regions to travel to those towns to participate in a governor led education initiative that sought to inculcate awareness in the traditional leadership of civil infrastructure development efforts and their role as social change leaders. While initially awkward, the role of social change leadership within the larger political state became a subject of intense discussion within the body of Amenokalen tribal leaders, a necessary first step in communal adaptation to emutyen, or "big social change."



never treating their disease or injury. Is the construction of physical infrastructure an important part of post conflict restoration of damaged communities? Of course, but dead patients have little use for infrastructure; not just the physically dead, but also the psychologically dead. The former expire from exsanguinations of their untreated wounds. The latter expire from extended trauma to the sociological structures that harbor the identities, psychological constructions and emotional expressions of their existential reality. I found during all of my work in northern Africa that each new layer of physical security and developmental projects introduced into the conflict society will fail to restore social order and initiate a reparative process because of the underlying instability of the sociological structure itself; damaged as it is from extended and severe trauma borne of adaptive failure and violence:

Trauma destroys the primary existential basic conditions: death, loneliness, meaninglessness, and liberty. Based on his observations on survivors from Hiroshima, [Lifton and Olsen] describe these disorders as loss of the capacity to feel and to be engaged in the outside world, and as various expressions of “the death imprint,” “the guilt over survival,” and “psychic numbing” (Elsass 1997, 55).

To relate the relationship of trauma to peace operations and humanitarian missions, I think about social trauma through the descriptive lens of physical trauma from where the term was drawn. Medical science uses physical trauma as a condition or category of injury that covers a wide range of wounds, fractures, breakages, and decapitation of limbs. Major trauma is defined using an injury severity score greater than fifteen and can present secondary complications such as hemorrhaging, circulatory collapse, respiratory

failure, and physical death (Sørøide 2009). Similarly, in sociology and psychology, trauma is a category or condition of injury to the psyche or psychological structure of one person or a related community of people (Elsass 1997). In this category of trauma, the injury or wound occurs in the form of a reaction by the person or community to a penetration, destabilization, or destruction of their protective psychological structures (Herman J. L. 1992).




Figure 12: Psychological reaction/defense to external event/wound

The diagram in figure 12 shows an external event/wound of rejection or abuse to illustrate the cyclical process of trauma, the subsequent reaction/defense, and the effects on sociological structure and psychological organization of the member and participating family. The reaction-defense of the victim works to limit the damage of the event on the individual, but in doing so, can damage the structure that the individual resides within. By itself (and in the eyes of an interventionist) the wound is not apparent outside of any physical manifestations of damaged bodies or destroyed infrastructure. The trauma-wound exists only in its damage to the psychic integration (full range of visible and non-visible interrelationships) between afflicted community members. For instance, when the

“meaning” of the open arms is transformed from love-to-pain or from embrace-to-abuse, the reality of that one psycho-social-emotional interaction (hug) is violated and transformed by trauma.

The community protects itself from trauma through reactions called defenses, which consist of psychological processes that shield, organize, and maintain a community’s psychic integration within and between individual members, their environment, and with those that populate their group identity and reality (Freud A. 1936). The reaction to traumatic wounds affecting touchetts of the Kel Tamashek arrive in the form of external events foisted on its members in a manner or degree that destabilizes sociological structure or psychological organization, or both.<sup>49</sup> Events such as famine, drought, extended communal violence involving physical trauma and death of related community members, or overwhelming unintegrated social and environmental change destabilizes the psychological organization (Erikson 1959; Herman J. L. 1992). Individual and group defenses to psychological trauma can deepen the negative effects of the initial violation by severing relationships (before they can be severed by follow-on external events) and emotional withdrawal to places of psychological safety, but physical insecurity.

The structure of Tuareg family and clan constitutes a dense, complex web of psycho-social-emotional securitization with a sociocentric organization. Its strength and depth of communalism is the principal basis of reality of Tuareg life. External events that breach family structure pierce a reality of communal lived experience that encompasses their

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<sup>49</sup> An external event is one that is not already within the interior psychological structure of the individual; it is a new event that penetrates the defensive mechanism from without. An internal event that creates a psychologically traumatic reaction would fall into the category of psychosis and penetrates the individual’s defensive mechanism from within.

entire historical narrative.<sup>50</sup> The psychological sociological trauma that accompanies these events (that breach the family psycho-social structure) is the primary danger to the larger physical survival of the afflicted community due to the heightened self-sovereignty that their desert nomadism provides them. The visible damage to the family structure only serves as the outward manifestations of even greater inner damage:

Traumatic events call into question basic human relationships. They breach the attachments of family, friendship, love, and community. They shatter the construction of the self that is formed and sustained in relation to others. [Traumatic events] undermine belief systems that give meaning to human experience. They violate the victim's faith in a natural or divine order and cast the victim into a state of existential crises (Herman J. L. 1992, 51).

The severity and duration of the external event sufficient to cause psychological trauma is entirely dependent on the individual within the community and the community affected, but the two are not merely linked. Physical damage and loss portends the presence of sociological trauma; burning villages and children abducted by warring militias in northern Niger and Mali leave their families in psychological and emotional shock from which they may have little options to overcome. To be trauma, the external event must be sufficiently powerful to penetrate or destabilize the psychological stability of the individual or collective of individuals. The type and potency of the event is necessarily different for people within a culture and different between cultures. For the

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<sup>50</sup> Erik Erikson's model of psychosocial behavior illustrates a useful stage of integrity versus despair, often in later adult life where issues of meaning and purpose create the possibilities for disruption of the relationship between the individual and the society where renunciation and disdain evolve from mal-adaptation to malignancy. I correlated this idea with psychiatrist Mardi Horowitz's conceptualization of a "shattered schema" (Horowitz M. J. 2001, 92).

touchetts of the Kel Tamashek living in essuf in northern Niger and Mali, the effects of losses thought to be recoverable by sub-Saharan communities may actually be far more destructive than imagined. For most of the communities living in the vast reaches of the Sahel and the Sahara, governance and security is episodic and sporadic. The only social security net is a derivative form of the Arabic diah, or blood wealth, where between three to five generations of related families participate in a mutual system of financial support and physical protection. When too large of a part of a single diah or touchett is damaged or destroyed, the remainder of the community may not be able to rebuild the whole and the multigenerational compact is abrogated as part of the cycle of traumatization and violence.

In my advisory work in northern Niger, for example, we worked to understand and articulate the symptoms and pathology of each community's trauma as part of establishing a diagnosis within the US Embassy's support to security, development and governance. Most of the touchetts that I worked with in Niger were involved in extended communal violence over the past decade that was replete with physical trauma, loss, dismemberment, and death of its inhabitants. Families and villages presented unique but identifiable symptoms of psychological and sociological trauma as a result of the violence and loss that they participated in as victims and perpetrators (Christian 2014). During my analysis of the data collection, I found that the symptoms of psychological trauma to the individual presented themselves in patterns of psycholinguistics and

behavior dynamics (especially in the children) that were representative of victims, perpetrators, or both.<sup>51</sup>

These behavior dynamics were often self-destructive, anti-social, and/or representations of intrapsychic conflict involving guilt, shame and the loss of self-respect (Klain 1998). During interviews with members of the Council for Renewal and Innovation in Agadez, for instance, they articulated a preferred story line that invariably included revenge or retaliation for loss of emarr'wan (parents and grandparents) who fought and died in earlier rebellions in either Niger or Mali. Other intrapsychic conflicts involving guilt, shame, and loss of self-respect centered on the death of their children from Tatreed id ashedad (sickness and disease), which placed them in a position of helplessness and hardship from which there is no escape—the place they call timogoutar. In the oral tradition of Tamashek society, this emotional devolvement is hastened as the victim attempts to relieve the pain and repair the damage by compulsively reliving the event over and over again. I found this return to the traumatic event in public storytelling

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<sup>51</sup> I use psycholinguistics to refer to the changes in how the inhabitants of conflict societies process severe stress and trauma into the verbal and non-verbal communication between family members and between families. Using psycholinguistics in the study of traumatized conflict societies means to examine how the meanings of words, sentences, and phrases are changed (or new ones created) to account for the damage to their sociological structures and the prolonged absence of basic psychological and physical needs. Similarly, the behavior dynamics refer to the changes in normal body posturing, gestures, non-verbal communication and Metacommunication that reflects the presence of damaged sociological structures and unmet psychological and physical needs. Trevor Harley (2008) provides a basic sketch of some of these processes in his text *The Psychology of Language*. It goes without saying that in keeping with Whorf's principal of linguistic relativity, the practitioner must first gain a sense of the normative linguistic communication style and content in order to fully understand the process of how trauma and violence has degraded or altered the host community's communication (Foley 1997). These psycholinguistics, along with behavior dynamics, informs our initial and subsequent analysis of the population and their psychosocial condition. When we walked into a refugee camp in Chad that was filled with 300,000 refugees from Darfur we found scenes where children endlessly (and compulsively) replayed the acts of violence and depravity that they had so recently experienced; scenes that would one day be replayed in later stages of their development as either victim, perpetrator or witness without effective intervention (Christian 2005).

and in the political organizing of movements with peace sounding names but stormy violent manifestos, their elderly leaders returning again and again to the pain and anguish of their chosen traumas. Their public wish for resolution belies their private wish to relive or refight the loss too terrible to bear in memory:

...despite the apparent wish to avoid the pain, the cost, the injury of the repetition, one finds oneself repeating nonetheless, as if drawn to some fatal flame, as if governed by some malignant attraction which one does not know and cannot comprehend or control. It has, in other words, all of the external earmarks of a volitional act, and yet the person is unaware of wishing any such thing. In fact, quite the contrary; he or she would wish to avoid it (Russell 1998, 8).

On a broader scale of the family and the village, the directly remembered and secondarily transmitted trauma of hardship and helplessness effect how the family, clan and tribe see themselves and the desperation with which they hold onto the primal archaic typology of imajaren – warrior. Such irrational holds over ancient identity descriptors that divide family generations between essuf and emutyen provide indications of failed reparative processes within the family. Chosen traumas that are unintegrated into the historical narrative are out of place, out of time of the ongoing process of mourning and releasing (Stein 1994; Volkan 2005). They become spoilers to conflict resolution, exacting “profound changes in the webs of human relationships and collective representations...[with attendant] changes in family dynamics, individual and collective meanings associated with trauma and [the] reparative processes” (Rousseau & Drapeau 1998, 465 - 466).

In Niger, our recognition of these visible and audible patterns of acute and latent trauma helped us to identify them as traumatized social structures and analyze their condition. This analysis subsequently informed our approaches to mediation, information collection, negotiation of cessation of hostilities, and facilitation of basic survival needs (Christian 2014). Within the US, EU, and UN interventionist teams operating in Niger and Mali, as they operate from a deeper egocentric psychological organization, they are less likely to understand the violent communal behavior immediately in front of them without prior training and practical experience. Their probable unfamiliarity with sociocentric communal structures in the first place creates a barrier to communication that is intensely aggravated by the trauma overlaid on the society they are attempting to engage. By understanding the pathology and symptoms of a sociocentric traumatized society, I believe that both military-civilian practitioners will be able to engage broken communities without increasing the harm already done and help its members step back from the edge of sociological anarchy and psychological death. Reproduced below is the first of three interviews conducted in Ingal used to help inform analysis and understanding of the Kel Tamashek.

### **The inner world of trauma in the Valley of Azaway**

*“The amaghr between imajaren and timogoutar is fought in the Ténéré and in the heart of the Kel Tamashek” (Alghafet 2014)*

#### **The violence of famine, thirst, and sickness**

There is an inner world of violence in the lands of the Tuareg that consists of famine, thirst, sickness, alienation, shame, and rage. While famine and thirst are familiar visitors



to the nomadic desert dwellers, alienation, shame, and rage are not. The construction of central archaic typologies of the Kel Tamashek encourage the development and maintenance of family members who are always prepared to resist the natural and manmade violence of the desert and mountain. They resist in an egalitarian fashion with a broad selection of strategies grouped around physical, mental, and relational prowess.

At each stage of life, male and female children are inculcated with skills to survive the violence of desert life through physical stamina and learned skills of navigation, fighting, and animal husbandry; through learned mental or psychological adaptations to time orientation and spatial representation of desert habitat bounded by horizons rather than by physical demarcations; and through their ability to create, sustain, and transmit an entire historical narrative and existential identity within a nomadic oral tradition that grounds each member in the vast space of open desert. Minutely, the two sides of their archaic typology *imajawen* (savior and warrior) heroic idealization work to prepare family members and their nomadic household for rest and movement; preservation of strength and supplies; and maintenance of narrative and *tas'ar*, the Tuareg meaning of family interrelationship and communication.

***Violence of geology, geography, and climate.*** I describe the ongoing violence in the Valley of Azawar as a secret inner world because it is often unseen or overlooked in favor of the violence of militia clashes, terrorist attacks, and national or international government militaries kinetic (lethal) actions to counter domestic violence. Life in the open desert is a contest of will and determination that requires strategies for survival in the most impossible conditions. Simple misfortunes become, in the desert, life-ending events that herald violence little reported and even less understood in its severity.

During my research time in Niger, Chad, and Sudan, I've spent days with my hosts huddled under flimsy roofs as a Shamal sand storm raged, threatening to cover any unprepared family with several tons of earth. In Niger and Sudan, I experienced spring rains that poured down on barren baked earth creating terrifying flash floods strong enough to push cars and entire touchett encampments off of ridges into gullies below. At UN refugee camps, I have listened to grief-strewn stories from parents as they recounted the death of children and family members from famine and thirst, unable to survive the long overland journeys to distant relief sites.

Their stories lay bare the phenomenological perspectives of family members as they tried to care for and save themselves from madness and death from thirst in an emotionally wrenching drama of interior family crises. In Sudan and Niger, I witnessed and heard participant stories of gazou and razzia, tribal raiding parties that abducted livestock and destroyed crops and tents, leaving those remaining to face certain death from starvation and exposure.

All of these and more are the moment-by-moment barriers to survival in the desert that the Kel Tamashek have sought to master and overcome in the generational life cycle of their historical narrative. What I have come to understand is the shape of violence from these barriers and the inhibition they create to the normal resolution of communal conflict. While I had seen famine and thirst before in Chad, Darfur, and Ogadin Somali region of Ethiopia, I became more deeply acquainted with them in northern Niger, less as events and more as living entities of suffering. Amamatou Bint Tigzali is the matriarch of her touchett in a semi nomadic encampment north of Agadez. She is the mother of

Achmedou and sister of Mohammed, and provides insight into the daily struggle for survival in the Sahara and the Sahel.

*The two of them [her son Achmedou and brother Mohammed] lost their minds together on the same day ... they were searching for water during a year of great thirst in the Sahara. It was about 16 years ago ... the water pump at the well nearby us broke and thirst was extreme. It was intensely hot that year. People said that the heat of that year would affect men's brains. They spent days and nights wandering the desert searching for water. When they came home from the journey they were both insane (Bint Tigzali 2014).*

***Psychological and emotional effects of starvation and thirst.*** Of course, hunger and thirst live within the person's ability to bear them and survive or die with dignity. But during the progression of famine and thirst, I found through observation and stories that the famine and hunger become split off from the sufferer as a way of externalizing the pain and agony so it can be fought against, separate from the owning body. The weakness of the flesh versus the weakness of the mind or spirit becomes the central battleground between the sufferer and the affliction of hunger and thirst. This battleground is tied to their known physical surroundings that now refuse to yield water, nourish animals, and produce crops. It is tied to the surviving family members who are also battling their own split off versions of hunger and thirst.

*The story of my son is a man chased by poverty. There is hunger that you can see if you look at the women and children around us. Omar [another son] was forced to travel to Libya, so he went. It wasn't a choice. To live in the desert is to suffer from hunger. One day you find food, he next day you don't. One day you go to*

*sleep thirsty, the next day you drink. Ever since the 1984 drought, we've been living his way* (Bint Tizgali 2014).

The agony of one's own pain is rearticulated hourly or daily as an observant-participant of the suffering of loved ones as their suffering complicates one's own to the point of seeking separation for relief. The lived experience of dissociative withdrawal induced by famine and thirst afflicts its victims long after the return of rains and food. I suggest that it is actually a traumatic break with reality, where the complete collapse of a person's inner psychological reality has left the ego-id-super ego unable to function or unwilling to re-trust the exterior world not to re-subject them to the suffering of trying to survive and failing. The self is left without the possibility of fight-or-flight, where inescapable shock leaves them in that dreaded place of helplessness hardship the Tuareg call timogoutar.

Another reason that I refer to this violence as a secret, inner world of violence is that I have found from personal and professional experience that both traditional and national government officials in Tuareg lands often do not think of famine, thirst, sickness, alienation, or social trauma as violence. The resiliency of Tamashek community to the violence of the open desert begins with the psychological construction of willful defiance to the possibilities of death and annihilation. The emanation of this construction appears to the western observer as a sort of casualness, a free and independent spirit who is beholden to no one. In short, a noble freeman or imajaren whose desert-mountain habitat was of no significance outside of transit, in which the violence of the desert defeated all except those who had made that violent place their home. Were the desert to remain the

only opposition to the social structure of the Kel Tamashek, they might remain as they are for many more generations.

But the fullness of violence against the social structures of the Kel Tamashek comes in the form of emutyen, the big change of environment (desertification), political (development of the Westphalian state), social (emergence of multi-ethnic societies), and technological introductions of motorized vehicles, individualized communication, and fields of knowledge that threaten the intrinsic value of the Tuareg's adaptation to their desert-mountain habitat. Routinely, parts and pieces of Tuareg social life in essuf disengage from the larger whole, weakening the overall structure. Each time a family or gifted younger member chooses life outside of essuf in favor of the securitization and human capacity employment offered by the modernizing life around them, the ability of the Kel Tamashek touchett to survive as it was before becomes less assured. For those families and their touchetts that remain behind, their situation becomes more desperate, in part by empirical measure and in part by relative comparison to the non-Tuareg touchetts that are adapting to emutyen. In concert with the decline of real or relative standards of survival and suffering is the decline of value and interest in the continuation of an ancient historical narrative that, on its surface, appears unsustainable.

Whether the suffering of the Kel Tamashek touchetts in essuf is empirically increased from that of their fathers and grandfathers, or whether their suffering has increased through qualitative comparison of their situation to others, a process Ted Gurr (1970) calls relative deprivation, seems to be immaterial to the lived experience of the current generation. For the Touchetts of the Kel Tamashek who are unable to adapt as fast as their neighboring ethnics, emutyen brings loss and violence that they are unable to

integrate into their existing worldview. The violence is physical in its manifestation of starvation of both the human and animal family that are codependent for survival. The violence is psychological or cognitive in its projection of guilt and failure nearly beyond endurance as parents and children are witness to suffering and helpless to intervene despite real or imagined pleas for rescue that cease only with death. Finally, the violence is emotional as the raw pain of loss of love and nurturance leaves it's still living victims in numbed states of feeling, vulnerable to instigations of cyclical vengeance. But it is the decline and threatened loss of narrative that terrifies all of the Tuareg, most especially the elders responsible for its continuation and extension across time and space.

*Social effects of the violence of desert and drought.* In conversations with Tuareg Chefs du Canton and Chefs du Villages (traditional neighborhood and village leaders) I found that they were willing and ready to acknowledge the obvious famine, thirst, and sickness as debilitating conditions within their membership. With regards to alienation or social trauma as conditions that were impacting their lives, they seemed to be defensive about even acknowledging their existence, if they even possessed the cognitive learning to understand and discuss the concepts of alienation and trauma. The traditional leaders that I interviewed were largely focused on the ongoing kinetic violence between Tuareg militia, violent extremist organizations, and formal government militaries, as well as loss of historical narrative, traditional habitats, famine, drought, sickness, and lack of education. The deeper, more psychological and emotional aspects of the conflicts were either not well understood or drowned out in the thunder of guns, bombs, and dying.

That the traditional and political leadership of the at-risk populations do not consider or understand the deeper motivations that are driving the conflict in the Sahel is not

surprising. Scheff & Retzinger write that the “concept of unconscious motivation is central to psychoanalytic theory, but it has never been accepted in the wider world” (1991, 104). They attribute this lack of acceptance to researchers’ failure to link cause and effect directly in sequence of conflict party discourse and political-military actions or counter-actions. When conflict analysis researchers clearly demonstrate underlying human motivations in conflict dynamics and describe linkages between cause and effect that are based on actual dialogue and military-political event sequences between conflict parties, then we will have presented the case for third party interpersonal analysis and mediation. This is what my research data presentation and analysis will attempt to do in this part of the dissertation; provide clear and direct cause and effect linkages between conflict party dialogue and action sequences.

Collectively, the physical, mental, and emotional violence experienced by the Kel Tamashek pierces their known historical narrative with images of hardship, madness and helplessness. The resulting trauma calls into question archaic typologies of warrior, savior, freeman, and noble that undergird their communal identity. Unable to distinguish a clear, common threat outside of emutyen, their inability to respond in a manner that re-coheres the touchett creates conditions of helplessness and trauma. Omar Sid Nasse Shihabane is a herder and former rebel living in northern Niger. As a child, he watched his father die of starvation, an imprint that lives with him always and haunts him. He describes his life then as being in timogoutar, a refutation of his imajaxen heritage which led him into service as a rebel soldier: “*our misery reached the point that I didn’t care how I would die...if I got killed or survived, either was fine*” (Sid Nasse Shihabane 2014). In his studies of the psychology of cultural resilience in ethnic minorities, Peter Elsass

hypothesizes that “the more often one experiences a lack of connection between one’s actions and their results, the easier it is to develop a general belief in one’s own helplessness and inability to master the world, thus establishing the grounds for depression” (Elsass 1992, 79). This helplessness and inability to master their world would be the antithesis of the central Tuareg archaic typology—that of imajaren or warrior-savior.

### **Trauma and the Tamashek family’s sociological structure**

There are primal inhibitors of conflict resolution in northern Niger and Mali that obviate many initiatives started by UN peace operations forces that are trying to resolve the violence in the central Sahel. For the military, diplomatic, and humanitarian interventionists working there, the landscape of communal violence and social breakdown can be unimaginably difficult to make sense of (Lochhead 2014).<sup>52</sup> This is because the conflict that is driving the violence and the ongoing disintegration of social structures is not external to the population as is the norm in inter-state conflict. Instead, it is internally based and often emanating from the most basic unit of social construction; the family. For intervention in traumatized conflict societies to be cost-efficient, personnel and organizations that plan and execute peace operations and humanitarian outreach must operate beyond their existing skill sets of psycho-social-cultural knowledge. The most important of these missing skill sets is knowledge of the effects of trauma on the sociological structure of at risk families vulnerable to recruitment and

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<sup>52</sup> Mr. David Lochhead is the director of security sector reform for the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Our interviews occurred in my field office in Niamey, Niger 6-8 March 2014.



employment by the violent extremist organization operating in the Sahara and the Sahel. Understanding cause and effect of violence, trauma, and the family allows the practitioner to move beyond the visible structures of political interest groups and into the complex structures of community life beneath that harbor the powerful emotions driving the conflict.

*The sociological structure and psychological organization of the Kel Tamashek.* In Niger and Mali, the communities most involved in the violence in the north are the Tuareg, Songhai, Fulani, Arab, and Teubou. Within both of these states, political parties comprised of Hausa and Bambara speaking Mande frame the national political dialogue. These ethnic majorities are sub-Saharan communities whose genealogical roots run southward into Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Benin, Togo, Ghana, and Cote D'Ivoire as opposed to their northern minorities whose genealogical roots run northward into the Sahara and the Sahel. Central to both Mali and Niger's northern conflicts is the dissonance between the national historical narrative emanating from Bamako and Niamey and the regional geographical narratives being protected by the northern minorities. The national historical narratives are distinctly African journey's that are emerging (more or less) successfully into globalized modernity and a seat at the international community of nations. The regional geographic narratives are distinctly non-African Arab, Tubou, and Tuareg journeys that are still fighting for space, identity, and freedom.

In the Azawar and Azawad (central Niger and Mali) we sought access to the psychological and emotional heart of the conflict by researching the lived experiences of those tribes most often involved in violence as either victims, perpetrators, or bystanders. Through the use of phenomenological inquiry and ethnographic surveying with the civil

traditional leaders in essuf, we tried to avoid entrapment by simplified ideological socio-political-economic explanations generated by the conflict parties based in Agadez, Kidal, and Gao. Our engagement of traditional leaders, for example, constituted an effort to understand the interior spaces of damaged communal life that constituted an (at times violently) emotional conjugate of sociological structures in violent conflict. Our ability to understand the nature of the sociological structure that we were engaging determined our ability to enhance their security, governance, and development. By focusing on the family, clan, and village (touchetts) of the Kel Tamashek rather than organized political parties, we worked to determine deficits of underlying non-negotiable human needs that drove conflict and inhibited resolution.

I began my exploration of Tamashek tmidrrt (life) by researching *waset'ally wan tilk'awi*, or the environment and health of the family. Every sociological structure is constructed along lines of historical origination, geographical proximity, geological and climatologically nuanced environments, and varying levels of political and social sovereignty (Casey & Edgerton 2005; Eriksen 2001; Geertz 1975; Horowitz D. L. 1985; Stein 1984). These factors are both a base for and an interdependent variable of, the development of group identity and its creative cultural expression in language, economy, art, music, religion, and architecture, and constitute what Ibn Khaldun calls *Asabiyya*<sup>53</sup> or tribalism (Durkheim 1995; Alatas 2006).<sup>54</sup> Within the Tamashek tilk'awi (family) and its inner environment (*waset'ally*), these factors and variables constitute the larger “I Am”

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<sup>53</sup> From Khaldun's *Muqaddimah*, written in 1377.

<sup>54</sup> French sociologist Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) described the process by where creative activity plays an important role in the development of collective consciousness, a concept that Georg Jellinek referred to as a “mass psychological function.” In societies tightly bounded by family and geography, this collective consciousness becomes a “mechanical solidarity” from intense mutual similarity (Gellner 2006).

(existential identity) of the group and the smaller emanation of the individual who is extracted from and reflected by the whole (Brewer 2001; McDougall W. 1921; Pettigrew 2007).

