

**Appendix A Country-of-Origin Context – The Sudan – East, West, North, & South Sudan.**

**§A1. Introduction.**

The context of violence in the Sudan that is driving residents like the claimant into exile can only be understood within the context of the psychosocial violence of the region. The countries of Sudan, South Sudan, and Chad are not at war with each other, but their populations are. In each of these three political states, the governments of Khartoum, Juba, and N'Djamena have limited social control over their population segments, outside of violent punitive physical force. The Arab East state of Sudan recently lost its civil war against its African South, resulting in the newest recognised state in the United Nations – South Sudan. The Arab North against the African South civil war was characterised by extreme levels of ethnic and cultural cleansing of the south, especially around the petroleum reserves located in the African part of the south. The violence between Arab and African over decades, traumatised and deformed psychosocial-political realities on both sides of the conflict. At the same time as the civil war between the Arab north and the African south, one segment of the Arab north was attempting to clear out non-Arab ethnicities in the western portions of the country from regions they believed to

Figure 1 Pictorial map of Sudanese related conflicts





belong to Arab Sudan. The civil war between the Arab north and the African south was an attempt to maintain historical Arab domination over, and subservience of Sudan's African ethnic peoples. Over the past three and a half decades, the conflict in the west between Arab and African, spilled over into Chad's ethnic communities and became intermixed with an already ongoing civil war between N'Djamena's Zaghawa led government against the Toubou led armed political movement seeking to overthrow the father and son Debey military regime. Finally, in 2020, Sudan's Arab solidarity split after the fall of the semi-theocratic regime of Omar Bashir, wanted by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity. The graphic pictorial map in **figure 2**, provides a caricatured illustration of multinational conflict in the western Sahel region of Africa. While the first civil war between Arab Sudan and African South Sudan finally ended, the resulting violent traumatisation devolved into new civil wars in the south, west, east, and north that plague all three states and beyond. The common link for all of these conflicts involves the past and present disintegration of the psycho-social identity of the tribes and the social organizing force provided by that identity. Sudan is a state that was divided between the Muslim north and the animist-Christian south, and between the Arab east and the African west. Sudan's relationship with Europe and the Americas has much to do with the United States' war against Al Qaeda and its leader, Osama Bin Laden. Before his attack on 9/11, Bin Laden lived in a villa in Khartoum provided by then Sudanese president Omar Bashir, whose government and elites sought public recognition and acceptance for their claim to be Arab, despite the obvious differences between their phenotype and that of the actual Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula. To say this succinctly, Sudan's Arabs desire to 'be Arab' more than the real Arabs whom they mimic and worship. In many ways the new state of South Sudan is largely an American creation, "carved out of war-torn Sudan in a referendum largely orchestrated by the United States, its fragile institutions nurtured with billions of dollars in American aid."<sup>1</sup> The conflicts in Sudan, and much of Africa, have been inadvertently aggravated during the intervention of Western diplomacy, humanitarian agencies and media. Western society, seeking to alleviate the visible part of the violent conflict, interacts with the new and emerging leaders who are poorly grounded within their own disintegrating cultures even as they are exposed to egocentric, individualistic western identity models that are not reflective of tribal identity or their preparation to merge into a globalised order of independent societies.<sup>2</sup>

**§A2. Distribution of Tribes, Ethnicities, & Militias.**

The claimant is from the Berti tribe, which is one of several black, African, Muslim, sedentary, and agrarian communities in Darfur. Each of these characteristics plays a role in identifying the phenomenological reality of each of the communities



**Figure 2 Phenotypes in Conflict.** Comparisons of Dominant Warrior Tribes of Chad: Zaghawa, Arab, Tuareg, and Toubou Non-African Caucasoid Seminomadic Pastoralist Rulers of the Sahelian Regions; with African Sedentary Bilal, Maba, Fur, and Berti Tribal Phenotypes. The caricatures of phenotype illustrate the difficulties of outside perceptions of racial discrimination and ethnic exclusions that are often derived from archetypal aspects of collective identity rather than differences in physical appearance.

<sup>1</sup> (Landler, 2014)

<sup>2</sup> Paul Riesman, "The Person and the Life Cycle in African Social Life and Thought," *African Studies Review*, 29, no. 2 (1986): 71-138.



in figure 3, and for understanding the conflict dynamics in Darfur. The peoples of the Sahel Transition Zone of the Sahara Desert are divided by two separate and conflicting dimensions. The first is between racial ethnicity and the second is between those who are sedentary farmers and those who are pastoral seminomadic. Unfortunately, neither of the two dimensions is straightforward or even logical. Racial, ethnic identity in the Sahel is more imaginary than reality. Tribesmen who are at odds because of differing racial ethnicity must often, ask each other their given and family names to interpret each other's ethnic race. Members of many of the tribes described below, are both sedentary and seminomadic, both farmer and pastoralist. And this is the crux of the psychosocial drivers of much of the violence within and between, the communities of the Sahel. Using the demographics map in figures 2 & 3 as a guide, you can discern the incongruity of the multistate boundaries of the ethnic-cultural tribes against the political boundaries in the northern regions of the Sahel. Tuareg, or Kel Tamashek, for example, claim ownership of the Valley of Azawad and its four geographical points of the Hoggar and Caucasus Mountains, the Adrar des Ifoghas, and Air Massif, located across four political states.<sup>3</sup> The Zaghawa, Masalit, and Arab homelands stretch throughout the north and east regions of Chad and most of western Sudan. Where the centre of Tamashek (Tuareg) Tribal life is the Valley of Azawad, the centre of Toubou life is the Tibesti mountains, from where the Toubou derive their name and language<sup>4</sup> The word Toubou translates as 'People of the (Tibesti) Rocks' from where they first emerged as hunter-gatherers. The African agrarian peoples in figure 3, are sedentary farming and animal husbandry, located in specific locations, such as the Bilal, around Lake Fitr, Maba on the Ouaddai Highlands, Fur on and around Jebel Mara, and Berti, around the region of Wadi Hawar, north of Al Fashir. The distinctions between African and non-African are psychosocial constructs of collective identity that support historical narratives past origination, present social hierarchy, and future claims of survival. While the phenotype distinctions are more imaginary than real and the historical narratives are as much myth as fact, the psychosocial power behind these individual collectives' thoughts of alienation and feelings of shame, continue to erupt in spasms of violence.

### §A2.1 The non-Africans: Arabs & Janjaweed, Zaghawa & Justice Equality Movement (JEM),

The claimant's persecutors are the communities of Arab tribal peoples from which notorious militias arose two decades past. Much of the RSF, SLA, and JEM consist of tribesmen from their respective tribes. The conflict dynamics of the non-Arab tribes are in large part, a counter to the conflict dynamics of the Arab tribes, which are entirely psychosocially internal to malformed Arab identity in Sudan. The Toubou, Zaghawa, Arabs, Tuareg, and Berber tribes, were original members of the Caucasoid race that over time, merged with other African tribes through intermarriage. Currently, the Toubou, Tuareg, and Arab tribes' DNA tests suggest that they are now 40% Caucasoid and 60% Negroid and present as a separately DNA identifiable ethnic community.<sup>5</sup> All of this matters in understanding long-standing racial conflicts within the Muslim Caucasian-north phenotypes from the Muslim African phenotypes depicted in figure 3. Many of these northern ethnic peoples live/lived as nomadic pastoralists herding cattle, goats, donkeys, camels, and sheep, with other subtribes historically engaged as farmers near the many oases, growing dates, grains, legumes, and roots. Still other parts of these northern tribes operate cross-border/cross-regional caravan trading routes throughout the Sahel and Sahara Desert.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>3</sup> (Christian, 2020)

<sup>4</sup> (Heath, 2005)

<sup>5</sup> (Christian, 2015a)

<sup>6</sup> The basic Arab social unit of the Toubou, Zaghawa, Arab and Masalit is constructed from a descent group called a kashimbet, that is made up of several generations of men, their wives, and children or grandchildren who are descended from the male lineage. Members of the same kashimbet descent group live near each other and follow the same route during migration. Each kashimbet is headed by an elder male, called a shaykh (Arab & Zaghawa) or Amenokal (Tuareg & Toubou). This aspect of the social structure is visible in the disposition of tents (or houses among the more sedentary Arabs of N'Djamena). The residence of the shaykh or Amenokal is often at the centre of the camp or settlement, with the woven straw tents or adobe houses of his relatives arrayed around it in concentric circles. The area is surrounded by a fence or some other boundary that defines the zeriba, or walled camp. Within the kashimbet, loyalty is generally intense. These inherited institutionalized relationships are continuously reinforced by bonds of common residence and personal acquaintance. Kinship bonds also provide the ideological basis for broader units. Led by the head of the senior lineage, who is more a "first among equals" than a chief, the shaykhs or Amenokalen of neighbouring kashimbets sometimes meet to decide matters of common interest, such as the date of the annual migration. The shaykhs' leader may also deal with outsiders on their behalf. He concludes contracts with farmers to allow other Arab clans to pass the dry



They are Islamic in religion and a single group will have a sultan. But real power and social authority rests with the local pastoralist herdsman who inherit their offices generationally.<sup>7</sup> The seminomadic and pastoral nature of the Arab, Zaghawa, Toubou, and Tuareg, tribes required them to be self-sufficient in a more complete way than sedentary communities grouped around farmlands, towns, and cities. Historically these communities survived because of a warrior-like culture whose individual and collective archetypes possess dominant characteristics of protector, saviour, punisher, and survivor. Such archetypal traits are necessary for survival in one of the most physically challenging regions of the world for human societies.<sup>8</sup> Like the thorny desert cactus, these communities survived through the evolution of psychosocial-emotional structures of identity that allowed them to bend, but not break in the face of extreme adversity, with advanced orientation of 'flight-fight' ideas filtrated by endless oral storytelling from childhood onwards. All nomadic pastoral peoples face complex difficulties with collective adaptation from warrior culture to post-warrior civilization.<sup>9</sup> This is because their collective psychosocial identities are formed around the avoidance of 'timogoutar' which the Tuareg define as the psychological place in-between 'fight or flight' which psychologists refer to cognitive overload and loss of individual agency.<sup>10</sup> This avoidance of timogoutar shapes male-masculine and female-feminine constructions that endow them with capacities to survive nearly any crises or threat.<sup>11</sup> Except those threats to their reality that are brought about by the intrusion of globalised trade, travel, transportation, communications, manufacturing, animal husbandry, medicine (human and animal).



