The Political Means of Population Control in Iran

The Political Means of Population Control in Iran.

The physical means of the regime’s control of the population is most directly asserted by Ettala’at, IRGC, Basij, Faraja, & Morality Police through the intrusion into every aspect of human life in Iran – physical and psychological. The Ettala’at is the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence & Security (MOIS) and its minister reports directly to the Supreme Leader. The regime goes to great lengths to insert the power of the Ettala’at into all parts of social, political, economic, religious, and social life of the family and of the individual. Their goal is to create a mental object of terror at the thought of coming to their attention. The authority of the Ettala’at is absolute and only the Ayatollah Khamenei can overrule the MOIS, Esmail Khatib. Minister Khatib’s Ettala’at employs terror, torture, & extra-judicial killings to enforce the regime’s social order in Iran. The UK Home Office’s Independent Advisory Group on Country-of-Origin Information (IAGCI), under the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration at Globe House in London, publishes relevant and timely information on many of the countries where serious threats to the health and survival of vulnerable minorities. The most recent published report was version 4, released in May of 2022. This IAGCI report describes an ongoing pattern of extra-judicial killings, torture, executions, and generalized terrorizing of Iranian families that is far outside of acceptable United Nations treatments of any citizens. This UK IAGCI report is laden with number and statistics regarding the brutality that Iranians face daily, however there is little about the plight of women. Even amongst families who are unconnected in any way to anti regime activities, there is anxiety and dread. In part, this is because Iranian societies (Kurdish, Persian, Azeri, Balochi, and Arab) are tightly knit with family and clan/tribal relationships remaining close through multiple generations removed; nearly everyone in these population segments has a sibling, cousin, uncle, or aunt, however distantly removed, that they know are in one of the many resistance movements. Regime security forces hold families of socio-political and militant activists’ hostage, threatening them with arrest and imprisonment or forcing them to trick their family members into returning to arrest and execute them.

---

“Close family members, such as spouses, children, parents, or siblings are more likely to be subject to arrest. In some cases, the authorities have arrested extended family members, because they were in touch with the politically active individual outside of the country.”

“The Iranian government relies on extracting information from family members, in order for the family members to put pressure on the political party member or supporter. One source stated that if the authorities are aware that a person is a family member to a political party member, s/he is at risk of being subjected to torture.”

---

Even the types of charges that activists and their families are charged with appear designed to incite terrorizing dread. The charge of Efsad-e fel-arz involves the nebulous allegation of ‘spreading corruption on Earth.’ The charge of Baghy, or rebellion against the State, can be anything that the regime says it is. IranWire reports that there is an increase of pressure tactics on the families of civil and human rights activists in the Iranian border provinces of Kurdistan. In recent weeks, the parents of Iranians whose children are living in Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan have been summoned by the regime’s security agencies and told to contact their children and convince or trick them to return home to Iran, where they are arrested. A New Generation of Basiji. Iran has stepped up its operations to recruit young people to protect the Islamic Republic, many of them children, using some of the country's most powerful resources, including sophisticated propaganda campaigns. Significant work to bring in young fighters is done by the Students’ Basij Force, and Iran's leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has praised young students willing to put themselves on the frontline, and the teachers who have encouraged them. He and other senior officials have publicly said that students should be regarded as a vital part of Iran’s able fighting force. But statistics reveal that more than half of the student population are of elementary-school-age and are less than 12 years old. Speaking to a group of teachers, Khamenei said, “Over 36,000 of our students were martyred during the sacred defense [the Iran-Iraq war, from 1980 to 1988]. If it wasn't for the warm spirit of the teachers, it would not have been possible for the students to go to the frontline in all circumstances. This honour belongs to teachers."

Former minister of education Mohammed Battaei has stated that the student population should be seen as a reflection of the country’s military capacity. Nine months ago, he said: "We now have 14 million students who, despite all the cultural invasions we have had, will be at the ready and, if necessary, will sacrifice their lives, just like the sacred defense."

During the years of 2019 to 2021, we conducted primary field research into the psychosocial conditions of Iran’s population segments. One of these, university students, offered good insight into how the population thinks about, or understands the strange system of faux political participation in Iran and its repressive system of governance. The students interviewed were from the University of Tehran, University of Esfahan, University of Mashhad, University of Shiraz, and the University of Tabriz. As a respondent target audience, the students expressed their pragmatism about the constraints on elected presidential power, by the clerical overseers of Iran and the IRGC enforcers of internal control in Iran. Nearly every interviewee said that the law enforcement structures of police and Basij are seen by the students as predatory organizations that work to extract wealth out of the majority unprotected social groups.

Their understanding of the interrelated nature of the political class of reformist and principalist ideologies that often overlap on many issues, while diverging-by-degrees on far fewer issues than their polar positions would indicate. “Principalists and reformists can’t agree on anything; it’s like they think their fight is a fight between good and evil.”

While the students usually vote overwhelmingly for the Reformist candidate, they understand that they do so only because he will be the lesser of two bad choices. The principalist candidate in the 2018 election was hardliner Ebrahim Raisi, then the Chief Justice of the Iran Supreme Court and Ayatollah Khamanei’s choice. He was beaten by the Reformist candidate, Hassan Rouhani, whose ability to open political space for social reform coincided with USA President Trump’s hard turn against Iran and reimplementation of sanctions. The following quote from one university student seems to sum up the collective attitude of the target audience to Rouhani’s presidency: “To be honest, I don’t think Rouhani is the best option, but I’m still glad he won. I dread to think what would have happened if Raisi had become our president.” Ultimately, Rouhani had no liberalising effect during his tenure, with little change in the amount or depravity of the violence. During Hassan Rouhani’s tenure as president of the clerical regime, more than 1,800 people were executed and thousands more subjected to torture and inhumane punishments such as amputation, flogging in public and being paraded in streets. In the 2021 election, Rouhani was defeated by Raisi in a closely controlled election that ensured the Ayatollah’s preferred candidate won. Iranian President Raisi was recently killed in a helicopter crash and the Ayatollah has directed the Assembly of Experts to move the presidential election from 2025 to 2024, on June 28th. A total of 80 candidates have registered to participate in the election, however, as in 2021, the 12-strong Guardian Council will invalidate most of the reformist and moderate figures in favour of candidates approved by the Ayatollah. Sources suggest that Ayatollah Khamanei’s son, Mujtaba, may be next in line for first, the presidency, followed by his elevation to Ayatollah. The Ayatollah and his Assembly of Experts (who elects the Ayatollah and will elect a replacement president for the deceased Raisi, are facing a difficult situation. Raisi was a leading candidate for Ayatollah on the death of Khamanei. If the Ayatollah dies before a new president has been elected, the country may potentially plunge into nationwide unrest.

The 2022-2023 nationwide “Woman, Life, Freedom” uprising, continues in full despite brutal repression by the IRGC. Unrest is beginning to be observed in some of the more loyal population segments because of Iran’s ongoing decrepit economic situation that has pushed over sixty percent of Iranians into poverty. Since the Guardian Council announced the registration for candidates, the reformist coalition has stated that if one of their selected candidates is not permitted to run by the Guardian Council, they will boycott the election as they have previously. The Guardian Council, however, decides who will run as principalist candidates and who will run as reformist candidates.