I found through ethnography and phenomenological inquiry that the existential identity of the Kel Tamashek reflects what is for me a unique psychological organization and sociological structure. Their distinctly sociocentric psychological organization and semi-nomadic agro pastoralist-based social structure provides familiar guidance to its members about how to think of each other and how to think about themselves. This familiar guidance involves how they communicate, love, share, and interrelate on an



Figure 13: Psychological sociological emotional structure of Tamashek family life

intimate level of human co-existence, findings that correlate with many other human communities (Blumer 1969; Brinkerhoff, White, & Ortega 2008; Geertz 1971). To better understand the complexities of the Tuareg family, I created a graphic model of a Tuareg tilk'awi (family) sociological structure that I imaginatively created from an amalgamation of observations and interviews.

*Emotional conjugations of Tuareg family life.* The graphic model in Figure 13 gives an idea of sociological structure and the psychological, emotional and physical sustenance it provides. Beyond showing the exterior functionality of the sociological structure and the interior psychological and emotional processes that are created and sustained, the model is meant to reflect the larger purpose of the Tuareg family as expressed in metaphysical beliefs and human spirituality. It helps me to think of the family sociological structure as what the members “do” and the emotional conjugates as the essence of the Tamashek “group self” that is created and sustained. In the middle of the graphic are the interior processes that I think of as emotional conjugates to the exterior functionalities. The word conjugate is from the Latin word *con* (with) and *iugō*, which means to join, bind, or connect. As we use conjugate in language, conjugating a verb for instance, can alter meaning, intent, or action. Similarly, exterior functions of the sociological family structure create emotion in combinations that are infinitely adaptive to changes in expression, affirmation, and acceptance from members, other families, clans and touchetts. The emotive combinations or conjugations can be unanimous or discontinuous within the family membership, with different members affected emotionally in different ways or degrees.

The conjugations are at times in cognitive dissonance when, for instance, a family's expression *shizada* and *Tidiurt* (elation and joy) of its survival against *iban-aman* (drought) and the potential of *timogoutar* (helplessness-in-hardship) runs counter to their *arkanaé* and *aakshoud* of a child lost to famine and thirst. This is the fascinating part about the emotional conjugation of exterior functions that I observed in Tuareg touchetts; that every time an event was pulled out for *assam'drn* (remembering), the forms of conjugation could change depending on the health of the family and their interconnection with their larger clan and community. Insults to the family could in one instance, produce a response that was consonant with the *it'tikhal* or right path of conduct which in turn adds to the family's *walagan* (honor or tribute), and yet in another, the same insult could result in feelings of alienation and attendant shame.

In healthy Tamashek families, the exterior functions of the family produced a range of emotional conjugations that served to both affirm the ethos of the blood related collective and as a cleanse of unwanted emotional feelings built up over the course of normal family life. I defined healthy family (*tilk'awi*) environments (*waset'ally*) as having nurturing, loving *tas'ax* and whose members articulated realistic positive hopes (*d'rann*), dreams (*dayrrn*) and future (*differ'awa*) thoughts (*amed'drn*) of life (*tmidrtrt*) Tamashek. This fits with Ervin Staub's observations that the health of the whole-person (physically, emotionally, psychologically, and spiritually) requires the ability to express the full range of feelings, emotions, and mental cognition listed, even if some are positive and others are negative (Staub 2004). In the sociocentric family, we merely replace the whole-person with the whole family as an emotional entity because of the interconnected and communal identity and collective expression of agency.

Ideally, the collective of these emotive functions in the model from Figure 13 create human happiness and human drive to survive and requires the full range of negative (in black) and positive (in red) emotions available for conjugation and expression. What keeps these emotive functions in balance and what keeps the negative emotive functions from dominating and burning up the hosts is the nature and quality of the structure that houses, creates, and sustains the balance. When the family sociological structure is damaged, emotions, feelings, and psychological processes are still generated, but mostly in the negative. For instance, the sociological structure functions of caring, loving, and nurturing creates self-love, love-of-others, joy, and happiness, while the loss of those functions creates their opposites of sadness, depression, anger, guilt, and associated feelings. If the functions of love, nurture, and caring were lost because the security or economic-social functions failed, then shame, guilt, rage, and hate may be the result.

*The logic of emotion in the Tuareg family.* As a way of clarifying and deconstructing the complex interaction between exterior and interior functionality of the Tuareg family, I propose that there is an emotional logic to the conjugation and expression of member harmony, happiness, and health, as well as to violence, shame, and trauma. As I observe and listen to families and members act and react toward violence and traumatic events, I have come to understand that we can predict emotional effect from exterior functionality in the same way that physicists can predict the activation of neutrons from electrical stimuli. That the expression of human emotion follows logical patterns based on type and intensity of external events seems a reasonable assertion that is used by western societies to plan for post incident responses by mental health professionals. The emotional logic that I observed in the Tuareg family sociological

structure likely follows a pattern that is replicated in one form or another in all human societies after adjustment for the differences in psychological organization, sociological structure, and cognitive effects of geography, geology, and climate. The logic of emotion would also be affected by the patterns of relationships (patriarchic, matriarchic, patrilineal, and matrilineal) that are created through marriage and the extended families' sharing of children's identities and the honor or glory of their accomplishments. Finally, the sociocentric nature of the family and the effects of central archaic typologies that call family members into exterior positions of belief and action would necessarily be key to unpacking the structure of emotional logic that guides the Tamashek family's exterior functionality.

*Effects of patriarchic inheritance and matrilineal relationships on trauma and its aftermath.* When a family structure's system of reality is broken suddenly or over time by violence or an inability to maintain coherence and memory, the nature of the members' relationships helps me to analyze the effect of the traumatic condition created. Simply stated, loose systems of relationships transmit less psychological and emotional import while dense, intimate systems of relation would tend to be heavily laden with meaning and context.

Tuareg families are patriarchic in terms of roles and responsibilities, placing the burden of the family externally on the male and the family internally on the female. Unlike the severe separation of roles that characterize Arab family life, the Tuareg family allows for sharing of the external and internal functions by both male and female. The spouses of my hosts for instance, would normatively come out and meet male visitors, even participating in dialogue relative to family history and such. My ongoing lessons in

Tamashek language even became something of a family task for one of my hosts, Abdoulaye, that involved his mother, wife, and daughters who spent many hours drilling me in pronunciation and vocabulary. This would have been fairly unusual in a traditional Arab household unless I were related by blood, marriage, or adopted by long term acquaintance. In my analysis, this sharing within the Tuareg family seemed to provide for equalization of positive and negative effect from external events within the family. I observed both husband and wife sharing the conditions of the traumatic event as they attempt to shield their children from the effects.

There is an element of matrilineal strategies of marriage and family relationships that appeared to differ across the touchetts of the Kel Tamashek and across generational practice within individual touchetts. In several instances, my male, head of household hosts would introduce me to their cousins and uncles whom I naturally assumed to be related by blood along male lines of inheritance. This assumption was based on knowledge of and experience with patrilineal societies of North Africa and the Middle East. To my surprise, I found that most of these introductions were to their wife's brothers and uncles, showing a positive matrilineal aspect of Tamashek family life.

The importance of patriarchic inheritance and matrilineal relationships to the logic of emotion and reaction to trauma is in these strategies' capacity to strengthen the family and clan against hardship and instill resiliency to overcome extreme loss and adapt to change. As it was explained to me, combinations of patriarchal inheritance and matrilineal relationships allow both sides of families connected by marriage to share in interactive management of iyzerien or younger generations. In times of normative life without challenging events or obstacles, such layers of family management might seem



heavy and intrusive. But in the Sahel and the Sahara, life is seldom without physical, mental, and emotional challenge and this extended patriarchal and matrilineal construction is the sole form of social security available to families of the Kel Tamashek.

***Trauma and the Tamashek family's psychological organization***

The interagency advisory team I led in northern Niger worked to positively affect the three core areas of life that create the socio-political conditions for healthy intercultural community: infrastructure development, deepening of governance, and extension of security to enable and protect the former two conditions. With the exception of one member, none of the team grasped the fundamental differences in psychological organization between their western background and the communities they were attempting to engage.<sup>55</sup> This missing intercultural competence created misunderstanding on their part of the host population issues of communication, motivation, and thought.

Before presenting and analyzing the sociocentric organization and archetypal effect of the Tuareg families that I spent time with, I believe it will be helpful to explain my comprehension of the difference between the egocentric and sociocentric psychological organization of families and communities. My explanation of egocentric and sociocentric organization is limited to the minimum necessary for my presentation and analysis of data relating to the archetypal affect on identity development, devolvment, and

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<sup>55</sup> US Army 'Captain Chris' as he was identified in the New York Times Magazine story, lived in Nigeria and Niger during childhood, attending local schools and learning French, Hausa, and a little Zarma languages. After attending university, he returned as a Department of State officer, and later as an Army Civil Affairs officer. His knowledge of the communities' of Niger and Mali was through inculcation borne of long exposure rather than academic study (Griswold 2014).

emotional conjugations of exterior events, especially those involving alienation, communication, and trauma.

*Contrasting forms of psychological organization: egocentric and sociocentric.* The real focus of intra-state peace and stability operations such as ours in Niger is on systems of human relationships in the conflict setting. And the most important human relationships in intra-state conflicts are those within and between the family structures. It is this relationship setting that harbors the power of violent communal conflict. For men and women working in peace and stability operations, understanding the family structures found in intra-state conflict societies and the pathology of trauma sequelae should be a precondition for engaging these populations. Nearly all violent intra-state communal conflicts involve sociological structures that are sociocentric in structure and function, presenting clear and clinical differences in how they process loss, victimization, anger, shame, and damage to their society by man-made and natural disasters (Bhugra & Becker 2005).

Sociocentric communities possess a discreet logic of group psychological identity reflective of its geography, climate, socio-economics, physical security, religion, culture, and historical narrative. This logic of group identity in turn determines their individual motivation and locus of member control (shame based culture) and their structure of family communications and meaning (high context culture) (Kaufman G. P. 1996; Chua & Gudykunst 1987). The psychological sociological story of the traumatized sociocentric community provides insight into the complex inner workings of families, villages, clans, and tribes involved in violent civil conflict in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America.

Communities that are sociocentric versus egocentric present unique variations in how victimization and trauma is felt and the psychological, sociological, and economic damage it wreaks on the families and the individuals' within. The significance of sociocentric social expressions of individual, family, village, and ethno-cultural organization lies in the disparity between practitioner interventionist and those needing that intervention assistance; they are often from different structures of social organization. Most military-civilian practitioners of humanitarian, peacekeeping and stability operations will be from egocentric family-social structures and most (but not all) of those they are helping stabilize are sociocentric. Generally, sociological structures with sociocentric organization thrive in rural areas dependent on agrarian or animal herding, and where the responsibility for physical security and social sovereignty belong primarily to the individual family and village (Wood E. J. 2003).<sup>56</sup> This is normally seen in regions of states that have limited ability to access or control these areas, so the responsibility devolves to the inhabitants and their organizational structures (Scott 1985). Such areas are most often centrally involved in intra-state conflicts for which counterinsurgency and peace operations are planned and conducted (Fearon & Laitin 2003).

Egocentric sociological structures are found in populated, urban areas where community members exist and identify themselves in an array of groups rather than the primary family. There are, of course, sociocentric families, clans, and cultural groups that also live in the middle of major metropolitan cities, but this simply demonstrates that the two models possess utility, vitality, and an ability to coexist without overt conflict. These

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<sup>56</sup> Elisabeth Wood conducted extensive ethnographic research into the sociological and psychological underpinnings of the civil war in El Salvador from 1991 to 1992 in Usulután.

two models (egocentric and sociocentric) reflect differences in how the members of each perceive themselves in relation to those around them: independent versus integrated. This is a simplification of a complex relationship that I make only to illustrate the nature of sociocentric victimization sequelae. For both models, relationships are important, but where the egocentric form understands that relationships are creations that they construct, the sociocentric inherits their relations from birth, from blood, from family. The egocentric person learns to construct society where the sociocentric person learns that their reality is ascribed, inherited, vulnerable, but irreplaceable (Eisenbruch 1991). Once broken, it is more difficult to replicate, especially the contexts of communication and meaning.

***Egocentric psychological organization.*** The western egocentric family of developed Europe and the United States is single person centric in terms of individual identity, agency, and responsibility (Lindholm 2008). Individuals are rewarded or punished for personal behavior rather than for the behavior of family or clan. Egocentric and sociocentric organization is best thought of as polar opposites on a continuum or spectrum of psychological makeup; no community is purely one or the other. Rather a family or community's placement is along this continuum with egocentric on one side and sociocentric on the other.

As this research is intended primarily for western audiences, I begin with an explanation of the egocentric. The egocentric is not egomaniacal, but consists of a psychological organization that creates an internal locus of member control. This is a learned activity that is part of the development of a child's independent conscience. It is this independent conscience that allows for independent punishment and independent

responsibility found in our systems of economic reward, justice, and punishment.

Egocentric children are inculcated with internal mechanisms of self-control based on individual responsibility sustained by systems of personal identity and agency with emotional conjugates of guilt and innocence (Leyendecker et al. 2002).<sup>57</sup>

Egocentric children see themselves as individual actors and agents of thought and action (Enright et al. 1980). The learning of personal responsibility, action, and conscience occurs with the child being tasked with specific responsibilities separate from siblings and punished or rewarded separately for his/her performance (Baumeister R. F. 1997). This independent sense of responsibility and conscience supports the need for individual agency necessary to succeed in a highly diversified community where one person may belong to a number of different groups with their own rules and rewards or consequences (Lindholm 2008).

In such multi-group environments, the parents couldn't hope to be with the children everywhere to guide them and coach them into right action for each different group.<sup>58</sup> Instead, they are required to instill an ability to act independently, choose between conflicting positive desires, and possess a willingness to accept rebuke or reward for their efforts, all in the absence of parental control. This is accomplished by the augmented development of the egocentric child's id-superego-ego. A poor choice on the part of the child between the competing demands of the id-superego creates psychic pain in/on/of

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<sup>57</sup> As might be imagined, there is a great deal more scientific literature on egocentric societies, their inhabitants and behaviors than for sociocentric societies. As such, I used a combination of extrapolating and experiential review to fill in the descriptive blanks for sociocentric thought, behavior, and ideations. It helped that I grew up in a large sociocentric Québécoise family (9 siblings and 68 cousins on one side alone).

<sup>58</sup> Such as schools, clubs, part time jobs, sports teams, volunteer associations, etc., each with their own standards of behavior, rules, and rewards.

the ego; this we refer to as feelings of guilt, which have a powerful effect on people's actions (Hartmann 1952).

In the presence of the pain of guilt, the egocentric child is taught to self-balance their desires for pure pleasure (id) against their desire for higher levels of recognition, belonging, and acceptance (super-ego) won from their peers and superiors as they embrace and emulate archetypal behavior that establishes the norms of each particular group (Sandler, 1960). What differentiates guilt from shame is the focus of the comparison and the direction of the anger. Guilt is sharp psychological pain that the mind produces within its own estimation of itself (Baumeister R. F. 1997; Elsass 1997). Guilt possesses a shame-anger variant where the anger is directed at the self. Shame is sharp psychological pain that the mind produces from its estimation of its role or placement with other human beings (Gilligan 1996; Scheff & Retzinger 1991). Shame possesses a shame-anger variant where the anger is directed outward. The negative of the egocentric is the diminishment of the power of the family; the positive is the depth of the interconnectedness that each family member is part of, if the family structure is damaged. So while egocentric does not obviate the need for, and importance of, the family structure, it does not bear the same burden of psychological, emotional and identity support that is characteristic of sociocentric societies.

*Sociocentric psychological organization of the Tamashek touchett.* In contrast to the egocentric, the sociocentric family member remains a deeply integral part of the family structure of operation and identity (Lindholm 2008). Where egocentric communities promote individuation of its members' personal identity, the sociocentric Tuareg family promotes collectivization of their members' personal identity at the family unit. It is not

the child that flexes outside the family to achieve development and growth, but rather the family as a whole that seeks to grow and develop emotionally and intellectually. The given name of my friend and assistant in Niger is Hamidoun and his family name is Agalih. When he introduces himself to anyone outside of his family named circle, he does so not as Hamidoun, but as Agalih, emphasizing the familial participation and corporate belonging. Hamidoun's children see themselves as corporate members of an inner circle where how to think and what to think are collective, group activities.

The intimacy of the Tamashek sociocentric structure is created and governed by fantasized archaic typologies of communal existence that are characterized by intense interdependency of its members whose common thought patterns are mirrored in their communication and emotive feelings with one another (Jung 1981; Brower 1971). As applied to the Tamashek family's psychological organization, an archaic typology (archetype) can be thought of as an original idea, a base model of something that does not actually exist in human form such as perfection in love, mother/fatherhood, or protection from annihilation. The archetype of socio-communal existence offers the Tamashek individual and family a shared mental object of love, pride, identification, happiness, and the like.<sup>59</sup> The traditional nomadic Tamashek family is sovereign unto its own authority in varying degrees of hierarchal patterns from intense patriarchal to one that is more matrilineal in its power relations (Keenan 2001). While this archetype remains a fantasized ideal, every family follows, or seeks to become, the actual prototypical representation of that ideal in order to reap the perceived psychological and emotional

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<sup>59</sup> Jung's use of archetype was to describe organizing principals and motivating drives of the individual personality and its relationship to environment and people, e.g.: mother-caregiver, father-safety, self as existential persona, and the like.

rewards in both the present as well as the possibilities of generational projection of historical memory and identity (Stein 1994).

As a cultural archetype, the fantasized image usually revolves around a primary role of the male-father figure that involves intimate interaction with the members of family in all aspects of physical, psychological, and emotional survival and growth. The central Tamashek archaic type is based on imajaven, but adapted to other discrete roles necessary to sustain the touchett, such as imxad, inhaden, and a growing list of new roles that are developing as a response to emutyen or big social change. The fantasized archetype of Tamashek family is inherited from emarr'wan or earlier generations and serves as a fundamental guide for the continued constructions of family historical narrative and the transmission of existential group identity across generational time and space. The exterior functions of family roles or activity mirror the integration of their internal cognition, emotion and memory (Rousseau & Drapeau 1998). This constructed external reality in turn protects and sustains the interior production of positive feelings, emotion and belief systems. The family sociological structure, guided by the archetypal image imbedded in its historical narrative, informs the members' cognition and mental processes such as:

- What internal emotions and ideations go with what external stimuli and to what depths should one feel;
- How family emotions and identity are shared, passed between and among generations and what mental objects correspond to their correlates in the physical world;
- How the shared picture of current reality and past history identify heroic thoughts and actions;



- How ideas of saving, giving, building or creating are expressed into physical reality as archetypal fantasies of males and females through their physical and emotional lifecycle.

The sociocentric Tamashek family's sociological structure is the basis for psychological and physical reality in one small, neat package—small that is by comparison to its power and the energy it contains. Its organization is constructed around a strong central archaic typology (imajaxen). Its focus is on positive esteem and affirmation garnered through it'tikhal, ashok, allok, and walagan. Finally, its dependence on tisseewhy, eemeyen, and assam'drn to preserve their existential identity inside of an oral historical narrative, provides for a reality that serves as their central point of reference. The power of its organization, density of contextual oral communication and dependence on an interior constructed reality creates a “compulsory quality” to the family narrative that it maintains, safeguards, and continues to write with each successive generation (Stein 1994). The family members of the Tamashek touchett understand their existence from the comparison and contrast of themselves to the various African and Arab ethnicities that they defend against with constructed colors of skin and the imagined ownership of a vast desert.

***Tamashek family identity and traumatizing loss.*** As a sociocentric community, Tamashek children are inculcated with external mechanisms of group control based on collective responsibility sustained by systems of alienation and inclusion with emotional conjugates of shame and pride (Leyendecker, Lamb, Harwood, & Schölmerich 2002; Scheff & Retzinger 1991). The Tuareg sociocentric person's sense of self is not only sustained, but formed by the struggle over alienation and inclusion. “Answers to the

questions, ‘Who am I?’ and ‘Where do I belong?’ are forged in the crucible of shame and pride” (Kaufman S. J. 2006, 5). With the family unit remaining a discrete whole, there is little need for Hamidoun and his wife to assiduously arm their children with individual judgment and choice skills so necessary in an egocentric society. Immediately, one can see the positive aspects inherent in Tuareg family life that can provide deeper nurturing environments for their children and protect them from having to face ethical dilemmas, especially at so early an age. Without this need for heightened individual agency in order to survive, the identity, or existential “I Am,” of the child is left in a state of enhanced identification with their siblings and parents.<sup>60</sup>

The Tamashek home is characterized by an ever-ongoing dialogue over decisions and the collectivized making of meaning. Their participation in decisions and the making of meaning helps to establish and maintain a complex structure of social placement based on age, gender, and capability/capacity within the membership. The collectivization of meaning-making also supports the gradual identity development of the individual as extracted from the family as a whole while maintaining optimal social placement of each family member. This results in blended positions that reflect the ethos laden and softer ego/id/super-ego development of the sociocentric body, encouraging fainter delineations in the separate identities of its members (Leyendecker et al. 2002). We can think of their relationships as evolving from the whole to a nearly individual basis as opposed to egocentric communities that evolve from independence towards interdependence.

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<sup>60</sup> To be clear, the sociocentric person has an identity, feels the pull of both *Id* and *Superego*, and struggles to balance their demands just as the egocentric person does. The sociocentric person can and does hurt the members of their own inner group (family, village, tribe, etc.) and feels guilt just as the egocentric person does. The difference is one of degree for the former and one of primacy for the latter.

Tamashek family members achieve self-realization within the intimate network of family relationships that emphasizes esteem of the collective versus esteem of the individual; inter-human ethos of loyalty and connectivity rather than intra-human individuality and agency (Elsass 1992; Elsass 1997; Lindholm 2008).

Within the fainter delineations of family member identities, there is a heightened potential for significant discomfort in any differential movement of esteem between members. When Hamidoun and his wife talk intimately with their children, they do so in a manner that blurs the boundaries of individual agency and foregoes individuation for collective thought and shared emotion. Over time, this creates unbreakable linkage in behavior and thought between the siblings that carries well past childhood and shapes their adult lives, even into marriage. Because the members in this blended family identity group are so close, slight adjustments in approval or disapproval can have a disproportionately large effect in comparison to what egocentric community members might experience. It is within this blended identity that the power of the external locus of member control is understood. A sociocentric father who loses his son can suffer a more complex degree of trauma sequelae than his egocentric counterpart (Elsass, 1992). Besides possibilities of guilt arising from perceived failure to protect and safeguard, additional complications might arise from personality disorganization due to the imbedded nature of the father-son identity dyad.

A strongly sociocentric father vests increasing amounts of his personal identity into his ongoing relationship with his son, becoming “father of my son, son of my father” rather than the individual identity that characterizes his egocentric counterpart. Because of this, a subsequent loss may have a disproportionate effect on the psychological well

being of the father. Over and above the expected effects of grief, guilt, and loss of the relationship might be the father's requirement to reorganize his identity with the loss of such an important element. In these relationships, so much of what a father might anticipate doing in his future life would revolve around his role of being a father to his son. This role would not be an obligation, but rather an essential element of his *raison d'être*, his sole or ultimate purpose in life. With his son's loss, personality disorganization might threaten identity destabilization and ultimately, collapse of the family unit. The father would not be able to "get over it" and move on with his life. A mental object of shame would accompany the father's psychological state of personality disorganization and threatened identity destabilization.

*Balkhou: That is right, no manna – there is not enough food for animals and they die as we watch them because of manna id iban-aman (no food and drought). I say to my son, son we need to move the animals to water, but he look at me strange and say there is no water aba, how do we survive? Now my son is with the fighting and he is in Allah's grace but at least they feed him. If he should die in the fighting, how will we continue? We will be in timogoutar.*

This shame would necessarily be debilitating and immediate to the father's identity as head of family. While there would still be remaining members of the family, the loss of the son would create overwhelming alienation of himself from his fellow heads of family, especially if he and his wife were beyond childbearing years. This alienation would arise from the father's feeling of perceived loss of group placement, group acceptance, group affirmation, group love and esteem, both within his own family and his larger extended clan. The shame that is created is a direct result of this alienation and loss.

Czechoslovakian writer Milan Kundera (1990) reminds us that basis of the father's shame is not some personal mistake of his, but the humiliation of his inability to choose, or safeguard his family. That this humiliation is public and open is the essence of the alienation and overwhelming shame. The shame of the father would require no reminder from others as there is "no witness so dreadful, no accuser so terrible as the conscience" of the already grief stricken father, Polybius.<sup>61</sup>

In Tamashek touchetts of northern Niger and Mali, losses of family members create instability in the sociological structure due to the high context of communication and meaning. Further destabilization occurs because of internal alienation of the interconnected identities of brothers, fathers, mothers, and sisters, as well as other extended family physically and or emotionally resident within the family. The loss of psychologically interconnected family members threatens their connection to the larger sociological structure because unlike egocentric structures, each member does not have an independent, stand-alone space in the family. They are suspended in a dense web of relationships where the loss of too many members can impair the psychological orientation of their former pre-event reality.

This former reality that informed and sustained their psychological identity included mental representations of archetypes, prototypes, heroes, villains, social goals, memorializing, and dreams. The expulsion or alienation of the survivors from their place in society need not be real, only perceived in the mind and emotions of those shamed by loss and victimization. Their response to overwhelming shame is either attempts to regain lost placement and love, attacking the person or group that expelled them into alienation,

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<sup>61</sup> Classic quote from Polybius, Greek historian (205 BCE - 118 BCE)

or finally, surrender to a place of being outside the psychological walls of a shared human connection. They are in a state of trauma from which they do not have the self-capacity to leave or fix.

*External locus of member control.* In the Tamashek family sociocentric structure, each member's activities are to be guided and controlled by the family membership using collectivized wisdom of it'tikhal (right path) that builds family walagan (tribute-honor). In the open desert, the body of the Tamashek oral historical narrative holds the complex codes of conduct that constitute their system of indigenous justice. As a family and tribal code of conduct, the poems and stories transmitted in tisseewhy, eemeyen, and the concepts of ashok, allok, it'tikhal, and walagan provide social cohesion and order where the political state has little or no presence. A primary characteristic of this system is that it is collectively transmitted and maintained, and is collectively enforced by all upon all for the securitization of the family, touchett, and tribe.