Figure 3 Actual sign in Misseriya, Sudan, headquarters of the notorious 'Janjaweed' which prides itself on attacking by motorised vehicle, horse, and

There has always been a symbiotic relationship between African and non-African tribes in the Sahelian regions of Africa in the dimension of sedentary farmer and nomadic pastoralist. One aspect of this relationship involved the mutual interaction of pastoralist livestock and farmers' crops. When in harmony, African sedentary farmer and Arab nomadic pastoralist used each other to survive. After the African farmer had cultivated his crops, the Arab pastoralist would move his cattle and camels into the

field to each the chaff, leaving their dung that thousands of hooves ground into the soil, providing needed fertilisation. The non-African Zaghawa, Toubou, and Tamashek, have often taken sides with the African tribes, against the Arabs and, in the past, European colonizers. Like the Arab tribes, their survival in the Sahara and the Sahel depended on their martial skills and ability to resist hardship and deprivation of the desert. The Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), Armed Force for Change & Accord in Chad (FACT), National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) are led respectively by Zaghawa, Toubou, and Tamashek, but their movements contain African tribes as well. In terms of the second dimension,

season on agricultural lands and levies tribute on strangers who wish to use the group's pastures and wells. Unlike what is found in Toubou society, marriage among the Arabs strengthens kinship ties. First, marriage is more a family than an individual concern; senior males from each family make initial contacts and eventually negotiate the marriage contract. An ideal union reinforces the social, moral, and material position of the group. Second, parallel cousin marriage (that is, union between the children of brothers or male relatives more removed), is preferred. This custom encourages the duplication of bonds within the group rather than the creation of a far-flung network of more tenuous, individual alliances, as occurs among the Toubou. Finally, the marriage ceremony is itself a community affair. Among the Toubou, marriage is associated with the feigned "stealing" of the bride from her family, whose members respond with grief and anger, but marriage among the Arabs and Zaghawa is an expression of solidarity. The ceremony is celebrated by a faqih (Muslim religious leader), and a joyous procession of neighbours, relatives, and friends escorts the bride to the house of her husband.

<sup>7</sup> (Christian, 2013a, 2020)

<sup>8</sup> The Toubou language is of the Nilo-Saharan language family and is closely related to the Zaghawa and Kanuri languages. The Zaghawa lead the Fur dominated Sudan Liberation Army and the Masalit-Zaghawa Justice and Equality Movements, which are in a civil war against the Sudanese Arab backed Janjaweed militants of Darfur in Western Sudan. The Kanuri ethnic community of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon of the Lake Chad basin are the source of Boko Haram.

<sup>9</sup> (Christian, 2018a)

<sup>10</sup> (Christian, 2020)

<sup>11</sup> (Christian, 2013b)



Saharan – Sahelian survivor, they are of the psychosocial world of the Bedouin – Arab nomad. In terms of the first dimension, they identify as non-African, but also as non-Arab. They are simply Caucasian peoples of the Sahara and the Sahel and unburdened by the psychological identity pathologies of being ‘Arab’. Arab identity in Sudan has always been contested between its Arab ethnic and Islamic religious identities. The subsequent disintegrating effects of this struggle on the personal and social identities can be readily observed in the suffering and displacement of the tribes of Darfur. An overarching national identity struggle within the Muslim-Arab community (ummah) of Sudan has ramifications less for Christian-Animist South Sudan (because they have achieved independence status), but more for Muslim African-Arab Darfur and Kordofan.<sup>12, 13</sup>

### §A2.1.1 The Arabs – Rizeigat & Misseriya.

Sudan’s national struggle over its identity as Arab and Islamic is an inherited conflict imbedded within the historical narrative of Arab Muslims. This struggle is expressed and made-real in the actions of the Khartoum government as it tries to nation-build along alternatively Arab and Islamic lines of effort, depending on which side is winning the underground war over the identity and direction of the Sudan. It is in this alternating support for two competing variations of Sudan’s national identity (Arabic versus a universal belonging Islamic) that tears at the fabric of the remaining tribal identities of the people of Darfur, both African and Arab. After independence of Sudan in 1956, the adoption and projection of a coherent, non-subservient colonist identity became nearly an obsession to the elites in Khartoum, according to B.G.V. Nyombe, a linguist at the University of Nairobi:

*For the Northern Sudan Arab government which constitutes the de facto central government, there has been an obsession since independence with the political need to project the Sudan to the outside world as an homogeneous Arab nation; a nation with one language (Arabic), one religion (Islam), one culture (Arab-Moslem culture), and most importantly, one race (Arab). The reality is of course far different.<sup>14</sup>*

This psychosocial identity pathology is at heart of much of the chaotic violence in Sudan and beyond. The Arab tribes of Sudan are, by DNA, Arabized Africans. This means that they are not truly Arab, but nor are they truly African. Their phenotypes of face, body, hands, and feet, bear marked similarities to actual Arabs in the Arabian Peninsula. But there are a number of other non-Arab tribes that bear the same phenotype, such as the Zaghawa, Masalit, Toubou (Gourane), and Tamashek (Tuareg). So those Sahelian tribes choosing to call themselves Arab, despite their dark brown complexion,



Figure 4 Graphic depiction from actual references of an Arab militia attack on African villages in Darfur Sudan – from author’s personal experiences.

<sup>12</sup> The Arab identity is represented by the National Congress Party led by President Omar Bashir and his Vice President Ali Osman Mohamed Taha, while the Islamic identity is represented by the People’s Congress Party led by Hassan al-Turabi.

<sup>13</sup> Darfur’s popular antagonists are the Rizeigat Arab tribes, part of the *abbala* (camel herding) tribal federation of Arabs, while the protagonists are the African Tribes of Zaghawa, Fur and Masalit. Kordofan’s popular antagonists are the Arab Misseriya and Hawazma tribes, while the protagonists are the African tribes are primarily the Nuba tribe of South Sudan. The Kordofan dispute serves as a spoiler issue for the division of the North-South border and the important petroleum reserves divided by the separation of South Sudan from Sudan proper.


<sup>14</sup> B.G.V. Nyombe, "The politics of language, culture, religion and race in the Sudan," *Frankfurter Afrikanistische Blätter* 6, ISSN 0937-3039 (1994): 9-20.



do so out of a desire to be Arab, rather than a fact of tribal origination. The Sudanese Arab tribes are distinctly focused on their 'Arab-ness' to the point of an obsession that is often taken advantage of by the Arab governments in the Arabian Peninsula. Psychosocially, this obsession with their internal and external characterisation of themselves as Arab, constitutes a psychopathology that has kept these tribes in conflict for the past half century. Even within the Sudanese Arabs, there is conflict between the urbanised sedentary Arabs in the east, and the more tribal pastoralist nomadic (Bedouin) tribes from the west. From the west, the nomadic Bedouin (badawah) look inward to the lights of the city, the smell of the wadis and oasis, and reflection of wealth and safety that they might never attain. From the east, the settled elites (hadarah) of the clan and tribe look outward to the desert as both wall around the safety of hadarah community and smelled the freedom and nobility that their security and comfort had forfeited.<sup>15</sup> This central internal conflict within the archetypal structure of Arab life has had a profound effect on the development of Arabic identity that those 'Arabs' in the Sahelian regions of Africa have never been able to resolve. They are caught between the present and the lure of the past that calls them into positions of violent conflict. This crisis of identity has been 'Ground Zero' of Africa's arc of conflict in the Sahara and its Sahelian Transition Zone – peoples who were so well adapted to the austerities of life in the desert that they are not easily capable of adapting to the vast changes that globalisation has brought upon them.<sup>16</sup> Returning now to the pictorial map in [figure 2](#), the eastern part of northern Sudan is centred on Khartoum, the capital and the locus of Arab sedentary life, while the western regions are home to those Arab tribes divided between Baggara (cattle herders), and Aballa (camel herders). Often the tribes are intermingled, with cattle and camels moving in massive collectives along a north-south route from the upper reaches of the South Libyan Desert, southward the upper reaches of South Sudan's fertile farmland. These 'routes' of pastoral livestock movements can consist of tens of thousands of individual animals owned by hundreds of separate Arab tribes. This mass movement of livestock and their human herdsman is on average 100 kilometres in width and runs for nearly 1,000 kilometres, across farms, wadies, villages, towns, streams, and reservoirs. The principal threat to the black African Muslim agrarian peoples depicted in [figures 2 and 3](#) are the Arab Baggara and Abbala semi-nomadic tribes that are expanding westward from western Sudan with their vast herds of cattle and camels, respectively. When, the black African Muslim agrarian families and villages take up arms to defend themselves against the Arab militia onslaught, they often come under fire from the Sudanese and Chadian regimes' security forces, who perceive that armed African tribes may join in with existing rebellions or constitute a new armed rebellion. The armed Arab militias of the Sudanese Baggara (cattle) and Abbala (camel) tribes have been at the centre of ethnic cleansing throughout Darfur and are now pushing into Chad's Ouaddaï highlands, and on into the fertile Lake Fitri region of Central Chad. Sudan's Fur and Berti peoples have been the hardest hit with violence and ethnic cleansing reaching the level of genocide. My first field experience researching genocidal communal violence in Sudan was at the destroyed village of Ambarou just west of Melit and Kuma, central areas of the Berti Tribe. The village had reportedly come under attack, and my ceasefire mediation team was tasked with assessing the report and mediating with the conflict parties. From our base in the abandoned town of Tine, in the South Libyan desert, we drove across open terrain for a day, only to find the village in smouldering ruins. As I walked among the burned-out houses and partial human remains, I felt an indescribable chill on my face and neck, and realised I was no longer perspiring from the heat. I felt as if I had become unconnected to everything and everyone around me. When I looked at my research colleagues, their faces were blank, eyes staring at the carnage surrounding us. At one point, I came across a small figure charred in ashes with his or her hands still manacled to a wooden post as depicted in [figure 5](#). The dull stainless steel of the old-fashioned handcuffs still glittered in the bright sun, and whispered to us of the unspeakable things that our fellow humans had only recently been doing in the secrecy of the

