Activism, Freedom, and Punishment in Russian Federation

Activism, Freedom, and Punishment in Russian Federation.

Political repression in Russia is now, in some respects, more extensive than it was in the late Soviet period. The implausibility of many accusations and the growing number of convictions on political charges increasingly recall the Stalin era. Under strict anti-dissent laws, protests are effectively illegal, and the authorities have been especially severe in suppressing rallies supporting opposition parties or public figures. In the capital, the authorities routinely warn citizens not to attend such gatherings. Anyone wishing to hold a demonstration must first obtain official permission.

Technically, “one-person pickets” remain legal, but any perceived violation of Moscow’s war-censorship laws is immediately punished. Introduced in March 2022, these laws prohibit criticism of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. Citizens may speak of the federation’s “special military operation,” but not of a “war.” The censorship regime is both broad and highly specific. The law most frequently used against critics of the war is the criminal offence of spreading “deliberately false information” about the Russian army. The new censorship laws were rushed through parliament shortly after the invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov justified it as “urgently needed because of the absolutely unprecedented information war waged against our country.”

Recent cases under these laws include punishment for wearing clothing in the blue and yellow colours of the Ukrainian flag, writing anti-war slogans on cakes, dyeing one’s hair blue and yellow, listening to Ukrainian music, displaying anti-war posters ranging from “No War” to eight asterisks—the number of letters in the Russian phrase for “No War”— or even holding up a blank sheet of paper. One man was fined for wearing blue-and yellow shoes, which the authorities treated as a violation of laws regulating political demonstrations. A journalist from Vologda region, Antonida Smolina, came under police and FSB investigation after someone reported photographs she posted online showing her in a yellow coat against a blue sky. These and similar acts are treated as felony “discreditation” of the Russian armed forces and may carry sentences of up to 15 years’ imprisonment.

Other prohibited acts include “disrespect” toward the authorities and calls for sanctions against the country. Enforcement applies regardless of status or prominence. Even clergy are not exempt. A village priest in Kostroma region was fined for discrediting the armed forces after praying for peace and citing the sixth commandment, “Thou shalt not kill.” These laws triggered an exodus of independent media and activists beyond the federation’s reach and intensified the suppression of anti-war dissent. Although people in Russia continued to protest the war throughout 2022 and 2023, the authorities have sought to eliminate such activity altogether. The scope of the laws is also widening. On 27 February 2024, for example, the human rights activist Oleg Orlov was imprisoned for what a Moscow court described as his “hatred of traditional values.” Political and social repression now appears to be taking on an ideological intensity not seen since the Stalinist purges.

In 2023, both the number and the length of prison sentences for anti-war social media posts increased. In 2024, a new law authorised the confiscation of property from people charged under the war-censorship provisions. Another major instrument of repression is the federation’s “foreign agents” legislation, which allows the authorities to impose severe restrictions on real or perceived critics without securing a criminal conviction. Individuals and organisations that scrutinise government policy may be targeted if they are deemed to have received money from abroad—even from relatives—or simply to be under “foreign influence” because of personal, family, or professional ties outside the country.

Once labelled, they must attach the designation to all public communications, a practice designed to destroy trust and reminiscent of the Soviet branding of dissidents as “enemies of the people.” A resident investigated or labelled as a “foreign agent” or “undesirable” may find it impossible to rent an apartment, study, obtain employment, or receive support from any level of government. In effect, such persons become administrative non-persons. Those under investigation for censorship offences, disrespect toward the authorities, political activism, or foreign-agent status have also lost meaningful access to legal defence. Court-registered lawyers who take such cases are increasingly investigated themselves for assisting enemies of the state. The Ministry of Internal Affairs has even created a wanted list of lawyers alleged to be helping citizens accused of extremism or of facilitating extremist activity.

There is no real accounting of the numbers of federation citizens who have been arrested, abducted, or otherwise prosecuted as there is no reporting from the country-of-origin. Monitoring groups are reporting individual arrests in smaller cities across Russia, from the border city of Belgorod to Vorkuta, an Arctic mining outpost once a centre of the Stalin-era gulag labour camps, to Nizhny Novgorod, Krasnodar, Rostov-on-Don and Tver.“