In Hamidoun Agalih's home, for instance, Aisha is as responsible for the behavior of her little sister Fatimah as is her mother and father for her behavior in a shared system of ethos laden caring. There is an inherent duty amongst each member of a Tamashek family to care for and safeguard each other even from their own actions. When an egocentric child commits a fault, the parents look to that child and ask, "Why did you do that?" When a sociocentric Tuareg child commits a fault, the parents look to the siblings and ask, "Why did you let him/her do that?"

The external locus of member control places the burden of choice and action between right and wrong in the hands of the family, clan, or touchett social organization. This serves to further bind their nomadic society together and make it harder to fail against the

vicissitudes of desert, erg, and massif. Like all Tamashek parents, Hamidoun and his wife teach the conditions of right and wrong to their son Muhammad, and daughters Aisha and Fatima as collective functions. They teach ethical principles, values, and judgment based on their Tamashek historical narrative and its group identity centered on the imajaren archaic typology of ashok and allok. But the ethical choices that are discussed in the Tamashek family are very much a group process in collective thought that binds them to decisions much more than would an individual struggle.

Both inside the home and within the touchett, Tamashek family members are informed, guided, and directed to make that right decision by the immediate family and by members of the extended family, both on the matrilineal and patrilineal extended relatives. The guidance that family members receive is contained in their poetry (tisseewhy) and the oral storying (eemeyen) used to transmit historical narrative. The eemeyen and tisseewhy are talked about and debated as part of the process of transmission and determination of meaning by the present generations of emarr'wan (older-past generations) and iyzerien (younger generations). The conclusions arrived at during storying inter-generational dialogue serves to establish collective phenomenological meaning that is attributed to people, things, places, and events that touch the lives of the family and touchett.

The more important the topic or the greater the implications of the phenomenological meaning to be created or attributed, the wider the discussion is spread throughout the family, clan, and touchett. This is a process that ensures responsibility will be diffused across multiple lines of family authority (Lindholm 2008). Because important decisions are made at the furthest point of clan authority in a manner that uses discussion and

consensus to include larger numbers of family members at different generational levels, a high level of ownership of decisions is achieved. This high level of ownership is critical to the subsequent shared responsibility to enforce those decisions and provide a cross-family external locus of individual member control.

In the sovereign spaces of the Sahara and the Sahel, there are no police forces, courts, or central systems of justice enforcement. In the valley of Azawāḡ, justice enforcement is best accomplished as close to the offender as possible, at the lowest level of social organization, and done by those who most understand and care for the offender. Strangers don't call out a family member for an alleged transgression; discipline is left to the family, clan, and touchett to accomplish. This next section tries to describe the incredibly complex process of behavior discipline that occurs minutely in every family and touchett of the Kel Tamashek. Their system of discipline depends on the intimate connectivity of the sociocentric family and community. The system uses social alienation to produce psychological and emotional pain, achieved by subtle changes to the social placement of an offender. In normal conditions, this system of indigenous justice helps maintain the ethos of the sociocentric community. In times of social breakdown, this same system can become an obstacle to the resolution of conflict and the reestablishment of post conflict community.

In Tamashek family, pain experienced by one becomes pain experienced by all as the communication and making of meaning is so closely tied at the basic level of individual and family identity. When I ask my friend Hamidoun to describe himself in his life before marriage and fatherhood, he did so in terms of his brothers, cousins, uncles, and parents. Similarly, his daughter Aisha refers back to her sister Fatimah, her brother Muhammad,



and parents to describe her concept of self far more than would an egocentric girl of her age.

Agalih and Aisha's relationships describe their concept of self-identity, echoing a quote from American author-journalist Anthony Brandt: "Other things may change us, but we start and end with family." In these blended relationships, a member's action or statement (call them the actor) that deviates from the communal standards (positively or negatively) or detracts from/adds to the family's identity brand alienates or elevates those witness-relatives who are related to the offender. Because of the sheer interconnectedness then of the actor and witness-relative, the relative's cognitive awareness of an act or statement that generates pride or alienation is inevitably transmitted back to their relative actor through *tas'ar*, or interrelationship communication in Tamashek families. Figure 14 tries to model this interconnectedness of family feelings of alienation. If the action or statement adds to the family's brand, then the witness relative is momentarily elevated within the social hierarchy of clan and touchett. If the action or statement detracts from the family's brand or violates communal standards, their witness relative is momentarily alienated within that same social hierarchy with attendant feelings of pain.


This is the base mechanism of how an external locus of member control operates in a sociocentric society. In families with an internal locus of member control, the witness-relative neither feels nor transmits alienation or elevation (at least not to the same degree) to their relative-actor because they are inculcated with an internal, independent sense agency and responsibility for reward and punishment. In the sociocentric Tamashek family, alienation would occur in the witness-relative by their relative-actor when the

latter's conduct falls outside the boundaries of family and touchett acceptance, however slight that misstep might be.

The offender's feeling of pain of alienation arises because he or she is so closely connected to the alienated member, he or she cannot fail but to notice and feel their related members pain. This removes the egregiousness of intent from the act of alienation, which is the mechanism by which the locus of member control is externally enforced or disciplined. Hamidoun's daughter Aisha does not seek to actively discipline her sister Fatima by alienating her; she does so by first feeling the alienation on behalf of her sister, who in turn cannot help but to feel her older sister's alienation and, because they are so closely linked in psychological organization, feel alienated right along with her sister.

Figure 14: Model of alienation transmission within Tamashek family Tas'ax

At the point where the offender internalizes their culpability in alienating their witness-relative by their word or action, the offender begins a secondary process of self-discipline—that of self-alienation and the generation



of shame. The disciplining pain of shame arises when one's actions are called into question by those of the affected relationship, as well as when one's worth is called into question.

One's actions are usually called into question by others, but one's worth is usually called into question by the self/ego that is under assault from the damage it has caused to that shared part of family collective identity and transmitted through *tas'ar* by family and touchett. The interrelatedness of alienation and shame is of central importance in understanding the power contained in Tamashek families and to their struggle for esteem in times of great change and turmoil. The functions of alienation and shame play a controlling role in the stability and health of the central identity ideals of the Kel Tamashek, that of *imajaven*, or warrior-savior-protector.

### **Foundations of Violence and Trauma in the Valley of Azawax**

*“The false God changes suffering into violence: the true God changes violence into suffering.”* (Weil 2004, 507)

*“The emotion of shame is the primary or ultimate cause of all violence, whether toward others or toward the self.”* (Gilligan 1996, 110)

I start this section with the two quotes above because they have continuously helped me focus my research in the midst of leading a civil-military advisory mission in the middle of the desert. My mission and associated research in the Sahel, as in previous research-deployments, was for the United States Special Operations Command. The access and direct interface with combatants, victims, perpetrators, and bystanders of organized violence on a broad scale could not otherwise be possible. The intra-state warzones of Bosnia, Rwanda, Sudan, Somalia, Colombia, Niger/Mali, Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan (to name a few) have an incomprehensible kaleidoscope of violence.

Diplomats and soldiers speculate on the violence using terms like ethnicity, race, religion, history, hatred, or warlords in their attempt to make sense of what they are

witnessing. But their descriptions of overt symptoms never uncover the pathology or causality that drives the violence they are witnessing. The international “peacemakers” often seem to be as vexed at the chaos as those who seem to contribute to their own injury, suffering, and death. Once on the fields of violent communal conflict, diplomats and soldiers encounter conflict participants who seem vacant, numb, and unfeeling even as they direct or participate in the slaughter of those around them using machete’s, swords, guns, whips, and fire (Christian 2005).

The same victims of violence and abuse at other times are found to be protecting their tormentors, all the while, children and adults wander in an anesthetized state of “helplessness” punctuated by rage and paranoia or “primal depression” (Elsass 1997, 52). Nothing that diplomats and soldiers train for or experience prepares them for the chaos of violent intercultural communal conflict characterized by battlefields overlaid on top of towns, villages, and cultures. These are conflict zones where the terrain is human rather than geographic; where the wounds of psychological trauma are as debilitating as those that are physical.

My goal in this research section is to illustrate that the battlegrounds of communal conflict are not, in actuality, incomprehensible. Rather, such violence operates along specific pathways of action and reaction that psychologist Helen Block Lewis describes as “emotional dynamics” (Lewis H. B. 1971). These dynamics have pathways of expression that can be understood, planned for, and engaged with specific capacities created by the “peacemakers” from developed communities. These developed communities need not be only from Europe, the Americas, or Asia, but also from the developed portions of developing states and regions. The differentiation in sociological

structure and psychological organization that exists between the sub-Saharan capitals of Ouagadougou, Bamako, Niamey, N'Djamena, Addis Ababa, and Nairobi can be nearly as significant as the differentiation I find within the European Union and American peace operations forces.

The pathways I explore here are the logical lines of human psychology and emotional conjugation as adjusted for sociocentric psychological organization combined with patterns of sociological structures that conform to the physical demands of geography, geology, and climate. The data presented below and analysis thereof builds on the previous sections and on the review of the psychological organization of the Kel Tamashek in Chapter 4 to deepen our understanding of conflict drivers and resolution inhibitors to the violence in northern Niger and Mali. The subsections below present data and analysis related to the emotional dynamics of violence and trauma within the touchetts of the Kel Tamashek and to the primordial conflict within their psychological organization and sociological structure; the archaic typology of imajaren and its existential enemy and symbiotic definer—timogoutar. Throughout these subsections, I have included segments drawn from interviews that best illustrate evidence of Tamashek identity construction and traumatization.

### **The emotional logic of violence and trauma**

In chapters two and three, I described the analytical framework that I used during my research, part of which talked about an emotional logic of violence and trauma. I suggest that violence and trauma create specific conjugations of emotion that can be understood, even predicted, based on logical progressions of action and reaction. To return to the medical allegory, it is not a disputed statement that “if you cut my skin and veins with a

knife, I will bleed.” This allegory transposed to social conflict might read, “if you kill my child, I will be in emotional pain and my established reality of lived experience might be violated, or pierced in a manner from which I may not recover on my own.”

What I am suggesting is that within the Tamashek touchetts (as with other communities), the conjugation of emotions based on sociological structure, psychological organization, and the actualization of external events would necessarily be different culture-by-culture. However, they would also follow a logical pattern of expression and sequelae to trauma. The following interview segments and ethnographic data are presented with my analysis of this emotional logic of violence and trauma, all of which are meant to build on the previously presented psychological organization, sociological structure, and emotional conjugation in chapters four and five.

The Kel Tamashek describe themselves as living in a state of suffering, a place of hardship and helplessness they call *timogoutar* (plural) and *timagatirte* (singular). Their long, phenomenological descriptions of *tmidrrt arkanaé* (life or living in pain) create feelings of alienation from the land of their historical narrative and from each other as families adopt varying strategies of survival against violence and *emutyen* or change. The reality of the *imohor* (noble) in the *ekennass* (homeland) of Azawar and Azawad no longer coheres families and touchetts in the familiar ethos laden environment of hope and love. But “it is not the feelings themselves that constitute the trauma; it is the overwhelmed ego, the surrender to the total helplessness and hopelessness that makes the situation traumatic” (Elsass 1997, 52-53). In the excerpt below, Saed talks about this overwhelmed ego and surrender to helplessness that he calls *timogoutar*:

*Saed: Tomoost Tamashek is what Tamashek is, what he is taught. Nakou (I am) imajaren. All this ekennass (fighting) in of the north Azawad Mali and Azawar Niger is because of those who take our ekkalan (land) and bring arkanaé (pain-misery) to our touchett. Our emarr'wan made amaghr (war) against those who come to Azawar and take our touchetts and leave us in iban-aman (with no water). Our sons die, our children have no food, our animals are in iban-aman...leaves us in place of Timagatirte. Now we are nowhere in the land of Azawar. We are ibaradan (plural, abarade is singular)...this means a good Tamashek man who never did any bad things to be in timogoutar (Aradile et al. 2014).*

The social psychological trauma of the Kel Tamashek can be thought of as a “state of being” with two interrelated components; emotional and cognitive (Herman J. L. 1992). Together, they constitute a wounded sociological structure where Tamashek member expectations of love, compassion, sympathy, esteem, pride, and belonging are unfulfilled and even unacknowledged. This is because the human organizational structures that contained, stored, and generated these critical ingredients of sociological health have been damaged or destroyed in the aftermath of decades of rebellion and their inability to merge with external change they call emutyen (Elsass 1992).

The surviving members of the wounded sociological structure experience “a numbing of self-reflective functions, followed by a paralysis of all cognitive and self-reserving mental functions” (Krystal 1978, 113). Cognitively, the organized collective of Tuareg families and communities are no longer stable structures that the remaining interior members can depend on to sustain life and sanity. The family’s imawalan (nomadic)

historical narrative that binds the survivors to their sociological structure is “replaced by the only reality ... [they have] been forced to know - the trauma story” of loss and un-integrated damage from emutyen (Mollica 1988, 307).

In too many of the Tamashek touchetts I visited in northern Niger, one or more members of the extended family died in the rebellions of the 1990s, or those more recently in 2007-2009. Even where no members of the family had died in organized violence, families could name their losses from hunger, thirst, and madness borne of extreme hardships they are unable to discuss without visible emotion:

*Algabib: Not only amghar (old man), but iyzerien (younger generation) also is responsible for the amaghr Tamashek (the struggle to be Tamashek rather than amaghr the war). How can iyzerien still be imawalan when the animals all die? There is no wife for my son because we have no animals from iban-aman. My family is alone in our touchett, and tas'ax is quiet; no one to have eemeyen batu; assam'drn emarr'wan. Imedrananin (my remembrance) fil emarr'wan is not for my son. He is awazegin (about what will happen) diffa'rrwa. It's Emutyen, emoud is prayer, but emutyen is big change that brings arkanaé (pain, misery) to our touchett. With emutyen, we have no animals, no manna, no work, no d'rann (Aradile et al. 2014).*

The sociological linkages of love and nurturing are embedded in tas'ax, interior primary relationship communication of verbal and nonverbal touch that transmits kinship and human connection, essential to maintaining reason and reality in the isolating desert spaces of Azawax. In emutyen, family members of the Kel Tamashek find tas'ax either dead or disconnected and in timogoutar in distant refugee camps. Those members of the



wounded structure who survive cannot easily replace what has been destroyed because the mechanisms of demonstrating love, offering compassion, and instilling belonging are gone (Ochberg 1988). The mechanisms of family and touchett constituted the formal and informal expectations of society. They constituted the context by which the Tamashek family communicates and loves in a high-context society.

The stories of rebellion and punishment from the touchetts of the Kel Tamashek are tales of young men and their fathers enlisting into communal militia where the bonds of blood and a lifetime of battle against the harsh desert provides them with ready-made training to outfight poorly trained government troops. What the government troops fail to accomplish in direct action against the Tuareg militia, they make up for in civil retaliation against the undefended homes and villages. Search and seizure operations of rebel touchetts quickly and often degenerate into scenes of burning villages and the seizure of military aged males unlucky enough to still be with their families.

For Tamashek society, the context that burned up in their houses and lost physical infrastructure constituted the meaning within their high-context communication. The acts of killing, rape, looting, and rage serve to withdraw the agreed upon meaning of the social structures that orders their multi-family, multi-cultural society. Everything from bodily non-verbal communication to the value of status and possessions to the intent now hidden behind each person's eyes is open to dark suspicion of betrayal (Elsass 1997). Within the context of loss and war, their leaders frame their plight in totalizing terminology, where an indigenous population stands alone to defend the land of birth and historical narrative.

*Ag Hamid: Tanimert (thank you) for this discussion about the problems that Tamashek people have here in Azawar. Our people are divided by war and violence. We are between Arab and African and still we stand alone. Since we are the original people of the Sahara, all countries need to help kel Tamashek to survive. We have some westerners come to us in Azawar and Azawad and say they want to help, but they don't know what Tamashek people think and what they feel (Aradile et al. 2014).*

Their inability to relate their unmet underlying human needs to viable political positions and interests in a recognizable manner suggests that their ability to care for themselves physically is being undermined by far greater threats than mere physical death. In the midst of broken infrastructure and shaky relationships with the political government, discussions relating to rebuilding the fabric of the various touchetts are invariably derailed by their fixation on a diminishing historical narrative.

*Saed: Tamashek people needs their independence, their freedom, this is our way (of life). All of our stories and poem say we must be free by our own control...now we have Hausa and Zarma, they sit in the governor and all the important places in Azawar, where are the Tamashek? Azawar the home of the Tamashek touchett for longer than anyone knows...if we are enjoying our freedom and life, don't disturb us, and don't provoke us (Aradile et al. 2014).*

In place of their sociological reality and the safety, nurture, and the love it provided, our combat advisory teams find these survivors in states of shock over repeated loss; they are “stunned and bewildered” rather than panicked (Allerton 1964, 206). They are shamed by victimization and suffer from overwhelming guilt because they survived when those they

loved and where responsible for, died while they watched (Elsass 1997). The trauma story is imprinted on their memory, becoming “a personal narrative in the mind that is retold daily as it is searched for new meanings and clues” (Mollica 1988, 305).

*From the moment I was born I was a rebel. Because a person who grows up dispossessed and illiterate in the land of his ancestors becomes a rebel. Although I'm supposed to be a citizen I've never been free in my land to be anything other than a rebel. My parents died when I was a child. I have two little sisters. I am the one who takes care of us because when I look around for support, I find no one. Everyone around me is weak (Ag Al Qassim 2014).*

As they repeat their conflict trauma story to any interventionist who will listen with needed empathy, the meaning is shaped around fears of complete alienation with the refrain of “no one knows what Tamashek people think and what they feel.” And at the heart of this alienation is a “weakness” that leads to the ever-present threat of timogoutar (helplessness and hardship) as primary failures of their archaic typology of imajaren. The survivor focus on the sociological alienation and the psychological disorganization of identity rather than the physical reorganization of damaged society suggests the presence of even deeper issues than physical loss of family member and village.

*...people feel incomparably more alarmed by a threat to the psyche or the soul or the self than they are by a threat to the body. The death of the self is of far greater concern than the death of the body. People will willingly sacrifice their bodies if they perceive it as the only way to avoid “losing their souls,” “losing their minds,” or “losing face” (Gilligan 1996, 96).*

In the battlefields of the war in the Sahel, the terrain is human rather than geographic and sociological trauma is an inevitable result. The communal survivors possess individual and collective egos that are overwhelmed by conjugated emotions of guilt, fear, loss, abandonment, rage, pain, or shame. The emotions are conjugated from the breakage of the family structure and the failure of its exterior functions that support the psychological and emotional health of the family, especially the children. The collapsing family social structure generates volumes of negative emotion conjugations that are unreconciled, unintegrated and in cognitive dissonance (Horowitz M. J. 2001; Festinger 1957).<sup>62</sup> They are overpowered by mental objects of terror (or memory thereof) of both violence and abandonment in the desert, a place never meant for the survival of any but the fittest of touchetts; those of the Kel Tamashek.

The mental objects of terror at losing family members to rebellion and starvation or families abandoned by the loss of breadwinner or animal flocks leaves them without recourse to survival, resulting in sustained mental and emotional efforts at repression and avoidance. These efforts are part of a “stimulus barrier” or protective shield that the mind (ego) uses to block the flow of inward terror, horror, and pain of loss (Elsass 1997, 49; Freud S. (1929) 2002; Erikson 1959).<sup>63</sup> “Once operative, ego defenses distort both internal and external reality” in a manner that makes it difficult for interventionists to

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<sup>62</sup> The ego is the central balance between the pleasure seeking id and the righteous serving super-ego. For the ego to be overwhelmed by trauma, both the id and the super-ego have suffered blows and are in danger of failing; the id fails to demand pleasure in love, happiness, sex, and joy while the super-ego fails to value honor, sacrifice, responsibility, and compassion. The two animating forces of the ego are then suddenly quiet and reality becomes distorted.

<sup>63</sup> The process is described differently by many psychologists, but the essential point is that psychological defenses are overwhelmed or broken through by mental stimulus leaving the mind (or psyche) in a state of trauma, helplessness, hopelessness, listlessness, anesthetizing depression, and so on.

separate out unmet human needs from imagined positions and interests of the conflict parties (Turner 2007, 278). In interviews with leaders of the Collective for Renewal and Innovation (CRI) in Agadez, our discussions become exercises in the subversion of reality as claims and accusations begin to take on totalizing dimensions to account for fear, rage, and helplessness.

The mind's inability to adapt, filter, process or reject the overwhelming feelings violates the protective shield and overwhelms the ego, creating the "core of the trauma: the unbearable helplessness" of the Tamashek's timogoutar (Elsass 1997, 48). Their inability to emerge from the protective anesthetization of trauma-induced depression vastly complicated our attempts at mediation, facilitation, and negotiation of the conflict and subsequent reconstruction. In this state, the Kel Tamashek are unable to relate to the un-traumatized Hausa political elite, or to the international military-civilian interventionists, or even their own former neighbors with sufficient interactive awareness to be capable of complex relationship development outside of their own archetypes of strength and survival. What former rules and context that these traumatized survivors had for use in communicating communal ideations and needs are now destroyed and require time and effort to repair and rebuild. This process of rebuilding must allow the psychological to precede the physical.

### **The rage of shame in the land of Azaway and Azawad**

The study of emotions as a separate field within sociology dates back to the 1970s and is dominated by two perspectives of emotion's role in human behavior. The first perspective is the most traditional, where emotion is an inferior part of humanity to be feared for its lack of reason and its power to harm. The second perspective has been

called “profoundly...a reason-emotion distinction [of] two different natural kinds [of thought]...two conflicting and antagonistic aspects of the soul” (Solomon 2008, 3). From my perspective of studying communities engaged in ethnic and cultural conflict, the role of conjugated emotions as drivers of violence and inhibitors of resolution play a role that is equal to that played by the psychology of identity definition and cognition of cultural expression. Consider for instance, my rephrasing of Simone Weil’s quote at the beginning of section 5.3 above into psychological rather than religious terms: Where shame changes suffering into violence, empathy changes violence into suffering. Shame is an emotion, a psychological condition of inferiority, and a set of involuntary physiological actions; suffering is a psychological condition that is conjugated emotionally; violence is an action and could be a psychological condition of anger or rage; and empathy is an emotion, a psychological condition, and a set of involuntary physiological actions. Yet the complex interaction between shame, suffering, violence, and empathy still prevents us from fully understanding the driving factors in extreme communal violence and genocide.

In titling this section “the rage of shame,” I hope to do more than make a catchy phrase. I hope to bring to light that shame and rage are principal actors on the stage of extreme communal violence and that they must be dealt with in the same manner as drought and famine. Within the families and touchetts of the Kel Tamashek, the conjugations of emotional shame trends toward a particularly virulent pathology of withdrawal, psychic pain, and incendiary action. The exterior functions of the Tamashek family structure defend the members within from the violence of the desert, both human and natural. Its strength or rigidity protects them from abandonment in a nomadic life that

is under constant threat of oblivion from the ergs and the Shamal winds. When the family structure is damaged from physical loss or adaptive failure in the face of success by the enemy “other,” the alienation and shame threaten an annihilation that is totalized and imminent.

That the shame is annihilating and totalizing is not surprising given the starkness of the Tuareg family’s group identity and its interrelation to their environment. Simply said, when the exterior protection of family is weakened, they become exposed; they have nowhere to go, no refuge from the reality of physical and psychological survival in an unforgiving habitat. The shame creates an inordinate focus on the repair of the self – individual and group beyond what is needed for survival and “encompasses the whole of ourselves; it generates a wish to hide, to disappear, or even to die.” Shame creates conditions of narcissism, which is the “ultimate attempt to avoid shame” (Lewis M., 1995, 2).

Refer back for a moment, to the earlier sections that describe the family sociological structure as sociocentric in terms of the locus of member control and the blended development of member identities. In healthy families, shame is central to the maintenance of the health of member relationships, social identity placement, and *it’tikhal*, or acceptable family conduct (Lewis H. B. 1971). The psychological organization and sociological structure of the Tamashek family past and present establishes how “shame and self-consciousness are experienced and addressed” (Lewis M. 1995, 2). When the violence of rebellion, drought, and famine separates the family from its *walagan* (family honor or tribute), pushing it into alienation, the emotional conjugation becomes “unacknowledged shame...a crucial but hidden causal agent [of

psychic pain], leading to irrational and destructive behavior” (Scheff & Retzinger 1991, 104). Each time we investigated a case of razzia (tribal raid) between Fulani and Tamashek nomadic families along the Niger-Mali border, an action-reaction cycle normally prevailed that extended the violence further.

Even when the victimized children were fed by intervening humanitarian assistance, the animals provided lifesaving water, and the remnants of the touchetts’ scattered tents recovered, the virulence of this pathology of shame went untreated, terminating in overwhelming “destructive aggression: shame is first evoked, which leads to rage and then to violence” (Scheff & Retzinger 1991, 3). The removal of the children from their ashok (honor) and allok (character traits) status as protected members of an inner family structure to refugees within their own encampment reduced their social placement and esteem within their own estimation. Then because of the density of family members’ identity collectivization and the faintness of individual definition, the shame of the children became the shame of the father. As the principal prototype of the imajaren archetype within the family, the father’s failure to protect; failure to avenge the shame, weakened his and the family’s central and unifying identity coherence. Psychological defenses become operationalized and internal and external reality of cause, effect, and utilitarian response is subverted by an overwhelmed ego unable to integrate such extreme shame (Turner 2007). Balho explains the relationship between identity, conflict, honor, character, alienation, betrayal, banishment, and shame in terms of failure to protect family from razzia or tribal raids:

*Balho: The identity of Tamashek is in the tagelmoust what you can see and imajaren that you cannot see unless there is amaghr...a Tamashek father is*



*imajaren he must protect his family and his touchett. It'tikhal is what makes us Tamashek and is for all the community (Tamashek) don't do something who can blame Tamashek; to be Tamashek is Ashok. This is his allok if he fail [to protect, to save] he does not have ashok he is azook. To lose ashok is to do tagadar he take off the tagelmoust...any Amashek who leaves amaghr, that's bad he has Alghar; his touchett has milkate (banish) id his family has tekrakit...it's like you shoot him (Aradile, Ahmed, Assalim, Eridel, & Ahmad, 2014).*

The pathology of shame differs fundamentally from the pathology of guilt in that the “target of guilt is conceived to be the self’s behavior whereas the target of shame is presumed to be the whole self” (Kaufman G. P. 1996, 6). My experience in Niger, Chad, and Darfur is that the more remote the community; the greater the sovereignty of security and survival that the community possesses; the more debilitating and dangerous are the effects of shame. It is in this correlation between remoteness, sovereignty of security and survival that the emotional logic of shame emerges. Shame is a primal emotion<sup>64</sup> that cannot be shared because it is produced by a singular condition of psychological alienation (Scheff & Retzinger 1991). The condition of alienation produces a family of shaming emotions that include “disgrace, degradation, dishonor, and debasement” (Nathanson 1987, 3). The condition of guilt occurs within the mind of the individual when it judges (or believes) that his or her actions have violated accepted community standards.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> Scheff & Retzinger refer to shame as a “master emotion” that can either inhibit the resolution of other painful emotions or amplify yet others into uncontrolled emotional rage (1991, xix).