<sup>15</sup> (Christian, 2016)

<sup>16</sup> (Christian, 2016)



**Figure 5** Pastoralist Family depictions typical in central and northern Chad. Men and boys nearing the age of puberty leave the home-hamlet during rainy season, following the lush growth that sprouts after even small amounts of rainfall. This semi-nomadic existence is more than a way of life, it is an imprinting on the cognitive geospatial awareness of its members. The semi-nomadic imprint is expressed in pastoralism, trade, navigation, and security escorting trades that allow for the continuation and avoidance of complete sedentary life. One does not join into what one has not always been a part of. But not all Arab families still practice pastoralism, and many of the Misseriya families are now sedentary farmers, traders, crafts, and light manufacturing. Their connection with their pastoralist semi nomadic kin is evident throughout their shared identity.

desert.<sup>17</sup> I could not begin to imagine the sheer suffering that accompanied the death of that child and how I would have borne it at such a young age. We were well beyond the possibilities for restorative justice for either the victims or the perpetrators. I relate the above personal experiences to illustrate the very real phenomenological realities that the African Fur, Berti, Maba, and Bilal tribes experience during the ongoing attacks against them, aimed at driving them out of the regions claimed by the Arab Baggara and Abbala tribesmen. **The Misseriya** are the *Baggara* (cattle) segment of the Bedouin population of the central Sahel, and **the Rizeigat** are the herders of *Abbala*, which is Arabic for camel. The sociological differences between the two involve the respective animal herds capacity to move over long distances without water. Abbala Bedouins can range further north into the northern reaches of the Sahel and southern reaches of the Sahara. Properly equipped, Abbala tribesmen can cross the Sahara Desert in caravans as part of the African to Arabian Peninsula trade routes that date back several millennia. The *Baggara*, are required by geography, geology, and climate to remain closer to the Sahel regions, traveling from river to lake during the dry season to prevent their livestock from perishing. Both Baggara and Abbala speak a Sudanese variant of Arabic. Many Misseriya families lead a common traditional mode of subsistence and nomadic cattle herding, although many lead a settled existence as depicted by the graphic in **figure 6**. Where the Misseriya peoples believe themselves to be direct descendants of Bani Hillal Bedouins, the Zaghawa people were in recorded existence before and after the spread of Arabism and Islam from the Arabian Peninsula. The early Arabs



**Figure 6** Zaghawa family in depicted against a common village housing arrangement.

called them black nomadic pastoralists who were organised around an oasis-centred system of animal herding and were based in Dar Zaghawa, Land of the Zaghawa. One such family is depicted in **figure 7**.

### §A2.1.2. The Zaghawa and Justice & Equality Movement (JEM).

The Zaghawa internally refer to themselves as the Beri, and that their language is Zaghawa, an eastern Saharan language that has become Arabized. Their homelands range from southwestern Libya, northeastern Chad, and western Sudan, including Darfur, and estimates of their population size ranges between 350,000 to

400,000. Traditionally, the Zaghawa lead a predominantly pastoral life, made up of nomadic clans who obtain much of their livelihood through herding cattle, camels and sheep and harvesting wild grains.<sup>18</sup> They were noted merchants and traders with camels and horses, controlling some of the Trans-Saharan trade routes. Historically, the Zaghawa people have often held a sort of hegemony over most of the smaller societies that stretched along the Sahel between Lake Chad to the Nile valley kingdoms of Nubia, Makuria and Alwa. In Chad, several family clans of the Zaghawa have politically dominated for nearly half a century. The former president, Idriss Déby, and his son Mahatma Deby, supported by his immediate family have a firm grip on power in Chad that appears unlikely to change anytime soon. Different segments of the larger Zaghawa people have also been deeply involved in contemporary wars in Chad, Libya and Sudan. In Chad, members of the Zaghawa tribe have aligned with and joined the FACT armed rebellion against the Debey regime of father and son. In Sudan, the deep animosity between Arab and Zaghawa dates back to the genocidal violence that exploded in 2003-2004. During my work as a tribal conflict mediator for the African Union in Darfur, I learned through interviews that the Arab tribes had an expectation that the Zaghawa-



Figure 7 Caricature of tribal dispersion in Darfur

Berti peoples would align with them as seminomadic pastoralists against the African farmers. Through years of intermarriage, many Zaghawa families bear an identical resemblance to Rizeigat Arabs, to the point that they are nearly phenotypically indistinguishable even to each other. Instead, however, the Zaghawa men who had military service experience, threw their support and manpower behind the rapidly growing Fur people who had formed an armed resistance against the Arabs. The Zaghawa men who once served as officers in Sudan's army, became key leaders of the new Sudan Liberation Movement (SLA), igniting ideas and feelings of betrayal amongst the Arab tribes in Darfur and in Khartoum.<sup>19</sup> As the Arab Rizeigat and Misseriya tribes' violent armed militias known as the notorious 'Janjaweed,' grew in size and violence through the summer and fall of 2004, the Fur manned, Zaghawa led SLA began to be pushed ever deeper into the Jebel Mountains, leaving their villages open to ethnic cleansing. In the fall of 2004, the Zaghawa tribesmen formed a new armed resistance movement aligned with the SLA, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The JEM has been a particularly effective counter to Khartoum's active or passive support of the Arab cleansing of non-Arab tribes in Darfur, culminating in an open attack on the national capital in 2008. As a result, the Zaghawa have suffered much loss from the troubles there, with entire families and clans in Sudan among the peoples living in the refugee camps in Darfur and eastern Chad where the recruitment of child soldiers into rebel movements on both sides of the border is an ongoing problem. Both the SLA and the JEM continue their fight against Arab militias to this date. The most recent attacks by the Rapid Support

<sup>18</sup> (Legal Aid Board, 2013)  
<sup>19</sup>(Sudan War Monitor, 2024)  
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Forces (RSF) against civilian targets in Darfur were against 12 Zaghawa villages around Anka and against 2 Berti villages north of Mellit as illustrated in **figure 8**. The dates and locations of the attacks are fairly typical of the RSF's Arab militia forces, which employ combinations of mounted camel, horses, and technical vehicles, which are cars and pickup trucks transformed into gun platforms.

### §A2.2 The Africans. Berti, Fur, & the SLA.

The graphic in **figure 8** offers a caricatured illustration of the tribal dispersion in Darfur. Claimant is from the Berti tribe located in North Darfur, between the Zaghawa, Masalit, and Arab tribes in violent conflict. As described below, there is no way for the Berti people to avoid the conflict. A central feature is Jebel Mara, which is a line of extinct volcanic massifs that form a range of lake filled craters that support life and narrative in western Sudan. Nestled within its volcanic peaks lies captivating spectacles of nature such as the magnificent Deriba Caldera (**figure 12**) that rises from the desert into lush green hills and pastures, with lakes and rivers and a mild climate as you progress upwards. This is the centre of gravity for African and Arab peoples, serving as a visual demarcation of the Sahel from the Sahara. The African farmers tend to remain closer to the southern reaches of the Sahel, while the Arab, Zaghawa, and Masalit pastoralists occupy the higher latitudes. The Fur, Berti, and Masalit tribes have, historically, coexisted with the Arab Abbala and Baggara tribes in a symbiotic relationship noted previously, but those individual tribal contracts were shattered by the ethnic cleansing unleashed in 2003. **Figure 10** illustrates one of the crater lakes in the northern part of Jebel Mara range.

#### §A2.2.1 The Berti

The Berti self-identify as an African people, whose now extinct language was closely related to Zaghawa-Beri.<sup>20</sup> Berti live in the region of Darfur, nestled along the Jebel Mara range, alongside other Nilo-Saharan speakers, such as the Masalit and Daju, who were agriculturalists with varying levels of animal husbandry. They are sedentary farmers of subsistence levels depending on networks of wells, wadis, and seasonal rains. A tightly knit and peaceful people, they are socially organised around a hereditary king who looks out for their wellbeing and interfaces with the regional and national Sudanese government.<sup>21</sup> The Berti tribes of Darfur are generally located

Figure 8 Berti Tribe families in IDP camps



#### Surgi Jebel Mara's string of crater lakes



Figure 9 one of Jebel Mara's crater lakes that sustain both pastoral nomad and sedentary farmer. Surgi is located adjacent to the Berti's tribal lands in north Darfur.

between Mellit, Kuma, and Al Maliha, on the plains using the runoff from the plateaus above to irrigate their crops as illustrated in **figure 10**. Large numbers of Berti families have been driven into internal displacement camps with tens of thousands of tribespeople killed, harassed or chased from their homes by fighting in Darfur. But as a surge of violence threatens those still clinging to their land, the tribes' elders, guided by the Berti King, Sadeeg al Mellih Ahmadai, remains careful not to point fingers at either the RSF's Arab militias or the Zaghawa and Fur tribes' armed militias fighting back. Tribal leaders whose people live amid one of the

<sup>20</sup> They and their language are better known by the name Ouaddai (pronounced Wad-aye), which is the term used by people who are not Maba. Ouaddai has become the name of an administrative district and is often used less precisely for the eastern region of Chad. Their language, Maba, is a Nilo-Saharan language which is locally referred to as Bura Mabang. Many Maba people also speak Arabic, as their traditional trade language.

