Violent conflict conditions in Chad

Violent conflict conditions in Chad.

Violent conflict conditions in Chad are driven by interlocking dynamics of national political competition, armed rebellions, intercommunal resource warfare, Darfur conflict spillover, and state repression:

National Power Competition and "Winner-Takes-All" Governance: Since independence, Chad has experienced recurring conflict between the Christian and Animist sedentary farming communities of the south (such as the Sara) and the Muslim pastoralist or semi-nomadic groups of the north and center (such as the Toubou, Zaghawa, and Arabs). Control over the central government in N'Djamena represents an epicenter of "winner-takes-all" political competition, as it grants direct authority over foreign petroleum revenues (accounting for 50% of GDP) and international donor funding (making up 25% of GDP). National power has historically shifted through military coups d'etat and armed overthrows, such as Hissene Habre seizing power from southern leadership and Idriss Deby subsequently overthrowing Habre in 1990.

Northern Armed Rebellions and Regime Threats: The ruling Zaghawa-led regime of the Deby family (governed by Idriss Deby for three decades and currently by his son, General Mahamat Idriss Deby) faces persistent existential threats from northern armed opposition movements. The principal rebel movements include the Toubou-led Front pour l'Alternance et la Concorde au Tchad (FACT) and the Conseil de commandement militaire pour le salut de la republique (CCMSR), which maintain bases in northern Chad's Tibesti region and southern Libya. In April 2021, FACT fighters killed President Idriss Deby during clashes, after which General Mahamat Deby assumed power, dissolved the constitution, and initiated severe retaliatory measures targeting the families and relatives of FACT members with mass detentions.

Eastern Intercommunal and Agro-Pastoral Warfare: In central and eastern provinces (including Ouaddai, Sila, Wadi Fira/Dar Tama, and Lake Fitri), severe intercommunal violence pits indigenous African Muslim farming communities (such as the Maba, Bilala, Lisi, and Tama) against nomadic or semi-nomadic Arab Baggara/Abbala and Zaghawa pastoralists. Driven by environmental desertification that forces herders into southern farmlands, these disputes involve crop destruction, land seizures, and deep identity-based friction ("Arab-white" vs. "African-black"). These clashes have escalated into an "arms race" utilizing military-grade weapons, leaving hundreds of civilians dead, torched villages, and forcing local agricultural communities to form self-defense militias (such as clashes in Tileguey in 2024 and Ouaddaï in 2025–2026).

Darfur Civil War Spillover and Transnational Militia Attacks: The multi-decade genocidal war in Darfur, Sudan, routinely crosses the border into the Ouaddai highlands of eastern Chad. State-backed Sudanese Arab militias (Janjaweed / RSF) conduct cross-border raids against African farming communities (Fur, Masalit, Maba), driving hundreds of thousands of refugees into Chadian border camps. Transnational tribal ties further fuel the conflict: Chadian Zaghawa fighters align with Sudanese non-Arab rebel movements like the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), while Arab pastoralist herds and armed groups move across the border in continuous cycles of retaliatory raids.

State Repression, Impunity, and Security Force Abuses: The Chadian state operates primarily to protect regime survival and elite monopolies over resources rather than providing broad public protection. State security agencies (such as the army, police, and gendarmerie) routinely employ excessive force, live ammunition, extrajudicial beatings, and arbitrary mass arrests against peaceful political protesters and civil society groups. For instance, a crackdown on anti-government protests in 2021 resulted in at least 20 fatalities and 849 arrests, while security forces killed 11 people with live ammunition during January 2022 demonstrations in Abeche. Local populations deeply distrust state authorities, reporting that officials and security personnel frequently act with impunity and demonstrate favoritism toward herders or regime-aligned clans.