<sup>65</sup> Feelings of guilt (such as remorse) are accompanied by humiliation, an aspect of falling self esteem. The difference is that the person still feels entitled to be in their primary group; they have violated standards, but they can and will atone and the balance will be restored.

The condition of shame occurs within the mind of the individual when it judges (or believes) that his or her self-identity is unworthy of itself and in violation of the archetype of what that community seeks as its highest expression of human goodness (Wurmser 1981). We feel guilt for what we do or fail to do, whereas we feel shame for what we are. In Balho's explanation, the imajaxen who fails to protect doesn't just fail in actions, he fails in ashok (honor), in allok (character) and in it'tikhal, the right path of the Tamashek. He is defeated and becomes the antithesis of the central archetype of his identity. The distinction is in the severity and in the possibilities of recovering our place in the group. Guilt can be as easy as saying "I am sorry," but apologizing does not work for Balho's fallen imajaxen because the quality of the self has become known to be unworthy of continued participation in the life sustaining relationships of Tamashek family and community. The imajaxen is ikchad (rotten or corrupted) and the self has become alienated from redemption.

A failure to protect may be a bit less catastrophic for the egocentric person because they are often linked to so many different groups with differing normative standards of behavior and being. For the sociocentric person who's Tuareg family and touchett-bound, his imajaxen nomadic worldview that serves as the basis for his or her identity, this is a big problem. Because the shamed imajaxen believes himself to be separated from his primary group membership that harbors his existential identity or self (the I Am), he faces the threat of psychic annihilation if the situation remains unresolved. Because the shamed individual has transgressed against everyone in his failure to uphold it'tikhal and the imperatives of imajaxen, his transgression cannot be shared, assuaged, or mitigated by forgiving others who have also transgressed (Nathanson 1987; Scheff & Retzinger 1991).

Because the quality, nature, and subsequent alienation of the shamed person from their primary human membership occur in their own mind and not in the physical reality of community justice, external redemption or forgiveness is not possible. It must come from within the damaged superego or it has no meaning for the shamed person.

Self-redemption to communal membership from azook (alienation), milkate (banishment), and tekrahit (shame) is possible and all cultures possess mythical instructions on how a shamed community member might transform and regain their placement including the Tamashek (Horowitz D. L. 1985). These mythical instructions usually involve sacrifice, suffering, and heroic deeds that demonstrate their total transformation from alienated-stranger to community prototype illuminating the most heartfelt aspects of the communal archetype (Stein 1983; Stein 1994). Within the controlling imajaxen archetype of the Tamashek community, transformation is likely to involve displays of amaghr or battle and redemption likely to involve the vanquishing of enemy or forfeit of life in the attempt. The possibilities of redemption and transformation, however, lie entirely in the mind of the shamed person, and except for the spiritual leader of the community, few outsiders can help. Like other physical diseases, what is possible in prevention is not always possible in treatment, and like the most virulent of physical diseases, the pathology of shame in sociocentric society gets much worse.

Because shame occurs in the mind of the person, the causative event for the shame may be different in depth, quality, and texture for different individuals experiencing the same occurrence. This is why it can't be shared or externally ameliorated (Scheff & Retzinger, 1991). Nor can it be predicted based solely on the external event. Mortal shame occurs when the effected person believes that there is no recourse, no return from

that place of alienation that they find themselves in (Wurmser 1981; Nathanson 1987). Mortal shame creates a unique combination of extreme panic mixed with piercing psychological pain that can be physically debilitating because it directly threatens the sufferer with immediate psychological death (Gilligan 1996). The pathology of this condition is the disintegration of the superego, the part of the psyche that directs the self towards integration, love, selflessness, service, and heroism (Erikson 1959; Schore 1994).

The disintegration of the superego occurs in mortally shamed persons when the person believes that the quality of their self (I Am) has been denounced as defective by the community that gave it life and preserves its existence (Nathanson 1987). Mortal shame that damages or destroys the superego is not about a mere mistake that can be atoned for (Kaufman G. P., 1996). This shame only occurs when the mind believes itself unworthy to continue as part of the human structure that it calls home (Nathanson 1987). To be mortally shamed is a fate far worse than death; in death, we live in the remembrance of others through transmission of our existential identity across generational time and space. As Ag Sayadi suggests below, in mortal shame, we are forgotten, cast out of the historical narrative so that existentially, we never were and never will be. For the Tamashek, that place of existential annihilation is timogoutar, where they are not imajaren, imrad, or inhaden, the lessor of the primary archaic types of Tamashek identity. These are the conditions involving shame that should red flag the practitioner of peacekeeping and stability operations missions. Behind mortally shamed persons' overwhelming psychological pain is the possibility for overwhelming physical violence. Without the connectivity of the individual to the community archetypes of

goodness and adulation via the (now disintegrating) superego, most aspects of physical control over violent rage disappear (Baumeister & Vohs 2004).

*Ag Sayadi: You are asking about what's in our mind, here there is no one who knows that for sure because of timogoutar. If my son leaves for the town and does not come back to me; he does not learn Tamashek...he does not learn imawalan, and does not learn imajaren from the Hausa or Zarma who give him a job Maybe he wears a dress of the imedlan n ikufar (lands of the whites) (western suits) and takes off his tagelmoust. For me this is timogoutar because my touchett sees that my son is not imajaren, not even imrad or inhaden. In my family now we have arkanaé when we cannot give our children manna or aman...Salamatou taala nakou tidgazak wan tiksada fil diffa'rrwa (when my daughter cries from hunger and thirst I feel emotional pain and fear of tomorrow) (Aradile et al. 2014).*

As difficult as this is so far, its gets even worse, especially when my team works to rehabilitate the sociological structure of relationships, communication and meaning within the touchetts of Kel Tamashek and between them and other ethnic touchetts of Fulani, Hausa, and Songhai. Shame follows a “moment of exposure” to an alienating event such as “betrayal, treachery, or abandonment,” events that are all too common in the midst of communal violence (Nathanson 1987, 4). The individual shaming ideations involve the creation of a deep awareness of personal defectiveness that “reveals aspects of the self of a peculiarly sensitive, intimate and vulnerable nature” (Nathanson 1987, 4). These personal defects of a peculiarly sensitive, intimate and vulnerable nature are often linked to specific psychological issues that relate to conditions of psychological distress

amongst the Kel Tamashek: “What one is ashamed for or about clusters around several issues: (1) I am weak, I am failing in competition; (2) I am dirty, messy, the content of myself is looked at with disdain and disgust; (3) I am defective, I have shortcomings in physical and mental makeup; (4) I have lost control over my body functions and my feelings” (Wurmser 1981, 27-28).

Because shame is created by feelings of irretrievable alienation that prevent the afflicted person from sharing their pain with others, their condition naturally inhibits the reconciliation of other base emotions like love, grief, terror, and fear that accompany the ongoing communal violence (Gilligan 1996; Scheff & Retzinger 1991). As the mortally shamed person finds himself alone and unable to interrelate with other loved ones as a release for the emotion generated by the ongoing communal violence, extreme dissonance occurs between the id-ego and disintegrating superego inducing the onset of uncontrolled rage (Scheff & Retzinger 1991). Against the painful needs of the id for love, affection, inclusion, belonging, and attention, the superego continues to generate powerful psychic pain of shame, turning away from the very needs that are pressuring the id and tearing apart the ego’s sense of self. This internal conflict constitutes a war within the mind of the mortally shamed and without the possibility of resolution, leads to deeper psychopathologies towards eventual psychological death (Gilligan 1996; Herman J. L. 1992).

*Saed: With amaghr id iban-aman always comes tatreet (disease) twarna id tiwarnawen is one sickness or many sickness...and when it leaves, we have lost our wives and children to emutyen. My brother he went mad when his children died from hunger...he attacked the government camp with only a stick and they*

*killed him...we have found timogoutar, the bad hardness that does not let us do anything to end it (Aradile et al.2014).*

The sort of violent communal conflict that Saed relates above tends to create roles of victim and perpetrator that are often intermingled within one village, one family, or even one individual. In the psychological and physical discourse that follows each violent convulsion, victim-perpetrators exchange roles in a physical cycle of violence fueled by a complex psychological defense of their sociological structure of being. An example of this cycle of violence begins with survivor guilt of a victim. The victim subsequently attempts to alleviate shame (for the failure to protect) by the pursuit of heroic sacrifice-vengeance that the victim-turning-perpetrator pays as his price to redeem his lost place outside his family archetype (or his family's lost place within the communal archetype). The importance of this explanation is that the central driver of communal violence is psychological and emotional, not utilitarian (as in inter-state conflicts). Incidents of looting, dismembering, disemboweling, burning prisoners, raping and torture are all part of the twisted heroic-vengeance attempt to restore individual honor to family and family honor to tribe (Christian 2012). In this cycle, the victim ceases to be a victim by victimizing the perpetrator and repairing the shame-alienation breach. This cycle of violence described by Tambatan can be seen in the devolving behavior of the victims-perpetrators of nearly every violent communal conflict.

*Tamashek, you are in this world but there is no one who loves you; Stop, stop doing bad living in timogoutar...please all of you stand up and put your hands together and go as leaders of families to fix your life now and differ'awa (in the future); It is not a good idea to live apart; we are meant to live together; Amaghr,*

*amaghr together to build a good Tamashek touchett; Oh Kel Tamashek, what is wrong between all of our touchetts? Be Tamashek of honor and raise up; keep your selves as your emarr'wan (parents) fight against those who steal ashok and allok; All the world is watching you and listening to you; the other ethnics are watching you closely so prepare for amaghr in every touchett; Arr, iszzoum (defeat, slay) the enemy of Kel Tamashek (Tambatan 2014).*

In the aftermath of death, loss, dismemberment, betrayal, abandonment, and the accompanying effects of shame and rage, I generally found that the survivors expressed four general responses: withdrawal, avoidance, self-denigration, and the denigration of others, which are primary markers of shame (Elison, Pulos, & Lennon 2006). While some victims follow only one response, others will follow several, or all of them. The Tamashek father in Balho's story who allowed his home to be invaded and his beloved children to be killed for the entire village and community to see is himself attacked by powerful emotional responses. These emotional and psychological responses are called *tidgazak*, or emotional pain, and are more distressing than *arkanaé*, or physical pain. At this level of emotional pain, *tidgazak* descends into *timogoutar*, blending survivor guilt, shame over not protecting his family, pain from loss of love, fear over loss of purpose in life, or terror from his imaginations of the suffering of his babies to name a few.

The father's shame over his impotence in failing to protect his family and home would preclude his sharing his other pain with extended family and clan. Left unattended, the victimized father might withdraw from neighbors (especially if they were suspect, witnesses or bystanders to the defilement of family) and avoid confronting the loss of his family. He would find himself caught between his superego's denigration of himself for



the failure and his id's enraged demand that he redeem his imajaven archaic typology through heroic acts of sacrifice and vengeance; such as attacking the government camp (military base) armed with only a stick. I can compare similar events in conflicts in Darfur, Chad, Niger, and Mali that present these same psychological pathways to violence. Unchecked, they create a revenge-victimization-revenge cycle of violence that leaves the political state and the interventionist community unable to comprehend, much less intervene in.

One final note on this section involves community members whose defenses have withstood the psychological assault of victimization. "The pathogenic...effects of shame can be...inhibited, or redirected, both by the presence or absence of other feelings, such as guilt or innocence, and by the specific social and psychological circumstances in which shame is experienced" (Gilligan 1996, 111). Logically, there will always be some members of a traumatized society that do not suffer many or any of the symptomology of the community. They will be the first to reorganize physically and psychologically, most likely by rejecting not the pain of loss, but rather the object of that loss; family, neighbors, and friends in a process of peritraumatic dissociation (Lensvelt-Mulders et al. 2008; van der Kolk, van der Hart, & Marmar 1996). Free of any burden of the now destroyed community, they now constitute an individually self-contained social unit of one, purporting to speak for their community. They are often the first cogent speakers that humanitarian and peace operations interventionists meet when they arrive in the conflict zone and present themselves as literate, informed observers. In reality, however, they speak only for themselves and will, if allowed, thoroughly flourish in the influx of aid and donor dollars that flow in the conflict zone, disconnected and untroubled by the

pain and loss around them. Their very ability to so quickly reorganize the social construct of their ego reality suggests the tenuousness of their former connection with the traumatized community.

### **Between imajaxen and timogoutar: bipolar archaic typologies of Tamashek identity**

Throughout my research, interviews and analysis over the past eighteen months, I found that I was continuously returning to two central psychological concepts that controlled sociological structure and directed emotional conjugation; that of imajaxen and timogoutar. From observation and phenomenological inquiry I sensed that these concepts serve as twin points of conclusion in conversation, stories, poems, and rich descriptions of Tamashek lived experience. From the eemeyen, tisseewhy, and interview transcripts, one can easily see the centrality of timogoutar, a concept explored in more detail below. But also I found that the concept of imajaxen is equally important.

The name imajaxen means warrior-savior-protector and is an intentional meaning when in dialogue about the prototypical Tuareg known as the ifoghas (noble) clans of northern Mali or about the imohox (warrior) clans of the Kel Rely in southern Algeria. Consequently, I arrived at a number of conclusions that help me to understand the Tamashek identity construction and how it is sustained and or damaged. First, I concluded that all of these names (imajaxen, ifoghas, imohox) constitute a single-central archaic type of “feeling-toned” representation of the personal and collective Tamashek self or “I Am” that constitutes conscious and unconscious self-awareness (Hopcke 1989, 77). Second, I concluded that this archaic type of imajaxen is part of a dyad that is both bipolar and symbiotic in operation and sustainment. The other pole of the archaic type

dyad is the feeling-toned representation of timogoutar/timagatirte (plural/singular), which is a complex state of helplessness and hardship in inescapable shock.




Figure 15: Between imajaven and timogoutar: bipolar archaic typologies of Tamashek identity

The Tamashek man or family can never attain the perfection of imajaven or suffer the fullest annihilation of timogoutar. These types are fantasies used in the formation and sustainment of meaning that in turn guides the identification of prototypical representations of each fantasy opposite. These two archaic types are bipolar because they represent two extreme opposite states of feeling-toned representations of the personal and collective self. They are symbiotic because they are defined in opposition to or against each other, suggesting they are mutually necessary to meaning definition and meaning sustainment. I leave open the possibility that these two archaic types are in fact, a single feeling-toned representation of Tamashek self (identity) that includes two

balanced polar opposites whose central middle state harbors the placement of psyche and spirit. Kalsched's description of the inner workings of archaic types suggest the former, where the feeling-toned representation of imajaxen and of timogoutar each contain polar opposites rooted in physical instincts and affects, each with independent spiritual and mental imagery.

For Jung, all archetypes are bipolar dynamic structures combining opposites within themselves. One pole of the archetype represents instinct and related affects rooted in the body; the other pole is represented by a form giving spiritual component made up of images produced by the mind. The *psyche* exists between these two opposites and represents a "third" factor combining instinct/affect and spirit into unconscious fantasies that create meaning (Kalsched 1996, 92).

The importance of identifying the central archaic types of the Tamashek and understanding their internal functionality is in order to discern and track the effects of trauma on the personal and collective self as principal drivers of conflict and inhibitors of resolution. Trauma breaks the mind's established meaning of cause and effect, or threat versus safety. Trauma interrupts the psyche's ability to infer meaning (or realistic meaning) to events and situations because it "seems to rupture the integrated functioning of the archetype, severing the links between affect and image, thereby rendering experience meaningless" (Kalsched 1996, 93). Because trauma interferes with the archaic type imajaxen, the meaning of noble, savior, protector, or warrior can lose affect in the creation of mental imagery leaving fathers and their families with emotional conjugations increasingly negative or acquiescent of violent outplays as the only avenue to continue feeling something. Trauma interferes with the psyche's placement between the defining

archaic types of imajaxen and timogoutar, creating imagined fear and fantasies of annihilation that overpowers reason and drowns out the nurturance that balances the family life in the Tamashek touchetts.

**Timogoutar as an archaic typology of Tamashek identity.** During my time spent observing and listening to my Tamashek hosts, I came to question the origins of timogoutar. The concept is woven into tisseewhy and eemeyen ancient and modern without a clear explanation of origin. It seems as if this mythical state of horrific helplessness and hardship has always existed and therefore, archaic. There is no single chosen trauma that I could discern that affected all Tuareg geographical confederations that would explain the adoption of such a concept as helpless hardship. In chapter four, I speculated that timogoutar serves as negative fantasizing of helplessness as a result of geographical and geological hardship in survival in the desert. In relation to this line of inquiry, I began to explore in analysis, the idea that timogoutar serves an oppositional negative archaic type that works to define the positive archaic type of Imajaxen, but also serves as an organizing, cohering force for the central archaic type of imajaxen. In the interview extracts below, the relationship between the Tamashek and timogoutar is portrayed as a place they are in; a condition they part of (ibaradan); a place or condition without hope (d'rann), a description of sickness and dying; and a result of hunger, thirst, emotional pain, and fear of tomorrow:

*Balkhou: ...my son is with the fighting and he is in Allah's grace but at least they feed him. If he should die in the fighting, how will we continue? We will be in timogoutar.*

*Saed: ...we have found timogoutar, the bad hardness that does not let us do anything to end it. ...Now we are nowhere in the land of Azawar. We are ibaradan (plural, abarade is singular)...this means a good Tamashek man who never did any bad things to be in timogoutar.*

*Algabib: ...with emutyen, we have no animals, no manna, no work, no d'rann, in timogoutar.*

*Balho: Sometimes the outsiders bring amagal for amghar...Amghar is the Tamashek word for old man, and Amagal is the word for medicine...but sometimes twarna (sickness) is too deep or in amed'drn (the thinking) of amghar id emarr'wan (old men and grandparents) to help them...this is timogoutar from emutyen (Aradile et al. 2014).*

*Ag Sayadi: ...salamatou taala nakou tidgazak wan tiksada fil diffa'rrwa. Nakou timogoutar (when my daughter cries from hunger and thirst I feel emotional pain and fear of tomorrow. I am helpless). (Aradile et al. 2014)*

I underlined several portions of the phrases above that I heard over and again to illustrate the centrality to their thinking. These descriptive conditions or states of timogoutar logically symbolize the absence (or fear of absence) of imajaxen and the corresponding loss of ashok, allok, walagan, and ultimately, it'tikhal, as evaluative icons of personal and collective esteem that rank and order the Tamashek touchett. Rather than being seen as calls for direct assistance, I took them to be internal calls for re-expressing the imajaxen archaic type, accompanied by requests to the larger non-Tuareg society for permission to resume or repair their breaking structure of identity. The latter assertion is continuously suggested by Tuareg leader's statements such as this one from Ag Hamid:

*Ag Hamid: The United Nations need to help but they don't know, which way or where they will start...from 1910 to today, it's not the same like today...a lot of things change...we are not able to even write our names in Tifinaɣ (Berber alphabet that predates the introduction of Arab Bedouin or Europeans to North Africa)...But we understand each other still...no one else does. Amghar Tamashek tmidrɛt fil amagar (an old man's life is about the war or struggle) (Aradile et al. 2014).*

That the outside community cannot help the Tamashek is self-evident in that they can't even understand them (the Tuareg). Constantly, Tamashek thought, poetry, and stories emphasize their differential placement in the desert between white Arab and black African; between coastal life and sub-Saharan agrarianism; and between sedentarism and imawalan (nomadism). By casting nomadism as an essential part of imajaxen values, Tambatan asserts that the sedentary life of urban and agrarian economic pursuits are relegated to the despair of timogoutar:

- ⴰ *Tamashek without imawalan is in timogoutar*
- ⴰ *Agass imzad is both a cry of alarm and a message of hope*
- ⴰ *It is a cry of alarm because our anxiety is high that each year that is ending will see the holding of tradition becoming less numerous month by month*
- ⴰ *It is a message of hope that speaks to the desire for (iyzerien) a younger generation to take the baton to (agass) save/preserve/protect the imzad*
- ⴰ *It is also the expression of a willingness that this desire materializes in the desert life of Tamashek that was born one day of a spark; and over the*

*centuries has patiently built the magnificent edifice and made music and majesty the tagaste wan imzad id tomoost wan Tamashek*

ⴰ *A gorgeous but fragile construction in a modern world that is both more open and more aggressive is a condition, which requires us to dedicate a thorough reflection.*

ⴰ *The imzad is to Tamashek is what the soul is to elam (corpus): Agass imzad*<sup>66</sup> (Tambatan 2014).

The essential positive values of the imajaren archaic type are constructed as defiance against that dark physical, mental, and emotional place of timogoutar. With generational transmission, imajaren becomes pedagogy of defiance against the trauma of timogoutar and timogoutar in turn would become pedagogy of learned



*Figure 16: Photo of Tamashek women repairing their imzad during eemeyen and tisseewhy sessions*

helplessness and victimization, if not for the mediating presence of the savior-protector-warrior polar opposite. Together, imajaren and timogoutar represent a healthy functioning archaic type where the two polar opposites “enrich and energize” the larger communal identity (Kalsched 1996, 92). We can see this demonstrated within the Tamashek communities in essuf whose insistence on maintaining their historical battle to

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<sup>66</sup> Photo provided by Ibrahim Amawal; shows two women playing or tuning their imzad musical instruments, a central element of Tuareg nomadic life used to transmit historical oral narrative and express cultural identity.



survive in the Sahara and Sahel defies understanding from their sub-Saharan political masters.

Generation after generation, the Tuareg men and women plan, prepare, and survive the worst that nature has to offer, working the acts of survival and defiance into historical narrative and identity definition. Their survival against timogoutar is not merely a result of a defiant archaic typology (imajaxen), but rather constitutes one half of an identity construct that is as much a pedagogy of fear of timogoutar as it is a pedagogy of defiant protector-savior-warrior (imajaxen). If true, this hypothesis suggests that the Kel Tamashek cannot easily relinquish their hold over their defiant imajaxen archaic type, but also, they may not be able to easily adapt to conditions where the state of timogoutar is destroyed through state-provided structural safeguards to health, welfare, and such. In short, the Kel Tamashek may need the desert to remain imajaxen as much as they need to be imajaxen to survive in the desert.

But the emutyen, or big change, that comes with the encroachment of satellite, cellular communications, and city-towns with commercial access to jobs for young people, and the overall lure of life in diaspora outside of the desert provides a direct challenge to the central construction of the imajaxen – timogoutar archaic types that enrich and energize Tuareg identity. With the threatened removal of timogoutar comes the collapse of the archetypal dyad, where modern structural safeguards deny the continued requirement for the imajaxen pole of protection and savior that the remainder of the Tuareg identity is constructed around. The loss of their central archaic types cannot be easily managed in the same manner as the Shamal, the razzia, or even droughts and famine.

Emutyen that denies the need for and power of the imajaxen threatens dissolution of the Tamashek touchett through the loss of the cohering power of its polar opposite. The loss of coherence of the touchett would still bring the dreaded timogoutar, only in a different venue—one of membership dissolution rather than physical annihilation. Even beyond the disorganization of the Tamashek identity that emutyen threatens, the cognitive imprinting from the extremes of psychogeography and psychogeology adds to the difficulty of adaptation outside of their harsh desert environment.

*Image and instinct of imajaxen and timogoutar as archaic types.* Carl Jung writes, “... the image represents the meaning of the instinct” (Butler 2014, 44). Where the image of imajaxen represents the instincts of fight and flight, the image of timogoutar represents the traumatic helplessness of inescapable shock. The traumatic breakage of the Tuareg’s ability to fight or flight creates conditions where instinct is “severed” from its associated archaic type dyad image, “thereby destroying the psychological structure and leaving an already fragile ego further undernourished” (Kalsched 1996, 92). The resulting psychological organization of the personal and collective self tends to experience life without image or instinct and is “hence meaningless. The capacity for fantasy is destroyed” (Kalsched 1996, 92). The once sacred desert becomes only a sphere of desolation and loss.

The distant specter of timogoutar that is defended against by the images of imajaxen, imawalan, and the safety of erg and massif becomes meaningless without capacity for further inclusion into the fantasy narrative of collective identity. The instincts of aggression, sexuality, or survival become disconnected events devoid of meaning or interest to the continuation of the family’s historical narrative. The loss of fantasy needed

to infuse meaning into events used to project purpose into narrative removes “emotional significance” from language and prevents or distorts emotional conjugations of sociological functions (McDougall J. 1989, 18).

Anthropology provides several stark examples of communities who suffered disintegration of membership and even will to survive the devolution of personal and collective psychological organization. One such community is the Ik tribe of northern Uganda whose psychological devolvement from a failing large group identity resulted in a sociological collapse of family and community so total that anthropologist Margaret Mead described their plight as “terrifying” and “monstrous almost beyond belief” (Turnbull 1972). A more recent example of a society suffering the effects of psychological devolvement from trauma and resulting sociological collapse is the Chechen peoples of the Caucasus Mountains in the aftermath of the Russian interventions of the 1990s. For Ik and Chechen, the collapse of their sociological structure of order included the demotion of their essential archaic types that supported identity, meaning and emotional conjugation. Both were “reduced to suffering and needs, forgetful of dignity and restraint...whose life or death can be lightly decided with no sense of human affinity” (Hirsch 1995, 46).