<sup>21</sup> (Petráček, 1996)

world's worst humanitarian crises face a delicate balancing act: Even the perception of support for either government-allied Janjaweed militia or the rebel factions they battle may bring reprisal violence against their followers. Despite the massive violence perpetrated against the Berti, some elders insist that they are not being specifically targeted by either the government or rebels but are just peaceful farmers and herdsman caught in the maelstrom. Berti Tribe King Ahmadai insisted in an interview that the Berti are a peaceful people and that "when there is war, they prefer to take their belongings and leave. This is why you will find so many Berti in the refugee camps."<sup>22</sup> The ongoing campaign by the RSF in the northern reaches of the Jebel Mara range, continues to leave villages burned out and inhabitants either dead or fleeing to refugee camps which can be seen in thermal scarring imagery from NASA, NGA, USGS, and Esri. Even more Berti, Zaghawa and Masalit families and clans will be heading to camps soon because of a two-month-old government offensive against the RSF, causing violence to spike in northern Darfur, where about 250,000 Berti people are spread in villages across most of the arid region of Sudan's remote west. Despite the Berti king's deference to the armed factions, this has not kept him personally from being attacked over the past 7 years, with his house in Mellit repeatedly broken into and ransacked by members of the RSF who beat the king's staff and destroy the interior contents of the house, humiliating, killing, and injuring the Berti people within. While the social leaders of the Berti people claim that they are not specifically targeted and that they do not know why the Arab militias attack them, most observers agree that the goal is the physical removal of the Berti presence in northern Darfur.<sup>23</sup>

#### §A2.2.2 The Fur & Sudan Liberation Army SLA.

The Fur people self-identify as an African Muslim, black people who are socially and economically organised around sedentary agrarian and animal husbandry.<sup>24</sup> Life for the Fur people centre around the largest of Jebel Mara's volcanic



Figure 11 Deriba Caldera & Jebel Plateau An oppositional beauty to that of the desert spaces that surround it.

massifs and hosts the Deriba Caldera and Plateau. From the slopes to the multiple peaks, lush vegetation, groves of fruit trees, and an ancient civilisation make their home.<sup>25</sup> The Fur people construct membership in Sudan's Muslim ummah through an imaginative rearticulation of what it means to be African, black and Islamic. At stake is their membership in a state Muslim ummah that is at odds with many of the traditions, language, cultural expressions, and historical narratives of their African tribal memory. Their ability to integrate African tribal memory and identity narrative into their Arab-based Islamic identity is resisted by their fellow Zaghawa and Arab



Figure 10 Foothills and peaks of Jebel Mara Mountain

tribes who outwardly shudder at the despoliation of the pure faith, and inwardly shudder that their ummah is contaminated by the inclusion of descendants of slaves that their ancestors took for use as labourers. While the latter is hinted at in suggestive comments, the former is outwardly criticized as

<sup>22</sup> Berti King Sadeeg al Mellih Ahmadai, in an interview in a police compound in the northern town of Mellit

<sup>23</sup> "The house of King Yasser Hussein Ahmadai, the leader of the Berti tribe in North Darfur, was stormed by members of the Rapid Support Forces on Friday morning. His house has been searched several times. The house search in Mellit locality resulted in the damage to some furniture and was conducted 'in a humiliating manner', the head of the Berti youth group, Mohamed El Haj Yousif, told Radio Dabanga. He reported that a number of 4 RSF members, driving 14 Land Cruisers, raided the King Ahmadai's house. 'They beat one of the guards, broke the outside door and searched the house.' Inside, they broke chairs and parts of the tribal brass artefacts. 'This is the fifth time his house has been searched in this shameful and unfortunate manner,' El Haj said. He was unable to report the reasons for the house searches." (Radio Dabanga (28 November 2017) North Darfur tribe leader's house damaged)

<sup>24</sup> They and their language are better known by the name Ouaddaï (pronounced Wad-aye), which is the term used by people who are not Maba. Ouaddaï has become the name of an administrative district and is often used less precisely for the eastern region of Chad. Their language, Maba, is a Nilo-Saharan language which is locally referred to as Bura Mabang. Many Maba people also speak Arabic, as their traditional trade language.

<sup>25</sup> (Christian, 2018a)



**Figure 12** On April 27, 2023, the Al-Imam Al-Kadhim School in Al-Geneina City, West Darfur State, which had been serving as an Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) shelter, was burned to the ground amidst the ongoing crisis in Sudan.

African Muslims are chastised for incorporating traditional tribal music and traditions into the pure sterile Arab version of Islam. The integration of disparate elements of individual and group identity such as those found in Darfur occurs in a process of what James Marcia (1966) termed as exploration and commitment.<sup>26</sup> The development of identity is a process of individual examination and discovery of who and what one might be, with commitment to an identity being a consolidation of this process. Identity exploration might be seen as a basic process underlying the formation of an identity, but not the only one. Ascribed elements of identity are accepted as identity foreclosure, where the individual accepts with little or no thought the identity element

inherited from family.<sup>27</sup> For the African Muslims of Darfur, the identity formation process that attempts to integrate the warring elements of both ascribed and constructed identity create identity diffusion characterized by indecision between competing elements and identity moratorium, where the individual is unable to commit to a specific identity given the push and pull of forces external to his decision making ability. The current Fur identity mixes African tribalism with Arab-Islamism and dates back to the first Darfur Sultanate. Then, Sultan Solondongo, perhaps the first Fur prototype, simply blended the elements of existing African tribal identity with the politically controlling Arab-Islamic identity to create a hybrid which remained (relatively) uncontested until mid-19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>28</sup> This inherited hybrid Fur identity is now contested by their Arab neighbours who dispute the legitimacy of their Muslim placement in the ummah because of the African additions to their identity.<sup>29</sup> The Fur people have a difficult time refuting this contestation because their acceptance of an Arab Prophet as the final messenger of God presupposes their acceptance of Arab superiority in matters relating to religious doctrine.<sup>30</sup> Against an inward desire (or need) to integrate the prideful African half with his necessary Muslim half, the Fur person finds himself with an impossible choice; maintain his historical African narrative and the existential trans-generational memory it contains, or maintain his access to a post existential afterlife – but not both.<sup>31</sup> The Fur's ability to bridge the inconsistencies of Islamic dogma with African Identity are continuously defeated by denials and counter claims of the Arab owners of Muslim hierarchy and by fellow African (and Arab) Islamists who profess ownership of the Islamic purity of ideal. The former relegate the African identity explorer to a lower hierarchical caste within the Muslim social ordering with all the implications for access to political and social



**Figure 13** Fur family in one of thousands of makeshift internally displaced camps

<sup>26</sup> James E Marcia, "Development and validation of ego identity status," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 3 (1966), 551-558.

<sup>27</sup> James E Marcia, "Ego-Identity Status," in *Social Encounters*, by Michael Argyle (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1973), 340-353, 340.

<sup>28</sup> Prunier, *Darfur, The Ambiguous Genocide*. Flint and De Waal, *Darfur, A Short History of a Long War*.

<sup>29</sup> Such as music, use of tribal language, and women's placement in the social order.

<sup>30</sup> While the Arabs certainly profess that Islam is universal and egalitarian, they see Arabism as having a sacred guardian role of Islam, rather like the heritage of the Swiss who have the distinctive right by history and law as guardians of the Holy Roman Catholic Vatican. As such, those Arabs of Darfur hold a higher hierarchical place within the Muslim ummah, second only to those Arabs whose skin is lighter, and whose genetic descent from the Prophet is closest to the tribes of Adnan. The importance of this placement lies within the validity of the Muslim *hadith* (narrative origin) which provides the inerrant history of origin of the Prophet and his receipt of the message called the Qur'an. The *hadith* provides a physical linkage between Mohammad's revelations and Judeo-Christian monotheism by establishing a lineage of descent between Mohammad and the ancient Jewish leader-prophet Abraham. This link is through Abraham's other son, Ishmael, the older brother of the biblical Isaac. The *hadith* traces the split between Islam and the Judeo-Christian faiths to this ancient family drama, which saw Ishmael and his mother Hagar, pushed out of Abraham's tribe in favor of his first wife and second son, Sarah and Isaac.

<sup>31</sup> (Christian, 2013a)



power and acceptance, while the latter threatens loss of generational memory passed on by centuries of paternal nurturance. Either way, the African Fur tribesman is caught in an identity crossfire, unable to abandon his Muslim ummah, yet unable to abandon the existential memory of his historical African narrative. This philosophical identity dissonance, by itself, would be of little importance were it not for the Arab tribes attempts at ethnic (African) and cultural (synthesis of Islamic and African psychosocial identity) cleansing of Darfur's spaces.