Whether the external traumatic event arrives in the form of a psychogeographic loss of habitat as in the case of the Ik, or in the form of an invasive politico-military neighbor, the sequelae of trauma induced by an inability to adapt to rapid and overwhelming change can prove fatal. The power of the collective psychological organization’s archaic types call their members to cohere in communal membership with a terrible force that cannot be ignored without individual peril (to psychic health). In the psychological ruins

of their sociological structures, the traumatized members “become totally trapped... [where] all generally held social and cultural beliefs are replaced by the only reality he has been forced to know – the trauma story” (Mollica 1988, 307). When cognitive imprinting from extremes of geography, geology, and climate are added to the calls-to-position from the collective’s archaic types, a community may not be able to adapt to rapid and substantive change without significant distress.

The archaic types of imajaxen and timogoutar are dependent for their functioning on the natural extremes of the geography and geology from which they evolved and by the human prototypes that reflect the beauty and majesty of their collective identity. One cannot be imawalan or imajaxen for instance, without erg, massif, and Ténéré providing the possibilities of timogoutar, which in turn provide for the possibilities of saving, protecting, surviving, or imagining historical content in an otherwise empty desert. Collectively, the archaic types; the geography; and the geology organize and cohere communal membership. They establish an accepted and balanced emotional conjugation of esteeming energy. They provide necessary meaning to the capacity to preserve and protect the essential inner values and coherence. Finally, they ensure the accurate transmission of the resulting narrative and embedded existential identity across generational time and space.

These are some of the principal functions of Tamashek identity and its foundation of archaic types of physical, cognitive, and emotional representations of human life and purpose. That their identity is based on the struggle to maintain life in the most inhospitable spaces of earth creates an identity defect that drives conflict and inhibits

resolution.<sup>67</sup> The defect drives conflict and inhibits resolution by calling community members into positions that are aligned with their archaic types and that are inside a mythical fantasy world of beauty. This beautiful world of the Kel Tamashek transcends the metaphysical through the application of imajaxen image to timogoutar image and both images applied to their common reality as descriptors of instinct and conjugations of emotions.

*The psychogeography and psychogeology of timogoutar.* Logically, the deeper the identity defect in relation to present circumstances, the greater the threatened disintegration as the communal collective is less able to bypass or grow around the problem issue. In the case of the Kel Tamashek, the strength of their archaic typology structure (imajaxen and timogoutar poles in balance) that is able to withstand extreme natural hardship becomes the defect that threatens their ability to adapt and survive emutyen. The structure's rigidity becomes its downfall and the archaic type timogoutar then becomes the mechanism by which their communal psychological organization and sociological structure disintegrates, despite the presence of international assistance. Returning to the exploration of the archetypal pole timogoutar, this place that is both a feared destination and a condition of mind, body, and emotion would seem to be the genesis for the development of the larger dyad that includes imajaxen. As such,

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<sup>67</sup> The use of the word "defect" is related to the perspective of the research purpose; the identification of conflict drivers and inhibitors of resolution short of the use of kinetic force. A defect in one age or region can well be a positive in another. Thus my use of defect is not meant to be an inherent problematic descriptor of the central archetypal dyad of the Kel Tamashek; rather it appears to be an obstacle to their ability to adapt to a rapidly changing world around them. From a psychoanalytical anthropological perspective, this dyad makes for a fascinating study of human psychological organization and sociological construction. Researchers like Anja Fischer and Ines Kohl continue to explore the future of imawalan (nomadism) as both an important part of the archetypal dyad and as a sociological construction in the twenty-first Century. Perhaps they will help discover pathways for this archetypal dyad of imajaxen and timogoutar to overcome its defect and successfully adapt to a changing world.

understanding this archaic type would be useful in understanding any psychological devolution of the Tamashek collective identity and communal ethos.

As described in the previous chapter, timogoutar is a Tamashek word that roughly translates as a combination of hardship and helplessness. From both ethnographic observation and phenomenological inquiry, I find that timogoutar is borne out of the physical challenge to survive life in the open desert. Real life exists on stretches of semi-arid lands capable of harboring seasonal millet and the occasional underground well and are surrounded by majestic seas of ergs and massifs that form the psychological boundaries of a horizon ideology central to imawalan (nomadic life). Within the boundaries of the Sahara's horizons, Tamashek touchetts survive by nature and nurture in the absence of water, vastness of space, and shocking aloneness. The strands of timogoutar involve individual cognitions of tiksada, aksoudak, or warwalek (fear, horror, or terror); extreme thirst in the face of absolute dryness; extreme cold and heat from which there is no shelter; or famine and loneliness that cannot be escaped. Because the Sahara and the Sahel constitute the totality of their known reference, the Kel Tamashek have trouble describing their environment; they cannot explain to the western reader what it is, only what it isn't. Below I've reproduced an excerpt from Al Jazeera's interview with filmmaker May Welsh Ying, the director/producer of the three part video documentary series titled "Orphans of the Sahara" that aired on Al Jazeera in early 2014. Ying's simple but eloquent portrait of the effects of the open desert on human life from a western frame of reference give us insight into these strands of archaic type timogoutar that create and sustain the polar type of imajaxen:

*The physical conditions of Tuareg existence in the Sahara have hardly changed in decades. Even now, sleeping in the Sahara is like lying alone on a boat in the middle of a vast ocean. You are lying in the sand at 2 a.m. when suddenly a primordial wind howls up from infinite corridors of emptiness and time - terrifying in its loneliness, as awesome as the stars in the night sky - to confront you with the essential fact that you are alone in the universe, and everyone you have ever loved will die. If the Sahara can inspire that terrible feeling of cosmic loneliness in an adult, what would it feel like to be a child in this environment who had actually lost their parents? It is something I found myself wondering more than once during the nights we spent sleeping in freezing cold deserts, living the same way our Tuareg hosts do every day. Even the physical stamina required to live in a tent in the Sahara is incredible and always reminds you of your vulnerability and mortality. Just a few weeks of the constant exposure to sand, wind, heat and cold debilitated me to a point of exhaustion it took months to recover from (Ying 2011).*

The debilitating effects of life in essuf are no less impactful to the Kel Tamashek in the quality of their lives and in their ability to transmit existential identity embedded in memory of a collective historical narrative. Even as life in essuf debilitates, the Sahara and the Sahel possess its inhabitants with cognitive and emotional force; an imprinting on the psyche that itself is part of their identity. My Tamashek informants tell me that the Sahara “kills us even as it loves us,” a saying that is as much riddle as truth. Ying seems to sum up this dichotomy with further eloquence when she suggests that for the Tamashek, the Sahara is “mother and source” as well as “destroyer and grave.”

*On the other hand, far from being merely harsh and empty, the Sahara is a soulful place, embracing you with its solitude and beauty, its open space, and the company of gentle living things. Even the deepest parts of the desert are not dead, but filled with animals, people, culture, and history. All the feelings of being there - from sublime comfort and peace to terror and loneliness – are satisfying in their truth and draw you back to the desert, in spite of its hardship. The Sahara enriches and impoverishes the Tuareg. It is their mother and source, but also their destroyer and grave (Ying 2011).*

A central point in understanding timogoutar is that the strands of tiksada (fear), arkanaé (suffering), and tidgazak (emotional pain) are inseparable from their archaic type dyad (imajaxen and timogoutar). There is no imajaxen without timogoutar, and there is no timogoutar without the Sahara, the “mother and source” of the Kel Tamashek: "to us the Sahara means our origins. We are people who live in the Sahara, journeying in the Sahara. It represents our real nation" (Ag Alhabib 2008). All of this suggests that the concept of timogoutar is even larger than perceived by the Kel Tamashek because of the debilitating function that it creates as told in story, poem, song, and interview. In essuf, timogoutar seems to have an even deeper meaning that provides insight into the power of this word over Tuareg life experience. I believe that timogoutar describes the psychological condition of what Bessel van der Kolk calls inescapable shock, or IS. The theory of inescapable shock is based on laboratory experiments with animals subjected to life-threatening situations that require a fight or flight response. When the animals in the experiment were prevented from using either response, researchers noted a number of behavioral and physiological changes that included “deficits in learning to escape novel



adverse situations, decreased motivation for learning new contingencies, and evidence of chronic subjective distress” (Maier & Seligman 1976; van der Kolk B. A. 1988, 29).

As I related the theory of inescapable shock to the Tuareg concept of timogoutar, I came to understand that my informants thought of timogoutar as finding themselves in a “no win” situation of hardship and loss. This would explain their combining hardship and helplessness into a single word concept that is as much a physical place as a psychological and emotional state of being. The geographical vastness of the desert and mountains combined with the geological extremes of sand without water or water without shelter (during summer rain events that invariably precipitated flash floods) create daily no win situations for any human survival that is not sufficiently prepared. Where the story of western development has been to master their surroundings with growth in material inventiveness the story of Tuareg development has been to master their surroundings with growth in cognitive and emotional adaptation. In the former, the humans adapted nature to nurture and re-created. In the latter, humans adapted nurture to nature and survived. The Tuareg archaic typology of warrior-savior—Imajaxen, relates directly to this inescapable shock—timogoutar with its emphasis on endless preparation for travel, navigation, stealth, endurance, and the like. This makes imajaxen the direct counter to IS/timogoutar by ensuring that the Tuareg always maintain their ability to either fight or flight. By this reasoning, I can suggest that any perception by the Tuareg of their imajaxen archetype’s devolvement would likely trigger immediate fears of IS-timogoutar. For me, this further suggests that the archetype of imajaxen is the psychological and emotional counter to the condition of timogoutar.

To illustrate this linkage, consider the flow of dialogue in the Amenokalen interviews quoted throughout this section of analysis. The dialogue illustrates the presence of a central *amagar*, or struggle, within the historical narrative of the Kel Tamashek and the large group identity that it harbors and transmits. Central thematic issues raised by these Amenokalen (traditional Tuareg leaders) involve the tension between *imajaren* and *timogoutar* resulting from their inability to integrate *emutyen* into the existing reality of Tamashek *tmidrrt*, especially in *essuf*. The importance of their desert/mountain habitat of Azawar; the central typology of *imajaren*; its dependence on *imawalan* (nomadism); and the cognitive-emotional conjugates of *allok* (personal honor), *ashok* (principled life), and *walagan* (group ethos) suggests a rigid identity structure that is resistant to natural hardship. Ag Hamid speaks of a social order where Tamashek stands “between Arab and African and still we stand alone” (Aradile et al.2014).

This social isolation mirrors their geographical isolation in that the “African” is the master of the sub-Saharan lands of forest and the “Arab” is the master of the coast in cities of Casablanca, Tunis, Algiers, Tripoli, Benghazi, and the like. Bedouins notwithstanding, Tuareg reasoning seems to locate themselves in the central world of the desert and mountains as a primary symbolism of identity demarcation. Ag Sayadi says that “*Tmidrrt Tamashek is fil imajaren id imawalan*” or about warrior-savior and nomad, implying they are linked ideations inseparable as a struggle. Algabib echoes that “*imawalan is part of being imajaren and we can’t be imajaren if we lose our ability to remain as imawalan*” (Aradile et al. 2014). Kohl and Fischer suggest that the Kel Tamashek are “wedged” between sedentary and nomadic lives on the periphery of global trade and travel flows. They occupy a “peripheral position within the periphery” of

North Africa's global life "as they oscillate between resistance and accommodation" (2010, 2). In my analysis, I replaced resistance with imajaren and accommodation with timogoutar to describe their central existential crises of psychological devolvement and sociological disintegration.

*Failing boundaries of large group identity.* What is threatened by their growing struggle or "oscillation" between imajaren and timogoutar is a failure of the mediation process between the two. The archaic type dyad is traumatized, and the archetype is split within its own structure with one pole attacking the other. Such trauma "stirs up volcanic affect and at the same time severs it from its image-matrix" necessary to sustain the Tamashek's psychological organization, sociological structure, and emotional conjugation (Kalsched 1996, 92). As the meaning of imajaren separates from associated image and instinct, ethnic defection (usually led by iyzerien or younger generations) occurs across lines of established identity, triggering "volcanic affect" from emarr'wan (parents and grandparents) who are left behind. For the diminishing membership, the Tamashek world of desert nomadism that provided for sanctity of placement in nature and against other touchetts as a subsistence community begins to unravel. They sense that they are losing control and "losing the world" that is described in their historical narrative passed down from origination (Mollica 1988, 307). Mollica suggests that these two psychological dimensions of trauma are universal in nature and applicable across all cultures as an "accurate description of the total subjective loss of one's reality" (Mollica 1988, 307).

The Tuareg world is constructed, even predicated, on the predictable order of the natural world that modern technology and social construction recreates and reorders

along economic and political lines of convenience. This recreation and reordering threatens the Tuareg's hold over their natural world making them and their generational inheritance irrelevant. The omnipotence of the desert, with its impenetrable massifs and rolling ergs are mastered with uranium mines that rival massifs and GPS that overcomes the shifts of the ergs in navigation.

Their once undisputed hold over their desert world has become challenged by the big change of emutyen, causing the heroic story of the imajaxen to be called into question by the Tamashek's iyzerien (younger generation) inheritors. The threatened loss of their central archaic typology – imajaxen – destabilizes the known reality that their existential historical narrative rests upon. Their inability to fight or flight creates their dreaded conditions of timogoutar, a trauma state of helplessness that overrides all other stimuli. “Once an individual has lost the world, he can become totally trapped in his trauma story. In fact, all generally held social and cultural beliefs are replaced by the only reality he has been forced to know – the trauma story. Their psychosocial reality is full of the past, but empty of new ideas and life experiences” (Mollica 1988, 307). The psychosocial reality of the Tuareg is focused on the past precisely because they are unable to articulate a future outside of their archaic typologies of imajaxen, imxrad, and the noble freedom of an ideology of the horizon.

*Summary.* I describe culture as an expression of group identity. Identity is the psychological distinguishing of the self and its most closely related human members; the whole from which the individual was/is derived. At the center of identity (as I define it) exists those archaic types of human longing and desire for attainment; perceived strands of human perfection that amorously exist in forms that are tactile, visual, auditory,

olfactory, and intuitive to sense. These strands of longing and desire are molded and perhaps sparked by physical markers of ethnicity, geography/geology, and inherited mythical narrative of historical origination. At its inception, I suggest that identity is the noun (thing) and culture is the verb (action) and the adjective (description). Eventually, expressions of the verb-culture create identity-nouns of ever-greater depth in a cyclical symbiotic relationship.

But the relationship between them is important for my field of cultural and ethnic conflict and where my answers to conflict are primarily in the psychology of identity and trauma. Anthropologist Howard Stein writes that cultural identity groups possess a “compelling image or metaphor, by which it seeks to understand and organize itself” (Stein & Hill 1977). Where the “understand” part of this idea relates to the group and individual members’ need to capture their existential identity in a larger narrative that achieves human *tas-aq-q* (communion) and outward transmission, the “organize” part of his idea relates to a psychological organization of cognition, identity separation, archaic typology construction, and healthful emotional conjugation. The compelling image or metaphor directly relates both to how they understand their historical narrative and the organization of their group and individual identities that are encapsulated and transmitted across generational inheritance.

My research data suggests that the compelling image or metaphor of the Kel Tamashek is that of the *imajaren* (warrior-savior) in *essuf* (open desert-mountains) practicing *imawalan* (nomadism) as a precondition for avoiding *timogoutar* (inescapable shock) in a geography and geology that is hostile absolutely to human existence. Moreover, the construction of the central archaic typology of *imajaren* is symbiotic to the

feared psychological state of timogoutar and the sociological structure of imawalan life. In the case of the Tuareg of northern Mali and Niger, a case can be made that external events beyond their control are threatening psychological devolvement and sociological disintegration; conditions that are primary inhibitors of conflict resolution.

The piercing of the Tamashek reality that is built on imajaren and imawalan as a defense against timogoutar create a trauma that inhibits growth and adaptation to the emutyen change they so fear. Within the dialogue of Tuareg communal life, one can hear the cognitive dissonance of identity, culture and sociological construction. For example, in the second interview session, Ag Hamid says that the native writing of Tamashek is in the Tifinaɣ alphabet which most Tuareg are not able to read or write. Yet in the first interview, Balho poignantly asks how they can be Tamashek if they can't speak the language that bears their name? In the first interview, Ag Sayadi frames a central fear of identity definition for the Kel Tamashek when he talks about identity markers and threatened cultural assimilation into African and Arab cultural life (Horowitz D. L. 1985).

*Ag Sayadi: How will they know emarr'wan (parents and grandparents) and eemeyen batu (oral – talk stories of the past)? When the Hausa and Zarma towns take iyzerien what about assam'drn tas-aq-q (remembering and relationships)?*  
(Aradile et al.2014)

The Tamashek fear of identity boundary failure and cultural assimilation has been at the forefront of their efforts at constructing real and imaginary physical markers of identity and cultural expression for the duration of their historical narrative. In interview three, Ag Hamid links the central Tamashek archaic typology with the physical markers

of skin color and language as well as the Tuareg psychogeography of their horizon ideology.

*Ag Hamid: Tamashek comes from Amashek...in the past, Amashek was the leaders (of the Tuareg) before the colonization (by the French)...Tamashek children in those days would learn only their parent's language; now our children learn the language of the African and the French. The color of the imawalan and imajaxen (nomad and warrior) is imešwaxan and satta fan (imaginary skin colors of red and green respectively) and their language is Tamashek. Without Tamashek what color are we? What are we to the Africans and to the Arabs?*  
(Aradile et al. 2014)

By framing the Tamashek as existing between imikwal African and blanc Arab, the Tuareg have created, over the life of their historical narrative, a model of structural relationship that Stein refers to as an adversary symbiosis of differentiation, where black, white, and red/green communal colors exist only in opposition to each other (Stein 1982). This adversary symbiosis allows the color blocks to define and differentiate themselves from each other, thereby strengthening their own identity boundaries while dissociating negative traits from within onto the outer other (Stein 1983; Volkan 1986). As the reality of emutyen takes hold over the Tamashek touchetts, the boundary walls of identity weaken. Ag Hamid's plaintive question asking what color they will be without Tamashek is a stark reminder that their nomadic world built on language, the psychological boundaries of horizon, and the geology of erg and massif are crumbling.

## Chapter 6: Discussion and Implications of the Research

*So much of what is best in us is bound up in our love of family that it remains the measure of our stability because it measures our sense of loyalty. All other pacts of love or fear derive from it and are modeled upon it – Haniel Long<sup>68</sup>*

In the concluding chapter of this research dissertation, I reflect on the implications of the data and analysis presented to the ongoing conflict in the Sahel as well as on other conflict zones in Africa, the Middle East, and southwest Asia. To begin, the central theme of my research posits that most enduring communal violence possess deeper drivers of conflict and inhibitors of its resolution than either the participants or bystanders are able to articulate. Such conflicts are characterized by the appearance of intractability, where the violence is driven by causes that defy rational explanation by even those involved. The intractable violence usually cycles between latent and expressed violence that occurs over multiple generations (decades or even centuries) despite internal attempts at reconciliation and despite numerous external interventions.

At its least, communal violence lingers for generations, transmitting traumatization within families across multiple generations that create and sustain violent extremist ideology necessary for terrorism to grow and spread. At its worst, communal violence topples governing regimes and threatens the Westphalian state and associated international ordering. Those leaders charged with devising responses to communal violence include political scientists, politicians, and ambassadors, who describe such conflict as irrational war: “There is no rationality at all about ethnic conflict. It is gut, it is

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<sup>68</sup> Haniel Clark Long (March 9, 1888 – October 17, 1956) was an American poet, novelist, publisher, and academic. He is best known for his novella, *Interlinear to Cabeza de Vaca* (1936).



hatred; it's not for any common set of values or purposes; it just goes on. And that kind of warfare is most difficult to bring to a halt" (Power 2002, 282).<sup>69</sup>

When the communal conflicts that I am deployed to resolve are characterized by government leaders as irrational and without "value or purpose," those very comments suggest that they and by extension, all of us, are no longer competent to intervene militarily, diplomatically, or developmentally. As such, we have lost our intellectual authority for intervention and are morally obligated to redefine the basis for our intervention through the development of an alternative approach to interceding in communal violence. As a step towards developing this alternative approach to intervention in communal conflict, my research has focused on the health of the conflict community's sociological structure, the psychological organization, the emotional conjugation, and related traumatization that destroys or damages normal social function. This led me to outline four related areas that this research has implications for and where the contribution possibilities are greatest in the advancement of knowledge related to military-diplomatic-developmental intervention. These areas are:

- Diagnosing the link between failed states and traumatized communities
- Understanding the implications of generational transmission of trauma
- Learning to cross the trauma barrier and reestablish meaning in traumatized communities
- Relieving psychological sociological trauma and rebuilding communities

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<sup>69</sup> US Ambassador Lawrence Eagleburger, quoted in a U.S. Department of State Dispatch Supplement, September 1992, p. 14, regarding the conflict in Bosnia.

Within these four related areas below, I evaluate potential contributions that can be made to the field of conflict analysis and resolution from my research and praxis in the central Sahel. As part of these contributions, I hope to illustrate the possibilities for changes to policy, programming, training, and employment of peace operations activities.

### **Diagnosing the link between failed states and traumatized communities**

Foreign Policy Magazine's 8<sup>th</sup> annual index of the sixty most fragile states in the world provides insight into this first related area of research into traumatized societies by examining the collective of failed or failing states. The editors' note that this "entrenched problem [is] one the world is far from figuring out how to fix" (Foreign Policy 2012, 86). The article's contributors suggest that failed or failing states are caused by combinations of external intervention, demographic pressures, factionalized elites, brain drain, group grievance, inequality, poverty and economic decline, refugees, and failed legitimacy among other reasons. But as Major General James Linder notes, these issues are more symptoms than causes, and their use to describe why states fail amounts to rhetorical tautology (Griswold 2014). They fail because they are poor and they are poor because they are failures. To break out of the tautological circle of explanations requires our realization and acceptance that there are deeper forces that underlay the failure of states and the breakdown of their societies within. This assertion is posited on the assumption that societies that fail do not want to fail; that the societies that fail are in a condition that is deteriorated from a historical normative standard; and finally, that societies that fail do so because they are unable to adapt to changes that are affecting them.<sup>70</sup> This statement is

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<sup>70</sup> See Arnold Beisser for a discussion on the possibilities of societal change without engendering violence. Beisser suggests in the *Paradoxical Theory of Change* (in *Gestalt Therapy Now, Theory, Techniques,*

self-evident with the presumption that a failed state is presupposed to have been previously successful and its failure serves to contrast the majority of states that have successfully adapted to the same external changes that cause others to fail.

On March 21<sup>st</sup>, 2012, Malian soldiers under the command of a little known Army captain named Amadou Sanogo mutinied and overthrew the democratically elected government, sparking the newest rebellion by the Kel Tamashek in Azawad and opening room for a parallel invasion of Islamic Jihadists under the banners of Al Qaeda in the Maghreb that included the notorious Moktar Belmoktar and his Islamic fighting brigade. While these facts are well known from the new stories, what may be less known is that in the weeks prior to the collapse of governance and the general rebellion in the north, the United States Ambassador to Bamako continued to praise the growth of democracy, law and order, and rule of law within Mali. As well, Mali was a participant nation of the Millennium Challenge, a U.S. public/private partnership to invest in stable, developing countries in Africa and elsewhere.<sup>71</sup> After the fall of the government of Amadou Toumani Touré, dark details began to emerge that recounted political collaboration with Al Qaeda, vast trafficking in illegal drugs, human trafficking, and weapons as part of a latent conflict between the Bambara speaking Mande population in the south and the restless Tuareg populations in the north. With the opening of the United Nations Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), all pretenses that the

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Applications) that it takes 100 years or three generations for societies to successfully adapt to change without destroying their historical narrative or group identity.

<sup>71</sup> During this time, I was a senior policy advisor for the U.S. Department of Defense's Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, responsible for international access to North and West Africa. As such, I regularly attended State Department briefings that enunciated US Diplomatic positions in my areas of responsibility.

Mande political structure in Bamako possessed the ability govern a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural nation that is the 24<sup>th</sup> largest country in the world dissolved.

Societies and states fail when they are unable to meet their underlying human needs (Burton 1987; Center for Global Development 2007; Elsass 1992; Fukuyama 2004; Krasner 2004; Rubenstein 2001; Staub 2004; Toft 2010). Said differently, states fail when they are unable to adapt their sociological structures to meet their physical and psychological needs consistent with available resources or the ensuing environmental, climatologic, social, or political forces affecting their current organization. Healthy societies, like healthy people, have the capacity to adapt to change and to recover from trauma. To the contrary, failed states consist of societies whose sociological structures have been damaged or destroyed by extended violence and loss. Or they consist of societies whose internal large group identity structures are divided over meaning, status, distinction and affirmation. The latter afflicted societies are often led by cultural prototypical leaders who are waging a vicious campaign of self-cleansing of unwanted traits and characteristics in a futile attempt to shed psychic pain of humiliation, degradation, shame and self-loathing. However bad it seems at first, if there is still sociological structure, then mediation and reparative processes are still possible to resolve the underlying causes that are driving the conflict.

I believe that the former category is perhaps the direst type of case. They are failed societies of a failed or failing state that is suffering from all of these afflictions. The family-village-tribal sociological psychological structures they contain are in danger of dying psychologically and physically. They are unable to stop their “societal self-mutilation” as the physical pain is the only thing left they can feel. The Albertine Rift

from South Sudan to the South Kivu and encompassing the lake and border zones of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, the Virunga National Park, Rwanda, and Burundi, consists of a dense cluster of failed or failing societies. With population densities ranging from 500-2500 humans per square mile, deforestation, resource eradication and an absence of any indigenous or political state sociological structures have left massive populations in fierce competition for minimal physical survival (Draper 2011). The inability of the state governments to extend their authority and social organization beyond their immediate capitals has created a wild lawless multi-state no man's land ruled by warlords and militias that use violence as a primary negotiator for access to dwindling natural resources (Spears 2010). When the humanitarian or peace operations practitioner-interventionist enters the conflict zone of a failed or failing state, they see symptoms of a sick society that has yet to be diagnosed. Most of these symptoms are visibly present such as:

- Presence of child soldiers & warlords
- Refugees & broken families
- Starvation
- Withdrawal
- Rage
- Vacant compliance
- Psychosomatic physical ailments
- Ethnic & cultural violence
- Absence of government presence
- Extreme overkill of the “other”

- Violence without motive
- Dependence on aid workers
- Fear of abandonment
- Promiscuity
- Hyper vigilance
- Depression

Within the conflict zones in the Sahel, Darfur, Chad, Somalia, and Uganda, warlords like Joseph Kony in Uganda, Sudan, and the Congo or militia leaders like Moktar Belmoktar in the central Sahel, openly recruit children to fill their ranks, ensuring their loyalty through forced traumatizing acts such as the killing of family members. Nearly all of these symptoms that I have listed above are present and documented in the preceding chapters of this research. These symptoms portend a society whose sociological structures are broken and no longer meet their physical or psychological needs. The symptoms reflect extensive trauma caused by extended violence and loss; failing boundaries of individual and group identity; and extraordinary shame and humiliation that result from alienation of self and group from reality. Were an individual person to be discovered with such symptoms in an urban center of Europe or America, he or she would be incarcerated for mental health treatment or jailed if they had committed a violent act. But in this case, the “patient” is an entire society that is dangerous not only to itself, but to anyone who would try to intervene and assist.

Where in civilized societies, social workers, medical personnel, and law enforcement officers are provided training to subdue ill patients without undue harm to them or those around them, modern humanitarian and peace operations practitioners often blindly

wander into the conflict zones of emotionally or mentally ill societies with little or no training in what to expect or how to react. When they fail, as they must, given their lack of preparation and training, they normatively blame the patient-cum-society. As Dr Herman writes, “most people have no knowledge or understanding of the psychological changes of [traumatized human beings]. Social judgment of chronically traumatized people therefore tends to be extremely harsh. The chronically abused person’s apparent helplessness and passivity...entrapment in the past...intractable depression and somatic complaints, and smoldering anger often frustrate” those working to help them (Herman J. L. 1992, 115). During a focused interview session with a group of Tuareg students attending the University of Niamey, many of the students related to me a narrative that characterized their non-Tuareg peers’ attitudes toward them. This narrative is wrapped with fear and uncertainty over the Tuareg rebellion in Mali and the expected onset of the next rebellion to emerge out of the desert lands of Azawaj from the Tamashek still living in essuf.

Regardless of its origin, the narrative that seems to be quietly popular amongst the Hausa and Zarma elite in the south of Niger holds the Tuareg responsible for their inability to develop and evolve beyond the confines of the Sahara and the Sahel. One of the students in the focus group summed up the Tamashek view of their situation relative to the Hausa majority when she said, “everyone here in Niamey calls us terrorists because of the rebellions several years ago. But the genocide against us in Tchintabaraden show clearly that we are victims, not terrorists” (Ibrahim et al. 2014). Niger’s security forces conducted the massacres in Tchintabaraden in the 1990s in the Aïr Region of northern Niger. The subject is extremely sensitive with the officers of the Forces Armées

Nigeriennes (FAN) with whom I worked with this past year, but by international accounts, the repression of the Tuareg was considered violent and organized (International Crises Group 2013). My efforts at dialoging about the Tchintabaraden massacre and other such incidents were part of an engagement effort with security sector governance (as opposed to capacity, organization, and training).

The aspect of security sector governance I sought to engage was attitudes about professionalization that I needed for ongoing efforts at teaching the FAN how to positively engage the nomadic populations. This required the officers and senior NCOs of the FAN to rebalance prejudicial ideas in order to understand and accept the positive aspects of Tuareg membership in Niger society as well as the psycho-social damage from violence, rapid change, etc. My success was quite limited as the officers of the FAN were still too deeply engaged in the conflict narrative between the African south and the Tuareg north. More problematic, however, was the Hausa elites' access and messaging to the international community of diplomatic and development that tended to (at times and by some more than others) accept the elite message without looking deeper into the underlying social conflict. Within Mali and Niger, the sociological and psychological plight of the Tuareg may often be difficult to access, given the nature of the complex, oral language.

During one event outside of Agadez, I participated in an event that sought to review the distribution of development funds by donor representatives based in Niamey. A large group of recipients were invited to provide feedback to the donors about the efficacy of the assistance distribution plan and any recommendations for upcoming rounds of funding. The English-speaking donor representatives were accompanied by their French-



speaking Hausa host nation implementing partners and the recipient group was a balanced mix of communities in the northern part of rural Niger; 80 percent Tamashek, 10 percent Fulani, 5 percent Arab, and 5 percent Hausa/Zarma mix. The lead donor began speaking to the implementing partner and to the group in French.

Watching the crowd, I could see only four or five members of the group actually engaging in this French speaking discussion, and the remainder whispered quietly or looked around in apparent boredom. I realized that the majority of the group did not speak French, and asked the donors to switch back to English. When they did so, the Hausa implementing partner began translating into a mix of Hausa and Tamashek and immediately the room came alive and all participants began to pass back and forth the information that was being shared through Hausa, Tamashek, Arabic, and Fulani. From this we drew the obvious lesson that whomever controls the language controls the conversation; and that whomever controls the conversation controls the flow of resources.

As I translated this lesson over to planning and programming for development, governance, and security reform, we realized that important assumptions about the northern conflict communities were being made by the southern political elite communities and that their assumptions overlooked important aspects of underlying human needs, and sociological damage. The realization helped fuel our work and associated research in Niger, giving us impetus for observing and analyzing individual and collective behavior of the communities in conflict zones in order to capture and track behavior patterns necessary for intervention, mediation, negotiation, and facilitation of basic needs. This involved physically visiting and engaging hundreds of small and medium villages through the northern conflict zones to assess health, development,

security, and traditional governance as precursor to mediating tribal grievance and growth options. As presented in the previous chapter, we found combinations of withdrawal and vacant compliance that contrasted with outbursts of violence and rage without apparent utilitarian causation. Once we factored in the effects of trauma and failing boundaries of group identity and dug deeper into the psychosocial issues accompanying the event and the victim-perpetrator relationship, issues of personal and collective behavior became quite understandable.

The connections between the behavior of the conflict communities and the effects of trauma and failing boundaries of group identity is not information that is available from the Niger ministries of health and human social services, nor even from the Tuareg Prime Minister, himself born in Iferouāne, the cultural capital of Azawāḡ, after a lifetime in the Niamey capital.<sup>72</sup> The symptoms of traumatized society are usually not well understood either by foreign interventionists or other ethnic groups sharing a common political state. The former are likely to ascribe their behavior to normative standards and the latter are likely to blame the victims for being unable to extricate themselves from their failing condition, despite their inability to understand the underlying pathology or sequelae involved.

The lack of understanding cause and effect within the conditions of societal self-damage is characteristic in extreme communal violence is a special indicator of a failed society. A central need that healthy sociological structures provide their individual and collective members is the possibilities of identity awareness and memorial sustainment of

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<sup>72</sup> My interaction with PM Brigi Rafini was through his Director of Northern Nomadic Affairs, Colonel Amadou who helped arrange the Amenokalen interviews in Ingall.

the existential self—the identity of the person and related touchett. This identity is extracted from the past and present collective and provides the required sense of worth or self-esteem and ability to create positive meaning into images that drives or actives productive instinct. Self-esteem that is combined with a healthy psychological organization and sustainable sociological structure becomes the power that generates vast creative endeavors. When denied or withdrawn, the resulting vacuum can lead to equally vast destructive madness.

Chapters four and five describe the complex sociocentric societies that are characteristic of many conflict zones. The external locus of membership control that creates the deep ethos of belonging also create a rage of shame when broken by trauma and loss. The unmediated psychological identities extracted from the nurturing control of the group can become laden with newly associated traits considered shameful and humiliating. The unintegrated traits expose the bearer in memory and instinct to expulsion and alienation; the loss of all love, belonging, and acceptance. So powerful is the need for belonging in sociocentric society that even the mere thought of such a condition creates sharp pain in the mind (psyche) of the individual and excites a willingness to act alone or in concert to avoid the slightest hint of alienation and the resulting shame, humiliation, and expulsion.

The breakage of traditional sociocentric society by extended violence, loss of membership, and trauma resulting from adaptive failure can result in extraordinarily violent expressions of alienation avoidance by societies marked by complex intercultural, inter-ethnic identities. Once peacefully accommodating neighboring identities can explode into repulsed violence that quickly spins out of control by either party. The re-

introduction into social dialogue, for instance, of racial color as an indicator of past slavery cum present lowered position, can set off a chain reaction where looking in the mirror at one's face creates a self-loathing because of the perceived shadow of color (Cross 1998). The suddenly shamed and humiliated viewer, unable to accept their own expulsion outside the community, might suddenly (and subconsciously) be "called into a position" of needing to psychologically cleanse in their community what cannot be physically cleansed from their own face.<sup>73</sup> This example of identity conflict is meant to illustrate the power of alienation, shame and rage that characterizes the need for overkill of the "other" in extreme communal conflict.

But far from ending there, the affected membership's recast of a horrific event into a chosen trauma turns the event into one that is part of their identity definition. The identity defining chosen trauma is transmitted not only to the present membership, but to succeeding generations where children learn to feel the pain from "the genocide against us in Tchintabaraden...we are victims" in an emotionally visceral manner rather than one that is merely intellectual. This pedagogy of victimization becomes a multigenerational transmission of identity failure and trauma that we think of as intractable conflict.

### **The implications of generational transmission of trauma: Intractable cultural conflict**

The landscape of the failed, traumatized society in Azawar is only partially culturally relative to the Kel Tamashek. The meaning and communication created and transmitted in their nomadic desert sociological structure is particular to their collective identity and

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<sup>73</sup> Howard Adelman's (1997) paper explores the psychological processes that lead to horrific violence in *Death and dismemberment: the body politic and genocide in Rwanda*.

its cultural expression, as is its subsequent damage. But much of the trauma sequelae that I found within the Kel Tamashek was familiar from previous work with the Sahel communities of the Zaghawa, Rizeigat, Masalit, and Fur tribes of eastern Chad and Western Sudan. The violence or extreme change to the sociological structure of a community damages their ability to maintain their placement in their historical reality. How and to whom they communicate; who and what they trust; who and how they express love, affection, warmth and belonging; where to find safety, security, and sanctuary; what memories are valid from the past to an uncertain future. The trauma conditions and associated sequelae that I encountered in northern Niger did vary in the emotional and physical expressions of the population, ranging from what Herman calls a “peculiar, seething state of ‘frozen watchfulness’” to “helplessness and the futility of resistance” to violent rage (Herman J. L. 1992, 100).

The differences in how individual members and families of Niger’s rural nomadic and settled village life (such as in Agadez, Iferouāne, or Ingall) society reacted to the loss of their historical reality are dependent on many factors. Some of these factors include time spent in Libya, extent of family losses to violence, or individual member/family ability to adapt and thrive to outside intervention. But I found a fairly finite amount of expressive reactions that ranged from passive to violent, and from minor to major in intensity. Each member, each family of the damaged society, appeared to react in a manner that depended on the strength or resiliency of their family’s psychological underpinning.

In Niger, Chad, and Sudan, the trauma that accompanied the extended violence and the disintegrating sociological structures of nomadism and pastoralism had visible and different effects on the families’ adults and children. Herman calls the traumatic effect

an “erosion and deformation of personality structure” that I saw not only in my work in the Sahel, but in Iraq as well. Trauma eroded the “structure of personality already formed” for the adults and “deforms the personality” of the children (Herman J. L. 1992, 98). The fully formed adult personalities that harbor and transmit collective identity within the historical narrative become confused, frozen in uncertainty, sometimes retreating into a passive state of helplessness of an overwhelmed ego. The forming child personalities that are in a process of receiving and integrating that collective identity within the families’ historical narrative also become confused, but rather than frozen in uncertainty, begin rejecting or rashly modifying the narrative in an attempt to integrate what has become unintegratable. Rejection of familial love and nurture that has become intermittent and laced with episodes of helpless rage or rebellious modification to traditional modes of the procurement of food, shelter, medicine, and justice are some of the examples of child personality deformation in the face of trauma and extended violence that I have observed in Niger and most other such conflict zones.

The child in these societies of extended trauma is forced to adapt to the needs of immediate survival against death, dismemberment, starvation, and physical-sexual-emotional abuse, sometimes even by the affected adults in their own society (Odejide, Sanda, & Odejide 1998). Their adaptation to the violence against their once nurturing sociological structure sets the conditions for them to alter the sociological structures of life to meet their particular pathology:

The pathological environment of childhood abuse forces the development of extraordinary capacities, both creative and destructive. It fosters the development of abnormal states of consciousness in which the ordinary relations of body and

mind, reality and imagination, knowledge and memory, no longer hold. (Herman J. L. 1992, 98)

The abnormal state of consciousness that the child(ren) creates is in defense to overwhelming fear, anxiety, abandonment, terror, loneliness, and hunger. The reality abandoned is of theirs and other's pain, death, and requirement of cultural existential meaning outside of immediate survival (Kupelian, Kalayjian, & Kassabian 1998). When their altered states of reality for body, mind, imagination, knowledge, and memory are combined with the further traumatization inherent in their use by adults as child soldiers and laborers, the future stage is set for the anarchic state of warlord domination found in the worst of the failed states (MacMullin & Loughry 2004; Albertyne et al. 2003).

Violent sociological structures that have defaulted to base systems of physical survival such as those in northern Mali and Niger suffer the mass traumatization of thousands of children in violent abuse followed by displacement, internment in refugee camps or forced employment as child militia soldiers (Borchini, Lanz, & O'Connell 2002). Based on both qualitative and quantitative data thus far gathered, a good case can be made for the coming of a perfect storm of sociological structures in intractable violent conflict as the progeny of extended trauma and violence continue to replay their past. During interviews, I was not surprised to learn that the adult leaders of Niger's Council for Renewal and Innovation (CRI)<sup>74</sup> were themselves the surviving children of deceased or wounded members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Niger (FPLN), the Tuareg rebel umbrella organization that led the revolt from 1990 to 1995. For these adult

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<sup>74</sup> Formerly known as *Mouvement des Nigériens pour la justice (MNJ)* during the 2007 – 2009 open rebellion in Azawaj.

survivors (former rebels) of a childhood spent in extended trauma and learned violent practices, the formation of integrative adult personalities capable of merging their Tuareg narrative with the changing shape of socioeconomic conditions in the Sahel would naturally be difficult (Gilligan 1996; Derluyn et al. 2004). By this I mean that the adult survivor of this level of childhood trauma would remain in the psychological-immediate as a place of sanctuary (Elsass 1997; Gilligan 1996). They would resist mental projection of future ideations outside of that necessary for physical defense against enemy competitors (Bayer, Klasen, & Adam 2007).

Such future projections would subject these adult-children to concepts they are unprepared to face, like partial memories of murdered parents and family or atrocities they may have either watched or been forced to participate in (Oloya 2011). Other ideations sure to cause the adult survivor of extreme childhood violence a great deal of anxiety might include their existential identity beyond that of a child given what we know about the levels of abuse, violence, and trauma<sup>75</sup> (Bremner & Marmar 1998; Lensvelt-Mulders et al. 2008). The possibilities of these survivors-turned-perpetrators imagining or working toward the development of a healthy, adult identity would be resisted as such projections would require them to revisit earlier trauma, laden with guilt of participating and surviving (Bremner & Marmar, 1998). All of these dangerous ideations of normal,

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<sup>75</sup> For example, Derluyn, et al, (2004) found that of 233 children they interviewed, “77% saw someone killed..., 18 6% saw their own father, mother, brother, or sister being killed. 118 children (39%) had to kill another person themselves; 7 (2%) killed their own father, brother, or another relative. 184 of the children (61%) lived in the Sudan under very difficult conditions; 49 of them (27%) had to drink their own urine. 193 children (64%) were forced to participate in fights” and the list of individual and collective traumatization continues seemingly without end.



healthy human community life would necessarily be kept carefully compartmented from their daily reality of survival (Albertyne et al. 2003).

This compartmentalizing would require them to maintain simple and manageable concepts of body, mind, and the relationship between self and other (Bhugra & Becker 2005). The complexity of the sociological structure they tolerated then would be supportive of this simplified psychological basis of need. Complex sociological constructs of multiple identity definitions based on economic, spiritual, family, and historical factors would be far too threatening for their subverted deformed personality development and aggressively avoided (Elsass 1992; Herman J. L. 1992). Communication and cultural expression would naturally be delimited to a lower common equation that could be mastered and controlled by the fearful adult survivor of a violent failed society (Albertyne et al. 2003; Bayer, Klasen, & Adam 2007).

An immediate flash point for the members of the CRI in Agadez, for instance, is the presence of any of the Hausa political elites in towns and villages of the Aïr region. When President Issoufou's wife, the first lady of Niger tried to visit Agadez last year, she was met by CRI sponsored protests.<sup>76</sup> A number of the adult survivors of childhood trauma that populate latent rebel organizations like the CRI are able to intelligibly interact with us as western interventionists (even though we are known to be working with the government of Niger) because they are likely the least traumatized, least

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<sup>76</sup> CrisisWatch N°128, 01 April 2014: Agadez police 7 March released NGO umbrella group Committee for Renewal and Innovation (CRI) coordinator and SG, arrested with 8 others following 21 Feb demonstration against permanent ban on public protests. Agadez mayor again banned planned CRI demonstration 5 March. U.S. sponsored military exercises "Flintlock 2014" in N and E, for capacity-building in fight against terrorism, drug trafficking.

affected.<sup>77</sup> The most affected would logically not be able to bring themselves to interact with any representations of divergence from the reality they had created as a survival mechanism so many years earlier (Gilligan 1996). These adult survivors would naturally tend to resist the development of sociological structures that were based on trust and cooperation, foreign as those concepts must be to those adults who survived a horrific childhood only through their ability to employ cunning, subterfuge and violence in order to eat, find shelter, and avoid predators (Elsass 1997). US and international development aid organizations that attempt to recreate or reorganize healthy communal society in failed areas inadvertently create multiple competing societies against these psychosocially deformed groups of survivors.

Organizations such as AQIM in the Sahel, ISIS in Syria, or Al Shabab in Somalia prevent this fracturing of its organizational base by restricting NGOs ability to operate. Where attempts at recreating or reorganizing damaged society do occur prior to addressing the damaged groups of survivor adults (usually armed), the social based often fractures into multiple, competing factions that weaken the power of the original group, but grow the base of damaged survivor groups that continue to perpetuate the social damage in a vicious cycle of generational transmission of trauma. Other examples of this phenomena include the breakdown of the Fur tribe centric Sudan Liberation Army in Darfur, and the Acholi tribe centric Lord's Resistance Army in northern Uganda

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<sup>77</sup> This is not to characterize their experience as less worthy of understanding, but simply that if their personality was sufficiently organized around socially constructed concepts that they could interact across cultural barriers, they would be the lesser-affected members. The fact that the violence in such places continues despite the best efforts of the international community suggests that there are many more adult survivors that the practitioner-interventionist never sees that continues to subvert the reestablishment of sociological structures to meet the healthy psychological needs of the society.

(Christian 2012). The many factions armed militia groups operating in ungoverned spaces of traumatized communities competitively recreate versions of their traumatized reality onto previously undamaged communities of ever growing zones of communal chaos. Anchored around the Albertine Rift in Africa for instance, vast overpopulated areas of Uganda, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are home to these competing societies (Kelly 2010).

Operating with impunity, armed survivors of past abuse like the Mai-Mai Kifuafua<sup>78</sup> exist in numbed states of traumatized existence even as they extend their traumatized condition onto new generations of children. Unable to reintegrate psychologically into the community sheltered by peace-building operations, they feed off of travelers, aid workers, and the beneficiaries of international aid (Stearns 2011). Their presence and actions destabilize efforts at reestablishing sociological structures based on external reality and inhibits the scabbing and eventual healing of psychological wounds. The sociological structures they attempt to recreate resemble childhood fabrications of immediate defense replete with simplistic formulations of equity and fairness, using half remembered stories as a basis for recreating social belief and spirituality (Draper 2011; Neuner et al. 2012). Unable to cognitively process any ideations beyond the immediacy of physical survival, the organizing principals of these armed survivor societies remain at

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<sup>78</sup> One of a growing number of armed communal groups, themselves survivors of communal, interethnic, intercultural violence leading to a breakdown of traditional sociological structures of community in favor of armed warlord societies. Colonel Delphin Mbaende, Didier Bitaki, and Colonel Akilimali lead the Mai-Mai Kifuafua with an estimated militia force of between 500 to 1,000 members. They operate in southern Masisi territory and consist of mostly Hunde and Tembo tribal peoples - (Voice of America radio interview April 7, 2010).

based levels of human need. Such sociological ordering cannot establish the psychological foundations of community needed to properly develop out of childhood.<sup>79</sup>

Cultural psychoanalyst Donald Spence (1982) coined the term “non-overlapping translation” to identify a communication failure based on attempts to communicate across opposing contexts. Peace operations practitioners that attempt to communicate with these survivor societies on an adult basis of psychological context meet consistent failure. Similarly, attempts at DDR (disarm, demobilize, reintegrate) of survivor societies are doomed to failure because they approach them from an external perspective of the non-traumatized interventionist-practitioner. Survivor groups like the Mai-Mai Kifaufua can be temporarily disarmed, but they cannot be demobilized or reintegrated like normally constituted militia. Demobilizing them would be like demobilizing a village from being a village and the inhabitants (re)integrated or sent into the bush to try and live.

The structure of these sociocentric societies is dependent on the development of the humans who populate the imagined spaces of community. Human development based on love, safety, belonging, and creative purpose supported by learning creates one type of society. Human development in violence prone neighborhoods where hunger, thirst, disease, and the absence of love, safety, or belonging are the norm creates quite a

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<sup>79</sup> MacMullin and Loughry (2004) point out that even when studying the psycho-social effects of child soldier trauma on the surviving children of these damaged societies, very little is known about their relationships with parents, family, or their ability to reintegrate into any society, much less one that is still gripped by violent militias populated by children-adults of extended violence. Opiyo Oloya’s (2011) exploration of Acholi children’s return to their native villages in northern Uganda brings out a possibility that the damage to these sociological structures is greater than the western based UN research is crediting, because of their inability to cross the psycho-cultural barriers of meaning. The survey instruments used by MacMullin and Loughry use questions that are culturally and meaningfully neutral with respect to the Acholi cultural psychological systems of meaning within their life cycle. Even from their paper, the reader gained awareness that the authors had not first conducted a psycho-historiography of the Acholi tribe to determine normative standards, sociological structures of being and psychological needs meant to be subsequently filled before using their western-based Likert scale survey instruments.

different form of society. Societies marked by deprivation of physical, emotional, and psychological needs are abnormal and artificial, but nevertheless a reality in failed societies. They continue to extend psychological diminishment and sociological corruption because they are sustained by external communities that extend minimal life-sustaining provisions without addressing the underlying disorganization and maldevelopment of the psychological sociological structures lost in intractable violence.

### **Learning to cross the trauma barrier and reestablish meaning in traumatized communities**

In the data presentation and analysis of trauma, I compared psychological societal trauma to a physical wound: an injury to the psychological reality of the community. Such psychological wounds have the power to change how large groups of people react to their external stimuli. After September 11, how many people changed their preference for higher floors in buildings? After the Washington DC sniper attacks, how many people changed their patterns of using open public spaces? How did the pandemic threat of bird flu change the way people exchanged greetings and their concept of appropriate face-space with strangers? These few examples illustrate the idea that external changes involving disease, death and maiming can quickly change the nature of how an entire large group views their reality. The organizing rationale for community is the support of the psychological construction of the self, which includes “the image of the body, the internalized images of others, and the values and ideals that lend a person a sense of coherence and purpose” (Herman J. L. 1992, 93). In the presence of communal violence, this organizing rationale becomes subject to breakage as the interactive elements that are meant to be supportive are turned against each other.

In the examples above, a strong, well-structured community (county, state, and national) reacted quickly to reinforce communal organization, identify/contain/eliminate threats to the organization, and assuage damaged images of safety and security of the affected membership. In the conflict zones of northern Mali and Niger, we found that the communal violence overwhelmed the sociological structure's ability to contain it, process it, and integrate the losses and terror<sup>80</sup> into the ongoing historical narrative. We found that the community's inability to contain, process, and integrate loss and terror damaged the psychological organization of the collective. The damage begins with the members' perception of physical safety and continues with the degradation of their images of themselves, each other, and the coherence and purpose of their community (Gilligan 1996). Psychological images of safety, security, creative expression, historical memory, and ideations of archetypal heroism, purity, love, and existential memory are invaded and violated (Eisenbruch 1991).

Standard norms of safe, daily activity are overtaken, broken and replaced by expectation of sudden or jarring recurrence of immediate-past violence at each doorway, around each corner and within the opacity of shadows (Gilligan 1996). The imprint of violence and loss cannot easily be erased and the longer the duration, the deeper the imprint until the expectations of recurrence overwhelm the expectations of return to normalcy, to safety (Odejide, Sanda, & Odejide 1998). Those violent external events can actually change the internal reality of group ideations of what constitutes safety, what

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<sup>80</sup> Communities integrate the trauma of violence, tragedy, and loss into their historical narrative as 'Chosen Traumas and Chosen Glories', where they become major markers of large group identity, cohesion and generational memory (Volkan 1994). When the level of violence and trauma exceed the community's ability to process trauma, the historical narrative begins to falter as trauma begins to affect memory and cognition.

constitutes danger and how the group reality should change in order to defend against psychological chaos and reestablish routine (Horowitz D. L. 1985).