### §A2.2.3 The Masalit & Sudan Liberation Army – Khamis Abdulla.

The Masalit ethnic people primarily live in and around Al-Geneina, the capital of West Darfur and in South Darfur. According to Ethnologue,<sup>32</sup> there were 462,000 total Masalit speakers as of 2011, of whom 350,000 resided in Sudan. The Masalit are primarily subsistence agriculturalists, cultivating peanuts and millet. Further south in their territory, they grow various other crops, including sorghum. The typical Masalit dwelling is conical in shape and constructed of wood and thatch. The Masalit are Muslim, and their religious practices incorporate traditional beliefs and customs, similar to the Berti, Fur, and Maba, with whom they are closely related. The Arabs of Darfur derogatorily refer to them as Nubians or Nuba and have been trying to eliminate their presence in Darfur since 2003, along with the Fur, Berti, Zaghawa, and other non-Arab ethnicities. Since the civil war broke out between the SAF and the RSF, the Masalit, Zaghawa, and to a lesser extent, the Berti, have experienced ethnic cleansing that is as bad or worse than we witnessed in 2004-2005. Beginning in April 2023, the RSF began attacking the SAF barracks in Al-Geniena, then attacked the local Masalit self-defence forces grouped under a branch of the SLA's Sudanese Alliance, led by the then state governor of West Darfur, Khamis Abdallah Abbakar, a former Sudanese Army officer and one of the original founders of the SLA/M. The RSF and the state's Arab tribes quickly dispersed the Masalit defenders, who retreated northward towards North Darfur. Over the next weeks, and even after Masalit armed groups lost control of their neighbourhoods, the RSF and allied militias systematically targeted unarmed civilians, killing them in large numbers. Adolescent boys and men were especially singled out for killings, but among those unlawfully killed were also many children and women.<sup>33</sup> The RSF and allied militias also appear to have targeted injured people as well as prominent members of the Masalit community, including lawyers, doctors, human rights defenders, academics, community leaders, religious figures, and local government officials. Women and girls were raped, and detainees were tortured and otherwise ill-treated. The RSF and allied militias methodically destroyed civilian infrastructure.



Figure 14 Masalit survivors in the outskirts of Al-Geneina, dig mass graves for those killed by the RSF ethnic cleansing campaign.

They looted on a grand scale, and they burned, shelled, and razed neighbourhoods to the ground, homing in on neighbourhoods and sites, including schools, hosting primarily Masalit displaced communities.

Thousands of civilians, mostly men and adolescent boys, but also younger children including babies, older people, and women were killed in less than two months, and thousands more were injured. A retrospective mortality survey conducted by Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders, MSF) in

<sup>32</sup> Ethnologue

<sup>33</sup> Witnesses that I spoke to also reported that Arab neighborhoods were attacked and families were killed by both the SAF bombings and by the Masalit militias clashing with the RSF. Violent warfare within the civilian population centres by organised and civilian militias are always confusing and terribly costly in human life.



three refugee camps in eastern Chad concluded that there were 167 violent deaths in the households of 6,918 people from El Geneina. This amounted to a staggering mortality rate of 241 per 10,000 people, marking a 23-fold increase in the male mortality rate and a 11-fold increase in the women's mortality rate. During their campaign, RSF fighters and allied militias used derogatory racial slurs against Masalit and people from other non-Arab ethnic groups. They told them to leave, that the land was no longer theirs, and that it would be "cleaned" and become "the land of the Arabs." Ahmad, 41, a Masalit man, recalled, in an interview with Human Rights Watch, forces telling fleeing civilians: "No Masalit people will live here!" and "No Nuba will live here!" and "No slaves will live here!"<sup>34</sup> The UN observers in Darfur, reported that "throughout the seven-week RSF campaign against the Masalit population, SAF soldiers largely hunkered down in their barracks, unable to protect the population."<sup>35</sup> On June 14, the governor of West Darfur and leader of the Sudanese Alliance armed group, Khamis Abbakar, was killed. He was last seen in the custody of the RSF West Darfur commander, Gen. Abdel Rahman Joma'a Barakallah. His killing, coinciding with the collapse of Masalit forces' ability to fight back against RSF attacks in primarily Masalit neighbourhoods, led to a mass exodus of Masalit from El Geneina. Some civilians and fighters tried to go west, toward Chad, only to come under attack by the RSF and militias.<sup>36</sup> Many civilians and fighters then decided to flee toward Ardamata, a northern suburb of the city hosting a garrison of the Sudanese Armed Forces, leaving overnight in a convoy of tens of thousands of civilians and fighters. Throughout June of 2023, the RSF attacked the refugee convoys of thousands of people, in large numbers as they ran through the streets, tried to find refuge in homes and mosques, or attempted to swim across the seasonal Kajja river flowing through the city.<sup>37</sup>

### §A3. Civil War, Rebellion, Cultural & Ethnic Cleansing

There are primal forces at work in the civil conflicts in Sudan's African west and south, and Sudan's Arab central and north that directly affect the asylum claimant's ability to survive there. **Figure 2** illustrates the ongoing civil wars that have engulfed this region called The Soudan, which is "ground zero for Africa's crisis of collective identity."<sup>38</sup> These conflicts are physical, emotional, spiritual, and psychological. They rage between and within those who identify themselves as Arab, and those who identify themselves as African. Between those who identify themselves as Christian, Animist, and Muslim, and between those who identify as African Nuer, Dinka, or one of the other 60 African ethnicities of North, South, East, and West Sudan.<sup>39</sup> The genesis of these conflicts is the origin of the tribes' modern historical narrative and collective identity, nearly four centuries in the making. The historical narrative of these tribes and the group identity contained therein are products of discordant unions between Arab and African, Christian-Animist-Muslim, Farmer and Pastoralist, Caucasoid and Negroid, Slave and Master. Each of these combinations of identities plays roles in powerful psychosocial dramas of subjugation or



Figure 15

<sup>34</sup> (Braunschweiger & Gallopin, 2024)

<sup>35</sup> (Staff, 2024a)

<sup>36</sup>

<sup>37</sup> (Braunschweiger & Gallopin, 2024)

<sup>38</sup> (Christian, 2013a)

<sup>39</sup> The African tribes of South Sudan, Darfur, and Eastern Chad are not confined to political geographical boundaries, just as the Arab Baggara and Abbala do not recognise the superiority of political boundaries against their historical rights of movement. Generally, the Dinka and Nuer tribes live in South Sudan, and the Fur, Masalit, and Maba tribes live in Western Sudan and Eastern Chad. But there are always exceptions.




Figure 16 Sudan's Regime and Rebel Commanders

salvation, depending on whether the viewpoint is from the south or from the north, or from the east or the west. In each of the civil wars illustrated in **figure 1**, the “battle between autonomy and merger is fought most ferociously around relationships of domination”.<sup>40</sup> The African tribes of both Darfur and South

Sudan have suffered unimaginable horrors over the past decades, much of which I was a personal and professional witness to as first a soldier and later, an academic field researcher. The atrocities committed against those in South Sudan were first, from African-Arab northerners pushing ethnic cleansing and religious conversion. Later, villages of Dinka and Nuer were massacred in ethnic instigation of bloody victimisation, alienation, shame, and encouraged rage by political actors seeking power in the new state. The atrocities committed in Darfur were and are, from Arab communities driven by profound unmet and non-negotiable human needs for affirmation of an uncertain identity they desire (Arab), against a collective terror of being labelled as African. The conflicts in Sudan between Arab and Arab (SAF vs RSF); between Arab and African (RSF vs SLA/JEM), and between African and African (Dinka vs Nuer), have potentially become intractable, in that even after the political disagreements have been resolved, the populations are locked into desperate psychosocial traumatisation that fuels the fires of violence. The conflict emanating out of the Arab north did not merely attack the African south and west physically, but also psychologically and sociologically. The intended

effect was to induce ethnic conversion from African to Arab through rape as a weapon of war and to induce religious conversion through the labelling of Animist and Christianity as apostasy punishable by death.<sup>41</sup> The outcome effects on the victimised populations served to destabilise and malform the collective identities of once peaceful African communities into monstrous versions of their former peaceful selves.<sup>42</sup> While the African tribes are fighting for their physical survival against an Arab north and east, they remain within a state of ‘meta-contrast,’ united by a common existential threat. The generations of African families who lived, died, and survived during these past decades, did so under an increasingly deformed phenomenological reality, where to fight was to survive, and where peace was a form of surrender and physical-psychological death.<sup>43</sup> Below is a brief overview of some of the current leaders and social-political-militia organisations involved in Darfur’s ongoing violence. The utility of this overview is to lay the foundation for understanding the mental and emotional affect of the past and present violence on the populations of Berti, Zaghawa, Masalit, and Fur, which gives us insight into the intractable violence now ongoing in Darfur today and tomorrow.

§A3.1 Civil War & Rebellion: “The Enemy of My Enemy is still My Enemy”.



Figure 17 Darfur's non-Arab Commanders

<sup>40</sup> Charles Lindholm, *Culture and Identity* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2008), 217.

<sup>41</sup> I have spent thousands of hours interviewing Arab Baggara and Abbala fighters and their civilian leaders, whose intentions and viewpoints I relate here.