During my work in Niger, my teams and I traveled to hundreds of villages assessing security, governance, and development as part of planning for resiliency building programs. At each village, the Chef du Village would organize a meeting with the rural council and invite the Chefs du Canton (neighborhood leaders) and Amenokalen (traditional tribal leaders) to meet us and discuss issues of development assistance as governance participation. My team consisted of host nation civil military teams and representatives from USAID stationed in the country. In nearly every case, the village leaders identified security as the most pressing need or grievance, despite what appeared to us as more obvious pressing needs of infrastructure development and animal husbandry. I realized from their stories of security problems that they were remembering the emotional texture of events long past rather than of recent structural events requiring adjustments to security patrols and the like.

The emotional texture of memories of fear and loss were serving as coping mechanisms, grounded in established hearsay, folk wisdom, and shared thinking that reformatted their psychic landscape of what constituted safety versus danger (Neuner et al. 2012; Oloya 2011). Coping mechanisms change the mental landscape in traumatized societies to provide the group psychological body with an imagined reality of safety (Rousseau & Drapeau 1998). This is a necessary and normal occurrence that reduces the chaotic possibilities of continuing danger that would override their ability to reconstitute

orderly society and meaningful living that is not defined minutely by the specter of death and loss.



Figure 17: Researcher's US Interagency advisor team meeting with village leaders in Rural du Chetimari, Department of Diffa on December 11th, 2013, while assessing security, governance, and development

The meaning that we as military-civilian interventionist's attribute to routine events or mental objects in the midst of, or in the aftermath of, violent loss may not be the same as that given by those we are trying to help and secure. The inhabitants may display behavior that we may find strange and even incomprehensible, along the lines of paranoia, irrational fears, or rage that seems ungrounded to proximate causation. Their inexplicable behavior is a function of changes to their images of themselves and their society. As the extreme communal conflict devolves,<sup>81</sup> the survivors' images and ideations change. Their new, damaged images now include a community membership, whose bonds can be dissolved; where death of loved ones and widespread alienation can be sanctioned. As the organizing value and communal hold on social archetypes nears

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<sup>81</sup> Communal conflict devolves when it breaks down into its lowest individual form. Communal violence may begin with one sub-ethno-cultural group fighting another, but the longer the violence and loss continues, the greater and deeper the trauma. Eventually the violence "devolves" from a two-sided communal affair to a many sided chaotic melee when it reaches into the individual family as in Southern Somalia, Southern Kivu and the Albertine Rift zone.



collapse, violence increases. Elder sociological mediators are lost or marginalized by their inability to contain the conflict and social control decreases.

Driving and or guiding what may seem like bizarre behavior to the military-civilian practitioner are two facets of conflict psycho-social response: trauma and culture. The former we have discussed at length; where the psychological reality of the participants is shaken by the violence or conflict event. Doubt exists where once there was certainty, about who should they trust, what is important, why is it important. The inhabitants that we were working with spoke through the former (culture) as a language and a mode of thinking (Geertz 1975). Thus the traumatized inhabitants may not even be able to articulate even the need to repair the psychological sociological damage as a precursor to rebuilding the physical damage (Foley 1997). They may only “feel” resistance or pain at opening such discussions with each other and the outsider-practitioners. They may find it psychologically easier to subvert our intentions of the physical reconstruction of homes and villages by transferring and converting resources and funds to local control for future use as they continue their inward struggle to reconstruct sociological reality before physical reality. As an example, two communal buildings in a rural inhabited by two touchetts were damaged by razzia (tribal raiding), and my team worked to allocate funding for reconstruction. We found in that case that the communal leaders were having difficulty participating meaningfully because in their mutual shamed victimization, they were unconsciously focused only on whether the “enemy other” could ever be trusted again.

Questions that they cannot avoid target their ability to trust, such as why did they target our children? Should we move our children’s school or our religious site deeper

into sectarian controlled neighborhoods? Finally, how can we accept the physical presence of the 'other' (who killed our loved ones) in our immediate proximity when we are unable to make room for them in our minds? How can these outside interventionists insist that we do physically, that which we are unable to do emotionally or psychologically? Judith Herman suggests that social trauma that accompanies violent conflict may overwhelm the survivors' ability to think, decide and adapt to the post-blast changes as victims:

Psychological trauma is an affliction of the powerless. At the moment of trauma, the victim is rendered helpless by overwhelming force. Traumatic events overwhelm the ordinary systems of care that give people a sense of control, connection, and meaning. Traumatic events are extraordinary, not because they occur rarely, but rather because they overwhelm the ordinary human adaptations to life. (Herman J. L. 1992, 33)

The sociological schema of life is broken after each communal attack leaving the survivors unable to reintegrate past expectations of order with their newfound reality of fear and anticipation of more violence (Horowitz M. J. 2001). This becomes the trauma barrier.

Crossing the trauma barrier in traumatized, physically damaged societies begins with our realization as interventionist's that the surviving inhabitants are feeling, thinking, and speaking from two distinct but interactive points of reference: culture and trauma. The psychological and emotional damage suffered by the participants does not distort a universal sociological structure, but one that is bound and constructed by individual culture and group identity. Crossing the trauma barrier consists of first crossing the

cultural barrier which begins when the practitioner sees the inhabitants as they see themselves; hears the inhabitants as they hear themselves; and interacts with the participants using the psycho-cultural linguistics that creates and sustains their reality (Geertz 1975; Harley 2008; Lindholm 2008). This is not the verbal language of the traumatized group (such as Tamashek, Fulani, or Hausa), but the meaning of the language's words, objects, relations, and significance of how it orders values, honors memory, and transmits communal identity across time and space.

Returning to the analogy between physical wounds to the body and its organs, wounds to the sociological structure damage the meaning, significance, or affect of relationships, ceremonies, and memory within traumatized populations (van der Kolk et al. 1996; Stein 1994; Spence 1982). As the meaning of mental objects, emotions, social construction, and psychological health is different between cultural and ethnic groupings, so are the effects of how trauma destroys that meaning. The military-civilian interventionists of humanitarian, peacekeeping, and stability operations can hear the destroyed meaning as they try to secure and stabilize the population. The call for relief comes in the words of “Arregh tmidrrt Tamashek timos awa timos dae'twa,” a phrase of intimacy and sorrow that reverberates through every conflict zone we may visit. “*I want it to be as it was*” is perhaps the one universal cry from those the interventionist would help. The phrase illustrates a primary grievance; a need for relief from psyche pain, distorted reality, easing of suffering shame, guilt, abandonment, grief, and overwhelming helplessness. This need for relief becomes overpowering to the survivors of communal violence because the psychic pain in sociocentric societies is inhibited from relief by the nature of their sociocentric structure. The same ethos that arises from the dense,

interconnected family life leaves fewer outlets for pain and grief than do those that are egocentric.

When the family is the primary source of belonging, nurture, love, acceptance, and individual identity, its loss to violence and dispersion takes with it the natural outlets for expressing psychological anguish. Alienated from the primary source of positive emotion and psychological expression, shame arises from the subconscious awareness of loss of belonging. This exacerbates the individual's situation dramatically because shame is a natural inhibitor of shared emotions such as love, anger, grief, and anguish (Scheff & Retzinger 1991). Shame inhibits the expression of emotion because "nothing is more shameful than to feel ashamed" (Gilligan 1996, 111). The smaller the perceived reason, the greater the shame and the deeper the psychic pain of unrelieved anger, grief and anguish (Gilligan 1996). This is the vicious cycle that leaves the victim isolated and the interventionist helpless to maintain security and stabilize the community. What must change for both is the public illumination of communal pain; victims must be publicly authorized to grieve. The interventionist that is not beset by the powerful emotions dominating the remaining community must create outlets and forums for the public expression of outrage and shame-inhibited rage.

The publicly authorized, even encouraged, expression of debilitating emotion in an open forum of surviving community members allows for the reestablishment of lines of reality. This occurs when loss-by-loss, individual victimization is narrated in survivors' accounts using a process of public storying within the extended community. This public storying of collective trauma creates what Vamik Volkan (2005) calls a Chosen Trauma, a shared mental-object of victimization that survivors use release bottled up pain and

horror of loss that is too traumatic to integrate individually. The chosen trauma becomes a mental-object of loss that combines trauma and grief in a shared exercise that replaces the former “good-reality” (before the losses) with the ‘bad reality’ of the chosen trauma event. This new, shared mental-object of chosen trauma encapsulates the pain, grief, mental anguish, and debilitating loss of relationships that have created a destabilized reality for the surviving members. While this is a terrible replacement for the lost former “good-reality,” it is absolutely necessary because some reality is better than no reality. Even a painful reality can be built upon with love, compassion, caring, and loving memorialization of their loved ones’ existential identity. Without a floor of even painful reality, there is nothing upon which to build psychological and physical monuments of memory.

This is the meaning that is reestablished in traumatized communities; what was lost, how terrible was that loss, the depths of grief contained in the mental object of the chosen trauma, and the eternal effort to memorialize that loss to future generations. The failure to create this structure of healing dooms to failure any attempt by the military-civilian interventionist at reconstructing the outer physical facades of a damaged society.

## **Relieving sociological trauma and rebuilding society**

### **Communal betrayal and alienation**

The violent communal conflict that has been ongoing in northern Niger and northern Mali has destroyed two types of infrastructure; the physical and the sociological. Where the physical destruction and need may be obvious, the sociological is not. Houses, livestock, government buildings, and related electrical, communications, and water

infrastructure have been destroyed by machine guns, mortar fire, and improvised explosive devices in vehicles, clothing, and motorcycles. But the loss of wood, stone, and glass are not what the families and communities grieve for; they grieve for what the lost physicality represented—love, belonging, trust, and safety. Because the conflict is communal, there must be betrayal. Because there is betrayal, there is a violation of trust, expectation, and of community. Families, villages, and communities construct an ideation of sanctuary at each level of sociological organization. This ideation is founded on mutual trust or expectations of safety from theft, murder, and annihilation from within that sanctuary of home and village. Mutual expectations of communal trust and safety create structures of communication and pathways of community interaction; a sense of the familiar and of being at home:

To be home means to be able to circulate in the homeland with impunity and safety. To be at home means to be in a place in which the other appears as a reflection of oneself. “Home is, therefore, the association within a homogeneous group and the association of that group with a particular physical place.”

(Adelman 1997, 3)

The community interaction in turn establishes complex processes for the members to exchange love, affection, creation of goods and services, divisions of labor, and the exchange of family members through generational evolution. The combined total of communal interaction and life-supporting processes creates the sociological structure on which the members’ psychological reality is based. It is this reality that is destroyed for Tuareg, Songhai, and Arab in the Azawad of northern Mali; and that is destroyed for Tuareg, Fulani, and Teubou in the Azaway of northern Niger.

Their realities are not simple constructions. They are complicated interactions of cognitive processing, emotional imprinting and psychological determinants of happiness, love and existential identity. Communal violence is not simply the killing of members of a society and the destruction of their homes and possessions. Communal violence involves turning the sociological structure inward against itself in varying degrees of intimacy and varying levels of betrayal. The degrees of intimacy in which sociological structures turn inward are reflected by the relationships of the members attacked against the relationship of the members perpetrating the attacks (Spears 2010). Tuareg versus Fulani violence in episodes of razzia constitutes one degree of intimacy; the violent attacks of AQIM aligned Arab neighbor against Songhai neighbor in Gao constitutes another; and Tuareg family member aligned with Tuareg nationalist movement MNLA engaged in violence against Tuareg family member aligned with the Islamic Jihad group Ansar al-Dine constitutes the most intimate degree of betrayal of trust, safety, and sanctuary. The levels of betrayal that sociological structures turn inward are the interior and manageable responsibilities of the members attacked to the members perpetrating the attacks. Socio-economic group against a competing group might constitute one level of betrayal, but the attack by the protectors of society (such as police, military, etc.) on those they serve to protect might constitute a much deeper level of betrayal.

The internal betrayal of the communal trust and expectations of safety and sanctuary damages or destroys the sociological structures of family, village, and community in ways and depths that exceed what is possible during the conduct of inter-state warfare. If foreign soldiers from a different political state were running down your neighborhood street, it would be natural to expect (or fear) violence. After all, they are foreign, armed,

and uninvited. They have no right to be there. But armed police and military from one's own precinct have a right to be in one's neighborhood, patrolling one's streets, making arrests, and using violence as needed to ensure the general safety and order of the society.

When those trusted agents of order and security turn their violence on their own community members, betrayal occurs. During each of the conflict episodes in Niger and Mali, widespread reports of abductions, killings, and torture circulated against the gendarmerie and military. Fatimana Imola accused a twenty-five-year-old Niger Army lieutenant of killing and dismembering her younger brother, Imola Kalakouawa, for allegedly planting mines (Imola, 2008). This type of betrayal breaks a fundamental portion of the unseen sociological structure of each community affected whether they are witness or victim, because the structure is built around the social organization of governance and security.

The community members' surrender to governance subjects themselves to the dictates of security; from foreign hostility and internal chaos. When the governance they have previously surrendered to turns the violence against them, the crime of betrayal occurs. The victims' betrayal involves more than just their surrender to governance and the dictates of security; their betrayal strikes at the foundation of the sociological structure that they used to construct their psychological reality, secured as it was by the organizations of governance and security. In both Azawad and Azawar, the ethnic communities who live there openly claim that armed force of governance has betrayed the communal trust and forfeited rights to govern. The Tuareg of Mali and Niger claim that this betrayal was committed by the Mande regime in Bamako and by the Hausa regime in Niamey. The Songhai of Gao claim that this betrayal was committed by the



Tuareg's MNLA during the short time they were governing their self-proclaimed capital of Azawad. Made more complicated is the unilateral claim to Islamic governance by the al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, Ansar al-Dine, and the Mutual Union for Justice and Jihad in West Africa or MUJWA. Groups no one claims to want in power, yet which possess an unexplained staying power.

The crime that undermines the foundations of these victims' psychological sociological reality defies easy prosecution and resulting restoration of justice. The neighbor police officer who killed my son can be arrested, but if he were acting with the authority of the organization of governance and security, then his imprisonment is less meaningful. Arresting and imprisoning perpetrators cannot by itself restore the fractured sociological structures and the altered reality that follows because governance and security authorized the acts. And in so doing, they placed the victims outside of the community in a state of alienation, unworthy of governance and protection. Their alienation from the sociological structure that defines their reality emerges in discourse and dreams; words and images twist and corrupt their self-reflection of other, to one that appears as twisted nightmare of horrific betrayal (Scheff & Retzinger 1991; Kaufman G. P. 1996; Horowitz D. L. 1985; Mollica 1988; van der Kolk et al. 1996). This is the underlying rationale for the process of public storying called Truth Commissions. Such public events are forums where victim and perpetrator record the betrayal and repudiate the attacks on the public sociological structure. These public forums seek to validate the sanctity of the original communal structure that all had surrendered allegiance to and invalidate the betrayal of the victims by the use of formal violence on societal owners rather than those foreigners for whom it was to have been reserved for.

In scenarios where the underlying structural issues that prevent a conflict community from realizing and meeting their agreed upon underlying human needs are resolved, psychological sociological healing is possible. The underlying human needs that I refer to here are a bounded communities' ability to form and sustain acceptably positive group identity, express that identity in cultural creation, and transmit that identity and culture across generational time and space. Even if the Kel Tamashek were to realize their dream of an Azawad and Azaway homeland, the need to repair damaged psycho-social-emotional tissue that must bind the community together, lest it continue to fracture and divide as occurred between the Dinka and Nuer tribes of South Sudan after their independence was achieved. Public storying, oral histories, truth commissions, and victim testimonies all serve a function of collective review of the existing, damaged sociological structure (Leffler & Brent 1992; Ochberg 1988; Stein 1994). They are internal mechanisms for restoring internal justice and resolving internal conflict within a communal body that is willing to self-identify as emic rather than a collection of emic and etic bodies struggling to co-exist in a common political framework of a Westphalia state.

For victims and families to be able to meaningfully and safely relate their stories into a trusted emic community, they must first lay context of *jinsi mambo, kabla ya vita*,<sup>82</sup> or how it was before the war (Winslade & Monk 2000). This beginning context allows the storytellers to express depth of loss, pain, and the connection to betrayal in a forum that includes victim, perpetrator, and bystander. This storying is not in lieu of punishment of

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<sup>82</sup> Swahili

perpetrator, nor is it a prelude to the exclusion of the perpetrator, an act that would negate the value of the storying. This is because the exact purpose of the public storing, oral truth, and such is the making psychological, spiritual, and emotional space for victim, perpetrator, and bystander in the same physical (sociological) and ideological (psychological) space of co-existence.

The collected storying of the damaged community of victims, perpetrators, and witnesses who relate their horrific stories of loss, pain, suffering, and grief in shared contexts, serves to create a background narrative that binds the story tellers together (Enright & North 1998). These storytellers become a new, devolved collective of sufferers who exist in a shared alienation of loss. But their realization of this shared pain is (or can be) the psychological vehicle that transforms their individual alienation into a new commonality of existence (Herman J. L. 1992). They may be suffering, grieving, and in physical and emotional pain. However, they cannot be alienated within the confines of a bounded group, especially when the most salient point of commonality is the most loudly expressed component: pain and loss. If they are not alienated, they cannot be shamed (Kaufman G. P. 1996). If they are not shamed, then they can share their primal emotions of love, anger, grief, and terror. This then becomes a starting point for healing and reclaiming their psychological reality of a broken sociological structure (Elsass 1997).

**Palliative care, sociological development, and identity management as scenarios of conflict intervention in Azawad and Azawax**

Unfortunately for the populations of northern Niger and northern Mali, the structural issues that prevent them from realizing and meeting their underlying structural needs are long from being resolved. Both the Mande majority in southern Mali and the Hausa majority in southern Niger struggle to build consensus within their own sub-Saharan populations on the appropriate path of governance and development. In Mali, the United Nations Mission continues to wield stabilizing influence and manage ongoing violence in the north. In Niamey, student protests and an occasional political riot demonstrate the uneasy politics within the Hausa majority in Niger. These multicultural states struggle over the construction and implementation of mechanisms that share available wealth now versus long-term investment in a future state that many have difficulty envisioning. Often last among the struggling majorities' list of concerns are rural, nomadic populations whose contributions to the national gross domestic product are minimal, yet whose claim to the country's natural wealth is substantial merely by virtue of claimed historical ownership.

Only through repeated rebellions of the Kel Tamashek in Azawad and Azawax combined with the intervention of competing international Islamic Jihadism did the United Nations and international community deign to intervene; and then (some claim) only because a major western power's access to uranium was threatened. While the degree to which the northern populations challenge the Mali and Niger governments differs, the likely avenues to conflict resolution are the same. These avenues consist of three paths designed to preserve threatened communities and assist them with adaptation to the ongoing

environmental and industrial changes besetting them. They consist of short-term palliative care, mid-term sociological development, and long-term identity management.

*Palliative care.* Palliative care is drawn from medical terminology and refers to the management of physical symptoms without actually removing or curing the underlying cause. Palliative care is used when organized medicine does not offer a cure or treatment outside of the body's own natural defenses, or as part of a long term treatment that requires the body to build or maintain its defenses as part of the treatment. Palliative care is the treating of symptoms rather than curative measure that do not exist or are long term. As used in development aid and governance reform, palliative care is essentially a continuation of the humanitarian and developmental aid separate from addressing the underlying issues or social dysfunctions that fail to meet physical and underlying human needs.

Currently, much of the humanitarian and developmental aid that the United States, European Union, African Union, and United Nations are currently providing to the at-risk communities in the central Sahel and elsewhere is palliative in nature. I first used this term with the Charge de Affairs of the US Embassy in Niamey and executives of USAID to explain my support of the introduction in Niger of teams belonging to the Office of Transitional Initiatives, a subcomponent of USAID that operates closely with the State Department's Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations. A central concern of my team in Niger was that, at times, well-meaning humanitarian aid organizations contributed to social conflict by the provision of goods and services that were outside of sustainable social contexts. A common theme expressed in this dialogue was that we do not want to build roads to nowhere and that have no one to use them, much less sustain

them; a concept I found to be valid in my work in Africa, Iraq, and South America.

Palliative care is a simple approach to understanding the flow and direction of humanitarian and developmental aid in the context of countering international violent extremist ideology that uses suffering to explain its rationale and *raison d'être*.

Part of my advisory team in Niger consisted of a psychological operations team that is called a MISO team, or military information support operations team. Their job is to help me identify the strategic messaging emanating from violent extremist organizations (VEO) and counter those messages with versions that support a democratic and humanistic approach to security, governance and development. From this team's efforts at dissecting the mass communications of VEOs, we found that they possess skill in explaining the pain and suffering of communities that are unable to meet their basic physical and underlying psychosocial human needs. In their states of trauma and need, these at-risk communities are vulnerable to the siren calls of the VEOs who link their hunger, loss of membership, and marginalization by an uncaring world to their abandonment of the right path of Islam.

The VEO message effectively uses shame and the threat of alienation from the Muslim ummah to make them accept responsibility for their conditions that only expiation of sin and wrong living can reverse. Using their own version of narrative mediation therapy, the VEO messages deconstruct their failing living and social conditions and externalize the problem outside of their own community, outside of their own control, and onto an "enemy other" (Christian 2014). This externalized enemy other is Godless as a hated other should be and laden with worldly gifts that serve only to encourage the moral and sexual disintegration (*haram* in Arabic) of their children and

grandchildren. With their calls of young people to the cities and away from the roots of their family origination, this enemy other seeks the destruction of these at risk communities, clearing the way for the enemy other to plunder the natural resources of a desert homeland that carries their existential identity. The VEOs call this enemy other Boko, the West, Globalization, Modernity, Europe, and America. By deconstructing the story of their pain and suffering and externalizing the problematized suffering onto an enemy other, they VEOs seek to restory their historical narrative into one of archaic types of pure good versus pure evil.

Where palliative care helps is in the management of the worst of the physical symptoms of a society no longer able to meet their physical and underlying human needs due to extended violence, trauma and adaptive failure to rapid external change. Providing immediate food aid and fodder for animals; health care for child development, aging, and emergent care; short and medium term solutions for human and animal water supply; animal husbandry that includes recovery from the effects of drought as well as vaccinations and records of certification that ease the process of livestock sales; new forms of drought resistant agriculture suitable for the growth of fodder for pastoralist communities; education platforms that balance the development of national education standards with requirements for preserving and transmitting the specific interior cultural historical narrative, are some of the elements of palliative care that we worked to implement in Azawad and Azawar in northern Mali and Niger respectively. Beyond the immediate saving of lives, preservation of families, and the continuation of an existential narrative, the purpose of the palliative care is to provide us as interventionists with time

needed to help plan and implement sociological development and identity management in under governed portions of failing or failed states.

*Sociological development.* The reason that palliative care is so important is that the task of sociological development in conflict zones of under or un-governed spaces of states is complex, difficult, and requires tremendous patience over long periods of time. Foreign interventionists in humanitarian, development, and peace operations must work through surrogate members of the established governing institution who must then (usually) be coached to work through surrogate members of the traditional society that is the ultimate victim of a failed adaptation to a changed world.

The failing traditional society that is at risk to loss of life, habitat, membership, and failing existential identity from an interrupted historical narrative must eventually be the author of its own change. Forced change risks rejection by current or younger generations, whose comparison of their present narrative with that of their origination, discover identity definitions that are unpalatable. What makes this so difficult for the traditional, needing-to-adapt host community is that their task involves the merger of ancient structures and organization that are based on millennia of past practice in extraordinarily austere environments with the interconnectedness of a globalized community.

How the Kel Tamashek in the central Sahel merge their traditional systems of transportation, food and water production, navigation, health and psycho-emotional care, indigenous systems of justice and conflict resolution, education and knowledge creation, and storage and manufacture of goods and services with all of the advances that are being



introduced to them all at once is the basis of their future shock/cultural shock that I discussed in Chapter 5. As an interventionist in Niger, my goal was to help their formal governance develop their traditional governance, and help both systems to examine the possibilities for merging antiquity with modernity, all while continuing just in time palliative care to prevent loss of life, habitat, or membership disintegration physically and psychologically (Griswold 2014). The sociological development of ancient communities that are suffering from trauma (especially as it is induced from an adaptive failure of rapidly changing habitat, sociological structure, and associated integration of psychological organization) is the subject of much of my post-doctoral and post military work as scholar-researcher and as field advisor.

***Identity management.*** The final piece of the interventionist support into communities suffering from extended violence, trauma, and adaptive failure is a communal process that renegotiates their own internal large group identity against the already changed context of neighboring identity groups. This process is an inescapable part of long-term sociological re-development because of how group identity is formed, defined and sustained. A communal identity like the Kel Tamashek is not defined or sustained merely by what that identity is internal to the community. It is defined as much or more by what that identity is not (Stein, 1982). For instance, the Kel Tamashek identity as analyzed in chapters four and five is based on deep-seated, but relatively simplistic archaic types that have tremendous power in their saliency and relevance to their historical narrative and extant habitat.

Identity management is a combination process of growth and preservation that seeks to expand the existing set(s) of archaic types, sociological roles, psychological instincts

and affects, and emotional conjugations in a communal process that links all new growth with its mythical foundation of historical origination. First and foremost, this communal process prevents breakage in the historical narrative by increasing the memorialization of key prototypical figures in an organized manner that allows for the possibility of future democratization of the process that is based on a wide ranging set of attributes and displays of accomplishment. Said more simply, the base of the archaic types, instinct, affect, social roles, and emotional emanations is increased while the possibilities for the creation, heroization, and memorialization of prototypes are increased correspondingly. This is accomplished at the same time that the larger, more ancient historical narrative is increasingly preserved through physical emanations of cultural expression in all forms of political, social, economic, and artistic life.

Truly this task, combined with the requirements for sociological development and merger with a rapidly globalizing external community, is one that is daunting. Our continuing failure to orient our approach to dealing with communal conflict using combinations of palliative care, sociological development, and identity management as the central features of conflict resolution will result in our continuing default to the use of kinetic force as the principal negotiator of intrastate violence.

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## Curriculum Vita

Dr Patrick James Christian is an Adjunct Research Professor with the United States Special Operations Command's Joint Special Operations University (USSOCOM JSOU) tasked with documenting and analyzing the sociological breakdown and psychological devolvement of tribes/clans in violent conflict. His work is part of a research and development effort leading to evolving military and diplomatic approaches to security sector reform, internal defense & development and foreign internal defense.