<sup>42</sup> (Deng, 1995; Jeppie, 2001; Sharkey, 2007)

<sup>43</sup> (Christian, 2013a, 2018b)



During the spring of 2003 and continuing through 2004 and beyond, Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit tribesmen, farmers, animal herders, and craftsmen, joined together to form a militia to defend homesteads and villages against the relentless attacks by the Rizeigat and Misseriya tribes' militias. The militia was founded as the Darfur Liberation Front by Abdul Wahid al-Nur of the Fur, a lawyer, Khamis Abakar of the Masalit, a former army officer, and Minni Minnawi of the Zaghawa, who was a primary school teacher with only a secondary school education. Each of these three leaders created and led or lead, brigades of the Sudan Liberation Army and Movement, mostly staffed with members of their own ethnic communities. Another Zaghawa leader, Khalil Ibrahim<sup>44</sup>, formed the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and with the SLA, began inflicting losses on the Arab militias and an enduring civil war began. The Sudanese government in Khartoum, asserted that they were neutral in the conflict between African farmer and Arab pastoralist, however, during my service in Darfur, my team discovered that the Arab militia were in fact, under the control of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) Military Intelligence Service, which later became the Rapid Support Forces led by General Mohamed Dagalo, <sup>45a</sup> a member of the Rizeigat tribe of northern Darfur. The Sudan Liberation Army emerged as the only organised force that could contain the ethnic cleansing of Fur, Berti, Zaghawa, and Masalit peoples in Darfur. The rebel forces depicted in **figure 15** are from one of the brigades of Minni Minnawi's SLA, and the mediation depicted in **figure 1** is from one of many sessions with the elders and leaders of the Rizeigat tribe in Kutum, north Darfur. With quiet assistance, the early SLA brigades turned into a professional armed force and its movement, the SLM, became a capable political force capable of negotiating agreements on peace and governance sharing between the Arab government in Khartoum and the African political military movements in Darfur. The three SLA/M organisations led by the Fur's al-Nur, the Zaghawa's Minnawi, and Masalit's Khamis, mostly consisted of young tribesmen who wanted to defend their non-Arab villages from the cattle and camel herding Arabs whom the government recruited as proxy counterinsurgency forces.



Figure 18 Darfur's current state of Arab and non-Arab conflict as of summer-fall of 2024

<sup>44</sup> Khalil Ibrahim was one of the authors of a powerful political text called the *Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in the Sudan*, a manuscript published in 2000 that details what it views as the structural inequality in the country.

<sup>45</sup> (Christian, 2006)



Most Zaghawa joined the SLA to fight the Arabs—not the government. Khalil Ibrahim, and later, Gibril Ibrahim after the older brother's death in 2012, called for the removal of President Omar Bashir and the reconstruction of the Sudanese government along democratic and secular non-ethnic lines of organisation. President Bashir was eventually overthrown in a military coup de état in October of 2021 by the current leaders of the SAF and the RSF, working in collaboration. The SAF employed the RSF to put down opposition to the coup and suppress civilian resistance to the military takeover of the Sudanese government. The SAF was developed and operated by the secretive Sudanese Intelligence Service as a counterinsurgency organisation and was well suited to the task of ruthlessly putting down any resistance to the military regime, drawing on decades of experience against the African tribes of Darfur. The new military regime's leader, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan issued promises of civil elections and power sharing agreements with the various SLA/M and JEM, which led to expectations of a return to peace in Darfur after nearly 20-years of conflict. In 2023, however, the subordination of the RSF to the SAF ended and its commander, General Mohamad Hamdan Dagalo, attacked SAF forces. Civil war returned to Sudan, this time in Khartoum. As of late 2024, the besieged capital of Khartoum was divided between the two forces, with the UAE supporting the RSF and Iran supporting the SAF. The RSF, previously in control of much of Darfur under the SAF, extended its reach and drove SAF units out of the remainder of Darfur and much of Kordofan, with the exception of Al Fashir, the SAF's remaining stronghold, held only because of the combined declaration of war against the RSF by the Minnawi's SLA and Gibril Ibrahim's JEM. While some portions of the SLA are attempting to maintain neutrality in hopes that Dagalo and his RSF will honour preexisting power sharing agreements and protection of non-Arab ethnic groups, observers have agreed that the RSF has returned to ethnic cleansing with a vengeance. Human Rights Watch (HRW) said earlier this year that the RSF could be guilty of ethnic cleansing in its campaigns against non-Arab ethnic groups in parts of Darfur, just as the Janjaweed militias — from which the RSF formed — did two decades ago. Dagalo's forces and their allies have also raped young girls and women and kept them as sex slaves, according to first-hand testimony published by HRW this month. Chillingly, Michael Jones, a research fellow at RUSI, suggests that the RSF is following a premediated plan of removal of all non-Arab communities from Arab claimed lands.

*"The intent and in the scale of RSF atrocities are qualitatively different," he noted, citing reports that the militia is targeting specific populations. "SAF has been accused of indiscriminately shelling RSF-held areas and putting civilians at risk. Both are crimes but they are different in nature, intent and scale and they have a different underlying logic."<sup>46</sup>*

Following the declaration of war by Minnawi and Jibril's field commanders against the RSF, other SLA/M leaders called for the African communities to remain neutral, leaving Arab RSF to fight Arab SAF. One key leader to call for neutrality was Dr. Hadi Idriss, the chairman of the Sudan Liberation Army Transition Council (SLA TC) based in Al Fashir, was in the process of negotiating for full governance sharing with the Arab east. Another important leader continuing to remain neutral at least in action, is Abdul Wahid al-Nur Fur led brigade (SLA/M al-Nur). However, some of these two SLA< leader' field commanders led by Gen. Salah Rasas, have defected and joined Minnawi and Ibrahim, citing RSF attacks on civilians. Dr. Hadi of the SLA/M -TC insists that his organisation remains committed that "we shall never align with any party to the conflict. We believe that with this neutrality we can be able to play a role." Hadi's logic is deeply frustrating to the Zaghawa and Masalit leaders of JEM and the SLA/M-MM, whose homes and villages are under constant attack by the Arab RSF. Dr. Hadi of the SLM/A-TC suggests that if all SLM/A and JEM leaders refrain from actions against the RSF, that the violence might stop, but his rebellious commanders disagree, noting that the RSF attacks on African villages in North Darfur began before they chose to abandon neutrality and fight back. For the non-Arab civilian populations in Darfur, the

<sup>46</sup> Michael Jones, a research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)  
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central question remains about what the intentions of General Dagalo are and his RSF. Their history with the non-Arab tribes has been hostile to the point of ethnic cleansing for the past 20-years, and they have little evidence of their change of intentions if, and or when, they gain full control over all of Darfur, as Dr. Hadi fears. If actions by the RSF and the SAF are an indication, then the levels of violence in Sudan generally, and Darfur specifically, are far more likely to increase than to decrease. Since fighting first broke out between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on 15 April 2023, ACLED recorded over 7,623 events of political violence and more than 23,015 reported fatalities.<sup>47</sup> Between the period of 17 August to 6 September 2024, there were over 290 political violence events and over 430 reported fatalities. During this 3-week period, North Darfur illustrated in **figure 18**, had 57 violent episodes (battles, explosions/IEDs) resulting in 163 reported fatalities. While reporting is complex and often delayed, this pace of violent activity, compared with the violence shown in **figure 18** during the first 2-weeks of October, suggests that the scale of violence against civilians will only increase, regardless of whether the SLA/M-TC and SLA/M al-Nur remains neutral, or follows the rest of the SLA/M into resisting the RSF. After the civil war between the SAF and the RSF broke out, a dozen Arab tribal leaders from Sudan's western region of Darfur quickly pledged allegiance to paramilitaries at war with the army -- a move that tipped the scales of power towards the RSF early in the conflict, deepening the ethnic divide between Arab and non-Arab<sup>48,49</sup>

#### §A4. Psychosocial Conditions of Violence & Generational Transmissions of Trauma.

The Arab tribes of Sudan and beyond play a central role in the arc of conflict in the Sahel. They are victims and perpetrators, against themselves and others, and understanding them is central to conflict resolution and sustainable violence abatement. All attempts by the African Union, USA, Europe, and NATO of understanding and engaging these peoples using political science lenses of analysis have completely failed and the violence in Sudan is now worse than it was 20-years ago. The central issue on the minds of most of the non-Arab tribes in Darfur, as well as the SLA and JEM leadership that I have spoken to over the past year, is about the intentions of the RSF. The sections above offer a simplified illustration of the Arab and three of the non-Arab tribes in Darfur. Perhaps the most well-adjusted are the Berti, however they suffer from as much violent trauma as the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa. But the Berti and other non-Arab tribes are not waging ethnic cleansing, only the Arab tribes are. During my mediation and interviews with the Arab tribes as illustrated in **figure 1**,<sup>50</sup> the Arab elders spoke softly, from places of great psychosocial pain. They described their inability to cope or accept the loss of a way of life, the loss of their own sense of worth that arrives with the settled sedentary life of the non-Arabs, to include those sedentary Arabs in Khartoum. Every Arab elder I interviewed felt the need to show me his camel saddle, sword, and ceremonial battle dress clothing, even as they acknowledged that time and age now keeps them ... sedentary by need not by choice. These Arabs of Darfur, be they Abbala or Baggara, Camel or Cattle men, they are Bedouin. They are descendants of the Bani Hillal Bedouin that brought the new religion of the Prophet Mohammed to North Africa in the 6<sup>th</sup> Century, and most of these descent groups in the African Sahel have changed very little. In the Arab countries of origin, Bedouin communities still exist as well.<sup>51</sup> They are given space and protection by benevolent, oil rich kingdoms who celebrate their Bedouin roots even as they have long since transitioned to urban cities and joined the globalized world of trade, travel, technology, and communication. The Misseriya and Rizeigat tribes are two such descent groups whose members are still more rooted in their past than their present. Even those tribes and families who have become essentially sedentary, their psychological organisation is based on nomadism and pastoralism. **Figure 19** (top) illustrates a typical

<sup>47</sup> ACLED.

<sup>48</sup> (Staff, 2024b)

<sup>49</sup> (Staff & Agencies, 2023)

<sup>50</sup> Village of Kharazowi, near Kutum.

<sup>51</sup> Successful Saudi males have been using their wealth to recreate the Bedouin prototypical life with accurate archetypes, albeit one with substantially greater amounts of luxury and comfort. (AFP News Agency, n.d.)



Bedouin in the Arabian Peninsula from the 17<sup>th</sup> Century while the bottom depicts Darfur's Bedouins as they remain today. Both Misseriya and Rizeigat Bedouins are Muslim, but not in the manner that British, American, or European Muslims practice their faith. This is because the original Arab community surrounding the Prophet Mohammed consisted of two distinctly different psychosocial collectives: The *badawah* or Bedouin and the *hadarah* or Sedentary. The former is generally acknowledged to be the ethnogenesis of Arab origin, a sort of fantasy ideal of archetypal identity. The latter, on the other hand, was and is, the practical reality of human social life capable of progressive evolution. The *hadarah* (sedentary) consisting of tribes who had begun congealing Arab social life around established towns and cities supported by farming, trading and support of the cross-desert caravans.<sup>52</sup> It is this sedentary progressive Arab life that **figures** most prominently in the Qur'an and the *Hadith*, as Muhammad and his family were of the sedentary *Quraysh* tribe of the city of Mecca. But it was the newly converted Bedouin tribes such as the Bani Hillal that ultimately protected and transmitted the Qur'an into the Sahara and Sahelian regions of nomadic pastoralists. The religion they carried was their own unique blend that subordinated the 114 suras of the Qur'an to the preexisting Bedouin spirituality, placing this new religion into the perspective of nomadic life, rejecting or ignoring those elements that did not fit within the existing psychological framework of life in the open desert. The spirituality of the Bedouin grew out of the geology and geography of its tribal habitats where base survival in an inescapable, unchanging climate served as a normative destiny. *"Austere as it was, Bedouin life*

### Bedouin circa 17<sup>th</sup> Century




*seemed inescapable. Western and northern Arabia offered only a few alternatives, mostly around small-scale agriculture and trade"*<sup>53</sup> The Sahara and its Sahel transition zone, however, were vastly larger than Arabia's Empty-Quarter where Bedouin life evolved over millennia. In the desert, mere survival is a spiritual act little related to the will of humans fortunate enough to still be amongst the living at the end of the day. The initial Bedouin spirituality exalted the timeless ethics of survival in desert nomad life, becoming a psychological ingroup to the competing sedentary outgroup. As the alternative to nomadic life took root, Bedouin spirituality took on a moral dimension of condemnation against the sedentary challenge to the idealization of fatalistic acceptance of what *dahr* (epochal time) would bring with certainty. If sedentary society could build towns, store water and food, create defences against the acquisition raid, then change was possible, a renunciation of spiritual forces

that had allowed desert dwellers to survive in the first place. Bedouin spiritual philosophy expresses itself most clearly in the:

*"...belief in the relative profanity of all subjective rearrangement of the norms of nature, norms from which the idea of a possibly different future is absent. This view is based in the feeling that unchosen frames of social existence possess a claim to timeless and superior stability that surpasses the claims to stability of frames of existence chosen during an individual lifespan."*<sup>54</sup>

It's not so much as the advent of Islam then that the Bedouin railed against, but rather the fundamental change in moral



**Figure 19** Bedouin (Arab Nomadic Pastoralist) Life in the Sahel – Arab Rizeigat men in Northern Darfur. They identified themselves as policemen, assigned to an Arab militia unit based in Misteriya.

<sup>52</sup> (Christian, 2016)

<sup>53</sup> (Bamyeh 1999, 53)

<sup>54</sup> (Bamyeh 1999, 62).



and leader responsibility for directing human life best left to the finitudes of dahr. The struggle between the evangelizers of universal Islam and the Bedouin identity as expressed by its prototypical society the badawah over the placement of Islam in Arab life continues, finding its way into most conflicts where Arab and Islam vie for primacy of salience.<sup>55</sup> This Bedouin identity harbours a tribal ethos that developed over millennia of severe deprivation which allowed the collective to survive.<sup>56</sup> This ethos can be likened to a hard shell made impenetrable from suffering and loss that is 'baked into' the archetypal identity of male masculinity that interfered with the evolution of peaceful Islam as the outward expression of this identity is a generationally transmitted trauma of what is called muruwah. "From the very beginning, Muhammad's religion was diametrically opposed to some of the essential principles of muruwah".<sup>57</sup> The primary jihad or struggle of Islam was always against the resistance of the Arab tribes to abandon their patrimonial muruwah and the hasab or tribal glory contained therein. Muruwah is a complex ideation of individual and group identity that evolved from generations of bitter subsistence survival in the open desert. The feelings of muruwah that shape Arab identity encompasses stoic suffering, chivalric codes of honour and rigid conduct meant to ensure the survival of their species and historical memory of their existence<sup>58</sup>. The two concepts of a peaceful application of Islam and the hold of Bedouin muruwah creates a cognitive dissonance in the placement of Islam as a subordinate feature of the tribe's Arab ethnicity, which has the effect of negating the universality of the Islamic social ordering force. This creates internal conflict because Islam is not merely a personal spiritual faith, but rather a complete reordering of social values, family hierarchy, and human relationships.<sup>59</sup> At the core of conflicts for these types of communities is change. Unwanted change from globalisation that intrudes into the core of their psychological identity; creates alienation of their ancient, constructed identity without any blueprint for how they could or should adapt. The alienation created conjugates to overwhelming collective episodes of shame that, unintegrated, erupt into a frenzied rage that blots out reason and drives genocidal murder. From a psychoanalytical perspective, the changes to their psychological identity at the archetypal level that threatens them with psychosocial disintegration and subsequent physical annihilation would predictively result in episodes of intense inter and intra communal violence that bystanders would assert to be irrational or insanity. This arguably emotional description is based on my 12-months of physical presence in this genocidal conflict in Darfur Sudan and the Ouaddaï Highlands in Chad. Each of the tribes involved in the Arc-of-Conflict in the Sahara and its Sahelian transition zone are beset by a cognitive dissonance that could be described as a 'Soul Wound' to borrow from the Native American Indians, which is an inability to adapt their nomadic, pastoral, warrior based psychosocial organisation to the vicissitudes of intrusive globalisation. This soul wound is created from change that a people are unable to integrate into their psychosocial reality. Generations of nomadic pastoralism, we believe, imprints epigenetic changes in both mind and body that help ensure survival in the most inhabitable geography/geology/climate in the Sahara and Sahel. Beyond this, nomadic



Figure 20 Psychosocial Motivations of Tribes in Chad

<sup>55</sup> (Christian, 2016; Christian et al., 2018)

<sup>56</sup> (Armstrong 2006) (Bamyeh 1999)

<sup>57</sup> (Armstrong 2006, 34)

<sup>58</sup> (Izutsu, 2002)

<sup>59</sup> (Lackner 2016).



pastoralists possess a narrative identity designed to secure them from alienation, shame, and psychological disintegration. Roughly restated, their narrative support went something like this. On the one hand, the nomadic Bedouin (*badawah*) looked inward to the lights of the city, the smell of the wadis and oasis, and reflection of wealth and safety that they might never attain. On the other hand, the settled elites (*hadarah*) of the clan and tribe looked outward to the desert as both wall around the safety of hadarah community, and smelled the freedom and nobility that their security and comfort had forfeited:

*“The ancestors’ way of life had been the nobler one, the life of tent-dwellers, often on the move. Nobility and freedom were inseparable, and the nomad was free. In the desert a man was conscious of being the lord of space, and in virtue of that lordship he escaped in a sense from the domination of time. But the townsman was a prisoner; and to be fixed in one place – yesterday, today, tomorrow – was to be a target for time, the ruiner of all things.”<sup>60</sup>*

Nomadic pastoralist peoples and families’ tribal identity is primary to their national identity as citizens of any political colonial state such as Chad. The former is far more powerful than the latter which is interpreted differently by tribe. Every tribe considers themselves to possess a sovereignty that no other tribe, nor the state, can infringe upon. Each tribe possesses a collective ownership of, and direct control over, its hereditary geographical habitation and the resources underneath such as soil, water, or (when allowed) energy. Land is used collectively to provide the means to its sustenance, development, and growth. To be without tribe is to be ‘*muhammashin*’, ‘*dhaif*’, and ‘*maskin*,’ without the means of survival.<sup>4F61</sup> The basic stratification of nomadic pastoralists is between those whose protection and social security is derived from their tribe and those who are dependent on the slowly developing state structures found predominantly in the large urban cities. For the former, the tribe is both the building block of society and a competitor to the central government. As a comparison to western jurisprudence and social structure, nomadic pastoralist’s think of their tribes as states, shaykhs & Amenokalen as governors, tribal law as social constitutions, and tribal militia to a home militia guard. While this is a very imperfect comparison, it does accurately reflect the psychosocial-emotional sentiment of tribes and their leaders. In pastoral nomadic society, men who can bear arms, and thus are able to protect themselves, are responsible for those who are considered ‘dependent’ and are therefore under the protection of others.<sup>62</sup> The emphasis is not so much on the weaponry, but on the social authority to protect and speak for others. Although women, children, and young unmarried men belong by birth to their respective social group, they are also considered ‘dependent’ and are under the protection of those with social authority. One does not join a tribe but must be born into it. WHERE a person is from matters only so much as it indicates WHO he/she is from. Children and adults from a broken Bayt are absorbed into the Habl, usually within the Qarya, and always within the Uzla.<sup>6F63</sup> People who were not born into one of the Uzla of the Qabila have no status, no existence within and could not join even if they tried to. As **figure 12** illustrates, tribal life is a closed social system. The Bayt and the Habl that it belongs to is beyond patriarchal. Except for the Kel Tamashek in the Valley of Azawad<sup>64</sup>, only men in tribal life can bear arms and thus wield authority of any type. Women, children, and land constitute a Qaabilah’s principal patrimony, wealth, and obligation, and his greatest source of alienation, shame, and identity disintegration.<sup>65</sup> For a nomadic Qabila, his ability to protect *and control* his women, children, and land is the basis of his social position which undergirds his male masculine identity.<sup>66</sup> Contrary to French sociologist Émile Durkheim’s<sup>67</sup> ideas about ‘primitive society’ - what he thought of as mechanical, repressive structures lacking moral cohesion - are sociocentric societies that depend on an external locus

<sup>60</sup> (Lings, 2006, p. 23)

<sup>61</sup> (ACAPS Thematic Report, 2020)

<sup>62</sup> (Cronin, 2013)

<sup>63</sup> (Schmitz, 2011)

<sup>64</sup> The Kel Tamashek, or Tuareg have a partial matriarchal society and in certain cases, women can become the leader of a family-clan-kel, with the right to bear arms and wage war.