Dr Christian was a US Army Green Beret officer with twenty-four years of experience in the practice and research of intra-state violence, civil war and tribal conflict. He has lead field teams conducting combat advisory missions, tribal engagement and counterinsurgency operations in Caquetá, Putumayo and Los Amazonas Colombia; Puerto Francisco de Orellana in Ecuador; Darfur Sudan; Bilate and Ogadin regions of Ethiopia; and Baghdad and Taji Iraq. For the past year and a half, he served as a Special Forces interagency field team leader with US Africa Command's Special Operations Command – Africa, conducting counter-terrorism, intelligence analysis, international security, and military operations (advise/assist/accompany) in the northern reaches of the Republic of Niger in the Central Sahel.

Prior to his most recent deployment back to Africa, he served as a Policy Advisor in OSD-Policy and an adjunct faculty teaching African Civil Wars at the National Intelligence University's Department of African Studies. At the National Training Center in Ft Irwin CA, he trained US Army Special Forces, US Navy SEALs, and USMC Advisory Groups in combat advising, tribal engagement and psycho-historiographical profiling of tribes in conflict.

Dr Christian is published in peer reviewed journals, including the Journal of African Security (Citadel University), International Journal of Conflict Engagement & Resolution (Bar Ilan University, Tel Aviv), Small Wars Journal, Special Warfare Quarterly, and the Combined Arms Center for Lessons Learned. In 2011, BrownWalker Press published his first book, a Combat Advisor's Guide to Tribal Engagement, under its Universal Publishers label which is available through Amazon and Barnes & Noble booksellers.

Dr Christian attended undergraduate school at the University of South Florida's Department of Interdisciplinary Social Science, graduate school at Gonzaga University's School of Organizational Communication and Leadership, post graduate studies at George Mason's School of Conflict Analysis & Resolution, and the doctoral program in ethnic and cultural conflict at Nova Southeastern's Department of Conflict Analysis & Resolution.

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## CV

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Doctorate in Philosophy with concentration in Ethnic & Cultural Conflict
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- GONZAGA JESUIT UNIVERSITY, SCHOOL OF PROFESSIONAL STUDIES, DEPARTMENT OF ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION AND LEADERSHIP, Spokane, Washington, USA  
Master of Science in Cross Cultural Organizational Leadership
- UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA, COLLEGE OF ARTS & SCIENCES, INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES DEPARTMENT, Tampa, Florida, USA  
Baccalaureate of Science in History, International Relations and Pre Law

### LANGUAGES:

- English (Native or bilingual proficiency)
- Spanish (Professional working proficiency)
- Arabic (Elementary proficiency)
- Tamashek (Elementary proficiency)

### FIELDWORK: Research, Training, Mediation & Advising Experience (72 months)

**Research Typology:** *Participatory Action Research (Colombia & Iraq), Reflective Ethnography and Phenomenological Inquiry (Ecuador, Panama, Guatemala, Kenya, Morocco, Darfur Sudan, Ethiopia & Libya)*

- NIGER: Niamey, Taouha, Ingall, Agadez 2013 – 2014: *Tribal Engagement and Phenomenological Research with the Kel Tamashek (Tuareg)* (12 months field advisor to Les forces armées nigériennes).
- IRAQ: Taji, Iraq 2008 – 2010: *Teaching, Training & Facilitating the Mukahafat Mutamaradeen Academy & Battle Command Exercise Center, Iraqi Ministry of Defense* (14 months)
- COLOMBIA: Departamentos de Caquetá y Putumayo de Sur Colombia 2006 – 2007: *Participatory Action Research with Acción Social and Training/Advising 1<sup>st</sup> & 2<sup>nd</sup> Agrupación Fuerzas Especiales Urbano y Rural AFEUR Compañías* (14 months)
- GUATEMALA: Antigua 2006: *Ethnographic research on the language of post conflict restoration of justice and society* (2 months)
- MOROCCO: Casablanca and Marrakesh 2006: *Ethnographic survey of Arab and Berber culture* (1 month)
- KENYA: Nairobi, Mombasa, and Mount Kenya 2006: *Ethnographic Surveys of sociocentric rural agro-pastoralists* (2 months)
- ETHIOPIA: Somali Ogadeen Region 2005: *Training & Combat Advising Ethiopian Special Forces and tribal engagement with Oromo and Somali pastoralists* (6 months)
- SUDAN: Darfur, Sudan 2004 – 2005 *Conflict Ceasefire Mediation and Tribal Engagement with Zaghawa, Masalit, Fur and Rizeigat Tribes (from Tine/Ambarou south to Kabkabiya, Nyala & Jebel Mara)* (8 months)
- ECUADOR: Puerto Francisco Orellana (El Coca) Ecuador 1992-1993: *Teaching & Training of Brigada de Selva diecinueve* (7 months)
- PANAMA: Golfo de San Blas, El Porvenir to Ustupo Yantupo 1985-1986: *Ethnographic population surveys along the Caribbean coastline narco-trafficking routes* (6 months undergraduate overseas study)

#### PUBLISHED BOOKS & PAPERS:

- ✚ Christian, P.J. (2014) A Reformulated Model of Narrative Mediation of Emerging Culture Conflict. *International Journal of Conflict Engagement & Resolution*, Vol 2, No. 2, 76-94 (Univ of Tel Aviv)
- ✚ Christian, P.J. (2013), Engaging Traumatized Communities in Village Stability Operations. *Small Wars Journal*, September Issue, Stable URL: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/engaging-traumatized-communities-in-village-stability-operations#!>
- ✚ Christian, P.J. (2013) Darfur: Ground Zero for Africa's Crises of Identity, A psycho-Historiography of Darfur's Tribes in Conflict, *Journal of African Security*, Vol 6, No. 1, 1-39 (The Citadel)
- ✚ Christian, P.J. & Nestic, A. (2012). Crossing Barriers of Communication & Culture in Traumatized Societies, *Intercultural Management Quarterly*, Vol 13, No.1, Spring 2012, 6-8 (American Univ)
- ✚ Christian, P. J. (2011). *Combat Advisor's Guide to Tribal Engagement: history, law and war as operational elements*. Boca Raton: Brown Walker Press. (152 pages) ISBN-10:


1599428164 and ISBN-13: 9781599428161. Book Review by Special Operations University, US Army Special Warfare Center & School, Fort Bragg, NC. Review on page 37, of *Special Warfare*, Volume 25, Issue 2, April-June 2012

<http://www.dvidshub.net/publication/issues/10170>

- ✚ Christian, P. J. (2011). Sleeping with the Enemy: Pakistan's military industrial complex and existential crises of national identity. *Small Wars Journal*, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/815-christian.pdf>
- ✚ Christian, P. J. (2009). Rebalancing the Force: Unconventional Advisory Forces in Counterinsurgency. *Small Wars Journal*, 1-9. <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/535-christian.pdf>
- ✚ Grange, D., Swanson, S., & Christian, P. J. (2009, February). Winning Damaged Hearts & Minds. *McCormick Tribune February 2009*, reprinted in *Chapter 5, Center for Army Lessons Learned 11-34 and Small Wars Journal June 2009*, 29-33. [http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/11-34/ch\\_5.asp](http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/11-34/ch_5.asp)
- ✚ Christian, P. J. (2007, May-June). Guerrillas in the Midst: U.S. Planning, Advisory and Training Team Helps Colombian Army Build Skills. *Special Warfare Volume 20, Issue 3*, 16-22. <http://www.dvidshub.net/publication/issues/8247>
- ✚ Christian, P. J. (2006, July). Meeting the Irregular Warfare Challenge: Developing an Interdisciplinary Approach to Asymmetrical Warfare. *Small War Journal*, 49-53. <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/535-christian.pdf>

Christian, P. J. (2005). Brokering Peace in Sudan. *Special Warfare Bulletin Volume 19, Issue 2*, 6-13. <http://www.dvidshub.net/publication/issues/8264>

#### ACADEMIC PRESENTATIONS (FORMAL - INVITED - SPONSORED)

- DOD EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP STEERING COMMITTEE CONFERENCE ON NORTH AFRICA DISTRIBUTION NETWORK, AUGUST 1<sup>ST</sup> 2014. *Presentation of conflict drivers in northern Niger and Mali*. (Formal – Directed)
- USAID WEST AFRICA REGIONAL OFFICE & SOC AFRICA VEO CONFERENCE, ACCRA, GHANA, 12 JUNE 2014. *Presentation of conflict drivers in northern Niger and Mali*. (Formal – Sponsored)
- 14<sup>TH</sup> ANNUAL INTERCULTURAL MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, WASH DC, 14-15 MARCH 2013. *90 minute presentation of Mediating Tribal Conflict as part of post conflict restoration of justice in sociocentric tribal communities*. (Formal – Invited) <HTTP://WWW.AMERICAN.EDU/SIS/IMI/CONFERENCE/PATRICK-CHRISTIAN.CFM> 
- UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, CONFLICT RESOLUTION CONFERENCE, BOSTON, 19-20 OCT 2012. *30 minute presentation on Emerging Culture Conflict Mediation Model*. (Formal – Invited)
- DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY LANGUAGE, REGIONAL EXPERTISE & CULTURE PRESENTATION, WASH DC, SEPT 19<sup>TH</sup> 2012. *180 minute presentation on the psychological sociological structure, dynamics and identity of the Somali clans*. (Formal – Invited)
- NIU PRESENTATION TO THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S GENOCIDE & WAR CRIMES DIVISION, WASH DC, MAY 17<sup>TH</sup> 2012. *2 ½ hour presentation on the psycho-cultural*

*dynamics of perpetrators, victims & bystanders in genocide and extreme communal conflict.* (Formal – Invited)

- 13<sup>TH</sup> ANNUAL INTERCULTURAL MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, Wash DC, 15-16 March 2012. 90 minute presentation of *Crossing Barriers of Communication & Culture in Traumatized Societies*, with co-presenter Aleksandra Nescic, Florida State University (Formal - Invited)  
<http://www.american.edu/sis/imi/conference/Christian.cfm>
- 24<sup>TH</sup> RESIDENTIAL INSTITUTE, NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF CONFLICT ANALYSIS & RESOLUTION, Ft Lauderdale, Florida, 12-13 February 2011. 120 minute presentation of *Tribal Engagement featuring live mediation between Ewelle and Njeke Tribal Leaders of Central Cameroon* (Formal - Sponsored)



#### INTERNATIONAL ACCESS & RESTRICTIONS:

- **Passports:** USA Tourist (valid thru 2023), USG Official (valid thru 2017)
- **Security Clearance:** US TS/SCI

#### UNIVERSITY/ACADEMY TEACHING & TRAINING EXPERIENCE:

- NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF AFRICAN STRATEGIC STUDIES, January – November 2012; Adjunct Instructor
  - 2012 – Spring Semester, Graduate Certificate Class in African Civil Wars
  - 2012 – Summer Semester, Graduate Certificate Class in African Conflict Stabilization
- UNIVERSITY OF PORTLAND & PORTLAND STATE UNIVERSITY, Oregon 2000 – 2003; Assistant Professor of Leadership Studies and Military Science (*US Army ROTC Programs*)
  - 2000 – Fall Semester, Sophomore classes in Organization & Functions of U.S. National Defense; Junior classes in leadership practice & theory
  - 2001 – Spring Sophomore classes in Leadership Essentials; Junior classes in Military History
  - 2001 – Fall Sophomore classes in Organization & Functions of U.S. National Defense; Junior classes in leadership practice & theory
  - 2002 – Spring Sophomore classes in Leadership Essentials; Junior classes in Military History
  - 2002 – Fall Sophomore classes in Organization & Functions of U.S. National Defense; Junior classes in leadership practice & theory
  - 2003 – Spring Sophomore classes in Leadership Essentials; Junior classes in Military History
- NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER, US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, Fort Irwin, California 2007 – 2009; Director of Training and Analysis Division, responsible for instructional development and implementation for the subjects of:
  - Irregular Warfare

- Tribal Engagement
- Village Stability Operations
- Key Leader Engagement

Training audiences consisted of 7 battalions of US Army Special Forces (Green Berets), 8 Squadrons of US Navy Special Warfare (SEALS) and 5 Teams of US Marine Corps Advisory Groups. Training was conducting using training structures that fully replicated live cultural and linguistic operational scenarios relevant to either Iraq or Afghanistan (role players and villages in the Mojave Desert).

#### FOREIGN ACADEMY/UNIVERSITY TEACHING EXPERIENCE:

**Academie Mukahafat Mutamaradeen:** From January 2009 to March 2010, I established the Iraqi Armed Forces Counter-Terrorist/Counter-Insurgent Academy and Battle Command Center at Taji Military Base, Iraq, at the request of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. With a staff of 16 personnel provided by member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) participating in the stabilization of Iraq, I created three iterations (levels) of course instruction complete with class lecture notes and physical and virtual training aids. The three iterations consisted of a basic, intermediate, and an advanced course for Iraqi military and police personnel from Platoon Leader to Brigade Commander (Second Lieutenant to Brigadier General). After the first year of instruction, we trained and supervised Iraqi instructors as they transitioned to full time cadre. All course materials in both English and Arabic are available at the following website:

[http://nova.academia.edu/PatrickJChristian/Teaching/24369/Field\\_Research\\_and\\_Notes\\_Countering\\_insurgency\\_in\\_Iraq](http://nova.academia.edu/PatrickJChristian/Teaching/24369/Field_Research_and_Notes_Countering_insurgency_in_Iraq)

#### Un-Classified Courses Developed and Taught

Course: **Information Operations (معلومات العمليات)** Principals, theory, and practice of information operations in support of stabilization and legitimization of emerging governance. 2 months for course development followed by 5 iterations of 2 weeks of instruction.

Course: **Managing the consequences of Terrorist Attacks (إدارة النتائج (العواقب) للهجمات الإرهابية)** Purpose and meaning of terrorism in Iraqi society as an introduction to Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP). The course focuses on the principals and methods of government responses to attacks and protection of critical civil infrastructure as a basis of governing legitimacy and countering terrorist insurgent messages. The course included computer simulations of attacks followed by student responses in a Battle Command Simulation Center operated by the Academy. 2 months of course development followed by 5 iterations of 2 weeks of instruction.

Course: **Negotiations and Conflict Management in Peacekeeping & Stability Operations Missions (المفاوضات)** Principals of negotiation and mediation for Iraqi military and police officers working to support and stabilize civil society in post conflict resolution. Covers the roles of peacekeepers in civil conflict, rules of engagement,

ethics, and leadership principals; emphasizes primacy of civil governance and a review of appropriate use of public funds and equipment for the benefit of civil population. 2 months of course development followed by 5 iterations of instruction.

Course: **Key Leader Engagements (KLE) and Interactions with Local Populations** ( )

Course provided a basic, intermediate and/or advanced review into civil military operations designed grow internal legitimacy for local and state governance in structure, methods and actions.

Course: **INTRODUCTION TO POPULACE AND RESOURCE CONTROL (P&RC)**( تدابير

السيطرة على الموارد و السكان) Principals, theory and methods of population and resource control required to protect life and property; secure common areas from terrorism and establish protected public spaces for sociological functioning of cities and towns.

Course: **Restoration and Provision of Essential Government Services to Populations**


(البنية التحتية الحرجة والخدمات الأساسية) Principals, methods of types of essential services required by populations and their civil infrastructure. Course includes alternative delivery methods, minimum requirements for subsistence, epidemiology, fire and damage control of public and private infrastructure, and strategic messaging as it relates to essential services expectations and deliverables.

#### UN-PUBLISHED PAPERS & RESEARCH:

- ✚ Christian, P.J. (Winter 2013), Islam's Eternal Internal Conflict - the cognitive dissonance between universal faith and ethnic origin.  
<http://www.scribd.com/doc/124666458/Islam-s-Eternal-Internal-Conflict-the-cognitive-dissonance-between-universal-faith-and-ethnic-origination-pdf>
- ✚ Christian, P.J. (Winter 2013), Intractable Conflict and the Sociocentric Indigenous System of Conflict Resolution.  
[http://www.academia.edu/2254452/Intractable\\_Conflict\\_and\\_the\\_Sociocentric\\_Indigenous\\_System\\_of\\_Conflict\\_Resolution](http://www.academia.edu/2254452/Intractable_Conflict_and_the_Sociocentric_Indigenous_System_of_Conflict_Resolution)
- ✚ Christian, P.J. (Summer 2012), Genocide & Communal Violence: *Exploring the Connection between Victim, Bystander and Perpetrator*.  
[http://www.academia.edu/1255660/Genocide\\_and\\_Communal\\_Violence\\_Exploring\\_the\\_Connection\\_between\\_Victim\\_Bystander\\_and\\_Perpetrator](http://www.academia.edu/1255660/Genocide_and_Communal_Violence_Exploring_the_Connection_between_Victim_Bystander_and_Perpetrator)
- ✚ Christian, P.J. (Summer 2012), Dynamics of Sexual Violence in Intrastate Conflict.  
[http://www.academia.edu/1621707/The\\_Dynamics\\_of\\_Sexual\\_Violence\\_in\\_Intra-State\\_Conflict](http://www.academia.edu/1621707/The_Dynamics_of_Sexual_Violence_in_Intra-State_Conflict)
- ✚ Christian, P.J. (Spring 2012) Gatekeepers in Conflict Research Settings: *Ethics, Access & Safety*.  
[http://www.academia.edu/1494659/Gatekeepers\\_in\\_Conflict\\_Research\\_Settings\\_Ethics\\_Access\\_and\\_Safety](http://www.academia.edu/1494659/Gatekeepers_in_Conflict_Research_Settings_Ethics_Access_and_Safety)
- ✚ Christian, P.J. (Spring 2012) Memory, Monuments & Conflict.  
[http://www.academia.edu/1400651/Memory\\_Monuments\\_and\\_Conflict](http://www.academia.edu/1400651/Memory_Monuments_and_Conflict)
- ✚ Christian, P.J. (Spring 2012) Book Critique of Maurice Halbwachs' "On Collective Memory"




Top 2% Downloads



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[http://www.academia.edu/1437974/Book Critique of Maurice Halbwachs On Collective Memory](http://www.academia.edu/1437974/Book_Critique_of_Maurice_Halbwachs_On_Collective_Memory)



Top 3% Downloads

- ✚ Christian, P.J. (Fall 2011) Participatory Action Research (PAR) as a modality for resolving intra-state conflict in Caquetá, Colombia, submitted for publication to the *International Journal of Action Research*, Prof Danilo Streck, Editor  
[http://www.academia.edu/1102485/Participatory Action Research PAR as a modality for resolving intra-state conflict in Caqueta Colombia](http://www.academia.edu/1102485/Participatory_Action_Research_PAR_as_a_modality_for_resolving_intra-state_conflict_in_Caqueta_Colombia)
- ✚ Christian, P.J. (Fall 2011) Phenomenological Inquiry in Tribal Conflict Engagement.  
[http://www.academia.edu/1100438/Phenomenological Inquiry in Tribal Conflict Engagement](http://www.academia.edu/1100438/Phenomenological_Inquiry_in_Tribal_Conflict_Engagement)
- ✚ Christian, P.J. (Editor, 2009-2010) The Iraqi Commanders: Struggling partners in pursuit of peace. *A collection of Student-Commander class presentations on "My Experiences in Counterinsurgency & Civil Security"*. Translated by Rami Abu Shear  
[http://nova.academia.edu/PatrickJChristian/Teaching/24369/Field Research and Notes Counterinsurgency in Iraq](http://nova.academia.edu/PatrickJChristian/Teaching/24369/Field_Research_and_Notes_Counterinsurgency_in_Iraq)
- ✚ Christian, P. J. (2007) *Cross cultural communications survey for the Gran Comité de Cooperación Western Department of Caquetá, southern Colombia*. Retrieved Nov 11, 2011, from Scribd.com: <http://www.scribd.com/doc/33151769/Communications-Survey-for-the-GRAN-COMITE>
- ✚ Christian, P.J. (2005) *The Rise of Internal Determinants of State Legitimacy and its Impact on 20th and 21st Century Warfare*, United States Army Command & General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
[http://nova.academia.edu/PatrickJChristian/Papers/1156181/The Rise of Internal Determinants of State Legitimacy and its Impact on 20th and 21st Century Warfare](http://nova.academia.edu/PatrickJChristian/Papers/1156181/The_Rise_of_Internal_Determinants_of_State_Legitimacy_and_its_Impact_on_20th_and_21st_Century_Warfare)
- ✚ Christian, P.J. (2004) *The Evolution of State Legitimacy and the Impact on the Nature of 18th and 19th Century Warfare*, United States Army Command & General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
[http://nova.academia.edu/PatrickJChristian/Papers/1156220/The Evolution of State Legitimacy and the Impact on the Nature of 18th and 19th Century Warfare](http://nova.academia.edu/PatrickJChristian/Papers/1156220/The_Evolution_of_State_Legitimacy_and_the_Impact_on_the_Nature_of_18th_and_19th_Century_Warfare)

#### TEACHING INTERESTS:

Emerging Culture Conflict \* Psycho-Cultural & Ethnic Conflict \* International Relations \* Cross-Cultural Communication \* History \* Intelligence Systems (HUMINT)

#### RESEARCH INTERESTS:

Emerging Culture Conflict \* Group Identity Dissonance & Disintegration \* Failed State Rehabilitation \* Unconventional (insurgent) Warfare \* Irregular Warfare \* Psycho-Cultural & Ethnic Conflict \* Psychological & Emotional underpinnings of inter-group violence \* Psychological Anthropology \* Tribal Engagement \* Conflict Group Identity Reformation and Resolution \* Cross-Cultural Communication

#### MEMBERSHIPS & PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS:

Joint International Security Force Assistance

US Army Special Forces Association

Founder/Moderator Tribal Engagement Advisory Council

Member: Africa Security Studies Group, Cultural Analysis Group, Irregular Warfare Center of Excellence, Middle East Studies Association, and International Center for Conflict Engagement

#### PROFESSIONAL & LANGUAGE TRAINING COURSES: 33 MONTHS

- |  |             |
|--|-------------|
| • Jungle Warfare Training School, Central America                | Diploma     |
| • Army Officer's Infantry Basic Course, Fort Benning GA          | Diploma     |
| • Parachute School, Fort Benning GA                              | Diploma     |
| • Army Officer Special Forces (Green Beret) Qualification School | Diploma     |
| • Survival, Escape, Evasion & Resistance Course, Fort Bragg NC   | Diploma     |
| • Spanish Language Basic Course, Monterey CA                     | Diploma     |
| • Army Officer's Infantry Advanced Course, Fort Benning GA       | Diploma     |
| • Strategic Reconnaissance Course, Camp Blanding, FL             | Certificate |
| • Combined Arms Staff Service School, Fort Leavenworth KS        | Diploma     |
| • Command & General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth KS           | Diploma     |
| • Arabic Basic Language Proficiency Course, Fort Riley KS        | Certificate |
| • Spanish Language Advanced Course                               | Certificate |
| • Tamashek Introduction Language Course, DLI Monterey CA         | Certificate |

Summary Report for 55-1017.00 - Special Forces Officers MOS 18A: Lead elite teams that implement unconventional operations by air, land, or sea during combat or peacetime. These activities include offensive raids, demolitions, reconnaissance, search and rescue, and counterterrorism. In addition to their combat training, Special Forces

officers often have specialized training in swimming, diving, parachuting, survival, emergency medicine, and foreign languages. Duties include directing advanced reconnaissance operations and evaluating intelligence information; recruiting, training, and equipping friendly forces; leading raids and invasions on enemy territories; training personnel to implement individual missions and contingency plans; performing strategic and tactical planning for politically sensitive missions; and operating sophisticated communications equipment.

MEMBERS RETIREMENT DATE 01 MARCH 2015

<b>DATE</b>	<b>ORGANIZATION</b>	<b>STATION</b>	<b>DUTY TITLE</b>	<b>DMOS</b>
20140909	OSD-POLICY/USSOCOM JSOU	PENTAGON	TRANSITION/ADJUNCT	18A00
20130824	SOC AFRICA JSOTF-TS	NIGER	SR MIL ADV – FAN	18A00
20130530	DEF LANG INST	MONTEREY	LANG STUDENT	18A00
20100324	OSD USD-POLICY	PENTAGON	POLICY ADVISOR	18A00
20081129	MITT TM47428 (COIN)	TAJI IRAQ	CDR	18A00
20070703	USASOC/NTC	FT IRWIN	JOINT SOF TRNR/COOR	18A00
20060503	USASOC TAFT TEAM 3 CBT ADV	COLOMBIA	CDR	18A00
20060303	SEC ASSIST TNG TM	GUATEMALA	ADV TRNG	18A00
20050615	CJSOTF - AP J3 DIR	BAGHDAD	J3 GRND OPS FWD	18A00
20050201	CJSOTF – HOA CBT ADV TM	ADDIS ABABA	TM LDR / SOFLE	18A00
20040801	CJOSTF – HOA CBT ADV TM	DARFUR SDN	TM LDR / SOFLE	18A00
20030901	J3 HOMELND DEF RED TEAM	PENTAGON	OPNS OFFICER	18A00
20010401	US ARMY CADET COMMAND	PORTLAND	EXECUTIVE OFFICER	18A00
20000224	1ST US CORPS RAOC	FT LEWIS	OPNS OFFICER	18A00
19980201	41 SIB 7TH ID AC/RC	PORTLAND	MENTOR-COACH	11A00
19940101	USSOUTHCOM 50ASG	MIAMI	DIRECTOR PERS	42A00
19911001	USASFC SF GRP	FT BRAGG	DETACHMENT CDR	18A00
19900801	USAJFKSWC&S/USAIC&S	FT BRAGG/BEN	STUDENT	18A00
19880915	187 IN	PANAMA	PLT LDR	11A00

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## **Appendices 1 - 17**



Between Warrior<sup>Imajalen</sup> and Helplessness<sup>Timogoutar</sup>  
In the Valley of Azawar  
*the struggle of the Kel Tamashek in the war of the Sahel*