<sup>65</sup> (Adra, 2006)

<sup>66</sup> The Arabic terms of Habl, Qarya, Uzla, Qabila, and others used here are not the only variations used by different Arabized nomadic pastoral tribes. Variations exist across the Arabian Peninsula, the Sahara, and the Sahel.

<sup>67</sup> (Durkheim, 2021; Gellner, 1975)



of member control. Durkheim's assumption that sociocentric societies (*which characterise the Sahelian nomadic pastoral tribes*) are lacking in morality was incorrect. Morality deeply infuses the sociocentric Arab person, perhaps more so than their egocentric counterpart. The sociocentric Arab father for instance, learns to live with the requirement to make painful and difficult choices between equally loved members of family; between the good of the one versus the good of the whole. The misunderstanding of morality in nomadic pastoral sociocentric society lies in the differing calculus of behaviour control of societal members – internal for the egocentric and external for the sociocentric. Where the egocentric member of society is consumed with individual decisions about moral thoughts and behaviour, the sociocentric member is consumed with a shared moral character that encompasses at a minimum, the nuclear family and maximally the entire tribe. The sociological construction of society based on an external member locus of control establishes vast and complex differences for the sociocentric family (from that of the egocentric) that is particularly susceptible to damage and rapid change. This greater vulnerability to damage in sociocentric families involves the requirement for group synchronization in thought and emotion as part of the process of making meaning and sustaining the ethos laden collective of shared individual identities. Using Durkheim's example of primitive morality, sociocentric family members determine right and wrong collectively, not individually – shame of alienation drives conformance rather than individual guilt socialized into the egocentric member. Even before any right or wrong act takes place, the family members interact with each other to form the basis for their shared individual morality, just as they do their shared individual identity. In such a communal structure, morality cannot be an individual ideation in the sociocentric society, dependent as it is on the collective for definition, context, and execution.<sup>68</sup>

#### §A4.1 Indigenous Mental Health in Arab Sociocentric Tribal Society.

From 2004 to 2021, I was a field researcher in Somalia, Sudan, Chad, Niger, Mali, Libya, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, conducting in-depth qualitative interviews of families and leaders of tribal societies in conflict. My assignments were to research the psychological and emotional drivers of civilian participation in extremism, violence, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. My focus direction was often drawn to indigenous mental health because behavioural radicalisation is a by-product of mental extremization, which is a form of psychological pathology. Nomadic pastoral tribes' conceptualisation of mental health uses metaphysical concepts that long predate western psychology's methodological ontology. Indigenous mental health conceptualisations also predate Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. This is central to all interactions with sociocentric societies whether tribal, nomadic, pastoralist, or subsistence hunter-gatherers. This lesson was reinforced for me during one interview of an elder of one of the clans in the Ha'il region. As we sat on a blanket and discussed his family's participation with rebel forces against their ethnic enemy, he pointed to the sky, where twin lines of jet contrails curved across the horizon. He then told me that we were watching "Jinns" or spirits flying across the sky, which he used to illustrate his story of human interaction with the metaphysical world. I naively attempted to inform my elder host that those white twin lines were from the engines of an aluminium tube with wings full of human beings and their luggage, flying several kilometres above the ground. His wrinkled face showed such incredulous contempt of my childish ignorance, that I never repeated that mistake.<sup>69</sup> Jinns are spirits that have interacted with mankind

"God divided the jinn and the humans into ten parts. One part makes up the human race, and the other nine parts is made up of the jinn." (El-Zein 2009, p.52)



Figure 21 pre-Islamic metaphysical beliefs enshrined into religious text

<sup>68</sup> (Christian, 2016)

<sup>69</sup> As I pondered this episode in my field research, I realized how improbable was my explanation of those twin white lines high in the noon sky must seem to that elderly man who was born in the first quarter of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century.



since the beginning of time.<sup>70</sup> Jinns work to comfort and console man in his darkest hour. Jinns also cater to, and excite man's imagination within art, music, purpose, and yes, sex.<sup>71</sup> Psychologically, Jinns serve an important mental

housekeeping function of trait dissociation, where socially unacceptable thoughts and feelings are cast outward onto a Jinn spirit, where it can be safely condemned and disavowed, without undue damage to the individual's ego-self. The dynamic and its necessity is culturally universal. The expression of this dynamic using spirits called Jinns is unique to Arabic and Arabic aligned cultural identity groups. The use of metaphysical 'Jinns' to explain mental health conditions such as bipolar, manic-depressive, schizophrenia, trauma, and others is a natural part of indigenous forms of mental and physical health. In practice, however, Arabized Muslim tribes' attempts to employ religiously based explanations often lead to an increase in harm to the already suffering victim. In other indigenous, non-Arab, tribes, my research has

### Elements of Jinn as symbolic object of Psychology

The Qur'an references Jinn and humans as the only two intelligent categories of beings on earth. Jinn are spiritual entities as opposed to humans who are physical entities.

The Prophet's divine message was intended for both humans and Jinn. Jinn, like humans, exist as lesser entities than angels or saints, but humans are God's vice-regents on earth.

The Jinn live in an unseen metaphysical world but work to influence the destinies of physical humans. (Qur'an 6:128-130).

In Arabic, each time the letters ج "jeem" and ن "noon" appear together as in jinn, the word will convey a meaning of hidden or invisible. Other examples include Jannah, as in paradise is Jannah because it is hidden from human sight, and Janin, hidden in the womb.

Figure 22 Psycholinguistic constructions of symbolic objects of psychological meaning

revealed extensive structures of indigenous health that rival western psychotherapy. From the Acholi people's Mato Oput ceremonies of justice and forgiveness to the Kel Tamashek peoples' spirit possession ceremonies that relieve guilt, shame, and reaffirm individual and collective subconscious identity, many indigenous communities have developed complex practices of maintaining communal mental health.<sup>72</sup> Arab cultural identity construction is based on ancient modes of austere socioeconomic life of Bedouin archetypes, a condition that was exaggerated-made real by its incorporation into the Qur'an and Hadith of the Islamic faith.<sup>73</sup> The centrality of the Bedouin archetype in Arab identity and its unavoidable incorporation into the Islamic faith are evidenced as much by Islamic conflict and violence as by normative Arab cultural expression. Even as the hadarah Arab tribes settled into villages and towns, creating economies, social structures, and the moral basis necessary to support the evolution of a sedentary identity, the badawah Arab tribes resisted. Despite the change of parts of clan and tribe from badawah to hadarah, both desert dweller and townsman retained ritual and tradition, formulated by millennia of time surviving in the desert. The sociological structures that allowed for life to develop without water, without agriculture, and without permanent abode required psychological conditions of fulfilment not found in other types of settled societies. The sociological structure of Bedouin life produces profound psychological emanations of ritual and tradition:

*"The theme of perpetual loss and ruin, as the 'substance' of this tradition resonated differently within Bedouin and sedentary societies. For the nomads, loss and dying were regular norms of nature; they needed no metaphysical camouflage, and the ode [spiritual poems of Arab Bedouin life] did not venture to offer any. Only the language of mourning itself mitigated the loss."*<sup>74</sup>




Figure 23 Jinniyah as mechanisms of (negative) trait dissociation

<sup>70</sup> (El-Zein 2009, p.52)  
<sup>71</sup> (Sunderland, 1983; Turner, n.d.; White, 2010)  
<sup>72</sup> (Christian, 2015b, 2020)  
<sup>73</sup> (El-Zein, 2009)  
<sup>74</sup> (Bamyeh, 1999) Page 53



The spirituality of the Bedouin grew out of the geology and geography of its tribal habitats where base survival in an inescapable, unchanging climate served as a normative destiny.<sup>75</sup><sup>76</sup> Thus, even though many Zaghawa and Arab families in Chad are mostly hadarah, or sedentary, a significant portion of their cultural identity remains based on the individualist, survivalist, nomadism of the Bedouin. Their collective identity exists in a steady state of tension between enlightened Islam and *badawah*, where male masculine identity involves a rejection of weakness and an embrace of alternate spirituality of the illogical metaphysical spirit world that rules man's inner psychological self.<sup>77</sup> The complexity of nomadic pastoralist tribes' struggle with cultural identity archetypes drawn from austere survivalist Bedouin life can be thought of or explained as the generational transmission of trauma, a 'pierced/altered reality' that is out of place and time in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. This generational trauma of Bedouin survivalist is the reason for much of the family and tribal conflict in the peninsula, which is exacerbated by intrusive globalisation and malign external actors seeking to influence behaviour within vulnerable members and families. Even in the absence of external intrusions, the clash of the sacred (*badawah*) and the profane (*hadarah*) are infused with a life-or-death ideation that energises resulting family pathologies. Family members 'must comply' with ancient archetypes of thought and prototypes of behaviour if the family-tribal identity is to survive. This same identity has resisted change by Islam, modernisation, and now, globalisation of thought and mental health. Within nearly all of Africa's Sahara and Sahel regions and the Arabian Peninsula, tribal affiliation and affinity is as strong as ever and rising.

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<sup>75</sup> (Dickson & R. Wilson, 1983)

<sup>76</sup> (al-Dawsari, 2012)

<sup>77</sup> (Burge, 2012)



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